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Introduction to Wonder,  
Education, and Human Flourishing
Anders Schinkel
Introduction
T oday is Thursday, 28 May 2020, just over a year since the conference Won-der, Education, and Human Flourishing was held in Amsterdam, selected papers of which appear in revised and edited form in this volume. Back 
then I certainly did not anticipate that a year later I would be working from 
home for months on end as a result of measures taken to control the spread of 
a virus. In the Netherlands, as in most other countries across the world, many 
aspects of ‘ordinary’ life came to a grinding halt somewhere between December 
2019 and April 2020 (with many countries now slowly starting to emerge from 
their self-imposed ‘lockdowns’). Part of this was something virtually unpre-
cedented since the introduction of compulsory schooling: in many countries, 
schools closed their doors, literally but to some extent also figuratively, and 
education continued at home, with schools offering support in varying degrees 
through online contact. As a result, education became the responsibility of par-
ents to a much greater extent than before.
One of the most striking aspects – to me, at least – of the impact of COVID-
19 on the educational sector in my country, the Netherlands, is the overriding 
concern, in all levels of education, with the continuity of education – with how 
to arrange this practically and how to ensure that ‘vulnerable’ students in par-
ticular do not fall behind, or further behind. Thus, concern with potentially 
increasing inequality between students is simply the other side of the same 
coin. Although the situation triggered a flurry of opinion pieces, reflection on 
at least two things is still conspicuously lacking. The first thing barely reflected 
on is the existing social inequality that has been around long before this pan-
demic, which we apparently consider normal, or the fact that it is by and large 













































tion from this ‘normality’. But as David Sclar, history teacher at a New Jersey 
private school, rightly observes: “However this plays out in the sort of immedi-
ate effects to people, really all it does is demonstrate the profound inequality 
that already exists in this society.” (Maxouris and Yu 2020). Only in an already 
grossly unequal situation can a few months without physical school attendance 
give legitimate cause for concern (and arguably such concern is most legitimate 
where the problem is not just missing out on a few months of schooling, but 
having to go without school meals or having to spend all of one’s time in an 
unsafe home environment). And what should we think of the role of schools 
in this context? If one of the crucial functions of primary schools, for instance, 
is now revealed to be one of mitigating some of the worst (and otherwise most 
visible) aspects of structural social inequality, how can it be that the education 
system is still widely regarded as one of our strongest weapons against inequal-
ity? Should we not be more concerned about the role the education system as a 
whole plays in maintaining that inequality (see, for instance, Merry 2020)?
The second type of reflection largely absent from the debate on education 
during and after COVID-19 is the type fed by the wonder that the current crisis 
undoubtedly has evoked in many people across the world – a wonder at human 
beings, at human societies, and at particular societies and their ingrained habits 
and unquestioned assumptions. Again, the overwhelming emphasis in educa-
tion is on continuation of the ‘normal’ – or else on so-called ‘innovations’ that 
speed up the normal or make it more efficient, for instance by moving ‘educa-
tion’ online –one of the ‘opportunities’ we are supposed to thank the crisis for. 
The unprecedented intrusion of the state in the private lives of many people 
– an intrusion that may be justified (to the extent that it can be justified) by 
the fact that these lives are not just private – has thrown into high relief what 
many of us normally take for granted: freedom of movement, freedom to meet 
friends and family, personal safety and security, and more generally, the more 
or less smooth running of the whole ‘system’. At the same time, this intrusion 
has served as a reminder of the otherwise much less visible power of the state 
(as well as demonstrating its relative powerlessness, of course, in the face of 
this type of threat). The crisis has also exposed very clearly many problematic 
aspects of our current global economic system: skies were suddenly blue again, 
free of smog and vapour trails; the spread of the virus owed much to human-
ity’s unchecked intrusion into wild nature and deeply unethical relationship 
with animals and the non-human world in general, as well as to the volume 
of global movement of people and goods; not being able to go shopping or 
go on holiday abroad or at home was a big ‘frustration’ for many of us; many 
countries’ economies depend greatly or almost entirely on luxury consump-













































for life and even for living well; and so on and so forth. In short, the crisis trig-
gered a kind of alienation (deepened, I think, by the ‘shadow’ that appeared to 
hang over everything), a sense of distance from normal life, a defamiliarisation 
of the familiar – something that is also an aspect of wonder (Egan 2014), and 
that in this case may well precede or lead (one) to wonder.
‘Education’ does not depend on schools alone. When and where did we get 
that idea, that it can happen only or mostly between the virtual or material 
walls of the school? It would be foolish to suggest, as some ‘innovators’ like to 
do, that the school is a fossil, an outdated institution. There is great value in the 
type of learning it makes possible precisely because it is in a sense ‘separate’ or 
at a distance from the world and everyday life (Masschelein and Simons 2013). 
But life educates as well, and for such reasons as sketched above the outbreak 
of the novel coronavirus can be a significant life experience for children and 
adults alike. However, this can only happen if we allow ourselves time to stop 
and simply observe. What is happening? What am I seeing? How do I feel about 
this? And what does this mean for me? This requires that we give ourselves 
‘pause’, the pause in thought that wonder entails (Lloyd, this volume). The 
crisis may easily lead to wonder’s ‘shock of awareness’ (Hadzigeorgiou, this 
volume) about many aspects of life, but we must take care not to run it over or 
rush past it in a hasty effort to re-establish ‘normality’.
It saddens me to see how many people – not least in academia – seize upon 
the crisis as an opportunity for self-promotion, to gain influence or to attract 
money. (But perhaps I am naïve and just not sufficiently aware of how the crisis 
may have the opposite effect for those who ‘fail’ to do so.) However, in terms of 
education, the crisis does hold an ‘opportunity’ that would be a shame to waste. 
If, as Dewey and Buber maintained, education centrally involves mediation, 
in the sense that the educator selects what of the world the child encounters 
(Dewey 1965, 27-28; Buber 1962, 23; see Schinkel 2019a), and if – as is surely 
the case – the crisis itself also singles out certain aspects of life and the world 
as particularly significant, then we should not be too hasty to get back to the 
planned curriculum. Instead, we should take the time to see what we can learn 
from the situation, and beyond that, how we may deal with the difficulties it 
brings with it, be shaped by it, and hopefully in the long term grow as human 
beings as a result of how we deal with it.
But pausing, taking time, deviating from plans – these terms do not 
describe our current education systems. Teachers in many cases may want to do 
all of these things, but the system hardly allows it, being geared towards effi-
ciency, routine, speed and accountability (Cant 2014; Trotman 2014; d’Agnese, 
this volume; Gilbert, this volume). ‘Intrinsic motivation’ is a buzzword in edu-
cational practice and educational and psychological research – it is hardly an 
10 exaggeration to say that it is currently considered the Holy Grail of education 
– and ‘curiosity’, too, is quite welcome in this literature, and so is ‘interest’ (see, 
for example, Niemic and Ryan 2009; Kashdan and Silvia 2009). But despite its 
close connection to these issues, the concept of wonder is still not getting the 
attention it deserves in educational research, theory and practice. A hopeful 
sign is that wonder is enjoying increasing attention, not least thanks to Yannis 
Hadzigeorgiou’s work in science education (e.g., Hadzigeorgiou 2001; 2012; 
2016; Hadzigeorgiou and Garganourakis 2010), Kieran Egan’s work on ‘imagi-
native education’ and ‘romantic understanding’ (Egan 1990; 1997; 2001) and 
Kieran Egan, Annabella Cant and Gillian Judson’s excellent edited volume 
Wonder-Full Education: The Centrality of Wonder in Teaching and Learning across the 
Curriculum (Egan, Cant and Judson 2014). The current volume hopes to add to 
and build on this with further theoretical reflection and empirical research on 
the interconnections between wonder, education and human flourishing, on 
the nature and development of wonder, and on how to stimulate wonder in 
education.
Wonder, education, and human flourishing
T he conference from which this book has sprung was based on the prem-ise that there are strong interconnections between wonder, education and human flourishing; and more specifically, on the premise that won-
der can make a significant difference to how well one’s education progresses 
and how well one’s life goes.
Those latter things, education and life, and flourishing in life, are of course 
also connected in various ways (see Moore in this volume). It is obvious that 
education, and in most societies today this means formal education, or school-
ing, generally speaking promotes human flourishing simply because, if a 
student completes their education successfully, they receive the paper proof of 
that success, which is almost indispensable to get anywhere in life. (Though of 
course one can very well get somewhere without flourishing.) But in another 
sense of the term education is also connected with human flourishing due to 
what it is. If we understand education as a process in which one’s relation to 
and outlook on the world is changed through wider and deeper understanding 
of it, a process that also includes the acquisition of a sense of the richness and 
multifariousness that the world is, and of capacities to appreciate this – if we 
understand education in this way, rather than as schooling per se or any other 
attempt at education (thus understood) – then clearly to be educated is closely 












































11To flourish as a human being, as I understand it here, means that one lives a 
subjectively and objectively meaningful and worthwhile life, in which valu-
able human and personal potential is actualised and can find expression (see 
De Ruyter 2004; 2007; White 2011; Kristjánsson 2020). The normative concept 
of education used above implies what Peters called ‘the transmission of what is 
worth-while’ (1970, 45) and is for that reason alone tied in with the notion and 
reality of human flourishing. But it is worth fleshing this out a bit more. Is it 
possible for a person to lead a flourishing life without both an adequate under-
standing of at least those aspects of the world most relevant to her life and a 
sense of the possibilities the world holds for her (i.e. a sense of what is possible, 
and more specifically what is possible for her)? Obviously, a lot depends on the 
exact meaning, charge, and weight given to each of the terms in this question. 
When are we prepared to say that a person leads a flourishing life rather than 
a decent or pleasant life? What counts as an adequate understanding? What is 
relevant? And so on. I am not going to attempt to pin these notions down here; 
it suffices to note that unless we set the bar for flourishing extremely low it will 
inevitably involve a more than superficial understanding of at least one’s most 
important domains of functioning and an ability to appreciate qualitative dif-
ferences in those domains (i.e. to distinguish better from worse, more from less 
important). Furthermore, it is perfectly plausible that a person could be said to 
lead a flourishing life due, in large part, to her personally and objectively mean-
ingful and successful engagement in teaching; but it is hard to see how this 
could be true if this person were unable to experience teaching both affectively 
and cognitively as remarkable, i.e. to be ‘fully aware’ of the reality of teaching at 
least occasionally, rather than permanently submerged in its routine.
If this makes sense, we have stumbled upon at least one link between won-
der and human flourishing here: wonder creates a reflective distance to its 
object that enables both reflection (and therefore the imaginative considera-
tion of alternative possibilities; see Pedersen’s first contribution to this volume, 
as well as Pedersen 2019) and deeper appreciation. To experience wonder is to 
experience a combination of puzzlement and a sense of importance. In wonder 
one’s attention is arrested by something that puzzles or mystifies (and some-
times surprises) one, yet at the same time appears worthy of one’s attention for 
its own sake (Schinkel 2017; 2020). Wonder can take various forms – it can be 
more or less ‘inquisitive’ (involving a drive to solve one’s puzzlement through 
understanding and explanation), more or less aesthetic, more or less joyful, 
more or less unsettling, and it can be close to awe and even (though this is fur-
ther from our usual contemporary understanding of wonder) lead on to fear 
or dread (see Quinn 2002, Rubenstein 2011 and Vasalou 2015). But it always 












































12 giou’s terms – see this volume – ‘aporia’ and ‘thaumazein’, puzzlement and 
admiration), and that means it always involves both a strong awareness of 
the limits of one’s understanding and a heightened interest in the world. 
And because of this, wonder’s educational importance and its importance for 
human flourishing cannot be underestimated.
Understanding, as well as being aware of what one does not understand, 
may be said to generally contribute to human flourishing indirectly or instru-
mentally, by enabling one to secure goods that are constitutive of flourishing 
or prevent the loss of such goods; or directly, if they are seen as (aspects of) 
constitutive elements of human flourishing. In practice the distinction may 
be difficult to make, since flourishing depends on how we deal (and are for-
tunate enough to be capable of dealing) with the human condition, and our 
striving for understanding is a response to, and inextricable from, that same 
human condition (see Cuypers’ interpretation of Peters’ work in Cuypers 2012). 
We should also acknowledge the possibility that being or becoming ‘educated’ 
may detract from flourishing. Aldo Leopold wrote: “One of the penalties of an 
ecological education is that one lives alone in a world of wounds.” (Leopold 
1966, 197; cited in Orr 2004, 22). Still, it seems that the task of education may 
be summarised as one of opening up the world, and that human flourishing 
is in large part a matter of opening up to and being meaningfully connected 
with the world; and wonder epitomises that openness to the world, shows us 
the world as worthy of remark, and in many cases supports our efforts to find 
meaning and value in our lives (Fuller 2006; Schinkel 2019b). Last but not least, 
despite the common association of wonder with passivity, wonder may also 
inform and inspire action that helps improve our own lives and those of others 
(Lloyd 2018; also this volume). These connections – between wonder and edu-
cation, wonder and human flourishing, and between all three – thus deserve 
further attention, which they receive, from both philosophical and empirical 
points of view, in the present volume.
Overview of chapters
T he book is divided into three parts. Part I: The Importance of Wonder in Education and for Human Flourishing contains three chapters. In Chapter 1, Vasco d’Agnese engages with the problem that the neoliberal mind-
set and discourse that dominates educational policy and practice globally is, 
its own rhetorics notwithstanding, a conservative and closed mindset, lacking 
in wonder; and d’Agnese sees wonder, and a wonder-inspired pedagogy, as a 












































13and Arendt, he argues for wonder in education as something that helps students 
“face the ungraspable, the radically new, the unfathomable”. In confronting 
neoliberal educational discourse d’Agnese makes a powerful case for the impor-
tance of wonder in education and for living a rich and meaningful life.
Chapter 2 is an original exploration by Jan B.W. Pedersen of the contribu-
tion of wonder to human flourishing. After introducing the philosophy of 
wonder and the philosophy of human flourishing and its history, Pedersen 
discusses the connection between wonder and human flourishing through 
three lenses: individuality (or personal identity), relations and the political. 
In each case, through vivid examples, Pedersen argues that wonder “plays an 
important role in human flourishing because it takes wonder to discover how 
we might flourish as the kinds of creatures we are”.
In Chapter 3, Joseph Moore argues for human flourishing as an aim of 
education in two senses: because we have strong reason to promote people’s 
flourishing, and because education can promote flourishing, we also have 
strong reason to educate people; furthermore, because whether and to what 
extent education promotes flourishing depends on how we educate people, 
our reasons to promote flourishing are also reasons to educate people in a par-
ticular way. Moore argues that education should be as general as is feasible, 
expose people to a wide variety of valuable activities, and not be limited to 
formal education. He concludes by offering three reasons why, in light of the 
fact that we have strong reason to educate for flourishing, educators also have 
reason to try to instil wonder in students.
Part II: Conceptual Explorations and Theoretical Perspectives contains four chap-
ters, three philosophical and one from the perspective of developmental 
psychology. Genevieve Lloyd’s Chapter 4 draws out the educational implica-
tions of Spinoza’s view of wonder, a view that, as Lloyd argues, played a pivotal 
role in the history of the construal of wonder, and elements of which are worth 
recovering. For Spinoza wonder arises when the mind is confronted with 
something for which it has no comparison and therefore comes to a halt. This 
is a productive moment, for it provides “an impetus to finding alternative ways 
forward”. Wonder thus plays a crucial role in life and therefore also in educa-
tion – not least in civic education.
In Chapter 5, Sophia Vasalou focuses on a particular type of wonder, namely 
‘cosmic’ or ‘existential’ wonder, a type of wonder that, as she notes, finds quin-
tessential expression in the question: “Why is there something instead of 
nothing?” People are often led to this type of wonder by philosophical argu-
ment, or in a way that is mediated by such argument; does that mean that 
cosmic wonder is “only as good as the reasoning that produced it”? Is cosmic 












































14 Vasalou’s subtle and captivating investigation leads the reader to wonder at 
wonder and to a “celebration of our capacity to think”.
While Vasalou’s chapter already included some references to Wittgenstein’s 
reflections on wonder, Chapter 6 focuses on the world, and the limits of lan-
guage and understanding. In this chapter, David Erlich links Wittgenstein’s 
‘acceptance of wonder’ as an expression of, and our relation with, the unsayable 
and an experience of absolute value with Buber’s description of the I-You rela-
tionship. Erlich then goes on to discuss how education can promote wonder as 
an ethical openness to the World and to the Other, drawing on both philoso-
phers’ educational writings as well as their experience as educators.
The final chapter of Part II, Chapter 7, by Marina Bazhydai and Gert West-
ermann, constitutes an important addition of another kind to the extant 
literature on wonder. They review the state of cognitive developmental 
research on curiosity, wonder and creativity, focusing in particular on method-
ological considerations. They propose that the links between curiosity, wonder 
and creativity are highly complex, cross-fertilising and non-linear. Bazhydai 
and Westermann offer suggestions for future research using laboratory-based 
experimental studies, in particular highlighting the benefits of longitudinal 
research in order to understand the interrelations between curiosity, wonder 
and creativity as they unfold developmentally. Finally, they propose ways to 
develop effective educational interventions to foster these capacities.
Part III: Studying Wonder Empirically and Promoting Wonder in Education appro-
priately contains as many chapters as Parts I and II together. The seven chapters 
of this part contain a wealth of ideas and educational strategies to promote 
wonder in education as well as teacher education. Yannis Hadzigeorgiou leads 
the way in Chapter 8 with a rich discussion of the nature of wonder and its role 
in the learning process – a discussion based not just on philosophical engage-
ment with the subject, but also on many years of practical experience and 
empirical research. After an illuminating discussion of the concept of wonder, 
Hadzigeorgiou discusses no less than thirteen features of wonder and their 
pedagogical implications. This chapter and the work it synthesises thus con-
stitute an invaluable resource for anyone interested in promoting wonder in 
education.
Chapter 9, by Andrew Gilbert, is likewise informed by empirical research, 
but looks at wonder from a different but no less important angle: that of the 
education of teachers. Gilbert reports on an instrumental case study of two 
beginning teachers throughout their student teaching experience and into 
their first year in the classroom. In his case study, Gilbert aimed to find out 
how these beginning teachers’ experiences with wonder and a wonder-infused 












































15ond question addressed in the study and in the present chapter concerns the 
internal and external challenges these teachers had to overcome when they 
themselves tried to introduce a wonder-infused pedagogy, as well as the sup-
port they received from their educational communities.
In Chapter 10, Valentine Ngalim and Fomutar Stanislaus explore the poten-
tial of African traditional pedagogy for the promotion of critical and creative 
thinking skills. From a Western viewpoint, the use of proverbs, riddles and 
folktales may at first sight not seem conducive to such thinking. Ngalim and 
Stanislaus, however, offer a challenging and plausible argument that African 
oral traditions, due to the flexibility, ambiguity and openness of the narratives 
they employ, harbour a strong potential to provoke wonder and, in its wake, 
creative and critical thinking.
Laura D’Olimpio, in Chapter 11, asks how we can educate for wonder, given 
the elusive nature of wonder: it tends to come unbidden, not when we are look-
ing for it. She makes a convincing case for the arts as an important vehicle for 
prompting the experience of wonder. Artworks, being creative forms of expres-
sion, invite those who engage with them to view things in unusual ways, and 
to adopt an open and receptive mode of perception, a mode that is akin to won-
der, especially deep or contemplative wonder, and is likely to give rise to it. Art 
invites us to really look, or listen, and look again, to pay attention to something 
we take for granted, and this opens the way to wonder.
Chapter 12, by Jacky van de Goor, Anneke Sools and Gerben Westerhof, 
investigates the workings of existential wonder, conceived of as a mindset, 
an “intention to see the special and meaningful in the ordinary and every-
day”. They analyse the ways in which participants in their study constructed 
meaning in memories of ‘familiar routines’ that they regarded as extremely 
meaningful, such as family visits, a walk in the woods or caring for children. 
Their results suggest that several mechanisms may contribute to the mindset 
of wonder: the awareness of opposing values within the moment, the aware-
ness of the transformation from one value or state of being to another, and 
the awareness of the contrast between the instrumental and symbolical, ritual 
function of routines. Van de Goor, Sools and Westerhof conclude by indicating 
how these mechanisms may be employed to cultivate a mindset of wonder in 
education and to re-enchant educational routines that have lost their vitality.
In Chapter 13, Mihaela Frunză, Liana Precup and Sandu Frunză present the 
preliminary results of an instrumental case study of a total of 23 Philosophy 
for Children (P4C) sessions conducted using their ‘Community of Dialogue’ 
approach, inspired by the work of Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas. They 
hypothesised that, in the process of cultivating competences like critical think-












































16 strong emphasis on stimulating students’ capacity for wonder. Their prelimi-
nary conclusions are that this is indeed the case and that wonder facilitates the 
development of such competences in children.
The concluding Chapter 14 is another contribution by Jan B.W. Pedersen, 
in which he argues that weird fiction (a subgenre of speculative fiction), and 
in particular the work of Howard Phillips Lovecraft, is a catalyst for wonder. 
Pedersen takes the reader on a wonder-filled tour of Lovecraft’s work, paying 
special attention to the presence of ‘dark wonder’, followed by some conclud-
ing thoughts on the educational value of exposure to wonder and dark wonder.
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OF WONDER IN 
EDUCATION 
AND FOR HUMAN 
FLOURISHING

1  Contrasting the Neoliberal 




O ver the past decades, the neoliberal shift has widely affected edu-cational discourse and policies worldwide (Olssen and Peters 2005; Rutkowski 2015; Shahjahan 2011). This ‘neoliberal cascade’ (Connell 
2013), has de facto reframed educational purposes and schooling practice, thus 
reframing what students should know, strive for, and, in a sense, be (Biesta 
2006: 2015; Masschelein and Simons 2008). Educational institutions and pro-
cesses as well as what we may call ‘educational subjectivities’ (of both teachers 
and students) have been pushed toward a significant transformation (Ball 
2003). I argue that such a transformation is anything but benign. It implies 
a lack, if not an eclipse, of invaluable educational features such as democratic 
sharing among all the actors of educational processes and practices, meaning 
creation, and the possibility for newness to emerge. The failure to recognise 
such features and phenomena results in an impoverished conception of educa-
tion at the individual and collective levels (Ball and Olmedo 2013; Biesta 2004, 
2006, 2010, 2019; d’Agnese 2017a, 2017b; Hill 2004).
It is important to note that the neoliberal educational agenda acts not just 
through economic penetration and political influence, thus steering both the 
macro and the micromanagement of schooling and education (Alexander 2011; 
Apple 2000; Ball 2009; Ball and Olmedo 2013; Biesta 2004). It is my argument 
that, when analysing the neoliberal framework for education, we have to also 
analyse its linguistic level, and the widespread rhetoric that guides the repre-
sentations of education and schooling we address. Without such an analysis, 
we run the risk of not capturing the power of fascination and the pull neoliber-
alism exerts. Neoliberalism, in fact, also acts by means of a fascinating rhetoric 
























































ised, and a ‘new vocabulary of performance’ (Ball 2003, 218) reshapes teachers’ 
and students’ aims and purposes.
Although the purpose of this contribution is not to conduct a detailed 
analysis of such reports and documents – although I believe they deserve close 
examination – it is important to remember that they are much more than 
reports and documents; they deeply affect educational discourse and prac-
tices worldwide, penetrating in all of its details, from curriculum to teaching 
methods (Ball 2003; Biesta 2004; Alexander 2011), from families and students’ 
perceptions regarding what is worthwhile and what is not, to teachers’ profes-
sionalism (Biesta 2015).1
It is worth noting that when reading the documents, recommendations, 
publications and webpages of certain major educational agencies and institu-
tions worldwide (e.g., the European Commission, the OECD’s Directorate for 
Education and Skills, and the U.S. Department of Education) we see that the 
same educational picture is enacted and by means of the same rhetorical strat-
egy. Indeed, these powerful institutions frame their performative discourses on 
education in terms of ‘training [and] basic skills’ (European Commission 2015), 
‘student achievement and competitiveness’ (U.S. Department of Education 
2015), ‘knowledge management […and] students’ performance’ (OECD 2015) 
and ‘what is required to succeed’ (Schleicher 2016) in today’s complex world. 
Even by glancing at the webpages and names of these institutions we can gain 
an idea of how education is being enacted. The OECD’s Directorate for Educa-
tion is called the ‘OECD’s Directorate for Education and skills’, and the webpage 
of the European Commission devoted to education is entitled ‘Education and 
Training’ (EU 2015). In addition, in what we may call the EU’s leading docu-
ment, Rethinking Education (EU 2012), education is established in terms of skills 
of all kinds. The United States is no exception; at the centre of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education’s homepage, the following claim is found: “Our mission is 
to promote student achievement and preparation for global competitiveness” 
(U.S. Department of Education 2016).
Given the aims of this paper, I cannot adequately delve into this discourse 
or analyse in detail how and by what means it works and which values and 
idea of society it promotes. However, a few examples may be useful to both 
substantiate and better situate the analysis I wish to develop. In what follows, 
I will briefly focus on: a) the OECD’s PISA trifold brochure (OECD 2016a), which 
presents the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment; and b) 
What Works Clearinghouse’s mission statement.


























































Let us analyse the OECD’s PISA trifold brochure (OECD 2016a), where we find the 
following:
‘What is important for citizens to know and be able to do?’ That is the ques-
tion that underlies the triennial survey of 15-year-old students around the 
world known as the Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA). PISA assesses the extent to which students near the end of compul-
sory education have acquired key knowledge and skills that are essential for 
full participation in modern societies. (OECD 2016a, 1)
Although the passage, at first sight, may seem to be only an explanation of 
what an assessment programme is supposed to produce, it is my contention 
that through passages such as the one quoted above, a severe reduction of 
education, living and society is enacted. That is, the assumptions being made 
are anything but innocent. Drawing out the underlying assumptions of the 
passage above, the first thing worth noting is that citizens need to acquire the 
same knowledge and skills regardless of where they live. PISA, in fact, is able to 
assess “[w]hat is important for citizens to know and be able to do”. This state-
ment signifies that modern societies may be reduced to just one society in that 
each modern society would require the same skills, knowledge and education 
to flourish; in turn, citizens, regardless of their desires, aspirations, ideas, per-
sonal values and projects, would need to acquire the same skills to succeed. We 
can see that the OECD does not conceal its ambition to establish a valid world-
wide framework for all degrees of education. Moreover, PISA’s mortgage on 
education, given its performative role (Gorur 2011), is not limited to what stu-
dents should learn in the here and now. The OECD, according to its own words, 
aims to shape ‘what is possible in education’. PISA’s results, in fact, “reveal what 
is possible in education by showing what students in the highest-performing 
and most rapidly improving education systems can do” (OECD 2016a, 2).
The second cue I focus on is related to the What Works Clearinghouse. 
The What Works Clearinghouse, according to its own words, “is an invest-
ment of the Institute of Education Sciences (IES) within the U.S. Department 
of Education”. Its aims consist of “review[ing] the existing research on differ-
ent programmes, products, practices and policies in education [to] provide educators 
with the information they need to make evidence-based decisions. We focus on 
the results from high-quality research to answer the question ‘What works in edu-
cation?’” (What Works Clearinghouse 2016). I wish to be clear from the outset 
that my concerns are not so much with the evidence-based approach as relating 
to education. Although analyses have been provided about its weaknesses and 
educational inconsistency (Biesta 2007: 2010), one may reasonably argue that 
26 any educational approach has internal weaknesses and inconsistencies – my 
own included, of course. The problem is that there is something uncomfortable 
about the fact that an institution that aims to evaluate and, in a sense, govern 
education in such a wide country adopts only one approach. One would expect 
a wide, multidimensional and inclusive approach from such an institution, 
one staging comparisons of evidence-based approach and not-evidence-based 
approach. Instead, in the U.S. Department of Education’s documents on educa-
tion, we find little trace of alternative perspectives or, importantly, initiatives 
aimed at discussing and broadening such an approach.
Then, we may note that a significant problem of the neoliberal educational 
agenda is that only one vision of society and education is allowed to enter 
the educational arena. Otherwise stated, there is no competition between or 
acknowledgment of different ideas about society and education. The compe-
tition occurs within the system, namely, between countries, schools, teachers 
and students, on the basis of what has effectively been called ‘a global space of 
equivalence’ (Shahjahan 2013, 677). Through such a space, countries, schools 
and the subjects being educated are ranked and organised and are pushed to an 
ongoing competition aimed at achieving the best learning outcomes (Au 2011; 
Biesta 2010). Neoliberal discourse, although enacted in different countries and 
situations, speaks with one voice, as it were.
This paper, then, seeks to engage with the dominance of the neoliberal 
mindset using a specific foothold, namely, the very lack of wonder, as a term and 
concept, within official educational frameworks.
With regard to the argument I wish to develop, we should note that no 
mention of wonder is made within documents, publications, webpages and 
recommendations of major educational agencies and institutions worldwide 
(e.g., European Commission, U.S Department of Education, OECD).2 In this 
sense, Schinkel is right in saying that “there are some reasons to think that 
current education systems in the Western world constitute a particularly hos-
tile environment for the experience of wonder” (2017, 540). As a consequence, 
educators, teachers and students as well may lose their sense of wonder.
Then, although one can say that there is no need to engage with wonder 
in documents whose objective is to frame educational policies at large, it 
is my contention that wonder, which is situated at the core of fundamental 
educational features and phenomena, deserves our attention, whether we are 
2 It is worth noting that, analysing the main publications and reports of such institutions – e.g. 
Rethinking Education (EU 2012), WWC Intervention Report (What Works Clearinghouse 2016) or OECD’s 
presentation of PISA-based Test for Schools (OECD 2018) – we find the same result: wonder as a term 























































27educators, teachers, scholars or policy makers. Despite its rhetoric about con-
tinuous change and endless transformation, educational neoliberalism, in 
maintaining the educational status quo, is in fact conservative to its very core. 
Therefore, a call toward wonder as something challenging and disrupting such 
an apparatus may be educationally fruitful and even necessary.
My contribution is organised into two steps: in the first step, by drawing 
from Dewey, Arendt and current scholarly literature, I attempt to circumnavi-
gate the question of wonder educationally; in the second step, I pin down the 
educational bearings of my analysis. If schooling should not just be a place 
where given contents are learned in order to manage given tasks, space has to 
be made for unstructured activities and for new experience to happen. Wonder, 
I shall argue, allows for a different form of schooling than that embodied by 
current neoliberal narratives, namely, one concerned with the messiness and 
radical uncertainty of living and thinking (d’Agnese 2018). If students have to 
also face the ungraspable, the radically new, the unfathomable, the experience 
of wonder must have a place in schooling.
Circumnavigating wonder
S tudies and analyses about wonder are not frequent in educational scholarly literature. Some notable exceptions are Di Paolantonio’s conceptualisation of wonder as opposed to thoughtlessness (2018), 
Schinkel’s analysis of ‘deep wonder’ (2017), Hadzigeorgiou (2014), and other 
contributions to Egan, Cant and Judson’s edited volume Wonder-full Education’ 
(2014).
In his article, Di Paolantonio contrasts wonder with curiosity, arguing 
that the attitude of wonder “retains an un-mastered and inoperative relation 
with what might turn up in the world”. Wonder, then, may generate a kind 
of ‘attentiveness and care’ beyond ‘knowingness and purpose’ (Di Paolantonio 
2018, 4). Wonder, as opposed to curiosity, is a kind of astonishment and inter-
ruption in the flow of experience, the moment in which we feel the impact, the 
hit and the presence of the world as something independent from our concep-
tualisation. Wonder, in Di Paolantonio’s understanding, may enhance a kind 
of “dwell[ing] with things so that we might come to care about what it is that 
we are doing when we do what we do, even when we assume that what we are 
doing – “learning” – seems like the most serious and worthwhile of activities.” 
(Di Paolantonio 2018, 6)
Such an analysis echoes Schinkel’s understanding of wonder as something 
























































28 ‘as if seen for the first time’. (Schinkel 2017, 542) In Schinkel’s analysis “being 
capable of experiencing wonder implies an openness to (novel) experience 
and seems naturally allied to intrinsic educational motivation, an eagerness to 
inquire, a desire to understand, and also to a willingness to suspend judgement 
and bracket existing – potentially limiting – ways of thinking, seeing, and cate-
gorising” (Schinkel 2017, 539). Moreover: following Schinkel’s analysis of “deep 
wonder” we may also note that such a question is also associated with ‘speech-
lessness’ (Schinkel 2017) and even with a kind of discursive paralysis (Campbell 
1999; Vasalou 2015). Such a paralysis, far from being a kind of deterrent for edu-
cation, allows for the emergence of diverse meanings in educational settings.
Wonder, in Schinkel’s words, is ‘aporetic, vertiginous’ (2017, 544) and invites 
us “to remain open to (…) vulnerable uncertainty” (Vasalou 2015, 59). Moreover: 
‘deep wonder’ involves ‘a fundamental, irresolvable not-knowing’. (Schinkel 
2017, 546) In a slightly different vein, Hadzigeorgiou describes wonder as ‘the 
engine of all intellectual inquiry’ (Hadzigeorgiou 2014, 40), something pro-
moting “unexplored connexions with possibilities half-disclosed by glimpses 
and half-concealed by the wealth of material” (Hadzigeorgiou 2014, 48).
Wonder may fuel sensations of excitement and astonishment by which we 
feel entangled with the world, with its mystery and presence. In wonder there 
is no inside/outside split in ourselves: we feel a kind of wholeness. Following 
such an analysis one would be tempted to say that wonder allows for an epiph-
any of the world in its transcending immanence, if I am allowed to use this 
term. In wonder we clearly feel that something captures ourselves, something 
coming from above, so to say, and yet that something is there, close to our-
selves. In this sense wonder is not to be confused with any kind of ‘subjective’ 
experience. Wonder is an event in-between consciousness and the world. More-
over, in a sense consciousness springs and comes into the world by wonder. Yet, 
wonder is provoked by something external, something affecting ourselves in 
a radical, deep way. Wonder is upsetting and yet in wonder we are invested by 
something which stops time and sensations. In wonder we experience a kind of 
eternity, eternity understood as the suspension and absence of time. Wonder, 
in this sense, exceeds all boundaries.
That is why wonder may disrupt the predictability of learning processes 
and lesson plans. It is a mode of consciousness in which we experience some-
thing beyond our understanding, yet worthy of our attention (Schinkel 2018). 
Wonder interrupts our ordinary paths of thinking and action. Wonder catches 
us off guard, it is incidental. Wonder is unpredictable and episodic. That is why 
there is a difficulty to conceptualise and articulate wonder, a kind of inherent 
incomprehensibility of wonder; and that is also why, as I attempt to pin down 























































29One feature of wonder, then, is the connection with mystery and unknowabil-
ity. In a sense, where discourse begins, wonder ends. This implies that it is very 
difficult, if not impossible at all, to give prescriptions or practical advice that 
may help us create a space for wonder in current schooling practices, let alone 
the curriculum. Even as sensation wonder is paradoxical: in wonder we feel 
excited, and yet we are called to contemplate something; we may feel an urge to 
move, act and think, and yet wonder is the suspension and interruption of the 
very possibility of thinking and acting with an end in view. And yet, it is exactly 
the collapse of discourse and practice altogether, the entanglement with mys-
tery and unknowability wonder provokes that is educationally promising. To 
elucidate such an entanglement, I attempt to frame the question by interlacing 
Dewey with Arendt. I begin with Arendt.
The term ‘wonder’ rarely occurs in Arendtian writings and, to my knowl-
edge, Arendt does not engage in any analysis of wonder per se.3 However, I 
believe that her account of ‘newness’ and the ‘startling unexpectedness’ charac-
terising the human condition (Arendt [1958] 1998, 177-178) are deeply entangled 
with a sense of wonder. We may even say that a sense of deep gratitude for liv-
ing and existing is one of the hallmarks of Arendt’s writings.
As we all know, one recurring theme of the Arendtian oeuvre is her critique 
of any already established account of humanity. In The Human Condition she 
boldly challenges any definition of human nature. For Arendt, whatever we 
may think of it, the human condition is always already beyond the thought 
that attempts to capture it. This is so because human beings come to estab-
lish who they are in ever-ending and ever-changing processes whose structure 
and aims are defined in concrete living situations. Any attempt to give human 
beings pre-conceived aims, then, runs into such a reification of what is human 
and in the erasure of ‘[t]he disclosure of the “who”’ (Arendt [1958] 1998, 184), 
namely, the manifestation – and the fulfilment – of the subject as one who can 
act and speak and who strives for a meaningful life. What is highly significant 
from an educational perspective is that in Arendt’s view, both ‘meaningfulness’ 
and ‘newness’ come into play only in the dimension of ‘togetherness’.
To be clear, the central point in Arendt’s understanding is that human 
beings come into the world in their uniqueness by revealing to others who 
they are through their actions and speech while at the same time revealing to 
themselves who they are through such actions and speech. Otherwise stated, 
we do not know who we are before such a revealing comes into play in the 
public dimension. Therefore, in the Arendtian account, when disclosing their 
























































30 uniqueness to others and themselves, women and men are always on the verge 
of experiencing both a sense of wonder and the unexpected, for such a revela-
tion is not known in advance. Rather, it comes as an epiphany. The opposite 
is also true: when losing sight of the wonder entangled in such an epiphany, 
we lose sight, at the same time, of our humanity. As Arendt states, “Although 
nobody knows whom he reveals when he discloses himself in deed or word, he 
must be willing to risk the disclosure (…). It is in the nature of beginning that 
something new is started which cannot be expected from whatever may have 
occurred before.” (Arendt [1958] 1998, 177-180)
I wish to highlight that the accomplishment of such newness, along with 
its ‘character of startling unexpectedness’ (Arendt [1958] 1998, 177-178) and 
inherent sense of wonder, are not something added to human existing as an 
occasional outcome. In Arendt’s view, the very possibility of acting and speak-
ing, the very possibility of showing who human beings are, and, thus, the very 
possibility for education to happen lies in the conditions that guarantee such a 
public, eminently political space – that is, the space of diversity and plurality. 
As Biesta puts it, “Arendt consistently tries to understand human interaction 
in general, and political life in particular, from the point of view of plurality, 
diversity, and difference” (Biesta 2001, 394). Without plurality, in fact, we would 
have neither speech nor action, the things by which the ‘unique distinctness’ of 
human beings is revealed (Arendt [1958] 1998, 176). As Arendt states, “Plurality 
is the law of the earth” (Arendt 1978, 19) and only through speech and action are 
human beings able “to appear to each other, not indeed as physical objects, but 
qua men”. This is why “a life without speech and without action, (…) is literally 
dead to the world” (Arendt [1958] 1998, 176-177).
With the term ‘action’, Arendt means something unique, something that 
has to do with the capacity of human beings “to take an initiative, to begin (…), 
to set something into motion” (Arendt [1958] 1998, 177). By means of action, 
newness and human beings come into the world as such. I wish to highlight 
that the accomplishment of newness, “that something new is started which 
cannot be expected from whatever may have occurred before”, its ‘character of 
startling unexpectedness’ (Arendt [1958] 1998, 177-178), is not something added 
to human beings, something we as humans may or may not accomplish. As 
humans, we come into the world as ‘initium, newcomers and beginners’; we are 
beginners accomplishing newness. This state of being beginners is essential 
to the human condition, and by means of it we “take initiative, are prompted 
into action” (Arendt [1958] 1998, 177). In Arendt, ‘the capacity of beginning 
something anew’ (Arendt [1958] 1998, 9), the capacity to begin something unex-
pected and even ‘infinitely improbable’, is the peculiar trait of human living. 























































31are closely related to the capacity to experience a sense of wonder. Otherwise 
put, without such a sense of wonder we may hardly experience newness and 
the ‘infinitely improbable’.
And such being an initium is the focus of The Crisis in Education. Here, in 
speaking of the hope for the new generations, Arendt furnishes in advance 
a strong critique of the neoliberal framework for education, for such a hope 
“hangs on the new which every generation brings; but precisely because we 
can base our hope only on this, we destroy everything if we so try to control 
the new that we, the old, can dictate how it will look” (Arendt 1977, 189). Acting 
‘for the sake of what is new and revolutionary’ (Arendt 1977, 189) is, in Arendt’s 
conception, the first aim of education.
Then, it is clear that the neoliberal educational agenda, in giving students a 
pre-conceived framework in which aims and means are established in advance, 
an idea in which the world and things are – just – mastered, erases such a condi-
tion of being an initium, for thinking, in Arendt’s work, is far from any idea of 
‘master[ing] the world’ (Stonebridge 2017, 20). Following Arendt, we are begin-
ners accomplishing newness. We are then entangled with wonder, and only by 
keeping intact and alive such an entanglement we may fulfil our humanity.
And here is where Dewey’s oeuvre is important. Time and again, Dewey 
highlighted newness as essential for education to happen, and one founding 
feature of his thought is its commitment to the ‘unattained’ (Dewey 1929, 182) 
and ‘wonderful possibilities’ (Dewey 1913, 94) involved in experience and edu-
cation. When speaking of imagination and its pivotal role, Dewey expends 
crucial words on openness and meaning creation, going so far as to state that, 
“[t]here is no limit to the meaning which an action may come to possess. It all 
depends upon the context of perceived connections in which it is placed; the 
reach of imagination in realizing connections is inexhaustible” (Dewey 1930, 
243). In Deweyan understanding, the human capacity to create meaning – in 
Dewey’s words, “the capacity for constantly expanding the range and accuracy 
of one’s perception of meanings” (Dewey 1930, 145) – is potentially inexhaust-
ible. A limitation in connections leads inevitably to diminished creation and 
perception of meaning by narrowing the broadening of ‘the meaning-horizon’ 
(Dewey 1930, 191) for which Dewey so powerfully calls.
With regard to this it may be fruitful to recall the Deweyan conception of 
possibility as it is developed in Art as Experience. Dewey does not limit himself 
to the understanding of art and aesthetics. Rather, his insights work to reframe 
the conception of foundational educational and philosophical issues, such as 
inquiry, meaning creation and thinking at large. In a passage devoted to analys-
























































32 A sense of possibilities that are unrealized and that might be realized are, 
when they are put in contrast with actual conditions, the most penetrating 
‘criticism’ of the latter that can be made. It is by a sense of possibilities open-
ing before us that we become aware of constrictions that hem us in and of 
burdens that oppress. (Dewey [1934] 1980, 346)
The statement, as often occurs when analysing Deweyan claims, works deeply 
at different levels, opening a) a theoretical level, b) an ethico-political and edu-
cational level, and c) an existential level. 
At the theoretical level, it is worth noting that Dewey defines the sense 
of unrealised possibilities as “the most penetrating ‘criticism’ (…) that can be 
made”. Remembering that unrealised possibilities may be thought of only by 
employing imagination (Dewey 1913, 94), we observe that ‘the most penetrating 
“criticism”’ is effected through imagination. This is not to say that imagination 
allows the complete enacting of criticism; instead, imagination plays a crucial 
role in the appreciation and evaluation of things.
In this regard, it is crucial to understand that the contrast between ‘actual 
conditions’ and a ‘sense of [unrealised] possibilities’ is not only necessary to 
open different possibilities and paths to pursue in the future; it is also the 
basis from which to penetrate ‘actual conditions’. In other words, imagina-
tion enables us to understand the present and is the basis for inquiry. This 
leads us to the ethico-political, educational and existential levels. Here, the 
Deweyan call is clear and vibrant; it is a call toward our duty to imagine, to 
conceive of unrealised possibilities as things to effect. Namely, the Deweyan 
call is a call against every possible totalitarian thought, and his point is at once 
an educational, existential and ethico-political one. Possibilities, in Deweyan 
understanding, are indeed means of action, collective and personal. In addi-
tion, remembering that “[t]here is no limit to the meaning which an action may 
come to possess [for] the reach of imagination in realizing connections is inex-
haustible” (Dewey 1930, 243), we may understand the educational endeavour 
as characterised by uncertainty at its very core. Paraphrasing Dewey, the more 
numerous and varied such conditions are, the richer and vaster is meaning-cre-
ation and, thus, living. Educationally speaking, this means that in the concrete 
practice of schooling, in the time of the daily classroom, space must be made 
for unstructured activities. These activities must be held in common and must 
exist without given ends and tracks. This is not to underestimate the role of 
the learning of given content, ways of knowing and behaving in education and 
society alike. Without such activities, even the basic level of socialisation is at 























































33the neoliberal educational agenda, socialisation is at risk as well because true 
socialisation stands on both acquisition and newness. 
Then, we are not far from the truth in saying that the Deweyan account of 
meaning-creation is grounded in the experience of wonder we undergo in our 
ongoing interaction with others, the world and things, or, in Deweyan words, 
“when varied materials of sense quality, emotions and meanings come together 
in a union that marks a new birth in the world” (Dewey [1934] 1980, 267).
Wonder and education 
T hen, where might this lead teachers and educators in terms of thinking about the nature and role of wonder in schooling and education? If we understand education according to the role that wonder, unpredict-
ability and radical possibility may play in it, we find a continuous expansion of 
meanings, activities, knowledge, environments and relationships. In wonder 
we experience the awareness that the world and even we ourselves are not at our 
disposal, that we are radically exposed to the very unpredictability of encoun-
ters with the world, others and things. Wonder is the evidence, I would say, 
that the world, others and experience do not easily map onto given orders. In 
Opdal’s words, “[w]onder (...) always points to something beyond the accepted 
rules [thus evoking] a certain uneasiness towards the given” (Opdal 2001, 331). 
Wonder, then, may promote an open, sensible orientation to living and know-
ing. Wonder is there to remind us that words and concepts, though necessary, 
cannot fully capture the richness, variety and amazing uncanniness of living – 
and education, too, comes from what is other, risking, and even uncanny.
Wonder, in this sense, exceeds Plato’s logos and concept of truth as related 
to the apprehension and certainty of vision. Wonder, in this sense, is at the same 
time behind and beyond words and conceptualisations. In this sense, wonder 
can trigger the possibility that both students and teachers can shift given ways 
of understanding, can think otherwise, thus changing the way they relate to 
each other; and that they can form new interpretations of the world and others, 
thus displaying the core of teaching and learning. Wonder is about question-
ing, even forcing the boundaries and security of one’s certainties and identity. 
What teachers and educators may learn from wonder is a concern to be sensi-
tive to both the radical singularity of students and the possibilities involved in 
teaching and education. Through wonder, both students and teachers may face 
the possibility of change, putting forth the sense of radical possibility entailed 
in education. It is through the indeterminateness opened up by such a con-
























































34 Educationally, this means that teachers have to also create something which, to 
some extent, is not knowable in advance; something they cannot predict and 
control in all of its features; something which, by necessity, has to do with risk 
and the unknown, both on the side of teachers and students.
However, here we come to a slippery point. The role of the teacher, when 
reading their activity in such a way, is both difficult and pivotal, and it can 
hardly be measured or assessed. Considering that wonder is entangled with 
the unknown, with mystery and even the unfathomable, what kind of methods 
should be used to govern such an inexhaustible experience? Moreover, is the 
‘risk’ connected to such a disclosure worth pursuing? Who gives teachers the 
license to travel on paths they are unable to master in all of their features? To 
put it clearly, the problem with wonder when we come to curriculum and daily 
school practice is exactly that we can neither predict nor plan such an experi-
ence and, more importantly, what comes from such an experience. Then, in 
which way may teachers vouch for their work, if such a work is by definition 
entangled with the uncertain and even the unfathomable?
The problem, it seems to me, remains an open one. I would only make 
clear that by endorsing the experience of wonder I am not endorsing a kind 
of ‘everything goes’ model for teaching; such a model would be, in the best 
case, senseless, if not totally irresponsible. One thing that is clear is that the use 
of wonder in everyday schooling practice implies care, attentiveness and cau-
tion. And what the use of wonder in teaching may enhance is exactly a kind of 
awareness that makes teachers attentive to both the unpredictable qualities of 
their embeddedness in living educational situations and the unpredictability 
they actively produce in being engaged in education. This twofold uncertainty, 
rather than flowing into some nihilistic defeat of educational purposes, puts 
radical responsibility on both the side of the teacher and the side of the stu-
dents, who intentionally produce new interactions in the ongoing educational 
conversation despite not knowing exactly what may come from such interac-
tions.
This implies that students’ attention and imaginative vision should be 
directed toward the point in which a subject matter emerges as such, thus 
focusing on the activity of producing contents – and here the neoliberal prede-
fined framework is the least helpful. Here, I am arguing for a kind of existential 
and pragmatic engagement with learning contents, one that is able to create 
new points of interaction between disciplines, students’ experience and living 
situations. Importantly, wonder entails an engagement of all levels of a sub-
ject’s experience: cognitive, emotional, aesthetic, existential, even ethical. Or, 
better said, the experience of wonder is the collapse of all levels, the breaking of 























































35to newness. Then, to the extent in which education also aims at producing the 
conditions for newness to emerge, the potential of wonder has to be preserved 
and nurtured, along with students’ imaginative vision and capacity to disrupt, 
suspend and play with curricular contents.
Wonder, then, may furnish the cue for a different conception of education 
and schooling, one in which, under the regulation of teachers, the space of not-
yet, or the space of pure potentiality for growth, may emerge and new forms of 
subjectivities and meanings may arise. In this sense, the curriculum is not just 
a means to develop the skills required by the labour market, as the neoliberal 
agenda de facto promotes. It is also a matter of hesitation and waiting, one in 
which teachers and students attempt to dwell in pure potentiality for growth. 
Exactly such a dwelling allows for the possibility of newness (Arendt ([1958] 
1998) and ‘unattained possibilities’ (Dewey 1929, 267) that, in turn, make edu-
cation – and living – worthwhile. Furthermore, wonder may enhance a stance 
welcoming otherness and unpredictability – that is the ethical significance of 
wonder. 
Thus, we come to see how the complex of meanings revealed by the 
Arendt-Dewey connection helps us to frame a conception of education that is 
significantly different from the neoliberal model. This different conception 
may help students to engage with the world in purposeful and open ways. 
Such engagement is created in ongoing interactions with the curriculum 
and disciplines, which are not a means to learn and acquire always-already 
pre-conceived skills and competencies, as occurs in the neoliberal discourse 
on education. Unpredictability, in the neoliberal educational picture, is only 
ostensible in that the entire set of competencies and learning outcomes that 
students are expected to perform comes as a package to both Nation States 
and schools. If interrelatedness among schooling, the world and living must 
be enhanced, schooling should not become – only – a matter of testing the 
right skills and knowledge. Rather, what we may call the space of not-yet must 
become the primary focus of schooling because it is this not-yet that, in turn, 
comes to define education. Thus, it is in the interplay between the curricu-
lum and students’ push to explore it that, under the regulation of teachers, 
the space of not-yet may emerge and new forms and meanings may arise. In 
this sense, the curriculum is not only a means by which to develop the right 
skills; it is also a matter of hesitation and waiting, one in which we attempt to 
dwell in pure potentiality for growth. It is exactly this dwelling that allows for 
a different type of education to occur. Teachers, navigating on the verge of the 
actual and the not-yet, are, in a sense, the shepherds of this newness and of the 
uncertain, fragile equilibrium created in classrooms that are willing to pursue 
























































36 the risk and unpredictability that come with wonder, we would lose the oppor-
tunity to make room for newness – what Dewey calls ‘a new birth in the world’ 
(1980, 267) and what Arendt refers to as ‘startling unexpectedness’ ([1958] 1998, 
177-178). Only through such a commitment to unpredictability the open space 
of possibility, the open space of not-yet, may come to light as a space in its own 
right, for it is through such a space that new means may be forged and new 
aims may be conceived of.
Curriculum, then, develops “within the sphere of action for the sake of pos-
sibilities not yet given” (Dewey 1917, 63). It seems to me that when losing sight 
of such a ‘sphere’ of ‘not yet given’, schooling dismisses a significant part of 
its task and runs the risk of becoming a mere matter of reproduction. If we 
conceive of education as the means by which human life gains its always-open 
meaning and society may gain the possibility to radically experiment and 
change, the experience of wonder deserves a place in both schooling and cur-
riculum.
In conclusion, I wish to highlight that in an era in which education seems 
to be in the grip of economic demands and anti-democratic impulses, an 
alternative to both the current rise of right-wing populism and the neolib-
eral apparatus is required. The places from which such an alternative may be 
envisioned and the tools we may wish to use to address it in the concrete prac-
tices of schooling are different and diverse. I hope that the intersection I have 
attempted to propose between the Arendtian call for ‘unexpectedness’ and 
‘natality’ and the Deweyan call for newness and the expansion of meanings 
may help teachers, educators and those who have a stake in education to resist 
neoliberal pressure and to envision creative ways of engaging with students 
and new generations in the concrete and crucial practice of ‘coming into the 
world’ (Arendt 1977, 167).
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2  The Importance of Wonder  
in Human Flourishing
Jan B.W. Pedersen
We must look at the question more closely. For it is not a trivial one;  
it is our whole way of life that is at issue.
(Republic 352d; Plato 1987)
Preliminaries
‘W onder’ and ‘human flourishing’ are essential elements in the Wonderful Education Project but these elements are in themselves complex, elusive and difficult to fully grasp. Naturally, this con-
tributes to the wondrous nature of the Wonderful Education Project and turns out, 
for my part at least, to be one of the reasons why participating in the project is 
so thoroughly engaging.
This paper focuses on the importance of wonder in human flourishing and 
is orientated towards the dynamics between the two, but with an emphasis 
on how the former is important for illuminating the latter. It begins with a 
preliminary sketch of both wonder and human flourishing and subsequently 
moves on to highlight three aspects of human flourishing: 1) ‘Individuality’, 2) 
‘Relations’ and 3) ‘The political’, and why these play to wonderment. 
On the philosophy of wonder





































because it emphasises how wonder challenges certainty and ideals related to 
such a position (Lloyd 2018). Likewise, the anthology Medicine and Paradoxog-
raphy in the Ancient World, edited by George Kazantzidis, is of great value as it 
points out how thauma in the world of the ancients was the centrepiece of seri-
ous discussion on what constitutes reality and of significance in the dialogue 
between medicine and folklore (Kazantzides 2019).
The continuing growth of wonder studies is understandable, as studying 
wonder is a troublesome, bewildering yet an intriguing affair. For the thau-
matologist this is clear from the start because unlike external, observable 
phenomena like, for example, a red kite against a blue summer sky, wonder 
qualifies as an internal mental phenomenon that appears in relation to some-
thing the mind beholds yet struggles to understand.
What causes wonder or prompts its emergence can be both external and 
internal. The Montgolfier brothers’ successful launch of their first balloon in 
1783 containing 22,000 cubic feet of hot air is an excellent example of an exter-
nal object that, at least at the time, proved a marvellous sight. The giant flying 
balloon was new, extraordinary and bore with it sweet promises of the fulfil-
ment of the age-old dream of flying dating back at least to the myth of Icarus 
(Holmes 2008, 128).1
Tangible artwork like the hand stencils found in El Castillo Cave in north-
ern Spain is another example of an external object that may cause wonder to 
arise, and the reason is partly found in the fact that artworks like these carry 
with them the head-spinning notion that archaic humans living 40,000 years 
ago were likely to enjoy and make art as much as we do today. Furthermore, 
one might point out that even though archaic humans are extinct and lived in 
terms of knowledge and understanding in a world very different from our own, 
we are very much connected in terms of our humanity. Despite differences in 
time and place, archaic and modern humans could well be grouped together 
under the label of homo admirans – wondering man, which is wonder provok-
1 It is important to realise that when wonder arises in relation to an external happening our subjectiv-
ity is involved. This is because we are creatures of perception and interpretation, and do not have a 
one-to-one relationship with the external world. Now this is not to say that wonder is absolutely 
relative because it is possible to speak about the ‘density of wonder’, meaning that some objects elicit 
wonder better than others. To exemplify, because of its rarity and extraordinariness a celestial travel-
ler like the comet Hale-Bopp can lift us out of our immediate context, engage our imagination on a 
metaphysical level and remind us of our place in the universe in ways an austere parking lot cannot 
(Pedersen 2019, 120-121). In light of wonder being a virtue one might also argue that there is such a 
thing as ‘wondering appropriately’ and that for something to be worthy of wonder it has to meet an 
‘acceptance criterion for wonderment’ meaning that for an object to be worthy of wonder it has to be 
extraordinary, vivid and significant not just to the wonderer but to others as well (Pedersen 2019, 119).
42 ing indeed because it highlights the possibility that members of a species other 
than our own may harbour the ability to wonder.2
Wonder grounded in internal happenings signals that wonder can also arise 
from dealing with abstract or intangible objects, such as concepts or ideas. Ask 
yourself what it means for something to be eternal or everlasting and for some-
thing to be finite or going out of existence, and the case should be quite clear. 
The same applies when we ponder the nature of numbers or values, because 
such entities are not external objects. Unless encountered a posteriori in spoken 
or written form, numbers and values belong solely to our inner experiential 
world – they are as it were inner occurrences.
Wonder studies also fascinates because wonder is difficult to classify. Many 
a scholar labels wonder an emotion or feeling, which is understandable because 
as such, it can be situated neatly within the sciences in general and the field of 
psychology in particular. However, wonder is a giddy thing and resists pigeon-
holing. In addition to classifying wonder as an emotion or feeling, one might 
characterise it as an attitude, a mood, a value or an activity, understood as 
something a person does and not merely something that someone experiences. 
Pushing the envelope, one might also argue that wonder can be understood as 
a particular activity, i.e. something that one does in a specific way – a virtuous 
way even.
Furthermore, the wonder scholar must take into consideration that won-
der has 1) a foggy etymology that merely hints to us what wonder means, 2) a 
complicated history dating back to ancient times signifying that our view of 
wonder changes over time, and 3) a close and confusing resemblance to other 
2 At present, the term ‘archaic humans’ denotes either a species in the genus ‘homo’ that is extinct or a 
fossil population or deme of the ‘homo’ genus that presents a set of phenotypic, i.e. morphological, 
traits that are not found in extant human populations. To this end, it is common in palaeoanthro-
pology to describe Neanderthals as ‘archaic’. See Reich et al. (2010, 1053); Trinkaus (1993); and Fu et 
al. (2015). Even early anatomically modern human specimens understood as ‘homo sapiens’ and not 
‘homo sapiens neanderthalensis’ or ‘homo neanderthalensis’ have been referred to as ‘archaic’ such 
as those from Es-Skhul. See Stringer et al. (1989). I am grateful to David Clinnick of Saint Mary’s 
College of California for pointing this out to me. For more information on Palaeolithic art and how 
hand stencils may inspire wonder, see Walker, Clinnick, and Pedersen (2016). In this respect it must 
be noted that in relation to Spanish parietal art the first results using U-series dating produced an 
age estimate of 40,800 years ago on one painting from the site of El Castillo. This result possibly sug-
gests that Neanderthals understood as archaic humans were responsible for this painting. See Pike 
et al. (2012). However, at 41,000 years it is also possible that early modern humans may have made 
this painting. More recent dating at the sites of La Pasiega, Maltravieso and Ardeles in Spain have all 
produced dates on parietal art securely within an age range in which only Neanderthals are known 
to have occupied Western Europe. See Hoffmann et al. (2018). These results add to a growing body 
of evidence that Neanderthals were capable of producing symbolic material culture and it is for this 
reason that, regardless of the exact taxonomic relationship between Neanderthals and anatomically 
modern humans, the binomial descriptor ‘homo admirans’ has been given in this paper to both mod-























































43extraordinary states of mind including awe, horror, the sublime, curiosity, 
amazement, admiration and astonishment (Pedersen 2019, 19-52).
Can wonder be defined? Naturally, but given the uncertainty surrounding 
wonder, any definition, old or new, must be approached with caution. 
In 1605, natural philosopher and proto-scientist Francis Bacon published 
his opus The Advancement of Learning and in this particular work we find a defi-
nition of wonder that reads ‘wonder is broken knowledge’ (Bacon 1954, 7). 
Bacon’s definition is attractive in its simplicity and pushes the idea that upon 
realising that our knowledge about a given matter is incomplete or broken 
wonder emerges. We wonder as it were at what we cannot fully grasp.
Fast forward to 2003: philosopher Philip Fisher puts forth in his influential 
Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Rare Experiences that wonder is ‘a sudden 
experience of an extraordinary object that produces delight’ (Fisher 2003, 55). 
Important here is Fisher’s emphasis on the ‘suddenness’ and ‘delight’ of the 
experience of wonder and that the object responsible for the emergence of 
wonder must be of an extraordinary kind.
My own definition traverses some of the same territory, adds something 
new and goes like this: “Wonder is a sudden experience that intensifies the cog-
nitive focus and awareness of ignorance about a given object.” (Pedersen 2017, 
25; Pedersen 2019, 1). To further enrich the picture of wonder one might add 
that this peculiar state of mind owes its joyfulness to the fact that the experi-
ence situates us in a world made anew – a world where the term terra incognita 
retains its weight, its original meaning, and urges us to become fully fledged 
explorers. In this light wonder presents itself as a mode of inquiry, a setting of 
the mind even that encourages the wonderer to get to know the object of won-
der or, failing that, at least widen her understanding of it.
All this makes wonder as a subject matter worthy of wonder and thus 
not something we should be taking lightly. Our knowledge of wonder is at 
best broken, which connects us to thauma-haunted Theaetetus from Plato’s 
eponymous dialogue and reminds us that the individual who labelled Iris the 
daughter of Thaumas was indeed a most excellent genealogist.
On the philosophy of human flourishing
“T o live a happy life, my brother Gallio, is the desire of all men, but their minds are blinded to a clear vision of just what it is that makes a happy life” (Seneca 1932, 99). So begins stoic philosopher Seneca’s 




































44 ing such as his but also for our current endeavour, which is to shine some light 
on the intricate, troublesome and much related concept of human flourishing.
When a modern academic orbits the scholarly landscape surrounding 
human flourishing it quickly becomes clear that although flourishing origi-
nally was addressed by ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, 
modern scholars working on human flourishing hail from a variety of different 
fields and disciplines.3 Such academics often emphasise a particular aspect of 
flourishing that relates to their chosen field, thus highlighting a particular view 
of the subject matter. In support of this stands the fact that psychologist Mar-
tin Seligman thinks that flourishing involves a high degree of personalisation 
(Seligman 2011); and the same goes for economist Richard Layard, whose view 
of flourishing focuses on the satisfaction of basic economic needs (Layard 2011). 
Additionally, it quickly becomes clear that modern scholars working on 
flourishing often have an interest in merging or applying human flourishing 
to a field of study with some practical end or profession in sight. In this respect 
philosopher Harry Brighouse is a good example, because in his book On Educa-
tion he argues that the main purpose of education is human flourishing and 
that schools should help children live flourishing lives (Brighouse 2006, 42.)4 
Another example is nurse Derek Sellman who in his book What Makes a Good 
Nurse: Why the Virtues Are Important to Nurses argues that human flourishing is 
a legitimate end of nursing because nurses take care of more-than-ordinarily 
vulnerable people who unlike normal people face additional difficulties when 
it comes to living a flourishing life (Sellman 2011, 75).
Given that academics within psychology, economics, education and nursing 
are contributing to the seemingly ever-growing body of work on human flour-
ishing, one might get the idea that the subject in modern times has outgrown 
the category of philosophy and is perhaps best viewed as a science. After all, the 
above-mentioned fields do lean on empirical work. As tempting as this may be, 
I should think it wise to keep referring to human flourishing as a philosophical 
theme and my reason for thinking so is grounded partly in the philosophy of 
3 Although Plato’s approach to ethics is virtue-based and focuses on well-being or happiness he does 
not address the concept of ‘eudaimonia’ directly in any of his dialogues. The first to tackle ‘eudaimo-
nia’ directly is Aristotle and he does so in several of his works including The Eudemian Ethics, dedicated 
to a pupil of his named Eudemus of Rhodes, and The Nicomachean Ethics, dedicated to either Aristotle’s 
father or his own son, who both carried the name Nicomachus. One might also include Magna Moralia 
and Virtues and Vices, but although these works are incorporated in the corpus Aristotelicum scholars 
disagree on their status. Some claim they are actual works of Aristotle while others think them spuri-
ous.
4 For more recent scholarship giving thought to the relationship between the concept of human flour-
ishing and education see De Ruyter (2007); Kristjánsson (2017); Wolbert, De Ruyter, and Schinkel 























































45Bertrand Russell who stated that “science is what we know, and philosophy is 
what we don’t know” (Russell 1960). When we refer to human flourishing as a 
philosophy, or a subject matter for philosophy, we simultaneously acknowl-
edge that it is an open matter – a matter in which we all can have a say because 
there is no simple fact of the matter. Of course, this does not mean that there 
is no room for science or facts when it comes to understanding how human 
beings flourish. On the contrary, there is ample room for ‘what we know’ but 
because flourishing depends in part on the ‘flourisher’ it is impossible to pre-
sent a thin, precise description of the flourishing human being that is immune 
to criticism. Thus, a signature quality of human flourishing is that it only lends 
itself to be described in thick, vague terms. In other words, it resists the sci-
entific searchlight to such a degree that dark corners remain, which not only 
makes room for individuality but also philosophy and, indeed, wonderment.
Now a key feature of the concept of human flourishing is that it seeks to 
provide a reasonable answer to the ancient question of how we should live and 
thus its rightful place within philosophy is in the discipline of ethics or moral 
philosophy.5
Philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe’s 1958 article ‘Modern moral philosophy’ 
is important in this respect because it sparked a renewed interest in the works 
of Aristotle and virtue ethics. Importantly, she pointed out that the translation 
of the Greek concept of ‘eudaimonia’ into ‘well-being’ or ‘happiness’ was mis-
leading because to our modern ears such renditions cater purely to subjectivity 
(Anscombe 1958, 3). In Anscombe’s view ‘flourishing’6 is a better translation of 
‘eudaimonia’ because to be ‘eudaimon’7 or to live an ‘eudaimonic’ life is at least 
partly objective and encompasses much more than what the feeling or emotion 
of happiness can contain and the life of pleasure can achieve.8
To Aristotle as well as modern neo-Aristotelians, ‘eudaimonia’ qualifies as 
the ‘summum bonum’, the highest good – that which we ought to aim for in 
5 Ethics comes from the Greek word ‘ethikos’ which Aristotle introduced at the end of the first book 
in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE 1, 1103a4-10; Aristotle 2003). By separating two kinds of virtues namely 
‘arethai ethike’ meaning ethical virtues and ‘arethai dianoetike’ referring to intellectual virtues he 
could spell out what sort of character a flourishing person should develop. Moral philosophy deals in 
morals, which is a word derived from the Latin word ‘moralis’ that was introduced by stoic philoso-
pher Cicero in De Fato in order to have a word in Latin that corresponded to the Greek ‘etikos’ (De Fato 
1; Cicero 1942).
6 Rendering ‘eudaimonia’ into flourishing is of course not perfect because it has botanical connotations 
and human beings are not plants. Nevertheless it makes sense to speak about human flourishing 
because just like a plant needs certain conditions in order to flourish so does a human being. For 
example a human being needs oxygen in order to live and friends around in order to live well.
7 In Greek ‘eudaimon’ is a compound word consisting of ‘eu’ meaning ‘good’ and ‘daimon’ meaning 
‘spirit. 
8 Aristotle is pretty scornful about the life of pleasure and enjoyment. People in pursuit of pleasures as 




































46 life precisely because it is a goal in itself and not a means to something else. To 
clarify, one might say that everything we do in life must contribute to the high-
est good – to ‘eudaimonia’ – regardless if it involves embarking on a particular 
education, establishing a family or buying an ice-cream on the way home from 
work. If a person embarks on activities that do not contribute to her flourishing 
– on activities that makes the person languish – then that person is successfully 
combating her own flourishing. Elevating flourishing to be one’s ultimate goal 
in life and then not pursuing it is contradictory, self-defeating and a sign of 
extreme folly.
This is all very well and especially so for the person leaning towards the 
wisdom of the peripatetic philosopher from Stagira, but how does one actu-
ally flourish? Well, herein lies the rub, because it is difficult to find a rendition 
of flourishing – let alone a definition of the concept that satisfies every stake-
holder. In our age the people invested in human flourishing are varied and 
diverse, and sometimes one will find advocates that are downright antagonis-
tic in comparison. To exemplify, let us take a brief look at two very different 
attitudes to flourishing, beginning with Aristotle’s.
As mentioned, Aristotle equates human flourishing with the summum 
bonum, which he defines as:
The active exercise of [the] soul’s faculties in conformity with excellence or 
virtues, or if there be several human excellences or virtues, in conformity 
with the best and most perfect among them. Moreover this activity must 
occupy a complete lifetime. (NE 1, 1098a15-20)
Aristotle’s definition is particular because it presents human flourishing as an 
activity and something that requires the development and display of virtues. 
Having said that, it is also troublesome because judging from the definition it 
is not entirely clear what The Philosopher9 means by bios teleios or ‘complete 
lifetime’. He might be referring to ‘a long life’ or a ‘whole life’, which certainly 
makes sense given that he in relation to the above quotation states that ‘one 
swallow does not make a spring, nor does one sunny day’ (NE 1, 1098a18-19) 
and later puts forth the somewhat controversial statement that ‘children can-
not be happy’ (NE 1, 1100a1). To Aristotle it simply does not make sense to talk 
about a flourishing life if one merely flourishes during a brief period, nor does 
it make sense to speak about the flourishing of children because they are ateles, 
immature or incomplete, and have as it were not yet embarked on a life aim-























































47ing at human flourishing.10 Further evidence that Aristotle thinks of bios teleios 
as a whole or long life can be found in his often ignored companion piece to 
the Nicomachean Ethics, The Politics, where he puts forth that practical wisdom or 
intellectual prime does not manifest until one reaches the age of fifty or therea-
bouts, indicating that for him flourishing was an ongoing exercise extending 
beyond middle age (Politics 7, 1329a1).11
Many a contemporary philosopher advocating human flourishing would 
probably support the idea that flourishing is something that happens over 
the course of a whole human life, because a life cut short prevents a person 
from flourishing in the fullest sense or to her fullest potential. Furthermore, 
it would seem that most people need a certain amount of time to develop the 
virtues needed in order to live well because appetites, feelings and emotions are 
not easily understood, least of all moderated.
However, most people are not all people and if, for example, a Christian 
were to speak about human flourishing that person would not necessarily 
agree with Aristotle about bios teleios or the notion that flourishing takes place 
over a whole life. Writer, public speaker and former executive editor of Christi-
anity Today Andy Crouch is one such Christian and he explains that for human 
flourishing to have any meaning for Christians it must be infused with Chris-
tian content and that involves looking to Jesus of Nazareth as an exemplar of 
flourishing or, to put it differently, it involves looking at Jesus’ human life as a 
picture of human flourishing. According to Crouch, this means that flourish-
ing is not about being affluent, owning a home, being popular or – important 
to our current endeavour – living a long life, but involves as he puts it “a kind of 
profound truthfulness to God and other people [that] leads to healing for other 
people and to the driving out of the demonic” (Crouch 2017).
In comparison, Aristotle and Crouch’s respective views are at odds because 
whereas Aristotle seems to say that flourishing is something that happens over 
the cause of a long or whole life, Crouch holds that longevity is irrelevant to 
flourishing. The reason behind Crouch’s attitude is at least twofold. First of all, 
Jesus did not live to become an old man as Aristotle12 did but died by Roman 
hands at thirty-three, nailed to a wooden cross. Thus, if Jesus represents the 
10 For more information on the problem of Aristotle’s bios teleios see (1995).
11 I am grateful to philosopher C.D.C. Reeve of the University of North Carolina and Chapel Hill for 
pointing this out.
12 In biographer Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of the Eminent Philosophers we find that there is some uncer-
tainty about at what age Aristotle died and under what circumstances. Laertius holds that according 
to Eumelus Aristotle died at the age of seventy owing his demise to drinking wolfsbane. He also refers 
to Apollodorus who claims Aristotle died at sixty-three of natural causes. (Diogenes Laertius 2018, 




































48 flourishing person par excellence it follows that a long life is not an impor-
tant factor when it comes to living well. Secondly, many a Christian thinks that 
when Jesus began his ministry he was already a paragon of virtue, because his 
humanity and divinity at this particular stage was unified in one hypostasis or 
individual existence. In other words, Jesus was perfect during his ministry and 
thus in no need of flourishing.
If my interpretation of Crouch’s view is correct the Christian position is – 
philosophically speaking – somewhat problematic. This paper does not allow 
for a full exposition of why this is true, but in order to manifest why the neo-
Aristotelian approach to flourishing dealing in a thick, vague description of 
how we ought to live is favourable and more robust, I will in what follows high-
light a few problems with Christian flourishing.
First of all, the idea that Christ has two natures is paradoxical. This is not 
necessarily a problem for a Christian for whom, as philosopher Søren Kierkeg-
aard writes, faith begins where the thinking ends (Kierkegaard 1989, 52). 
However, it is a problem for a philosopher, for whom paradoxes are wonder 
inducing and a sign that something is odd or not quite right. 
If we for argument’s sake were to bypass this particular paradox, we would 
face yet another conundrum involving in what sense Jesus actually flourished 
and if his divine flourishing (if we can indeed speak about such a thing) is at 
all relatable to creatures like us who only harbour one nature – a human one.
Now a Christian with reference to the notion of Christ’s double nature 
could well hold that Jesus is very relatable indeed and a perfect exemplar of 
flourishing precisely because of his humanity. However, such a stance invites 
questions about how Jesus actually flourished and this means that not only are 
the years revolving around his ministry important, but his entire thirty-three 
year old life is of importance. If Jesus’ development could somehow be imi-
tated, copied or otherwise emulated a well-lived life would in theory be more 
or less guaranteed for the person seeking human flourishing. Alas we know 
practically nothing about the greater portion of Jesus’ life. The so-called ‘silent 
years’, understood as the period between when Jesus was twelve and when he 
was thirty is an utter mystery.13 Now one could, as indicated earlier, insist that 
13 Some hold that Jesus worked as a carpenter during those silent years while others push the apocry-
phal notion that the young Jesus travelled with Joseph of Arimathea to Glastonbury in the south of 
England. This particular legend was immortalised by Romantic poet William Blake in the preface to 
his epic poem Milton: A Poem in Two Books, written between 1804 and 1810, which includes the lines: 
“And did those feet in ancient times, Walk upon England’s green mountains” (Blake 2014, 5). ‘Those 
feet in ancient times’ refers to the young Jesus, and the idea of him strolling about the English coun-
tryside has held a special attraction for many an Englishman ever since. It even inspired the unofficial 
English 1916 anthem ‘Jerusalem’ that, equipped with Blake’s famous lines and moving music written 























































49Jesus’ development is irrelevant because his divine nature makes him supreme, 
equipped with ideal passions and a perfect character, and thus flourishing sim-
ply does not apply to him. However, then the issue of being relatable presents 
itself again because in this light Jesus becomes as far removed from the every-
day life of human beings as any literary ‘Mary Sue’.14 
To press Crouch even further one could ask if it is not also conceivable that 
Jesus would have flourished to a higher degree if he had had the fortune to live 
beyond the age of thirty-three. That he had an interest in flourishing beyond 
his thirty-third year is definitely possible, because according to the gospels of 
Matthew and Mark, Jesus in the ninth hour of languishing on the cross sud-
denly cried out in a loud voice “My God, My God, why hast thou forsaken me?” 
(King James Bible 2007, Matthew, 27:46, and Mark, 15:34). This indicates that 
Jesus could envision a better life than the one he was living while suffering cru-
cifixion, which is important given that we are talking about flourishing – our 
flourishing as human beings to be precise.
So where does all this leave us? Well, it is clear that conceptions of human 
flourishing may greatly differ, and that care has to be taken when we encounter 
or use the concept of flourishing. It also makes clear that we can argue about 
wherein human flourishing consists and that, given human flourishing as a 
concept has gained popularity and in some cases detached itself from its philo-
sophical roots, we must be prepared to discuss human flourishing in various 
arenas so that it remains an embracing concept. At the same time, it brings to 
the table an invitation to wonder deeply15 or reflectively16 about what human 
flourishing actually is, because the matter of which we speak is hazy, subtle and 
difficult to grasp. 
Now in my humble opinion there are three sets of spectacles one must view 
flourishing through in order to get a reasonable grasp of its complexity and 
importance. Common to these spectacles of which the first, as announced, 
focuses on ‘individuality’, the second on ‘relations’ and the third on ‘the politi-
cal’, is their connection to wonder; and this we shall turn to now.
14 A ‘Mary Sue’ is an idealised perfect fictional character with the ability to perform flawlessly without 
any need for studying, training or experience. The term ‘Mary Sue’ originates in a character created 
by Paula Smith in 1973 featuring in the story ‘A Trekkie’s Tale’ published in the Star Trek fanzine 
Menagerie.
15 For an excellent article on ‘deep wonder’, see Schinkel (2017).




































50 On the importance of wonder in human flourishing
A key part of human flourishing is ‘individuality’ and the art of know-ing oneself, understood as the realisation of not only ‘who’ one is but also ‘what’ one is. 
The ‘who’ highlights personal identity, preferences, talents, tastes, traits 
and so forth, indicating that flourishing comes in many forms and that it 
relates to an individual. It really does not matter if you are a banker with an 
interest in house music, an archaic human enjoying making hand stencils or a 
philosopher with a passion for weird fiction. Human flourishing embraces plu-
rality and merely ushers an individual to discover the goods needed in order to 
make her life go well. 
In this respect, wonder is called for because it is neither immediately obvi-
ous nor fixed wherein these goods consist. Naturally, basic goods such as air, 
water, food and so forth are easily identifiable to most people, and to some 
even idiosyncratic goods are identified with ease. To exemplify the latter, the 
pursuit of mathematics and logic was obviously a good for intellectuals par 
excellence Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, because if they were 
not, why would these learned scholars embark on their monumental ten-year 
quest to complete Principia Mathematica? It is hard to imagine anything short of 
talent and enjoyment could propel a laborious undertaking such as theirs for-
ward, especially when we consider that originally the work was supposed to be 
finished within a year and publishing Principia Mathematica ended up costing 
the authors a lot of money. 
The same can be said about rock climber extraordinaire Alex Honnold 
who is the only person in the world to have free soloed El Capitan in Yosemite 
National Park in the United States – and survive. If he did not have a talent for 
climbing and enjoy the activity, surely free soloing – which is extremely dan-
gerous given that there are no ropes involved – would not qualify as a good for 
a man like him.
Now although goods may present themselves as obvious for some people 
one cannot take for granted that this is always the case. Some goods hide in 
murky water and are not easily discovered because they are intertwined with an 
individual’s realisation of what actually stands in the way of that very person’s 
flourishing. To exemplify, a former highly intelligent undergraduate student 
of mine was plagued by ideas that in order to be someone of value, she had to 
engage with deep existential thoughts brought forth by 20th-century think-
ers and celebrate the angst and dark moods her intellectual peers described 
as unavoidable side effects to this singular activity – and prescribed as things 























































51sis-paralysis revolving around how she should live her life until, grounded in 
wonder, she realised that she would flourish to a higher degree if she could 
leave this particular attitude behind. Her wonderment marked a dramatic 
change for the better as it enabled her to finish her profession-orientated edu-
cation, land a stable job, move in with her partner and from here get on with 
her life in a flourishing and, I dare say, happier fashion. 
Moving on to the ‘what’ in individuality, we might say that it differs from 
the ‘who’ in the sense that it is indicative of species-membership and how an 
individual human being’s flourishing is tied up with his or her nature or, to 
put it differently, his or her biology. Wondering about what it means to be a 
member of homo sapiens in a biological sense is crucial for one’s flourishing 
because the good life for a human being is not the same as the good life for an 
American bison, a Komodo dragon or a Box jellyfish. Furthermore, not every 
activity a human being might indulge in is necessarily good for a human per-
son17, meaning that creature-hood acts as a framing mechanism and has a say 
in what goods are actually good for us.
Another way of highlighting the importance of the wondrous ‘what’ in 
individuality is to focus on what kind of a human being one is and compare 
it with trends in society that prescribe a supposed universal human good. To 
illustrate what I have in mind, let us for a moment dwell on the fact that every-
one is born with a different skin type. Measured against the Fitzpatrick scale, 
I personally score a whooping II, meaning that I tan minimally and my skin 
burns quite easily when exposed to sunlight. Given that I live in the northern 
hemisphere this is not too much of a problem, but if I were to move to Port 
Hedland in Western Australia or Yuma in the U.S. state of Arizona, two of the 
most sunniest places on the planet, I would have to be very mindful of protect-
ing my skin because it simply could not handle a dramatic increase in exposure 
to UV light. Unless I adapted and actively sought to protect myself against the 
damaging rays, I would risk developing burns and eventually a melanoma of 
17 A common attitude is that only human beings are persons and thus a reference to ‘human persons’ 
may seem an unnecessary sophistication. However, it is highly problematic to outright deny non-
human animals personhood, and it seems that most parties invested in this singular view are fuelled 
by a desire to simply deny non-human animals moral status and are not interested in personhood as 
such. If we adopt philosopher Peter Singer’s view of personhood, stating roughly that in order to be a 
person one must have an awareness of self over time, it seems quite possible that complex mammals 
like an orangutan, the large arboreal ape living in Borneo and Sumatra, may qualify as person as much 
as a human being does (Singer 1999, 110-117). Naturally, this allows us to marvel at the possibility that 
human beings are not the only creatures on the planet with moral status and that our desires and pref-
erences do not necessarily trump those of creatures such as an orangutan. Interestingly, particularly 
people living in the West might also be exercising a certain cultural bias when it comes to attitudes 
towards non-human persons because if we look closer at the 17th-century Malay word orangutan it 




































52 sorts and, in the worst-case scenario, die prematurely (Calzavara-Pinton et al. 
2018). 
Now, I grew up in Denmark in the 1980s and 90s, a period where being 
blond and sporting a dark tan was highly fashionable for men and considered 
a good in popular culture. This view was echoed in magazines and films, with 
male actors such as Rutger Hauer, Don Johnson and Julian Sands as unques-
tionable exemplars. Being somewhat blonder than I am today, naïve and eager 
to cut an attractive figure, I would spend a good part of my summers doing 
my best to tan. And when the days got shorter I, like so many others, would 
occasionally substitute the natural sun with the tanning bed. I continued this 
practice until, in my twenties, I moved to central London to work at what was 
then called Middlesex Hospital. During my time in London I enjoyed a con-
versation with a physician of Indian descent who, when I informed him about 
my relationship with the ‘sun’, firmly looked me in the eye and told me that if I 
did not change my extreme ways I, based on the science available to him, would 
face some form of skin cancer within 20 years. “You are not like me,” he said 
gravely. And the effect was wondrous, because I was unexpectedly lifted out 
of a particular culture of understanding and situated in a larger world where 
the sanity of my culturally induced aesthetic preferences was questioned by a 
medical man whose knowledge of the good for me paid attention not so much 
to ‘who’ I perceived myself to be (or wished to be) at the given time but ‘what’ 
I was.
Moving on, let us now change spectacles and look at human flourishing while 
being mindful of the importance of ‘relations’ in human life. Relationships or 
friendships have had a place in the literature on human flourishing for a long 
time. Plato dedicated parts of the dialogues Lyses, Phaedrus and Symposium to the 
topic. But the most striking of all ancient writing concerning the matter we 
find in book eight of the Nichomachean Ethics, where Aristotle states that a friend 
is another self and that without friends no one would choose to live even if they 
had all other goods at their disposal (NE 9, 1166a31-32).
To capture some of the rationale behind this remarkable view it pays to 
focus on the notion that human beings gain much of the pleasures in life out 
of being with other people. Naturally, this ties in with the continuation of 
the species and family life, but also with how humans provide each other the 
necessities of life, be it food, shelter, comfort, safety or education, to name a 
few. To some this may sound prosaic, but it is nothing less than a marvellous 
feature of human life because no matter how heroic and spectacular a person 
might be, she is not a self-sufficient island. Everything a person has in terms of 























































53person’s labour. Each of us stands on the shoulders of giants18 and we all are in 
one way or another indebted to those who went before us. Unlike shark pups, 
human babies are not miniature  adults and their life, survival and further 
development into someone who can take charge of their flourishing depends 
on relations. 
The dependency of human beings on others is not restricted to infancy; 
human beings depend on others throughout  their whole lives. To illustrate 
this, consider for a moment the Greek legend of Leander and Hero. The two 
lovers live on opposite sides of the Hellespont and every night Leander swims 
across from Abydos to Hero in Sestos, guided by a light she displays. The leg-
end has various components: great emotional upheaval, or love if you will, but 
also the skill of swimming, which one may reasonably assume Leander learned 
from someone he met earlier in his life who, in turn, acquired this skill or was 
inspired to develop this skill from an even earlier source.
Consider also the physician who kindly and quite rightly drew my atten-
tion to the limitations of my fair skin. The knowledge he conveyed to me on 
that memorable day in London many years ago was the fruit of the labour of 
many an inquisitive scientist or physician specialising in dermatology or per-
haps oncology, and whose work he had become familiar with possibly through 
the professors responsible for his education in medicine.
Now, in both cases we are dealing with persons whose actions require par-
ticular skills or knowledge that have been handed down to them; and if any of 
the persons involved ‘sees further’ it is precisely because they are standing on 
the shoulders of giants.19 That, and the notion that human beings need oth-
ers in order to flourish as humans, should thus be quite clear and especially so 
when we consider the beneficiary in the last example.
The fact that human beings depend on one another in order to flourish is 
important, but sometimes the sense of dependency is misperceived or per-
verted, and in such cases wonder is called for. To exemplify, many years ago I 
was working as an intensive care nurse and a lady was brought into the ward 
with multiple fractures to her ribcage, arms and legs. On top of that, her face 
was all bruised. She could hardly see because the tissue around her eyes was 
swollen and disfigured. Before I learned what had happened to her, I consid-
ered the possibility that she had been in a terrible road accident or something 
18 ‘Standing on the shoulders of giants’ originates in the Latin phrase nanos gigantum humeris insidentes 
but there is some controversy concerning who coined the phrase. Some scholars highlight medieval 
philosopher Bernard of Chartres as the source, but medievalist Umberto Eco points out that the apho-
rism originated in the works of medieval grammarian Priscianus Caesariensis (Merton 1993, xlv).
19 Isaac Newton is famous for using the expression “If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoul-




































54 similarly horrific. But when I studied her voluminous medical file I learned, 
to my surprise, that she had fallen down the stairs in her own home. I also 
learned that this was not the first time she suffered a nasty fall, and as I read on 
it dawned on me that there was practically speaking not a single bone in her 
body that hadn’t been broken at some point in her adult life due to some freak 
accident. No one can be that clumsy, I thought, while considering the obvi-
ous – that she was the victim of domestic violence. To cut a long story short, 
the obvious turned out to be correct and, being a nurse with a deep interest 
in my patients’ lives and minds, I set out to discover why on earth a beautiful 
lady in her early thirties with a long life ahead of her would stay in an abusive 
relationship. Four days later I learned the truth, or at least parts of it. She had 
no one in her life except her abusive boyfriend and was convinced that no one 
else in the wide world would ever be interested in her. She loved him, she said, 
and would rather be in a relationship with him than being alone because being 
alone utterly terrified her.
Without getting into a lengthy discussion on the elusive topic of love and 
the pangs of loneliness, I would argue that the outlook of the poor lady is one 
that lacks wonderment; and this partly has to do with her assumption that of 
all the millions of men in the world, only her abusive boyfriend would be inter-
ested in sharing a life with her. There is absolutely no reason for thinking that 
this is the case and her assumption seems to be the product of being subjected 
to tyranny and being extraordinarily vulnerable. Additionally, her inability to 
recognise that her boyfriend’s extreme ways were preventing her from flour-
ishing and would one day in all likelihood be the end of her is (from an external 
point of view) bizarre, devoid of wonder and highlights a disturbing lack of 
self-care. This is deeply regrettable because on top of being a victim of years of 
debilitating domestic abuse, she is also a victim of what one in an extreme case 
like this may describe as the abysmal phantasms of her own mind.
To sum up, human beings are dependent on one another in order to flour-
ish and thus relationships or friendships can rightly be viewed as goods. But 
in order to flourish one must consider very carefully the relationships one has. 
Obviously, some relationships are good and conducive to human flourishing, 
while others are dysfunctional, harmful and only lead to languishing. If the 
latter is to be avoided, it makes sense to set aside a little wonder for Aristotle’s 
notion that a friend is ‘another self’ and just how the implications of this piece 
of wisdom come to bear on our behaviour.
Pushing ahead, let us now put on the third set of spectacles and look at human 
























































55Towards the end of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle announces that the philo-
sophical deliberations he has put forth in relation to the ethical life continue 
on a larger scale in view of human beings as zoon politicon or political animals. 
When it comes to understanding human flourishing, it is not enough to won-
der about individuality and relations alone. We must also consider that human 
beings flourish best in communities. Therefore, it is important to wonder 
about what the constitution or political structure of a community that sup-
ports human flourishing should look like, and if the society in which one lives 
is conducive to flourishing.
As to the question of what a society in support of human flourishing should 
look like, Aristotle provides his answer (or parts of it) in the Politics. However, 
to modern people his vision is troublesome, as it supports slavery and ranks 
men superior to women (Politics 1, 1254b13-14).20 Having said that, Aristotle got 
something right when in the Politics he wrote that the city-state came into being 
for the sake of life but exists for the sake of the good life (Politics 1, 1252b29). 
The purpose of the state is to enable its population to live flourishing lives 
and as the state is comprised of citizens, an important part of a flourishing 
life is to take an interest in public affairs. Failure in this regard jeopardises the 
condition of the state, and increases the risk of citizens not being able to live 
flourishing lives and being subjected to the rule of evil or foolish people.
To put some weight behind these words let us take a brief look at the abhor-
rent practice of female genital mutilation (FGM). FGM is the ancient practice 
of removing parts or all of the female genitalia and the United Nations Popula-
tion Fund (UNFPA) estimates that around 200 million girls and women alive 
today in various countries around the globe have undergone some form of 
FGM (UNFPA 2019). Often the mutilation is done to girls between birth and 
15 years of age who, if they survive, in the aftermath face a life of tremendous 
sufferings in the form of severe pain, urinary tract infection, formations of 
cysts, dyspareunia, sexual dysfunction and childbirth complications, to name 
a few. The rationale behind FGM is rooted in everything from a desire to con-
trol women’s sexuality to myths about uncut clitorises growing to the size of 
penises, religion (or misunderstandings of religion), aesthetics or simply the 
ways of a particular cultural group who offers girls and women the prospect of 
condemnation, harassment and ostracism if they do not subject to the practice 
(UNFPA 2019).
FGM has a colossal negative impact on the flourishing of millions of girls 
and women worldwide and if a community large or small supports the practice 




































56 it fails to support human flourishing. Admittedly, this is a strong statement 
but given a choice and equipped with a full understanding of the consequences 
of FGM, no one would ever choose to submit themselves to such a practice. In 
her 1988 poem ‘My grandmother called it the three feminine sorrows’ Dahabo 
Musa, hailing from Somalia where FGM is widespread, writes: “It is what 
my grandmother called the three feminine sorrows: the day of circumcision, 
the wedding night and the birth of a baby” (Abdalla 2006, 187). Now, none of 
these events need to be associated with sorrow but should instead be sources 
of flourishing, which is perfectly possible, but it demands at the very least that 
one’s genitals are intact. FGM is an age-old institution – a deeply problematic 
practice supported by enduring political structures blind to human female 
flourishing and its discontinuation is absolutely desirable.21
Through the lens of human flourishing it is remarkable that an unbearable 
practice like FGM can endure and continue to play a central role in many com-
munities worldwide. It is illustrative not only of how important it is for each 
one of us to wonder about the structure of the society in which we live, but also 
how important it is that we take part in crafting our societies. Not all the rules 
and regulations, social mores or cultural practices that frame us are conducive 
to human flourishing. But all of them are there because human beings have 
put them there and continue to support them. Wonder is called for in terms of 
‘the political’ because as much as we might acknowledge that we stand on the 
shoulders of giants, we should also acknowledge that in some aspects we might 
be standing on the shoulders of fools, and that is not a compliment nor in any 
way praiseworthy.
Wonder plays an important role in human flourishing because it takes won-
der to discover how we might flourish as the kinds of creatures we are. This 
paper has pointed out three different lenses – ‘individuality’, ‘relations’ and 
‘the political’ – through which important parts of flourishing becomes visible. 
To conclude, I would like to say that I honestly hope that I have been of inspira-
tion, but should I have been merely a shadow that has offended, think of this 
and all is mended. The themes with which we have been engaged are delicate 
but of the utmost importance, because they concern the way we live our very 
lives, and you are invited to help sort things out.
21 A world without FGM will even help men flourish to a larger extent. A father would never have to fear 
that his child would suffer needlessly at the hands of others within his own community. A husband 
would never have to fear the wedding night and the amount of pain and suffering he would bring to 
his wife. Finally, a husband would not have to fear the birth of his child as much because his wife’s 
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W hy should we educate people? And why does the answer matter? It matters because understanding why we should teach can shed light on how and what we should teach. Plato and Aristotle – both 
hugely concerned with the manner and content of education – assert as a gen-
eral methodological principle that, if you want to know how something should 
be, or what a good version of that thing is, you should first ask what it is for. 
Applying this principle to the philosophy of education, if we want to know 
what a good educational system looks like, we should first ask what the pur-
pose of education is (or purposes, if there are more than one). Once we know 
why we should educate people, then we’ll be positioned to identify better or 
worse ways of educating by how well those educational systems fulfil their 
purpose.1 In the same vein, the purpose of education can provide a criterion by 
which to determine something’s importance to education – the importance of 
wonder, for example.
This paper first defends and explores one important reason why we should 
educate people, namely that education can enable people to flourish or live 
well. According to the account I defend, for someone to flourish is for them 
to successfully engage in activities which they subjectively value and which 
are objectively valuable (in the sense of being appropriate objects of subjective 
valuing). In addition to its many instrumental benefits, education can directly 
enable people to live well by exposing them to valuable activities, by creat-
ing opportunities to engage in and to come to value these activities, and by 
1 This general teleological approach to education has been advocated by other contemporary philoso-



























providing the skills and information necessary to succeed in these activities. 
Next, I demonstrate how to move from the ‘why?’ of education to the ‘how?’ 
by arguing that, to fulfil the purpose of enabling flourishing, education should 
be quite general. That is, a good education will include instruction in a wide 
variety of activities: diverse academic subjects, but also artistic, athletic, techni-
cal and social ones. Finally, I suggest how to apply the same line of reasoning to 
the question of the role of wonder in education. If certain assumptions about 
wonder obtain, then we should also strive to educate in a way that instils won-
der in students.
We should educate people to enable them to flourish
T he first principle claim I wish to establish is that we should educate people in order to enable them to flourish. In other words, I claim that enabling flourishing is an important aim of education. I am not the 
first to make this claim.2 But other authors in the philosophy of education who 
appeal to this aim tend to focus on how we should educate in light of this end – 
as I do in the second half of this paper. Arguments that flourishing is in fact an 
aim of education are often less explicit than they could be.3 This is a gap which 
bears filling if we are to make the strongest case for educating for flourishing. 
I will therefore present an explicit argument for the claim that enabling flour-
ishing is an important aim of education.
This claim admits of at least two readings, one stronger and one weaker. 
The stronger reading is that the only fundamental reason we should educate 
is that it contributes to human flourishing, i.e., that human flourishing is 
the sole ultimate aim or purpose of education. This claim is strong, but not 
implausible. It is entailed by the kind of eudaimonist normative ethical theory 
I defend in other work, according to which all actions, institutions and so on 
are ultimately ethically justified by their contribution to flourishing (Moore 
n.d.). If the sole ultimate aim of all our actions and institutions is human flour-
ishing (for the purposes of ethical justification), then a fortiori flourishing is 
the sole ultimate aim of our educational actions and institutions. This is not 
to say that education cannot also serve other aims, such as the acquisition of 
knowledge (Robertson 2009), the cultivation of critical thinking or rational 
2 See, for example, Marples (1999b), de Ruyter (2004; 2007; 2015), White (2007), Brighouse (2008) and 
Kristjánsson (2020).
3 Wolbert, de Ruyter, and Schinkel (2015) do offer, as their title puts it, “the first step in defending flour-
ishing as an ideal aim of education”, which consists of formal criteria for the concept of flourishing. 
These criteria are discussed below, in section 3.2.
62 autonomy (Scheffler 1973; Siegel 1988), or the cultivation of moral or civic vir-
tue (Brighouse 2009).4 But according to this strong, eudaimonist reading, any 
other aim of education must itself also serve the ultimate aim of flourishing (as, 
for example, rational and civic virtues plausibly do in many cases).
While I think the stronger reading is defensible and attractive, I will here 
defend a weaker and less controversial reading, namely that human flourish-
ing is at least one important aim of education and that we should thus educate 
people, and educate them in such a way as to enable their flourishing, all else 
equal. This recommendation is defeasible. It leaves open whether there are 
other aims of education worth pursuing independently of their contribution 
to flourishing. If educating to enable flourishing conflicts with some other 
important aim of education, we may even have most reason not to educate in 
the way that best enables flourishing. But in the absence of such conflicts, we 
should educate in whatever practically feasible ways best enable flourishing. 
To put this defeasible claim another way, we have strong (but not necessarily 
decisive) reason5 to educate and to do so in such a way as to enable flourishing.
The argument for this claim is simple. First, we have strong reason to enable 
people to flourish. Second, education can enable people to flourish. Therefore, 
we have strong reason to educate people and to educate them in such a way as to 
enable them to flourish. This is an instance of a general pattern of good practi-
cal reasoning: if you have reason to do X, and doing Y can be a way of doing X, 
then you have reason to do Y and to do Y in such a way as to do X. I assume that 
having strong reason to educate in such a way as to enable flourishing is suf-
ficient for flourishing to count as an aim of education.
Definitions of terms
I will defend each of the two premises of this argument below, but first we 
should clarify some of the terms of the argument. First, what is education? It 
will certainly include formal, institutionalised schooling – primary, secondary 
and higher education. But it is not necessary to restrict ‘education’ to formal 
instruction. It can also include informal instruction by, e.g., parents, coaches, 
job supervisors, clergy, peers, etc. Nor need we restrict the content of educa-
tion to traditional school subjects in the humanities, arts and sciences. It can 
also include socialisation and moral upbringing, religious instruction, tech-
4 For further discussion of the idea of aims of education, and of particular potential aims, see Marples 
(1999a). Note that I am only concerned with the aims of education in a normative sense, not in a 
psychological or sociological sense of what an individual or collective is actually trying to achieve 
by educating. We can perhaps think of the normative aims of education as what our psychological/
sociological aims should be.























































63nical and athletic training, and any other transmission of knowledge or skill. 
At least at the outset, we should be open to using ‘education’ in its broadest 
possible sense. As we fill in the details of how education enables flourishing, 
we will see just what kind of education is justified by this eudaimonistic aim. 
This will help us decide how to construe ‘education’. But for now, let us adopt 
an unrestricted sense as a preliminary gloss.6
Second, who are the ‘we’ who should be doing the educating? All of us, 
collectively – that is, any collective body of people that constitutes a society, 
up to the limit case of a global society comprising all people. The claim being 
advanced is that the members of any society collectively have a strong reason 
to educate. This does not imply that any given individual has decisive reason 
to educate instead of doing other worthwhile things. The collective respon-
sibility7 to educate is best fulfilled by a division of labour. Thus, we have 
professional educators for academic subjects, as well as e.g., parents, clergy, 
coaches, piano teachers and yoga instructors to teach other things. But we also 
have many other productive members of society, from politicians to publishers 
to postal workers, who do little to no educating in their individual roles but 
who do, collectively, make education possible by contributing to the economy 
and government.
Who should receive this education and who should be enabled to flourish? 
I contend that we should enable all people to flourish, insofar as we can. Mem-
bers of a given society have a collective responsibility to enable the flourishing 
of all the members of that society. If we are members of a global society of all 
people, then we have a collective responsibility to enable all people’s flourish-
ing. If, as I argue, education can enable people to flourish, then we have reason 
to educate anyone who can benefit from it. The young are the paradigmatic 
beneficiaries of education and we have special reason to make their education 
compulsory, though I contend that education should be available to all, regard-
less of age, to enable everyone’s flourishing.
6 As Schinkel (2017) notes, education need not even involve a distinct instructor and student. It may 
include learning for oneself and education by experience. My claim is that we should educate peo-
ple to enable their flourishing, and that is consistent with the claim that individuals should educate 
themselves to enable their own flourishing. My focus is on the more general principle, but I am happy 
to grant the special case.
7 I speak colloquially in terms of a collective responsibility, though, strictly speaking, I do not insist 
that our strong reason to educate entails a moral, rational, or otherwise normative requirement. I claim 
only that we have strong reason to educate, which may be outweighed or cancelled by other consid-
erations, and that we should educate, in the sense of an all-else-equal ethical recommendation, not 


























64 We have strong reason to enable people to flourish
N ow that we have clarified some of the terms of the main argument, let us defend its premises. The first premise, that we have strong reason to enable people to flourish, is hopefully intuitive. In abstract terms, 
human flourishing is whatever makes a person’s life well lived or a good life. 
And it seems important for people to live good lives. I certainly have strong 
reason to realise my own flourishing. To anyone but a staunch egoist, it will 
seem equally clear that we all have strong reason to help realise other people’s 
flourishing when we can.
If this sounds less than convincing, it is because we are approaching the 
limits of argument. We are asking questions about our fundamental aims and 
values, not just in education but in life.8 But we can perhaps further motivate 
the claim that human flourishing is an important good by making the concept 
more concrete. In what, then, does flourishing consist? Various answers have 
been put forward. It is standard to divide theories of well-being – a concept 
which includes that of flourishing – into two main categories (Parfit 1986, 492-
502; Crisp 2001; de Ruyter 2015, 87-88). On the one hand are subjective theories, 
which take well-being to depend on people’s attitudes or to consist ultimately 
in people’s mental states, such as pleasure or desires. On the other are objec-
tive theories, which take well-being to be constituted by objective goods such 
as friendship, knowledge, virtue or achievement, independently of anyone’s 
subjective attitude towards these things.9
Yet there is also growing interest in hybrid theories combining these two 
positions, both within and beyond the philosophy of education. The concep-
tions of flourishing put forward as the aim of education by White (2007), de 
Ruyter (2004; 2007; 2015) and Curren (2013) all combine subjective and objec-
tive components. They consist of having or doing good things while having 
fitting positive attitudes towards those things. Similar hybrid theories have 
been advocated outside the context of education as a conception of well-being 
(Raz 1986, 294-299; Darwall 2002) and as a conception of meaning in life (Wolf 
2010). Following these authors, I will here defend a hybrid values theory as a 
conception of human flourishing (but not necessarily one of well-being, which 
8 This natural limitation might be why other authors tend not to offer fully explicit arguments for 
the claim that flourishing is an aim (or the aim) of education. My position, however, is that the limit 
of argument lies at the level of the aim(s) of life, not of education. There is room for argument that 
flourishing is an aim of education partly in virtue of the fact that it is an aim of life, as I am arguing.
9 Excepting, of course, any attitudes which may (partially) constitute these objective goods, perhaps 
even including self-referential attitudes towards the goods – say, if valuing a friendship is partially 























































65I consider a broader notion). On my conception, a human being flourishes by 
successfully engaging in activities which they subjectively value and which are 
objectively valuable (Moore n.d.). This is what I have in mind when I claim that 
education can and should enable human flourishing.10 There is not space here 
to offer a full defence of this conception, but I will explain it and attempt to 
motivate it.
Necessary conditions of human flourishing
First, on my conception, flourishing consists in activity, not merely in having 
or being in certain states. As already mentioned, many theorists of well-being 
suppose that it benefits a person to experience pleasure, to have their desires 
satisfied, or to possess any of a number of objective goods like having knowl-
edge. And any or all of these may be correct, as far as concerns what is good 
for or benefits a person in any way, no matter how slightly. But the concept 
of human flourishing, as I use it, is narrower than that of well-being. Human 
flourishing and its constituents are specifically what make a whole human life 
go well. A flourishing life is one that is meaningful, worth living and worth 
celebrating, rather than pointless, regrettable or tragic. And I take it that no 
amount of pleasure, desire satisfaction or knowledge is enough on its own to 
make a whole life go well, though it might make a person better off in a more 
modest way. At least one reason why is that these are states which, in principle, 
one could have or be in totally passively. Someone could give you pleasure or 
knowledge, or satisfy your desires, without you lifting a finger, by stimulating 
you (or your brain) in the right way, by presenting you with sufficient evidence 
for a claim, or by doing whatever it is you desire on your behalf. But a passive 
life full of other-produced pleasure, desire satisfaction or knowledge would not 
be a well-lived life. A flourishing life requires not simply having good things 
done for you but doing things for yourself – for example, satisfying your own 
desires, seeking and discovering knowledge, or pursuing something pleasant.
But not just any activity can constitute or contribute to flourishing. For 
example, intuitively, it would not contribute to a well-lived life to pursue 
sadistic pleasure or to satisfy sadistic desires by actively harming others. Nei-
ther would it constitute flourishing to pursue a mission of turning on as many 
televisions as possible. The activities which constitute flourishing need to be 
10 If another conception of flourishing were correct, it might still be true that education can and should 
enable flourishing (on that conception). Aristotle, for example, held that human flourishing consists 
in the exercise of human virtues like justice, courage, moderation, and wisdom. He also believed that 
acquiring such virtues requires proper education in addition to practice. As a result, a central purpose 



























66 valuable in a way that immoral or pointless activities like these are not. I call 
this value, or valuableness, ‘objective’ to distinguish it from the subjective 
value which an individual might ascribe to an object or activity. It is possible 
for someone to subjectively value sadistic or pointless activities even though 
they are not objectively valuable.
There are many views on offer about what it is to be objectively valuable 
and the conditions which make something valuable, and here I wish to remain 
ecumenical. It should be relatively uncontroversial to say that something is val-
uable just in case it is an appropriate object of subjective valuing. For present 
purposes, I do not wish to commit to any view about which side of this bicon-
ditional has explanatory or definitional priority, or to any view about whether 
the objective value in question is natural or non-natural, mind-dependent or 
mind-independent, or agent-relative or agent-neutral. For all I’ll say, there 
may be one and the same set of valuable activities for everyone, or different 
activities may be valuable for different people depending on their capabilities 
and attitudes. I also prescind from a particular theory of the conditions which 
make something objectively valuable, e.g., that it is pleasant or conducive to 
pleasure, or that it exercises distinctively human capacities. Instead I will rely 
on plausible paradigms of objectively valuable activities, such as engaging in 
loving relationships or cultural practices, pursuing stimulating or socially use-
ful careers or hobbies, and generating intellectual, creative, skilful or athletic 
achievements. Any such activity can presumably contribute to a life’s being 
well lived and flourishing.
Objectively valuable activities are still not sufficient for flourishing, how-
ever. Parenting is a paradigmatic valuable activity that can contribute to 
making a life go well. But the activity of parenting would not contribute to the 
flourishing of a woman who did not want to be a parent, who only had children 
as a result of social pressure and not for any authentic desire on her part. Cook-
ing is another valuable activity, but the line cook in the chain restaurant who 
views it merely as a way to pay his bills is not made to flourish by cooking. For 
someone to flourish by engaging in a valuable activity, they must also subjec-
tively value that activity. 
Just as there are different philosophical theories of objective value, so 
with subjective valuing. Again, I wish to remain neutral. I think it safe to say 
that valuing something involves, at least, being positively emotionally and 
behaviourally disposed towards the thing. It seems also to involve endorsing 
or stably identifying with this positive attitude or disposition, which distin-
guishes valuing from merely liking or wanting (Raibley 2013). But whatever 
the best philosophical account of it is, the phenomenon of valuing, of loving 























































67requires subjectively valuing and engaging in objectively valuable activities, 
i.e. activities that are the appropriate objects of subjective valuing.
At least one more condition is still necessary. A chef who loved cook-
ing would not flourish by cooking if they happened to burn every dish they 
attempted to make or consistently prepared food that was just a little off. A 
teacher who valued teaching would not flourish by teaching if all of their stu-
dents failed to meet the learning goals of the course. To flourish, one must have 
some measure of success in one’s valued, valuable activities. This means that 
flourishing is never entirely up to us but depends on external circumstances 
outside our full control. For a parent to flourish through parenting, their 
children must survive and, ideally, thrive, which requires much that is out of 
the parent’s hands. But what counts as success can vary widely depending on 
the activity and one’s interests in it, and so we can have some control over our 
standards for success. One athlete may find success only in winning first place; 
another may find success merely in competing or in having fun.11 Whatever the 
relevant standards of success are, or what determines them, one must success-
fully engage in valuable activities one values in order to flourish.
Thus, we have reached our conception of flourishing as successfully engag-
ing in objectively valuable activities which the agent subjectively values. I take 
no issue with other, similar formulations, such as White’s conception of flour-
ishing as “success in worthwhile activities and relationships which [people] 
have freely engaged in and which they pursue wholeheartedly” (2007, 25) or 
Curren’s as “admirable and satisfying activity” that is “successful in relevant 
respects” (2013, 239).
Formal criteria of flourishing
As a way of further supporting this conception, it is worth pausing to note how 
well it fits the formal criteria for a concept of human flourishing proposed by 
Wolbert, de Ruyter and Schinkel (2015). That is, it takes flourishing to consist 
in activities (or ‘dynamic states’, their criterion 2b) that are objectively valuable 
(or ‘objectively good’, their criterion 2c). Moreover, flourishing on this concep-
tion is about a whole life (2a) and is intrinsically worthwhile (criterion 1). The 
only criterion of theirs for which there is some question is their criterion 2, 
which states that flourishing is (or ‘means’) the actualisation of human poten-
tial. Insofar as criterion 2 is spelled out by sub-criteria 2a-c, my conception of 
flourishing would appear to satisfy criterion 2 by satisfying 2a-c.
11 This is not to say that individuals can entirely determine their own standards of success. There may be 
limits set by social practices or expectations, or by the nature of the activity in question. For example, 


























68 Yet it is not clear whether my conception meets the letter or spirit of criterion 2 
itself. This is due to an ambiguity in the way in which we might use the notion 
of human potential. In a capacious sense, any activity performed by a human 
being is necessarily the actualisation of human potential, for that human 
must have had the potential to perform the activity and, in performing it, this 
potential is actualised. Any conception that considered flourishing to consist 
in activity would trivially satisfy criterion 2 in this sense. 
A more restrictive sense of human potential would be distinctly human 
potential. This is the sense that Aristotle has in mind when he writes that flour-
ishing is the actualisation of the distinctively human capacities for theoretical 
and practical reasoning. My conception of flourishing may not meet criterion 
2 on this construal of human potential, since it may not be true that all objec-
tively valuable activities are distinctively human. Certainly, child-rearing and 
socialising with peers are valuable activities, if anything is, and yet they appear 
throughout the animal kingdom, though there are perhaps distinctively 
human forms. If formal criterion 2 of the concept of flourishing is intended 
in this restrictive sense and these activities are not included among the dis-
tinctively human ones, so much the worse for criterion 2. However, if we think 
that the actualisation of distinctively human potential is a good account of 
which activities are objectively valuable (for humans), including paradigmatic 
valuable activities like engaging in loving relationships, then my hybrid values 
conception of flourishing can satisfy criterion 2 in its entirety.
Unnecessary conditions?
I have argued that these four conditions – activity, objective value, subjective 
valuing and success – are all necessary for flourishing. Other theorists of flour-
ishing may consider other candidate conditions conspicuously absent from 
this account. For example, contra Aristotle and modern Neo-Aristotelians (e.g., 
Annas 1993; 2011; Hursthouse 1999), I have said nothing about virtue, let alone 
specifically moral virtue. I have not claimed that flourishing requires an expe-
rience of satisfaction or contentment, or what Kristjánsson (2020) calls ‘flow’ 
(borrowing the concept from Csikszentmihalyi 1990). Neither do I claim that 
flourishing requires perfection, optimisation or any particular relation to an 
ideal (cf. de Ruyter 2007; 2012).
In other work I argue that my four necessary conditions are also jointly suf-
ficient – that flourishing does not require these other conditions, though they 
may all be additional goods beyond flourishing. However, I need not prove or 
rely on the sufficiency claim here. It would not affect the present argument or 
the arguments to come if there were additional necessary conditions. This is 























































69of education and, second, to give two kinds of examples of how we should 
educate in light of this fact. I take it that, if flourishing does have additional 
necessary conditions, we will still have no less reason to realise the four neces-
sary conditions for which I’ve argued. And these four conditions of flourishing 
by themselves will help us establish that education should be general and, 
pending certain hypotheses, wonder inducing. Thus, in what follows, I will 
assume that my four necessary conditions are also jointly sufficient, though 
this is strictly for convenience. There may be further interesting implications 
for education if there are indeed additional necessary conditions of flourish-
ing, but I leave these for others to explore.
We said before that human flourishing, in the abstract, is an important 
good, something we have strong reason to realise, even if it is not the only such 
good. This is hopefully no less plausible for the specific conception of flourish-
ing here advanced: we have strong reasons to contribute to people successfully 
engaging in valuable activities they value. The examples discussed to motivate 
the values conception of flourishing serve doubly to motivate the importance 
and goodness of flourishing on this conception.
Education can enable people to flourish
L et us suppose, then, that human flourishing is an important aim sim-pliciter. To establish that enabling flourishing is an important aim of education, the next step is to show that education can in fact enable 
flourishing. To do this, we should first examine how flourishing is enabled in 
general.
Enabling human flourishing
What is it to enable human flourishing? To enable something in general is to 
make it more likely or more possible.12 The presence of oxygen is an enabling 
12 On some theories of modality, it may not make sense to speak of making something more possible. 
Some might prefer to speak in terms of rendering possibilities more nearby or remote. I prefer to 
think in terms of making possibilities more accessible. The kind of accessibility I have in mind is the 
kind involved in distinguishing mere possibilities which will never be actual from those possibilities 
which can be actualised. For instance, it was possible, in some sense, for me to be six inches taller than 
I actually am, but that possibility will never be actualised – it is inaccessible to us in the actual world. 
Similarly it was possible, in some sense, for Napoleon to win the Battle of Waterloo, but that possibil-
ity too is no longer accessible to us in the actual world. I take it that actual events can render certain 
possibilities more or less accessible. For example, my informing you about the release of a new movie 
makes the possibility of seeing the movie more accessible to you – even if you were never actually 


























70 condition of fire, for example, since it makes combustion more possible than 
it otherwise would be, even though oxygen alone does not cause combustion. 
Not all enabling conditions are strictly necessary for the events they enable. 
Teachers who make the expectations for assignments clear and explicit thereby 
enable their students to do well on the assignments, even though it is possi-
ble for students to succeed on their own without clear and explicit direction. 
Expressly stated expectations simply make student success more likely or more 
possible.
There are a wide variety of conditions which enable people to flourish. I will 
draw attention to two main categories. First, flourishing requires resources, 
both those which are necessary simply to live and act at all, such as food and 
health, and those which are necessary for particular valuable activities, such as 
relevant information, skills and materials (e.g., flutes for flute playing, books 
for research, etc.). We need some such resources in order to flourish at all. But 
we are also better able to flourish when access to such resources is reliable 
across time and across possible changes in external circumstance and the wills 
of other agents. Our access to resources is more reliable when, for example, we 
have loved ones who will provide resources in adverse circumstances, when we 
have purchased insurance, or when the state guarantees the provision of those 
resources. 
Call this reliable access to resources ‘security’. With security, we can spend 
or risk our current time, energy and resources on valuable activities that we 
value, unconcerned that our resources will run out. Without security, we would 
instead be preoccupied with, e.g., avoiding risks to health and with simply 
securing resources like food and shelter in the near future through less valu-
able activities. So, while security may not be strictly necessary to flourish – it 
may be possible to flourish in adverse and insecure circumstances – security 
makes flourishing more likely or possible.
The second category of enabling conditions concerns our available options. 
In order to flourish, some valuable activities must be options for us in the sense 
that it is possible, i.e. within our power, to knowingly and deliberately engage 
in them. Our flourishing is better enabled when these options are also viable 
in the sense that nothing prohibitively bad will foreseeably happen as a result 
of choosing them – for example, when I will not be persecuted for my religious 
practices or fired for the results of my research. We are even more able and likely 
to flourish when we have a large number and variety of such viable options of 
valuable activities to pursue and ways in which to pursue them. When more 
valuable activities are viable options for us, we are more likely to find some valu-
able activity which we subjectively value and are able to successfully engage in. 























































71across time and across possible changes in external circumstances and the wills 
of other agents.
Call a reliably wide range of viable options ‘discretion’. With discretion, 
we can engage in some valuable activities now, unconcerned that these or any 
other particular valuable activities will cease to be viable options in the future. 
Even if some options become closed, plenty of others will still be available. 
Discretion is especially important given that our values, interests and abilities 
often change through time – an athlete’s body ages and weakens, a researcher 
loses interest in the questions that once gripped her, etc. Without discretion, 
we will be lucky if, at any given time, we happen to have one or a few valuable 
activities which we value and can succeed in. While discretion, too, may not be 
strictly necessary to flourish – we could get lucky and happen to value the one 
valuable activity available to us – discretion makes flourishing more likely or 
possible.
How education can enable flourishing
How does education in particular enable flourishing? In the first place, edu-
cation enables flourishing purely instrumentally. The knowledge and skills 
acquired through education are often useful for pursuing any end successfully. 
A fortiori these knowledge and skills are often useful for successfully engaging 
in valuable activities one values. Moreover, education is often instrumental 
to having discretion and security. In our society, education tends to increase 
one’s opportunities for employment, which in turn tends to increase the reli-
ability of one’s access to resources, healthcare, etc. And wide-scale education 
has instrumental benefits for economic growth and stability, which in turn 
increases the reliability of many people’s access to necessary resources. I pass 
over these instrumental benefits quickly because the personal and economic 
benefits of education are already well explored and plausibly contribute to any 
end of education, not uniquely the end of enabling human flourishing.
Education can also enable flourishing more directly (and more interest-
ingly) by providing students with more viable options of valuable activities 
to pursue, thus increasing discretion. First, acquiring knowledge and skills 
through learning is a valuable activity in its own right. Students who value 
learning can therefore flourish simply by successfully engaging in the activity 
of learning. So providing education directly creates opportunities for students 
to flourish – at least those students who value education and learning.13
13 Note that the same can be said for teaching. Teaching is also a valuable activity and so those who value 


























72 But education also creates opportunities to engage in many other valuable 
activities beyond learning itself and so can enable flourishing even for those 
students who do not value learning as such. Education in academic subjects, 
for example, prepares students to engage in the valuable activities involved in 
research into and appreciation of language, history, chemistry, mathematics, 
biology, economics, philosophy, and so on. Technical education prepares stu-
dents to pursue valuable careers as, e.g., chefs, mechanics, accountants, farmers, 
doctors, electricians, lawyers, engineers, therapists, accountants, architects and 
teachers. Artistic education prepares students to act, to dance, to create and 
appreciate music, photographs, clothing, paintings, movies, sculptures, poems 
and literature. Athletic training and education prepare students to compete in 
running, swimming, weightlifting, curling, basketball, football, hockey, etc. 
Other forms of education prepare students to engage in valuable religious or 
cultural practices, to raise children, to run households, and so on.
In short, we expose people via education to a wide variety of valuable 
activities, thus rendering these activities more viable as options.14 Education 
typically proceeds by allowing students to practise these valuable activities in 
order to acquire the requisite knowledge and skills. Students who value these 
activities can therefore flourish while engaging in the activities as part of the 
educational process. This learning process, however, also equips students to 
succeed in these valuable activities at higher levels outside of the educational 
process. The student of carpentry, for example, learns the craft by practising 
the work of a carpenter and then can pursue carpentry as a career or hobby after 
completing their education. At each stage, while learning or after, the carpenter 
can flourish by engaging in carpentry, so long as they value it. Moreover, good 
education can spark student interest and make it more likely that students 
value the valuable activities they are learning to perform. In all these ways, 
educating students in valuable activities and practices can create more viable 
options for them, more ways for them to flourish. So education can directly 
enable people to flourish by increasing their discretion.
We have now defended both premises in our original argument. We have ana-
lysed human flourishing and seen that we have strong reason to enable it. We 
have also seen that (and how) education can enable flourishing. From these 
premises, we conclude that we also have strong reason to educate and to do so 
in such a way as to enable human flourishing. In other words, enabling flour-
ishing is an important aim of education. This conclusion paves the way for 
























































73others. We concluded that we should educate in such a way as to enable flour-
ishing. Presumably, this implies that we should, all else equal, educate in those 
ways that best (or at least sufficiently) enable flourishing. How, then, should we 
educate, in order to best enable flourishing? There may be many answers here, 
for education is a complex activity involving many factors which might affect 
flourishing. I will focus on two. I argue first that education should be general. 
Then I show how we might apply the flourishing-enabling aim of education to 
argue that wonder is important to education, conditional on certain assump-
tions about wonder.
Education should be general
W e should educate people so as to enable them to flourish. Edu-cation enables people to flourish by exposing them to valuable activities, thus making it possible for them to value those activi-
ties, and by preparing them to engage in those activities. And people are better 
able to flourish as a result of having more viable options of valuable activities 
to pursue. So then, we have reason to provide people with a general education 
– that is, to instruct people in many different kinds of subjects and practices.15 
We should expose students to a wide variety of valuable activities, since each 
additional kind of valuable activity available to someone makes them more 
likely and able to flourish. So, all else equal, education should be as general as 
feasibly possible.
Just how general should education be? We can start with traditional aca-
demic subjects: history, mathematics, languages, physical and social sciences, 
and so on. The study and application of any of these subjects is valuable. But 
we should also teach much more: for example, the study, creation, performance 
and appreciation of art; the development and exercise of athletic and technical 
skills; cultural and religious beliefs and practices; and the creation and mainte-
nance of valuable forms of association and social relationships. We have reason 
to teach any valuable activity that can be taught.
We should qualify this claim in a few ways. First, it relies on the assumption 
that having more options of valuable activities always better enables flourish-
ing. And there is some empirical evidence which might suggest this is not the 
case. Some psychological studies suggest that having too many options in a 
choice situation – for example, when making a purchase – can decrease an 


























74 agent’s motivation to take any of the available options and can decrease the 
agent’s satisfaction with whatever option they do choose (Iyengar and Lepper 
2000). If having too many options of valuable activities similarly paralyses 
people and prevents them from pursuing any valuable activities, or if having 
too many options causes people to value their chosen activities less, then there 
will be a point at which providing more options ceases to enable flourishing 
but rather hinders it. If that is the case, then we will only have reason to teach 
additional valuable activities up to a point. That said, the available psychologi-
cal evidence for choice overload is far from conclusive (Chernev, Böckenholt, 
and Goodman 2014). Moreover, it is not obvious that decreased motivation and 
satisfaction in the narrow kinds of choice situations studied by psychologists 
would necessarily translate into decreased motivation and subjective valuing 
in the choice of medium- to long-term valuable activities and life pursuits 
like careers. Nevertheless, we should keep the possibility of choice overload in 
mind as a potential limit to the claim that we have reason to teach any kind of 
valuable activity that can be taught.
A second limiting factor is feasibility. Educational resources are finite, and 
we cannot teach everything. So, we shall have to make decisions about which 
kinds of activities to teach. This does not contradict the claim that we have 
eudaimonistic reason to teach any valuable activity, but it means that this 
standing reason can, and at some point will, be outweighed by other consid-
erations. It’s not the case that we should, all things considered, teach every 
valuable activity, or even that we should attempt to do so.
Note, however, that neither of these two countervailing considerations 
count against a general education in diverse kinds of valuable activities. There 
may be contingent limits to the number of activities we should teach, but this 
would not imply that all of the activities we teach should be of a particular 
kind, e.g., traditional liberal arts subjects. It would still serve students’ flour-
ishing-enabling discretion to have diverse kinds of options, since people’s 
interests and aptitudes are diverse. An academically inclined individual may 
equally well be able to flourish by studying either philosophy or physics, but 
another individual may not value either and would benefit more from religious 
or athletic instruction. To best enable people generally to flourish, in light of 
our diverse and often changing interests and aptitudes, it remains true that 
education should be general in the sense of including diverse kinds of valuable 
activities.
Particular individuals’ interests and aptitudes may supply a third kind 
of countervailing consideration. While it might benefit many people to be 
exposed via education to a wide variety of valuable activities, there may be 























































75An individual may be completely devoted to studying mathematics and may 
therefore benefit far less from also studying literature and music. Learning 
about these other subjects may give this individual more viable options of valu-
able activities, but it also takes time away from their pursuit of the valuable 
activity they actually value – not clearly a beneficial trade-off. So, while general 
education in many kinds of valuable activities may be a good general policy, 
this does not entail that all individuals must receive a general education or that 
any particular individual should be forced to try different kinds of valuable 
activities. Whether we should require anyone to learn diverse kinds of activities 
will depend on other considerations. For example, we may have good reason to 
require young children to learn diverse kinds of valuable activities given that 
their interests, aptitude, and values are less fully formed and more plastic than 
many adults’. But such considerations may not apply in general. What is clear 
as a matter of general policy is that we should make instruction in a wide vari-
ety of valuable activities at least available to people.
Even in this qualified, defeasible form, the fact that we have standing reason 
to make available education in as many kinds of valuable activities as we can 
has a number of interesting implications. The first implication is that it vin-
dicates the broad and inclusive construal of ‘education’ which we introduced 
as a preliminary gloss of the term. We have the same kind of eudaimonistic 
reason to teach people how to square dance as we have to teach them how to 
calculate the area under a curve. Having either of these skills makes it possible 
to engage in some valuable activity. So, at least with respect to the educational 
aim of flourishing, there is no normative difference to make it fitting to call one 
kind of instruction ‘education’ and not the other.16
A second interesting implication is that, since education should be very 
general, the various valuable kinds of social, cultural, artistic, athletic, tech-
nical, etc. activities can be justified in formal schools as part of the schools’ 
educational purpose. School sports teams, glee clubs, theatre troupes, auto 
shops and the like need not be considered merely extracurricular pastimes but 
educational opportunities in their own rights. As a result, funding and support 
16 Note that this does not mean that all forms of teaching or instruction count as education. If we do 
wish to reserve ‘education’ as an honorific and distinguish it from other, less desirable forms of 
instruction, the eudaimonistic aim of education may help us draw the line. As a first pass, we can call 
‘education’ the transmission of skills and beliefs which contribute to the pursuit of valuable activities. 
Inferior forms of instruction will then include the transmission of skills and beliefs which either do 
not contribute to or positively hinder the pursuit of valuable activities, as well as the transmission of 
skills and beliefs which contribute to activities which are either not valuable or positively disvaluable. 
But this is a first pass definition only: there may be other necessary conditions for education, e.g., ones 


























76 for such programmes require no more special justification than the support of 
formal classes. 
On the other hand, it is not necessary to consider education limited to 
formal, institutionalised schools. Correlatively, it is not necessary for any par-
ticular subject or activity to be taught in a school rather than in some other, 
informal way. If there are good community sports clubs outside of schools, for 
example, there may be no strong reason for schools in particular to host sports 
teams. There may also be good reasons in a pluralistic society not to teach 
any particular religious customs or beliefs in schools, at least if they cannot 
teach others equally well. Determining which kinds of activities a given for-
mal school should offer is likely to be a highly contingent matter, depending 
on considerations of efficiency, availability of informal alternatives, and other 
institutional and social goals.
Third, much non-school training and teaching should be recognised as 
an important part of a society’s educational system, from moral education at 
home and in religious institutions to on-the-job training. Many people besides 
professional teachers of the academy can contribute to fulfilling our collective 
responsibility to educate others in order to enable their flourishing. This gen-
erates a society-wide interest in the manner and content of informal education 
in non-school settings: we collectively have some stake in what and how par-
ents, priests, supervisors, etc. are teaching. This does not immediately entail 
a right of individuals or political agents to regulate or otherwise intervene in 
others’ informal education in the way that formal education is publicly regu-
lated. But some such intervention at least could be legitimate, depending on the 
strength of other normative considerations. By the same token, there might 
also be legitimate grounds for public support or subsidies of informal educa-
tion just as formal education is publicly funded.
Should education promote wonder?
T he flourishing-enabling purpose of education can help to answer the question of whether education or educators should strive to instil won-der in students. Whereas I argued for the conclusion that education 
should be general, here I put forward only hypotheses, conditional proposals 
of how to vindicate the importance of wonder for education if certain assump-
tions hold. For the purposes of these proposals, I wish to leave ‘wonder’ 
undefined and ambiguous between its various possible senses. There well 
may be important differences between wonder and mere curiosity, between 























































77der (Schinkel 2017). Any given assumption I discuss may obtain for, and thus 
help to vindicate the importance of, one form of wonder but not another. Those 
interested in a particular form of wonder may simply supply that sense of the 
term to what follows.
First, it seems plausible that wonder might motivate students and thus 
lead to better learning outcomes. In that case, we should try to instil wonder 
in students in order to educate effectively whatever our aims in educating are, 
including enabling flourishing. In particular, increased motivation may lead 
more students to engage in the valuable activities which are being taught, and 
better learning outcomes make students more likely to succeed in those valu-
able activities. So, wonder in education may better enable students to meet 
the activity and success conditions of flourishing. The motivational impact of 
wonder is an empirical hypothesis which awaits scientific confirmation.17 But, 
if it does increase motivation in education, wonder will serve the flourishing-
enabling purpose of education.
A second, plausible empirical hypothesis is that experiencing wonder from 
an activity might make participants more likely to value that activity or make 
them value the activity more. Certain valuable activities certainly are won-
drous and instil wonder in participants: an astronomer marvels at how we are 
all made of star stuff, parents wonder at their child’s development. This sense 
of wonder plausibly draws participants towards such activities as astronomy 
and parenting, and leads participants to care more about them. In that case, 
educators should instil wonder in students to make them more likely to value 
the valuable activities being taught. If wonder positively impacts subjective 
valuing, then for this reason also wonder in education will serve to enable 
flourishing. This empirical hypothesis as well awaits scientific confirmation.
A third hypothesis is not empirical, but normative. It is plausible that some 
activities may be valuable, or more valuable than they would otherwise be, in 
virtue of being wondrous. The wonder instilled by astronomy, parenting, etc. 
might be part of what makes those activities worth valuing and doing. If won-
drousness is a contributor to the objective value of activities, then wonder will 
be a criterion relevant to the selection of activities to include in education. We 
want to teach students knowledge and skills which will help them engage in 
valuable activities, and so, if wonder makes some or many activities valuable, 
then we have reason to teach wonder-full curricula. And in that case, it makes 
sense for educators to strive to instil wonder in students in order to do justice 
to their wondrous subject matter, to help students appreciate the value of what 


























78 they are learning and doing. If wonder is a contributor to the objective value 
of activities, then, again, wonder in education will be crucial to its flourishing-
enabling purpose. As a normative hypothesis, this possibility awaits further 
philosophical inquiry into the nature of objective value.
It seems, then, that we have provisional grounds for asserting that wonder 
is indeed important to education in light of the fact that we should educate to 
enable flourishing.18 The present conception of human flourishing involves 
four necessary conditions – activity, success, objective value and subjective 
valuing – all of which may be enabled or enhanced by the presence of wonder. 
Though our three hypotheses above bear further investigation, they are not 
implausible, and any one of them on its own would support the importance of 
wonder to education.
References
• Annas, Julia. 1993. The Morality of Happiness. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
• Annas, Julia. 2011. Intelligent Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Brighouse, Harry. 2008. “Education for a flourishing life.” Yearbook of the 
National Society for the Study of Education 107, no. 1: 58-71.
• Brighouse, Harry. 2009. “Moral and Political Aims of Education.” In The 
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education, edited by Harvey Siegel, 35-51. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Chernev, Alexander, Ulf Böckenholt, and Joseph Goodman. 2014. “Choice 
overload: A conceptual review and meta-analysis.” Journal of Consumer Psy-
chology 25, no. 2: 333-358. 
• Crisp, Roger. 2001. “Well-Being.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
edited by Edward N. Zalta. Last modified September 6, 2017. https://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/well-being.
• Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly. 1990. Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience. 
New York: Harper Perennial.
• Curren, Randall. 2013. “A neo-Aristotelian Account of Education, Justice, 
and the Human Good.” Theory and Research in Education 11, no. 3: 231-249.
18 Yannis Hadzigeorgiou has suggested to me another possible way of vindicating the importance of 
wonder specifically for the education of children. He proposed that flourishing in childhood might 
have necessary conditions distinct from, or in addition to, those for (adult) human flourishing in 
general. The experience of wonder may be one such condition of child-specific flourishing, in which 























































79• De Ruyter, Doret J. 2004. “Pottering in the Garden? On Human Flourishing 
and Education.” British Journal of Educational Studies, 52 (4), 377-389.
• De Ruyter, Doret J. 2007. “Ideals, Education, and Happy Flourishing.” Edu-
cational Theory, 57 (1): 23-35.
• De Ruyter, Doret J. 2012. “On Optimal Development and Becoming an Opti-
mizer.” Journal of Philosophy of Education 46, no. 1: 25-41.
• De Ruyter, Doret J. 2015. “Well-being and Education.” In Education, Philoso-
phy, and Well-Being: New Perspectives on the Work of John White, edited by Judith 
Suissa, Carrie Winstanley, and Roger Marples, 84-98. Oxon: Routledge.
• Darwall, Stephen. 2002. Welfare and Rational Care. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
• Hadzigeorgiou, Yannis. 2011. “Fostering a Sense of Wonder in the Science 
Classroom.” Research in Science Education 42, no. 5: 985-1005.
• Hirst, Paul. 1993. “Education, Knowledge and Practices.” Beyond Liberal Edu-
cation: Essays in Honour of Paul H. Hirst, eds. Robin Barrow and Patricia White, 
184-199. London: Routledge.
• Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1999. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
• Iyengar, Scheen, and Mark Lepper. 2000. “When Choice is Demotivating: 
Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 79, no. 6: 995-1006. 
• Kristjánsson, Kristján. 2020. Flourishing as the Aim of Education: A Neo-Aristote-
lian View. London and New York: Routledge.
• Marples, Roger, ed. 1999a. The Aims of Education. London: Routledge.
• Marples, Roger. 1999b. “Well-being as an Aim of Education.” In The Aims of 
Education, edited by R. Marples, 133-144. London: Routledge.
• Moore, Joseph. (n.d.) The Ethics of Human Flourishing, unpublished manu-
script.
• Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon.
• Peters, Richard S. 1966. Ethics and Education. London: George Allen & Unwin.
• Raibley, Jason. 2013. “Values, Agency, and Welfare.” Philosophical Topics 41, 
no. 1: 187-214.
• Raz, Joseph. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon.
• Robertson, Emily. 2009. “The Epistemic Aims of Education.” In The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy of Education, edited by Harvey Siegel, 11-34. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
• Scheffler, Israel. 1973. Reason and Teaching. London: Routledge.
• Schinkel, Anders. 2017. “The Educational Importance of Deep Wonder.” 


























80 • Siegel, Harvey. 1988. Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking, and Educa-
tion. New York: Routledge.
• White, John. 2007. “What Schools Are for and Why.” Impact 14: 1-50.
• White, John. 2009. “Education and a meaningful life.” Oxford Review of Edu-
cation 35, no. 4: 423-435.
• Wolbert, Lynne S., Doret J. de Ruyter, and Anders Schinkel. 2015. “Formal 
Criteria for the Concept of Human Flourishing: the First Step in Defend-
ing Flourishing as an Ideal Aim of Education.” Ethics and Education 10, no. 
1: 118-129.
































































4  Wonder and Education:  
Some Lessons from Spinoza
Genevieve Lloyd
Introduction: wonder and education
T he idea that wonder has a special connection with education is an old one. It goes back at least to the model of education which Plato had Socrates enact with the boy Theaetetus in the dialogue which bears 
that name. Plato’s dialogue is not just about educational method. It is also an 
inquiry into the nature of knowledge itself. More specifically, it is a dramatisa-
tion of the nature of philosophical thinking, which begins in wonder. “This is 
where philosophy begins and nowhere else”, Plato has Socrates say (Theaetetus 
155d; Plato 1990, 277).
Theaetetus is being initiated into a kind of thinking which is relentlessly 
rigorous and adversarial in its persistent mode of questioning. Every attempt 
the boy makes to define knowledge is demolished by Socrates. As an approach 
to education – even to education in philosophy – the Socratic method of 
response and riposte has its limitations. Adversarial intellectual combat is not 
always fruitful inquiry – least of all in contexts of power imbalance between 
student and teacher. But there is something deeper going on here than a relent-
less challenging of definitions. Plato presents the boy’s proneness to wonder as 
making him an ideal candidate for Socrates’ approach to education. However, 
his dramatisation of their interaction marks also an early stage in a long history 
of philosophers’ attempts to articulate the nature and significance of wonder. 
Those passages in the Theaetetus raise issues which remain important for 
understanding the role of wonder in education in present times. I want to 
focus, especially, on a particular moment in the philosophical history of won-
der, which emerged in 17th-century Amsterdam or, at any rate – due to Spinoza’s 




















































be learned from Spinoza about the place of wonder in education. But first let’s 
stay just a little longer with Socrates and Theaetetus.
As is often the case in intellectual history, the trajectory of the philosophi-
cal history of wonder can be captured in recurring metaphors. The most basic 
ones are already there in Plato’s dialogue. That is no surprise. For, despite his 
notorious distrust of the poets, Plato was a master of language which engages 
imagination and emotion – as metaphors do. 
Wonder itself – as Plato presents it in the Theaetetus – is an intense emo-
tional experience. The metaphors through which its nature is described are 
drawn from motion and stillness. Those metaphors can seem to be in tension 
with one another. On the one hand, the boy’s puzzlement brings his thinking 
activity to a standstill. He stops, not knowing how to proceed. Yet that condi-
tion of apparent intellectual immobility is also a state of emotional turmoil – of 
an agitated restlessness. Asked to reflect on the nature of knowledge, Theaete-
tus reports: “I often wonder like mad what these things can mean; sometimes 
when I’m looking at them, I begin to feel quite giddy.” (Theaetetus 155c; Plato 
1990, 277).
In the early stages of the dialogue, Plato offers a luminous metaphor which 
points to a possible resolution of that tension in wonder between motion and 
stillness. He has Theodorus, the boy’s tutor in mathematics, praise his intel-
lectual potential by saying that Theaetetus approaches his studies in a way 
reminiscent of “the quiet flow of a stream of oil” (Theaetetus 144b; Plato 1990, 
262). It is an evocative metaphor for an ideal of intellectual style and character 
– dynamic, but steady and smooth; controlled, yet intense. The ideal is elusive 
– difficult to articulate clearly without the metaphor, no less than it is to realise 
in practice. 
That tension between stillness and motion haunts the subsequent philo-
sophical history of wonder. It lingers in conflicted metaphors – of stunned 
immobility and of turbulent, agitated movement. Wonder has been associated 
with surprise and amazement – and hence sometimes with intellectual stupor. 
By extension, it can be related to passivity – to the mental torpor of stupidity. 
Yet it has also been related to intense intellectual activity – to smooth flowing 
mental agility.
On the one hand there is the recurring image of a mind transfixed – ‘won-
derstruck’ as the English language has it. That model is explicit in Descartes’s 
Passions of the Soul, where he warns that excessive indulgence in wonder can 
reduce would-be knowers to a state akin to gaping like immobilised statues 
– stopped in their tracks, not knowing which way to move. There, wonder 
is construed as a freezing or paralysis of the activity of thinking. Descartes 








































inquiry, it can also be dangerous. He argued that wonder – like other emotions 
– should be reined in by the exercise of a virtuous will.
In contrast to that imagery of a paralysis, endangering the mind’s activity of 
the mind, wonder has also been described through what seem equally appro-
priate images of a kind of mental restlessness – of helpless disorientation, 
wandering in uncertainty – not a smooth flow, but an agitated fluctuation. The 
clash of metaphors reflects an old and ongoing ambivalence in philosophers’ 
attitudes towards wonder. 
Aristotle, like Plato before him, saw wonder as the beginnings of inquiry. In 
the Metaphysics, at A.2982b, he says that wonder inspires the desire to know – to 
better understand what he calls ‘the greater matters’, concerning phenomena 
of the moon, sun and stars, and the genesis of the universe (Aristotle 1941, 692). 
However, Aristotle also insisted that what really matters is not the beginnings 
of inquiry, but what he called the ‘nobler’ end state of knowledge. For him, won-
der belonged to the early, uncertain stage of the process of coming to know. He 
saw it as a kind of vacillation – a hovering between not knowing and knowing. 
Ideally, then, wonder is left behind by the greater ‘nobility’ of actual knowing. 
Something of that old narrative of a condition best left behind has persisted 
– not only into modern philosophy, but also more generally into contemporary 
attitudes towards wonder. Wonder may be regarded as charming in the very 
young. Yet – as in the old philosophical narratives – adult, mature knowers are 
expected or presumed to leave it behind. Adult indulgence in wonder seems 
now to be more often associated with recreational retreat into fantasy than it is 
with serious intellectual engagement with reality.
There is nothing wrong with recreational fantasy. Nor would I want to sug-
gest that there is any really sharp line between fantasy and serious engagement 
with reality. After all, the literary genre of science fiction is a major source of 
reflection on some of the most pressing issues of our time – issues about cli-
mate change, about social responsibility in relation to technological advance. 
Yet the common linkage of wonder with fantasy can be an obstacle to thinking 
through clearly just what role wonder should have in educational theory and 
practice.
The connections that were obvious in ancient philosophy between wonder 
and knowledge – and hence between wonder and education – seem to have 
largely gone missing. That is what I want to address. How has it happened? 
And what might be done about it? Nietzsche says, in Beyond Good and Evil, that 
maturity involves acquiring again the seriousness of a child at play. I think 
something similar can be said for wonder. Indeed it may come to one and the 
same thing. Playfulness and wonder alike – and together – are too important to 
88 be treated as something to be left behind in mature adult life. If that is so, they 
should both have their place in the serious business of education. 
My general question, then, is: how to make sense of, and respond to, mod-
ern loss of old connections between wonder and education? But why look 
to Spinoza in framing an approach to that issue? Apart from the fortuitous 
appropriateness of talking about Spinoza in Amsterdam, why focus on that 
particular 17th-century example in the long philosophical history of wonder? 
My answer is that Spinoza confronts us with a pivotal moment in that history 
— a crucial turning point in how wonder has been construed. For his treat-
ment of wonder is a watershed between its old connections with knowledge 
and the development of 18th-century notions of the Sublime, which were taken 
up in Romanticism and have suffused contemporary attitudes to wonder.
The transformation of wonder into the Sublime happened partly through 
the reception of Spinoza’s philosophy, though I think that was a development 
which he would not himself have welcomed. He offered a way of thinking of 
wonder which preceded – and was in some ways antithetical to – the Romantic 
Sublime. He stressed the old connections between wonder and knowledge. Yet 
his version of wonder was distinctive – in ways which helped make possible 
subsequent developments in Romanticism.
I want to argue that to engage now with Spinoza’s treatment of wonder 
is not to seek a nostalgic return to a largely lost past. It is, rather, to better 
understand what happened when the Romantic Sublime came to dominate 
the modern understanding of wonder; and to see what has been unfortunate 
– as well as what remains good – about that shift. So, let us now have a brief 
look at this notion of the Sublime. I will then try, against that background, to 
sum up the contemporary significance of Spinoza for the place of wonder in 
education.1
The Sublime 
T he concept had many sources in ancient thought. But the version of it which became relevant for Romanticism came largely through 18th-century revival of a fragment attributed to Longinus. Edmund Burke, 
and subsequently Immanuel Kant, articulated this revived notion of the ‘sub-
lime’ as a contrast term to the ‘beautiful’. Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry into the 
Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful was published in 1757; Kant’s 
1 I discuss the significance of Spinoza in understanding the concept of the Sublime – and more gener-



















































89early essay “Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime” came 
in 1764. Kant later developed his version of the sublime much more fully as a 
core theme in his Critique of Judgement, published in 1790. The notion of the sub-
lime has a lot in common with earlier versions of wonder. Yet it also involves a 
significant departure from them: it has a more complex relation both with Rea-
son and with Nature. For later Romantic thought, one of the most important 
insights from Burke’s Enquiry was that reason is largely bypassed by the feeling 
of the sublime.
For Plato and Aristotle, wonder involved emotional excitement or agita-
tion; but it was not disconnected from intellect or reason. It belonged with 
rational inquiry into the natures of things. According to Burke, in contrast, the 
Sublime ‘takes precedence’ over our efforts to think. This ‘feeling’ is a mixture 
of pain and pleasure, associated with power and with fear. He describes it as 
hurrying thought on by an irresistible force, which puts it at odds with reason. 
Whereas reason has connotations of clear and precise thinking, this feeling of 
the sublime abhors clarity. It thrives on vagueness and confusion. Yet Burke 
presents it as a positive experience, producing a sort of ‘swelling and triumph’ 
within the mind (Burke [1757] 2015, 43). Although it is associated with horror, 
human minds experiencing this feeling are supposed to find themselves, not 
abject, but exultant. Despite its dissociation from reason, it is supposed to 
bring a sense of self-worth. 
Although Burke’s Sublime is an experience of turbulent astonishment – 
suppressing rational thought – it retains an element of reverential awe in the 
presence of Nature. Clearly, it has some continuities with earlier versions of 
wonder, associated with awe at what Aristotle called ‘the greater matters’. But, 
being ‘shadowed with horror’, the Sublime is no longer a state of calm, reflec-
tive intellectual contemplation. It is elicited especially by scenes of Nature at its 
most terrifying – with a sense of human vulnerability in the face of that might 
and power.
Kant, in his early Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, echoes 
Burke’s emphasis on the intensity of the feeling of the Sublime; but already 
there are some important differences. His treatment of the relations between 
the Sublime and Reason are more nuanced. Though it remains a ‘feeling’, 
Kant’s Sublime is no longer polarised from rational thought. That shift is more 
fully developed in his later Critique of Judgement. There, the swelling sense of 
self-worth, of which Burke had talked, becomes explicitly associated with self-
satisfaction in the power of Reason, which marks human beings off from the 
rest of Nature. In Kant’s treatment, intellect and the feeling of the Sublime 
come closer together – though in a very different way from the connections 







































90 The Sublime remains for Kant a feeling of great intensity and power. However, 
in contrast with Burke’s Sublime, it is now a feeling that belongs with intel-
lect, rather than being at odds with it. For Kant, the Sublime brings awareness 
of the supremacy of Reason over mere ‘sensibility’. The crucial shift that he 
introduces is that the Sublime is now located – not in objects of thought – but 
in thought itself. This Sublime is explicitly a cast of mind. It must, in every 
case, have reference to our way of thinking. True sublimity, Kant insists, must 
be sought only ‘in the mind of the judging subject’, and not in the ‘object of 
Nature’ that occasions it (Kant [1790] 1952, 104).
This shift brings a dramatic change in how the human mind’s relations with 
Nature are construed. As Kant sums it up, the Sublime does not reside only in 
Reason’s power over ‘Nature within’ – over the lesser, non-rational aspects of 
human nature. It involves also a sense of superiority over what he calls ‘Nature 
without’ – the realm of material things. It arises, he says, in our recognition 
of Reason’s power to reach beyond the seeming omnipotence of Nature. The 
might and power of Nature can of course physically destroy a human being. Yet 
that sense of the power of Nature is for Kant offset by the mind’s realisation of 
“the appropriate sublimity of the sphere of its own being, even above nature” 
(Kant [1790] 1952, 111-2).
Kant treats Reason as the highest faculty of the mind; and the sublimity of 
Reason gives human minds a status higher than that of mere Nature. However, 
its relation with the lesser aspects of mental life – especially Imagination – is 
for him not a static relation of superiority. The dominance of Reason must be 
established in a struggle. The dramatic story of that contest of human faculties 
unfolds in Kant’s Critique of Judgement. The power of Reason is elicited in the 
struggle of the Imagination to apprehend something ever beyond the limits 
of its capacity – a struggle in which Imagination must inevitably give way to 
Reason. 
Burke had related the feeling of the Sublime to the mind’s realisation of 
its own powers. In Kant’s mature version of that feeling, the power of Reason 
is now explicitly celebrated as Reason’s triumph in a contest between differ-
ent faculties of the human mind. However, as the story goes, the turbulence 
of the struggle is not left behind in the triumph of Reason. It persists in what 
Kant describes as an ongoing ‘discordant accord’. A fragile balance is attained 
between rival forces. Imagination is not suppressed once and for all. It remains 
a power in its own right – a force with which Reason must contend. That strug-
gle involves intense emotion. 
Talk of ongoing struggle – the ‘contest of the faculties’, as Kant describes 
it – seems to suggest a dynamic, energised form of Reason. That was indeed 



















































91in Romanticism. Somehow, the complex Kantian model of the supremacy of 
Reason within an ongoing ‘discordant accord’ got lost along the way. The Sub-
lime, rather than belonging – as Kant had claimed – to a transformed Reason, 
became associated with intense, emotionally charged Imagination. It is as if 
Imagination, imbued with emotional intensity, went off on a frolic of its own. 
Reason came in contrast to be construed as an abstract, arid, pedantic ‘objectiv-
ity’ – devoid of either the colour of imagination or the intensity of emotion.
Spinoza and the Sublime 
T hat is my story of the Romantic Sublime. Like any story in the history of philosophy, it is open to contestation. But I think it does make sense of what happened when the feeling of the sublime came to replace 
older ways of thinking of wonder, which had seen it as closely connected with 
rational, methodical inquiry. Something of the Sublime, thus understood 
– with its connotations of emotionally charged imagination, at odds with 
rational thinking – persists into the present in a common understanding of 
the condition of wonder.
How does Spinoza fit into this story? The Romantics understood him – 
and in some ways distorted his thought – through their own preoccupations, 
including the allure of the Sublime. They had an ambivalent and vexed rela-
tion with Spinoza’s philosophy. There were arguments about whether and 
how particular thinkers were influenced by – or perhaps tainted by association 
with – his alleged pantheism: the treatment of God as one with Nature. There 
were disputes also about whether the pantheism the Romantics saw in Spi-
noza sprang from atheism or rather from his philosophy having altogether too 
much God. (Does God here disappear into Nature or Nature into God?) 
There was a Romantic reconstruction of Spinoza – not all of which was con-
sistent with what he actually said. Yet it is also true that there was much in his 
philosophy that did suggest intimations of the transformation of ancient won-
der into the modern Sublime. Spinoza stressed the close connections between 
reason, imagination and emotion; and he had a dynamic view both of the 
whole of Nature and of the human mind’s place within that totality. However, 
the most striking affinity between Spinoza’s philosophy and the Romantic 
Sublime emerges in the central concept he calls conatus, commonly translated 
as ‘striving’.
Spinoza claims that the essences of individual finite things reside in their 
striving to persist in existence – a prolonged effort, which can be helped or 







































92 conatus applies to individual human minds as well as to bodies. For, in this sys-
tem, the mind is the awareness – as he puts it, the ‘idea’ – of the body. Human 
minds and bodies are corresponding modes of God-or-Substance, under differ-
ent attributes: ‘thought’ and ‘extension’ – ‘mind’ and ‘matter’. 
There is no need here to go into the details of the underlying metaphysics. 
What matters is that for Spinoza the essence of a human mind – what it is to be 
a human mind – resides in an ongoing struggle for better understanding of the 
body, of which it is the idea. A mind, of its nature, struggles to persist as ever 
more adequate understanding of its own body in relation to other things – all 
striving for continued existence within the whole of Nature. 
Clearly, in that talk of striving for understanding, there are resonances of older 
versions of the stirrings of wonder. There are resonances, in turn, of Spinoza’s 
version of ‘striving’ in the Romantic Sublime. Hence my talk of Spinoza as a 
watershed between the old and the new in the philosophical history of wonder.
Spinoza’s account of wonder resonates with how it was understood prior 
to the allure of the Sublime – as a mind’s thoughtful, inquiring response to 
the actual world. Yet it does that in a way which also points forward to the cel-
ebration of imagination and emotion as crucial to the life of the mind – rather 
than treating them as processes to be ultimately set aside, or suppressed, by the 
higher exercise of intellect or reason. Those threads come together in Spinoza’s 
distinctive treatment of wonder, where it becomes clearer what he might have 
to offer contemporary understanding of its role in education.
Spinoza’s version of wonder and education2
S pinoza – it must be acknowledged – does not offer an explicit theory of education. What is more, when we look at his best-known work, the Ethics, it does not leap off the page as an exercise in the cultivation of 
wonder. It is set out in a daunting geometrical structure, which fits the com-
mon impression of Spinoza as an austere ‘rationalist’. The format does not 
suggest any encouragement to modern aspirations towards ‘holistic’ educa-
tion. It may seem to promote the privileging of reason over imagination or 
emotion. Its chilling array of postulates, axioms, definitions, proofs, corollar-
ies does not offer a promising model for contemporary educators, reflecting on 
how best to draw out the potential of young minds. Yet what emerges in the 



















































93content of the Ethics points in a different direction from that initial appearance 
of arid, abstract ‘rationalism’. 
Spinoza does affirm the importance of the cultivation of reason in a well-
lived life. However, what that amounts to for him is something quite different 
from claiming the supremacy of reason over other aspects of the life of the mind. 
Here, reason is not the master of imagination or emotion; it is their companion 
and ally. The content of the array of definitions and deductions in the Ethics is 
devoted to establishing, among other things, the inseparability of reason from 
imagination and emotion. Underlying that inseparability is Spinoza’s affirma-
tion of the union of mind and body. A human mind’s embodiment is for him 
a conceptual necessity. A human mind cannot exist without body; for it just is 
the awareness – the idea – of body. That claim is reflected in what he has to say 
about the process of becoming a flourishing human being; and this is where we 
get to a Spinozist approach to education. 
We get, for example, this — from the Scholium to Proposition 39 of Part V. 
We must note here that we live in continuous change, and that as we change 
for the better or worse, we are called happy or unhappy. For he who has 
passed from being an infant or child to being a corpse is called unhappy. 
On the other hand, if we pass the whole length of our life with a sound 
Mind in a sound Body, that is considered happiness. And really, he who, like 
an infant or child, has a Body capable of very few things, and very heavily 
dependent on external causes, has a Mind which considered solely in itself 
is conscious of almost nothing of itself, or of God, or of things. On the other 
hand, he who has a Body capable of a great many things, has a Mind which 
considered only in itself is very much conscious of itself, and of God, and 
of things. 
In this life, then, we strive especially that the infant’s Body may change 
(as much as its nature allows and assists) into another, capable of a great 
many things and related to a Mind very much conscious of itself, of God, 
and of things. (Spinoza [1677] 1985, 614)
We have there a statement of what is for Spinoza the goal of education. It is, as 
he puts it, the transformation of the infant body into ‘a body capable of a great 
many things’. For him, the mark of success in this project is the pleasure that 
the flourishing human being finds in living. 
There is a complementary passage, at the Scholium to Proposition 45 of Part 







































94 It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh and restore himself in modera-
tion with pleasant food and drink, with scents, with the beauty of green 
plants, with decoration, music, sports, the theatre, and other things of 
this kind, which anyone can use without injury to another. For the human 
Body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which con-
stantly require new and varied nourishment, so that the whole Body may 
be equally capable of all the things which can follow from its nature, and 
hence, so that the Mind also may be equally capable of undertaking many 
things. (Spinoza [1677] 1985, 572)
That may all sound to contemporary educators like a trite affirmation of the 
mantra of a ‘healthy mind in a healthy body’. It may summon up familiar talk 
of the desirability of ‘educating the whole child’, which has become a common-
place. And to a contemporary ear, talk of becoming capable of undertaking ever 
more things may sound like a nod in the direction of what is now celebrated 
as ‘multitasking’. However, there is a deeper thought here. For Spinoza, the 
maintenance or restoration of bodily well-being is not just a precondition for 
a well-functioning mind. He is not talking of attending to bodies as well as 
minds. For him, it all comes to the same thing; and that is the basis for seeing 
intellect, imagination and emotion as inseparable. 
On Spinoza’s account reasoning, as a thought process – even at its most 
abstract – is bound up with the awareness of bodily modifications. Rational 
thinking reflects the ways in which bodies constantly affect and modify one 
another. A mind is aware of its own body – the body of which it is the idea – only 
together with other bodies; and it is aware of other bodies only together with 
its own. That confused confluence is what Spinoza calls imagination. It is made 
possible by the structure of the human body – by its capacity to retain traces of 
the ways in which it is affected by other bodies. Without that bodily retentive 
capacity, there would be no possibility of comparing one state of awareness 
with others. Hence the formation of what Spinoza calls the ‘common notions’ 
of reason depends on the mind’s confused awareness of other bodies together 
with its own. Reason and imagination are thus intertwined. At the Corollary to 
Proposition 17, in Part II, he emphasises this way of thinking of imagination: 
“The affections of the human Body whose ideas present external things as pre-
sent to us, we shall call images of things… And when the Mind regards bodies 
in this way, we shall say that it imagines.” (Spinoza [1677] 1985, 465).
For Spinoza, then, reason is interconnected with imagination; and it is also 
interconnected with affectivity – with emotion. He stresses that a human body 
undergoes constant change as it is impinged on by other bodies; and so too the 



















































95bodily changes. He identifies those transitions in mental activity and passiv-
ity as the ‘affects’. Parts III and IV of the Ethics elaborate the rich and complex 
interactions of reason, imagination and emotion, which yield a multiplicity 
of specific ‘affects’ – all derived from three basic ones: joy, sadness and desire. 
What is important in all this for education is that, according to Spinoza, 
human minds cultivate the power of reason by exploiting its interconnections 
with imagination and emotion, rather than by transcending or suppressing 
them. Hence, he says at Proposition 12 of Part III: “The Mind, as far as it can, 
strives to imagine those things that increase or aid the Body’s power of act-
ing.” (Spinoza [1677] 1985, 502). Putting all that together, what emerges is that a 
human mind is to be seen as an agitated confluence of processes, among which 
it strives – through reason – for a deeper understanding of its own presence in 
the world. Reason, imagination and emotion are all involved – and intertwined 
– in that ongoing struggle. Another important thing to notice here is that this 
means that human minds come to know only from within the totality of Nature, 
in which bodies affect one another and retain traces of those interactions. They 
do not stand apart from the rest of the world, somehow singled out by their 
capacity for reason, and coming to knowledge as if from a position outside it 
all. Human minds know only as embodied beings, immersed in – and affected 
by – the whole of Nature. 
What then, for Spinoza, is the nature of wonder? What does it contribute to 
the well- lived life? What part does it play in the process of a mind’s becoming 
capable of being, as he puts it, “very much conscious of itself, of God, and of 
things”, and hence able to take pleasure in the richness of what a human life 
can offer “without harm to others”?
Like many philosophers before him, Spinoza centres his account of won-
der on the notion of a pause – an intermission in mental activity. In wonder, 
the mind comes to a halt in the face of something unfamiliar. But, from that 
familiar motif, Spinoza comes to his own distinctive conclusions. In particular, 
wonder takes on a special status in relation to emotion. I mentioned earlier his 
treatment of affect – emotion – as the mind’s awareness of transition to greater 
or less activity. If that kind of transition is indeed the nature of emotion, it 
follows that wonder is not itself one kind of emotion among others. Spinoza 
argues that, if wonder involves a cessation of activity, it cannot then itself be 
considered as one among other emotions. The presence of wonder nonetheless 
haunts his treatment of all the emotions, playing a central role in their forma-
tion and in their transformation. Despite not being itself an emotion, wonder 
is for Spinoza crucial to the emotional aspects of the life of the mind – both 







































96 If wonder is not an emotion, what then is it? Where is it to be located in the car-
tography of mental states? Spinoza’s account of the nature of wonder reworks 
the old theme of surprise at something unfamiliar. He explains that element of 
surprise in terms of a temporary thwarting of the activity of imagining. Sum-
ming up his account, in a section on “Definitions of the Affects” in Part III of 
the Ethics, he says: “Wonder is an imagination of a thing in which the Mind 
remains fixed because this singular imagination has no connection with the 
others.” (Spinoza [1677] 1985, 532). In wonder the mind is brought to a stand-
still by the singularity of an object of attention.
On Spinoza’s account, imagination brings things together for comparison, 
thus making it possible for reason to grasp what they have in common. It is 
through imagination that the mind is able to retain traces of bodily modifi-
cation, and hence to compare what is present before it with things no longer 
present. So, if the exercise of imagination is brought to a halt, the search for 
commonalities – the cultivation of reason – is also temporarily blocked. Where 
there is no apparent basis for comparison, the mind is forced to pause. It 
remains stuck in the contemplation of singularity, finding no easy transition to 
other things. This focus on singularity is for Spinoza the key to understanding 
wonder. At the Scholium to Proposition 52 of Part III, he says: “This Affection 
of the Mind, or this imagination of a singular thing, insofar as it is alone in the 
Mind, is called Wonder.”
By stressing those connections with imagination, Spinoza is able to give 
fresh content to the old idea of wonder as a pause in thought. On his account, 
wonder is a fixation of the imagination. In explaining the exclusion of wonder 
from his listing of specific affects or emotions, he says that, rather than being 
– as emotions are – a transition to greater or lesser activity, it is a “distraction 
of the Mind”. It arises not from any positive cause, but only “from the fact that 
there is nothing determining the Mind to pass from regarding one thing to 
thinking of others” (Spinoza [1677] 1985, 532).
Spinoza’s description of wonder as a ‘distraction’ might sound like a trivi-
alisation of it. But Spinoza is in fact locating wonder in the depths of mind’s 
awareness of body, and its efforts to understand bodily modifications. Hence, 
for him wonder belongs to the very essence of what it is to be a mind at all 
– an expression of a mind’s conatus as effort to persist in understanding. Won-
der brings a halt to the flow of the mind’s movement between similarities. It 
is a thwarting of anticipation – a frustration of expectation. Yet this pause in 
thought strengthens understanding, rather than diminishing it.
Encountering singularity, the mind initially finds no room to move. How-
ever, having been stopped in its tracks, it then must resort to finding less 



















































97standing bodily modifications. The blocked pathway – the encounter with 
singularity – becomes an impetus to finding alternative ways forward. Hav-
ing been rendered passive, the mind finds its own way back to the activity of 
thought. Properly understood, wonder thus enhances – rather than impedes 
– the mind’s ongoing struggle to understand the natural world and its own 
place within it. 
The connections Spinoza has forged between wonder and imagination are 
grounded in painstaking definitions and deductions. That can make for dry 
reading. Yet his conclusions articulate a refinement of the understanding of 
wonder that has far-reaching consequences. The style and tone of Spinoza’s dis-
cussion seem to belong in a different world from later exultation in the wild 
power of imagination, celebrated in Romanticism. Yet, cerebral though it may 
all sound, this treatment of wonder facilitates those later developments in the 
philosophical history of wonder.
Spinoza offers a treatment of wonder which stresses its role as a mind-stop-
ping encounter with singularity. In his Theological-political treatise, he addresses 
more fully the social and political dimensions of wonder, thus construed. What 
he has to say there is also significant in relation to contemporary issues of edu-
cational theory and practice. His direct concern is with ways in which biblical 
narratives of religious mysteries can be exploited by untrustworthy theolo-
gians for their own ends – to the detriment of respect for scientific inquiry. 
However, his analysis has broader application to social critique of the opera-
tions of power through the manipulation of imagination and emotion.
The theologians criticised by Spinoza present themselves as the authorita-
tive interpreters of divinely revealed truth. They induce fear and elicit hope 
– in ways that reinforce their own power. His analysis of those operations – 
and obfuscations – of social power provides a model for broader criticism of 
manipulative exploitation of prevailing cultural narratives. It amounts to an 
exercise in social critique, which remains relevant in present times.
Confronting the dogmatic theologians, Spinoza insisted that the biblical 
narratives should be understood as constructs of imagination. He considered 
those narratives, thus understood, as worthy of respect. Stories of divine inter-
vention – of miracles and prophecies – could in his own times help shape the 
collective self-understanding of a people: of who they are, and of what is cen-
tral to shared lives. More generally, cultural narratives express insight into 
what matters in a people’s past, and in its collectively imagined future. Yet such 
‘fictions’ – if they are misconstrued as definitive truths – can also threaten the 
collective well-being which they make possible.
Spurious certainties can debilitate the life of the mind. Spinoza’s critique of 







































98 the 17th century. The broader point here is that the cultural narratives that help 
bind a human collectivity together can also produce a hardening of thought, 
which restricts the freedom of minds to move in new directions. The social sig-
nificance of Spinoza’s treatment of wonder here becomes clearer. The shock 
of incredulity at the utterances of powerful leaders can induce a construc-
tive pause in thought, followed by renewed active thinking. Such transition 
through wonder from mental passivity to activity can be a healthy response to 
the mind-numbing effects of many of the repetitious mantras of contemporary 
political rhetoric. 
I want to suggest, then, that Spinoza’s treatment of wonder remains of 
contemporary significance – in relation to both individual and collective imag-
ining. Wonder induces a pause in thought. However, for Spinoza that pause is 
not the intrusion of an alien passivity into the activity of thinking. Rather, it 
is integral to intellectual vitality – an aspect of the striving for understanding, 
which he sees as the very essence of a human mind. To wonder is to confront an 
intellectual impasse: the mind comes to a temporary pause, in which it must 
begin thinking anew.
Perhaps it could be said that, on Spinoza’s account, wonder allows the mind 
to ‘move forward’. But the notion of ‘moving forward’ – at any rate in English 
– has itself become a familiar mind-numbing rhetorical refrain. A quick ‘mov-
ing forward’ does not always yield an appropriate or viable way out of either 
a personal dilemma or a policy impasse. So, daring to speak here on Spinoza’s 
behalf, I would prefer to suggest that true wonder demands a decent interval 
of acknowledged not knowing where to move.
Some lessons from Spinoza
In conclusion, what more specific lessons might be drawn from Spinoza for 
wonder in contemporary education?
Lesson no. 1: Wonder, in association with imagination, is central to education. 
It should not be seen merely as light relief from the serious business of learn-
ing. If it is associated with ‘play’, that should be in the spirit of Nietzsche’s 
remark about the seriousness of the child at play. Wonder should be seen as 
central to the process of coming to maturity.
Lesson no. 2: It is worth reflecting on the implications of Spinoza’s perhaps 
surprising claim that wonder is not itself a specific emotion. His insistence on 



















































99list of ‘good’ emotions to be inculcated by educators. The ‘open-mindedness’ 
associated with wonder does have ethical aspects. But wonder is integral to the 
learning process itself, in contrast to the ongoing ethical challenges which can 
arise in the course of inquiry.
Lesson no. 3: To think with Spinoza about wonder is to engage with the claim 
that reason, imagination and emotion are all interconnected. Especially, it is 
to question the notion that being ‘objective’ is a matter of cultivating intellect 
at the expense of imagination or emotion. Keeping that in mind might also help 
soften sharp separations between different areas of a curriculum – between 
‘hard’ sciences as against ‘soft’ humanities, literature or the arts. Those sharp 
separations of subject matter often rest on the questionable idea that intellect 
can always in principle be extricated from supposedly ancillary, or subsidiary, 
operations of imagination and emotion.
Lesson no. 4: Perhaps finding a place for wonder in education is not really a 
matter of teaching it. Plato has Socrates present the boy Theaetetus as already 
prone to wonder before he begins his induction into intellectual inquiry. Theo-
dorus may have been right in describing his student as having special aptitude 
for mathematics and other forms of methodical thinking. But, with respect to 
his capacity to wonder, Theaetetus was like any other child.
Wonder comes naturally to children. What Spinoza added to that was the 
stronger claim that it is inherent in a mind’s effort to persist in being; and hence 
that it belongs in adult life as much as in childhood. The important insight 
here is that a wondering child has not yet learned not to wonder. Strictly, then, 
wonder cannot be taught. Yet mature, adult wondering can be modelled in a 
teacher’s own intellectual style or character. So, the lesson here is to let students 
wonder – to make space for it; and that we should be willing, where appropri-
ate, to do it ourselves in their presence.
Lesson no. 5: Wonder is a collective as well as an individual phenomenon. It 
has social, even civic, dimensions. The capacity to wonder – the capacity to not 
stop wondering – is not just important to individual flourishing. It is crucial to 
collective well-being and to citizenship. Perhaps we should see it as a bulwark 
against the threats to active thinking which can leave a society vulnerable to the 
abuse of power. So, as much as is practical, we should treat wonder – as Spinoza 
did – as opportunity for renewed collaborative thinking. Don’t think of it – as 
Descartes did – as an individual lapse into gaping, statue-like passivity, to be 







































100 In conclusion, of course, none of this is to suggest that teachers need to become 
Spinoza scholars in order to be good educators. It is a matter of reflecting on a 
general approach, rather than of trying to act out the details of a complex the-
ory. In his engaging little book, Spinoza: practical philosophy, Gilles Deleuze wrote 
that Spinoza is unusual among philosophers in that non-philosophers can take 
from him a sudden flash of illumination – and find that, in a practical sense, 
they are ‘Spinozists’. Film makers, painters too – even chance readers – he says, 
can have that experience, often more readily than professional philosophers 
do. I suggest we might add to that: Yes, and educators too.
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5  Philosophical Arguments  




F ew today would deny that the thoughts we think determine the emo-tions we feel (at least in part). Fewer still would deny that the emotions we feel determine who we are, and how well our life goes for us. In this 
paper, I want to focus on one particular emotional experience – one particular 
form of wonder – that occupies a special place in our understanding of wonder, 
and on its role in determining our character and the character of our life. This 
is the experience often referred to as ‘cosmic’ or ‘existential’ wonder. On a com-
mon characterisation, this form of wonder finds its object in the very existence 
of the world, and receives its quintessential expression in the question, “Why 
is there something instead of nothing?” It is an interesting empirical question 
how, by what routes and under what circumstances, such wonder arises. While 
not foreclosing this general question, I will be focusing on one route that seems 
to me especially important, namely philosophical argument, and in particular 
the kinds of arguments that typically feature in religiously motivated works. 
Some of these arguments have a familiar place in natural theology projects, and 
represent strains of a well-known species of argument known as the ‘cosmo-
logical’ argument. But such argumentation can also be found in other types of 
religiously motivated narratives that do not form straightforward exemplars 
of this genre. In both cases, these works mediate an experience of wonder that 
is a direct product of their reason-giving narrative. In this capacity, they bring 
up a challenging question about the relationship between our ‘thinking’ and 
our ‘feeling’ in the case of this emotional experience. If wonder is mediated by 
argument, is it only as good as the reasoning that produced it?
How we answer this question has important implications for the way we 
understand the cognitive dimensions of wonder as an experience, and also the 
102 way we approach its value. Yet part of my aim in pursuing this question is to 
expand our picture of the routes through which wonder becomes available to 
us, and to foreground the role of narratives more generally, and philosophical 
narratives more specifically, in educating us into it. To the extent that these 
philosophical narratives develop within religious traditions, this points to the 
special role that a theological education may have to play in strengthening the 
muscle of wonder.
I begin (section 1) by a general comment on this type of wonder, which sets 
the stage for a question about how the experience may arise. I then pick out 
natural theology as an important cultural route to the experience, and in par-
ticular cosmological arguments for the existence of God, and I outline a few 
prominent exemplars of these arguments. The ability of this type of argumen-
tation to produce assent to substantive claims about God’s existence, I suggest 
(section 2), can be separated from its ability to generate an emotional response 
of wonder at the world’s existence. Yet if this response emerges as a direct out-
come of philosophical reason-giving, doesn’t its validity equally depend on the 
strength of these reasons? Given the notorious controversies that beset these 
kinds of arguments, this experience would appear to be a highly fragile good 
(section 3). Having framed this challenge, I offer two responses. One (section 4) 
involves a way of defending the experience that focuses on its internal features 
and phenomenology. This defence is developed through an analogy with a sim-
ilar type of wonder produced by pharmacological means, specifically through 
exposure to psychedelic substances. Another (section 5) briefly makes the case 
for a more cognitive justification of the experience, focusing on the capacity 
of these arguments to make certain concepts – like the ordinary concept of a 
‘world’ – thinkable to us. We don’t need to be persuaded by these arguments, I 
conclude, to avail ourselves of the possibilities of wonder they offer.
1.
Wonder comes in many kinds; yet no doubt one of the most powerful, and also 
the most elusive, is the experience often referred to as ‘cosmic’ or ‘existential’ 
wonder.1 Those who have written about this experience have described it 
using a number of interrelated expressions: as a wonder directed to existence 
as such, to the that-ness of things, or to the world taken as a totality. Existential 
wonder, in the words of Ronald Hepburn, is the sense of astonishment we feel 
when the ‘sheer existence of a world’ strikes us as an extraordinary and inex-
1 Hepburn (1980) refers to this experience as ‘existential’ wonder, and Schinkel (2018) follows him in 




















































103plicable fact (Hepburn 1980, 10). Wittgenstein gave voice to this wonder using 
a religious turn of phrase in his Notebooks: “The miracle is that the world exists. 
That what exists does exist.” (Wittgenstein 1979, 86e). Its archetypal expres-
sion, as he would later give it in his “Lecture on Ethics” is in the exclamation: 
“How extraordinary that anything should exist!” “How extraordinary that the 
world should exist!” (Wittgenstein 1965, 8). The explanatory question “Why is 
there something instead of nothing?” forms a natural articulation of this sense 
of surprise.
It is a type of wonder that on the face of it seems very different from many 
of the cases we would instinctively invoke when seeking to illustrate the con-
cept—whether it’s laying eyes on a blood moon or Aurora Borealis for the first 
time, soaking up a fantastical architectural creation that just burst into view in 
a newly visited city, confronting an exquisite work of art on a gallery wall, or 
watching the athletic exploits of an exceptionally gifted individual on a sports 
track or a TV screen. Some differences are obvious: the familiar sight of the 
world around us is a very different kind of object from the unfamiliar sight of 
exotic celestial phenomena or architectural fantasies made real. Other differ-
ences require closer reflection. One of these concerns the question just how we 
take these experiences to arise. 
When considering these core cases, for example, it seems relatively easy to 
understand why someone might experience wonder, in the double sense of what 
it is about those objects that makes them worthy of wonder and how the experience 
came about. Any description of the causal history of these experiences would 
begin with the following: she lifted her eyes to the moon, to the skyline, to the 
museum wall, to the TV screen, and saw.... In a handful of cases, the explanation 
might (almost) stop there. Being the kinds of creatures that we are, such-and-
such sensory stimuli simply affect us in certain ways (under certain conditions 
that include novelty of stimulus, absence of fear, and so on). It is such cases that 
inspired Philip Fisher to tie wonder narrowly to visual perception, describing 
wonder as the “outcome of the fact that we see the world” (Fisher 1998, 17). 
In many other cases, the causal history would have to be extended backwards 
to encompass the development and education of the judgements mobilised in 
our affective response. Our wonder at artistic objects or athletic achievements 
is a case in point, yet the same arguably applies to certain kinds of natural phe-
nomena.2 In these cases, we may often have to explain what it is about such 
objects that makes them worthy of wonder to others who do not immediately 
2 The experience of the sublime in nature is a case in point. The historicity and cultural evolution of 


















































104 share our response. Yet even in these cases, it is the particular object before us 
that serves as the immediate trigger of our response. That would seem to be the 
more general truth in Fisher’s claim.
What about existential wonder? How might such an experience arise? This 
type of experience seems especially recalcitrant to being accommodated by 
Fisher’s visual model in its simplest form. Taken as a surprise that attaches to 
the sheer existence of a world, it is not an experience we could easily regard 
as capable of being stimulated by any one object in this world, a fortiori by 
an object of visual perception.3 Such wonder may, as Hepburn observes, be 
directed to particular objects ‘seen as representing the whole’ (1980, 10). In the 
most minimal sense, we need to direct our gaze somewhere. Yet it is clear that 
seeing objects as tokens of something else is no mere seeing. It naturally invites 
the question how such objects became tokens, and what kind of education our 
judgement has undergone that enabled us to see them this way. Hepburn him-
self clearly points to this cognitive education when he refers to the ‘thought of 
the whole’ as the object of existential wonder (1980, 10).
It is important to bear in mind that the question just posed – how does 
existential wonder arise? – is ultimately an empirical one, and one that takes 
at least two forms, one concerning the historical appearance of this experience 
in the trajectory of an individual’s life, and another concerning its appear-
ance in our trajectory as a species. My aim here is not to provide an exhaustive 
account of the causal pathways through which this experience may arise, and 
certainly not to engage in tantalising yet fruitless speculation about how it 
might have arisen in our natural history. It is possible that, for some individu-
als blessed with what we may call ‘mystical genius’ – gifts analogous to though 
not entirely identical with those of Nikos Kazantzakis’ fictionalised hero 
Alexis Zorba (Vasalou 2015, 196-99) – a sense of surprise at the sheer existence 
of a world might arise with few antecedents. This is a possibility that would 
become more plausible if we followed the Eastern Orthodox theologian and 
philosopher David Bentley Hart in his hypothesis that such wonder, drawn to 
the ‘sheer inexplicable givenness of the world,’ is ‘primordial’ for us, ‘an abid-
ing amazement’ that ‘only in very rare instants breaks through into ordinary 
awareness’ yet that ‘lies just below the surface of conscious thought’ at all times 
(Hart 2013, 87). As children, before habit displaced awe, we perhaps experi-
enced this wonder with greater constancy. 
Yet Hart’s view (a view of human nature) is compatible with acknowledging 
that this wonder will usually require external assistance in order to break into 
3 Which is also why the experience is hard to preserve, as Hart notes: “there is nothing to hold on to in 



















































105conscious awareness. My own intuition is that for many of us, at least at the 
point of natural history where we stand, this wonder, like the wonder at artis-
tic works or athletic achievements and possibly even more so, is cognitively 
saturated at a deep level, and emerges as the cultural product of an education 
of judgment that makes certain kinds of thoughts available to us. There is 
arguably more than one form such a cultural education might take, yet in my 
view one of the most important is the one provided by intellectual traditions 
in which a sense of surprise at the existence of the world has been enshrined 
in well-developed practices of inquiry. If we wished to locate an exemplar, we 
need look no further than the type of religiously motivated inquiry known as 
‘natural theology’. 
Natural theology, as usually understood, is a mode of inquiry into God’s 
nature and existence which relies on ‘natural’ epistemological resources such 
as observation and reason to effect its aims, to the exclusion of scripture and 
other supernatural sources of knowledge. Enjoying a long history across dif-
ferent cultural contexts and religious communities, one of its best-known 
expressions lies in a cluster of philosophical arguments that set out to estab-
lish the existence of God drawing on a range of rational considerations. These 
include the teleological argument (or argument from design), the argument 
from religious experience, the moral argument, and the argument from con-
sciousness.4 For my purposes, the argument that holds special interest is the 
one commonly designated as the ‘cosmological’ argument. It is a type of argu-
ment that has assumed a variety of forms at the hands of different thinkers. Yet 
its central pivot is the idea that reflection on the cosmos, or on fundamental 
features of the constituent parts of the cosmos, compels us to acknowledge the 
need for an eternal creator.
C. Stephen Evans (2013, 49-51) helpfully distinguishes between two ver-
sions of the cosmological argument, ones that start from particular parts of 
the natural universe (‘part’ arguments) and ones that start from the universe as 
a whole (‘whole’ arguments). Exemplifying the former, Thomas Aquinas thus 
focuses on certain general features that characterise particular things, such as 
their being in motion or their having been caused to exist. He then combines 
this with a claim that an infinite regress of explanations is not possible, to reach 
the conclusion that there must be a first mover or first cause who coincides with 
what we understand as ‘God’. A good example of the second type of argument 
is supplied by the German philosopher Leibniz in a short yet much-discussed 
4 Analyses or restatements of these arguments can be found in virtually any introduction or compan-


















































106 tract titled “On the Ultimate Origination of Things”. Drawing on the principle 
of sufficient reason – which stipulates that there must be a sufficient reason for 
the existence of anything that exists – Leibniz moves from a claim that par-
ticular things in the world are contingent to a claim that the world as a whole, 
taken as the aggregate of contingent particular things, is contingent. The exist-
ence of the world as a whole, therefore, requires an explanation which is not 
part of this aggregate. The ultimate reason for its existence must be ‘above the 
world, and, so to speak, extramundane’ (Leibniz 1989, 149). 
Leibniz frames his argument with the help of a concrete example, which it 
is worth quoting in full. 
Let us suppose that a book on the elements of geometry has always existed, 
one copy always made from another. It is obvious that although we can 
explain a present copy of the book from the previous book from which it 
was copied, this will never lead us to a complete explanation, no matter 
how many books back we go, since we can always wonder why there have 
always been such books, why these books were written, and why they were 
written the way they were. What is true of these books is also true of the dif-
ferent states of the world, for the state which follows is, in a sense, copied 
from the preceding state, though in accordance with certain laws of change. 
And so, however far back we might go into previous states, we will never 
find in those states a complete explanation [ratio] for why, indeed, there is 
any world at all, and why it is the way it is. (Leibniz 1989, 149)
Despite the emphasis in this passage, Leibniz believed that his argument holds 
fast regardless of whether we posit that the world has existed eternally or had a 
beginning in time. In this regard, his position can be distinguished from that 
of another well-known version of the cosmological argument, often captioned 
the ‘kalām’ argument to honour the paradigmatic articulation it received 
among Muslim practitioners of theology (kalām).5 There, the argument pivots 
around the claim that the universe had a beginning. Since anything that has a 
beginning must have a cause and nothing can cause itself to begin, there must 
be a cause that lies outside it.
This argument obviously hinges on the premise that the universe had a 
temporal beginning. The attempt to prove this proposition has taken a variety 
of forms in philosophical and theological circles past and present. The ninth-
century Arab philosopher Abu Yusuf al-Kindī, who flourished around the same 
5 The most prominent contemporary exponent of this argument is William Lane Craig. For a recent 



















































107time that Islamic theology was acquiring its lasting lineaments, followed one 
particular approach when seeking to defend the Islamic idea of ex nihilo crea-
tion against the implications of Aristotle’s assertion of the world’s eternity. 
This approach was based on a simple (and itself Aristotelian) idea: the infinite 
cannot be traversed. If the world was eternal, this would mean that an infinite 
amount of time would already have elapsed. But if that were the case, we would 
never have gotten to the present moment (yet here we are!).
Before every segment of time there is [another] segment, until we reach a 
segment before which there is no other segment (...) if it could be otherwise, 
every segment of time would be followed by another segment, to infinity. In 
that case we could never reach a specified time, because from infinitely long 
ago up until this specified time is a duration equal to the duration from this 
specified time all the way back in time to infinity.
Hence, “it is impossible that there be a body that has always existed”, and “the 
universe necessarily has a creator [who created it] from nothing” (al-Kindī 2012, 
66-67).
In another set of arguments, al-Kindī focuses on proving the slightly differ-
ent premise that the universe cannot be infinite in magnitude – an idea which 
he believes (rightly or wrongly) entails that it cannot be eternal in time. He does 
this by asking us to assume an infinite body and to imagine that something 
is subtracted from it; he then invites us to consider whether this same body 
is finite or infinite after the subtraction of this finite piece. Both possibilities 
seem to ensnare us in contradictions, proving that an infinite universe cannot 
exist.6
2.
My intention in the above has not been to provide a detailed account of these 
arguments, certainly not one that would be informative enough to enable a 
reader to determine whether they are persuasive. My presentation has been 
inevitably skeletal and elliptic. Taking in a skeletal outline of this type is not 
the same as giving these arguments a proper hearing. To let oneself be properly 
worked upon by a philosophical argument, giving it a fighting chance of per-
suading one, one needs to go through it without haste, engaging with its detail 
with a reasonable amount of care and attention. Even if these basic conditions 
are met, evidently one cannot generalise about the result of this engagement. 
6 For a lucid reconstruction of this argument, see Adamson (2007, 93), and generally chapter 4 for a 

















































108 Arguments, it is often observed, are not ‘coercive’, in the sense of being able 
to force us to believe their conclusions whether we like it or not.7 Arguments 
about the existence of God are notoriously even less so (a point whose special 
relevance I will return to). How a train of reasoning ‘works’ upon a person 
depends on many additional conditions, including how well adapted it is to 
her cognitive and imaginative capabilities. If mathematics is not your forte, 
al-Kindī’s (and his modern heirs’) mathematical arguments against an actual 
infinite will probably leave you unmoved. It also depends, more obviously, on 
how amenable she already was to the conclusion, and to being worked upon by 
an argument that she knew was designed to secure it. This last condition is of 
special importance, and evokes well-known questions about the right balance 
of sympathy and critical distance in our reception of philosophical arguments.
With all this in mind, and while allowing for these disparate effects, I want 
to distinguish between two ways of construing the effects that the kinds of 
arguments I outlined may possibly, if not necessarily or invariably, produce. 
As crafted by their authors, the intended effect of these arguments is to secure 
assent to a substantive conclusion concerning God’s existence. We naturally 
tend to judge the failure or success of philosophical arguments depending on 
how they have altered our belief set and epistemic commitments. By the same 
token, we tend to think of the experience of engaging with and responding to 
an argument in purely cognitive terms: we think, we scrutinise, we analyse, we 
judge (the truth of individual premises, the soundness or validity of the entire 
structure). This picture conspicuously leaves out of view how such arguments 
may impact a broader range of features of our mental life, including the emo-
tions and the imagination. And the specific suggestion I want to make is that 
our picture of the reception of these arguments will be incomplete unless we 
acknowledge that one of their peculiar effects may lie in stimulating the feeling 
we call ‘existential wonder’.
The tendency to give only patchy acknowledgement to the affective dimen-
sions of intellectual inquiry has a long tradition, and is tinctured by an old 
suspicion of passion as reason’s saboteur. Wonder has traditionally featured 
as an exception to this rule, with philosophers from Aristotle to Descartes and 
beyond recognising its importance as a passion of inquiry (Vasalou 2015). Yet 
certainly among these thinkers, the focus has fallen on the role of wonder in 
stimulating thought. What I am suggesting is that certain kinds of thought 
can also serve to stimulate it, and that the arguments I have considered offer 



















































109one way of explaining how a wonder at the existence of the world may become 
available to us. 
On one level, their capacity to do so can be understood very simply. To follow 
an argument at all (and certainly to follow it with the right level of sympathy, 
care and attention) is to allow yourself to entertain intellectual possibilities. 
And one of the central possibilities that cosmological arguments – particularly 
the class that Evans calls ‘whole’ arguments – invites you to take on is that the 
world’s existence requires explanation; that the fact that anything exists is not 
self-explanatory. This requires, at some level, entertaining the contrary pos-
sibility that no world might ever have existed. It requires you to imagine the 
world away. If you didn’t entertain these possibilities, even in a hypothetical 
mode, you simply wouldn’t be following the argument with the right level of 
sympathy and attention. 
The reference to imagination is not tangential here. Because like many 
powerful arguments, these philosophical arguments work by mobilising our 
imagination, whether in more or less direct ways. Leibniz’s vivid example of 
the concatenation of book replicas is a prime illustration of an appeal to the 
imagination to crystallise ideas that would otherwise remain highly abstract. 
We find an equally direct if less vivid invitation in al-Kindī’s imagined addi-
tions and subtractions from the imagined body of the universe. Less direct yet 
still present is the invitation represented in his suggestion that if we try send-
ing our minds back toward the infinity of time, we will fail to make it back to 
the present in which we exist, and that if we follow the chain of time backwards 
segment by segment we will hit upon the cliff-edge of pre-creational ‘nothing’. 
To take in al-Kindī’s philosophical prose is to imagine our way into nothing.
The same appeal to the imagination can be found in the work of David 
Bentley Hart, a writer whose special interest in this context partly lies in the 
salient place he assigns to the experience of wonder within the philosophical 
narrative of his 2013 book The Experience of God. Hart’s project in this book is 
not a wholly natural consort to the genre of philosophical arguments I have 
outlined. He modestly describes his project as a mere ‘lexicographical exercise’, 
which aims to offer a definition of the concept of God as understood among the 
theological and philosophical arms of the major global religions. Hart’s stated 
concern is not with rational proofs for God’s existence. This is partly tied to 
a sense of scepticism about the power of such proofs to change minds (Hart 
2013, 83-84). Instead, Hart places his trust in the power of experiences. Some 
of the most important insights, in his view, are already present in our experi-
ence, and can be harvested “by way of a contemplative and moral refinement 
of that experience” (2013, 44). First and foremost among the experiences that 

















































110 suddenly become aware of the ‘utter uncanniness of the reality we inhabit’ and 
we are shocked by ‘the sheer unexpected “thereness”’ of everything around us 
(2013, 88, 91). 
Hart does not, to my knowledge, explicitly describe the aim of his own nar-
rative as that of helping produce that ‘contemplative and moral refinement’ 
and thereby reconnecting his reader to that experience of mystery. Yet this is 
a natural way of receiving his aim. And if this experience crystallises for the 
reader following Hart’s narrative, it will partly be by working her way through 
a series of philosophical arguments. Because while Hart’s stated concern is 
to define a concept, that means illuminating the place this concept occupies 
in ‘logical space’. That in turn requires saying something about traditional 
proofs for God’s existence, notably including cosmological arguments, which 
show why the concept of God occupies a space that ‘no other kind of causal 
explanation can intrude upon’ (Hart 2013, 99). It also involves philosophically 
evaluating the coherence of naturalism as a total worldview, and interrogating 
the claim that science could ever provide an answer to the question of existence 
and explain the basic fact that things are.
Many of the arguments featured in classic discussions of God’s existence 
find a limpid restatement in Hart’s account. So do the appeals to the imagina-
tion they harbour. In one of his multiple passes at naturalism, Hart draws a 
(traditional) distinction between ‘accidental’ and ‘essential’ causes to explain 
why even if one holds that the world did not have a beginning in time, the 
explanatory need opened up by the world’s contingency will remain. A hall-
mark of the relation established by accidental causes is that “the consequences 
of a particular thing can continue indefinitely after that thing has disappeared, 
because all causes in the series are ontologically extrinsic to their effects”. A 
classic example is the causal relation between a man and his grandson: “by 
the time the latter is sired the former may have been dead for decades (...) The 
relation is one of antecedent physical history, not of immediate ontological 
dependency, and so the being of the grandson does not directly depend upon 
the being of his grandfather.” To explain existence, you need a different kind 
of cause. “The ultimate source of existence cannot be some item or event that 
has long since passed away or concluded, like a venerable ancestor or even the 
Big Bang itself – either of which is just another contingent physical entity or 
occurrence – but must be a constant wellspring of being, at work even now.” In 
traditional religious thought, the metaphor is that of the flame of a candle or 
lamp and the light it casts in a room. Snuff out the flame and the whole room 
goes dark. The modern version of that is that of an electric current that “if shut 




















































I have been suggesting that religiously motivated philosophical narratives, 
paradigmatically cosmological arguments for God’s existence, can provide the 
cognitive education that makes the fundamental experience of ‘cosmic’ or ‘exis-
tential’ wonder available to us. They do so, at the simplest level, by inviting us 
– as part of the bona fides of seriously engaging with the argument – to think our-
selves into the proposition that the world’s existence is not self-explanatory and 
to temporarily entertain the possibility that nothing at all might have existed. 
Direct and indirect appeals to the imagination form an important part of the 
means through which such narratives make this possibility thinkable for us.
My view stands in contrast with the account presented by Stephen Evans in 
Natural Signs and Knowledge of God in the context of a broader re-evaluation of the 
nature of traditional arguments for God’s existence. In Evans’ view, these argu-
ments are grounded in, and represent attempts to rationally articulate, what he 
calls ‘natural signs’, which point to God’s reality in a non-inferential manner. 
Thus, the beneficial order we observe in the natural world is the natural sign 
that finds a rational articulation in teleological arguments for God’s existence. 
The natural sign that lies at the core of cosmological arguments more specifi-
cally, in Evans’ view, is the experience of cosmic wonder. “[W]hat lies at the 
bottom of all or at least most of the forms of the cosmological argument is a cer-
tain experience of the world or objects in the world, in which they are perceived 
as mysterious or puzzling, crying out for some explanation” (Evans 2010, 60). 
It is this fundamental experience that cosmological arguments attempt to 
rationally articulate. As a natural sign, this experience is prior to the argu-
ments, their stimulus rather than their cognitive product; and it is the power of 
this fundamental experience that explains where such arguments derive their 
power. Central to Evans’ account of this relation is a view of cosmic wonder as 
immediate and irreducible. “We simply perceive the universe as surprising; on 
reflection we might cite various characteristics of that universe as the ground 
of the perception, but the perception itself is immediate and primary.” (Evans 
2010, 61).
As I said earlier, it is no part of my purpose to exclude the plurality of routes 
through which this experience may arise, and to legislate against the possibil-
ity of a less mediated generation of it. My own sense is that this experience is 
less widespread among ordinary people, and more of an intellectual achieve-
ment, than Evans hypothesises.8 All I would note here is that it is perfectly 
8 His own examples of ‘common’ experiences of cosmic wonder (Evans 2010, 62) certainly point to some 
form of intellectual paternity, including the intellectual direction provided within spiritual practices. 

















































112 legitimate, faced with a profession of puzzlement or surprise, to ask a person 
for their reasons for being puzzled or surprised. And it is arguably a perfectly 
legitimate expectation that a person be able to answer that question (even if 
this may sometimes require an effort). If the claim that cosmic wonder is an 
immediate and irreducible perception involves denying this simple point, it 
will seem unconvincing. More than any other type of wonder, cosmic wonder 
seems hard to separate from the thinking of thoughts and the giving of rea-
sons. Reversing Evans’ causal order, my suggestion has been that it is precisely 
philosophical arguments that may mediate our wonder and help us think the 
kinds of thoughts that make it possible. Faced with a question about why we 
feel surprised at the existence of the world, their reason-giving would feature 
centrally in our response. 
Yet this now pulls into a view a question that many may have felt to have 
shadowed my above discussion. Because in fact taken most broadly, the point 
just made about this specific form of wonder is one that many theorists would 
be inclined to generalise to all emotional experiences. On a prominent view, all 
emotions involve what I loosely called the ‘thinking of thoughts’. All emotions 
involve (on the strongest view, consist in) some form of judgement or cogni-
tion. It is this cognitive saturation, crucially, that provides us with a handle 
for critically evaluating particular instances of emotion. Many theorists dis-
tinguish between backward-looking and forward-looking justifications of 
emotions, or in another idiom, between the cognitive and strategic rationality 
of emotions (see e.g. briefly de Sousa 1987, 163-65, and Greenspan 1988, 8-9). 
The former concerns their representational capacity, while the latter concerns 
their capacity to stimulate actions which may bear different relations to an 
individual’s interests and well-being. For any emotion, put simply, we might 
ask: is it epistemically appropriate, and are we served by the actions it makes 
us want to do? The most basic illustration of the former kind of assessment is 
where emotions depend on false beliefs, as when a feeling of anger is provoked 
by the mistaken belief that someone intentionally harmed us. It is easy to imag-
ine cases where wonder might be criticised on such grounds. On the colourful 
side of the range, Derek Matravers gives the example of someone who “might 
think a certain child is the reincarnation of former beings, who carries within 
him or her memories drawn from several lives across the ages. Such a thought 
makes a difference to their experience, and they regard the child with won-
der.” Yet if the belief is false, the feeling of wonder it generates loses its warrant 
(Matravers 2012, 176).9



















































113Yet if the cognitive constituents of an emotion provide different kinds of lever-
age for critical appraisal, the particular emotion I have considered represents 
an unusually stark case. Cosmic wonder, as I have described it, is not merely 
constituted by cognition in a softer sense but caused by it in the strongest possible 
sense, emerging in direct response to philosophical reason-giving and struc-
tured argument. As such, this is a sense of wonder that depends on reasons 
more than most. And this now raises an obvious question: Doesn’t the validity 
of this wonder therefore depend on the strength of these reasons? To the extent 
that this experience of wonder is constituted by argument, doesn’t it stand or 
fall with the argument? 
I have said little so far about the qualities of the experience itself. Yet 
it would be difficult to keep its phenomenology out of the equation if one 
wanted to explain how this kind of question might acquire its motivation and 
urgency. Although Hart does not explicitly refer this experience to the opera-
tion of philosophical argument – I can think of no first-hand descriptions of 
argument-induced cosmic wonder – what he says about its quality captures 
some of its most important aspects, above all the powerful sense of significance 
it carries. During this experience, he writes
we find ourselves brought to a pause by a sudden unanticipated sense of 
the utter uncanniness of the reality we inhabit, the startling fortuity and 
strangeness of everything familiar: how odd it is, and how unfathomable, 
that anything at all exists; how disconcerting that the world and one’s con-
sciousness of it are simply there, joined in a single ineffable event. When it 
comes, it is a moment of alienation from the ordinary perhaps, but not one 
of disaffection or loss; as long as the experience lasts, in fact, it has a certain 
quality of mystifying happiness about it, the exhilarating feeling that one 
is at the border of some tremendous and beautiful discovery. One realizes 
that everything about the world that seems so unexceptional and drearily 
predictable is in fact charged with an immense and imponderable mystery. 
In that instant one is aware, even if the precise formulation eludes one, that 
everything one knows exists in an irreducibly gratuitous way: “what it is” 
has no logical connection with the reality “that it is”; nothing within expe-
rience has any “right” to be, any power to give itself existence, any apparent 
“why.” The world is unable to provide any account of its own actuality, and 
yet there it is all the same. (Hart 2013, 88-89)
As Hart notes, it is an experience that is inherently unstable, and cannot endure 
indefinitely. Yet while it lasts, it has the thrilling quality of a shattering if uncer-

















































114 ends. This profound sense of significance is also conveyed by Wittgenstein in 
his discussion of the topic. In the spare remarks he offers on the experience in 
the “Lecture on Ethics” (Wittgenstein 1965) possibly the most telling is his deci-
sion to class existential wonder as an experience of absolute value.10
And yet if the experience owes its power to an intuition of insight, what 
kind of insight is this really? It is precisely the phenomenological importance 
of the experience that creates a stake in its epistemic warrant and makes its 
rational dependence a point of anxious concern. The potential vulnerability of 
the experience is the fragility of a good. And it takes little to determine that the 
risk is a real one. Philosophical arguments for the existence of God are notori-
ously inconclusive, as even their most sympathetic discussants admit. In John 
Hick’s view, neither theistic nor anti-theistic arguments deliver a clear verdict, 
for “the special evidences to which they appeal are also capable of being under-
stood in terms of the contrary worldview” (Hick 1989, 12) – though for Hick, 
this inconclusiveness is less a bug than a feature, marking the inherent ‘ambi-
guity of the universe’ which permits both theistic and naturalistic responses 
and makes possible the uncompelled response in which religious faith consists. 
In developing his own understanding of theistic proofs as grounded in natural 
signs, Evans takes his point of departure from a similar observation about the 
divisiveness of these proofs and their failure to elicit conviction (Evans 2010, 
1-3).11 It is sometimes wryly observed that philosophy makes no progress. Yet 
this seems truer of this part of the philosophical curriculum than of any other.
Cosmological arguments, on which my focus has fallen, are no exception to 
this rule. All of the arguments referred to above have been the subject of fierce 
debate, with even the most fundamental intuitions they mobilise contested by 
their detractors. Take the principle of sufficient reason, which assumes we can 
keep asking “Why?” of every phenomenon including the totality of phenom-
ena we call the world. Perhaps we are mistaken in thinking that the principle 
transfers from the parts to the whole, and that because it makes sense to ask for 
explanations for this thing or that, it also makes sense to ask for an explanation 
for everything there is. The very concept of the ‘whole’, Hume suggested, is 
merely an ‘arbitrary act of the mind’ (Hume 1998, 56) – the human mind machi-
nating concepts and positing them of reality. Others, like Wittgenstein, might 
query whether the human mind can grasp the absence of the whole and truly 
comprehend the possibility that there might have been ‘nothing’ in place of 
10 As I understand his discussion, the value is posited of the experience, not the object of the experience 
(i.e. the world) – though the two valuations are not wholly unconnected. 
11 This also provides the context for John Cottingham’s alternative proposal (Cottingham 2014, 28-35) 




















































115a world, without which the expression of wonder becomes nonsensical (Witt-
genstein 1965, 8-9).
 Even the most basic propositions in which the sense of cosmic wonder 
finds expression, such as that ‘it was possible that there be nothing’ or that ‘the 
world might not have existed’, would seem to disintegrate on the philosophi-
cal analyses of modal statements offered by certain stripes of modal logicians. 
David Lewis, for example, appears to simply build the possibility that there 
might have been nothing out of the system in his realist account of possible 
worlds. 
If a world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated 
things, that makes no provision for an absolutely empty world. A world is 
not like a bottle that might hold no beer. The world is the totality of things 
it contains, so even if there’s no beer, there’s still the bottle (...). Minimal 
worlds there can indeed be. There can be nothing much: just some homo-
geneous unoccupied spacetime, or maybe only one single point of it. But 
nothing much is still something, and there isn’t any world where there’s 
nothing at all. That makes it necessary that there is something. (1986, 73)12 
It is these kinds of positionings that Hart likely has in mind when he puts 
clear blue water between himself and those who claim that “the question of 
existence is an inept or false query generated by the seductions of imprecise 
grammar” (Hart 2013, 90). Yet can such claims be dismissed out of hand, sim-
ply declaring that no manner of intellectual legitimation is required? In the 
case I’ve been considering at least, where the feeling of wonder – which regis-
ters the relevance of this question – has been generated through a process of 
inquiry whose grammar or propositional content eminently invites scrutiny, 
this would on the face of it seem tough to argue.
From one regard, the problem I have raised may appear paradoxical. 
Because if one experiences a feeling of wonder at all as a result of following the 
progress of an argument, this would imply that one has, at some level, been 
persuaded by that argument. So why must the issue of rational warrant come up 
from the perspective of this type of inquirer? Yet here is where the ecological 
conditions I mentioned earlier – the sympathy, care and attention with which 
one confronts an argument – provide some context. Because it is possible to 
follow an argument in an ‘as-if’ or hypothetical mode, to give a kind of hypo-
12 There are many questions one could ask as to how exactly this position engages with the perspective 
of theistic arguments. As Lewis notes (ibid.), his position should not be taken as an attempt to explain 

















































116 thetical assent to its elements, as part of a commitment to engaging with it in 
good faith and giving it a serious hearing. (One’s amenability to the conclusion 
will no doubt play a role here.) Yet this assent is only provisional and is liable 
to be withdrawn when critical distance is fully re-established. Many a philo-
sophical hypothesis, as Hume pointed out in a slightly different context, does 
not survive its exit from the conditions in which it was earnestly entertained.
The point at issue, to repeat, is not about the rational warrant for a sub-
stantive conclusion concerning God’s existence – the specific conclusion these 
kinds of arguments are designed to press. It is about the rational warrant for 
an emotional response directed to the world’s existence, which incorporates 
an acknowledgement that its existence requires explanation. These two epis-
temic stances are in principle separable. One can hold that the world’s existence 
requires explanation (is surprising) while remaining agnostic about the conclu-
sion that God supplies that explanation, though it certainly makes one more 
receptive to the latter conclusion (making it a ‘living hypothesis’, in William 
James’ wording (2000, 199)). Yet as I have suggested, the former stance, too, rep-
resents a contested hence non-trivial commitment. Both stances emerge out 
of the same reason-giving process, and the challenges that beset it affect them 
alike. The possibility this raises is that cosmic wonder might ultimately rest on 
an error – and our wonder would not survive the discovery. 
4.
How should one respond to this quandary? If it is a quandary at all, as I have 
said, this is due to the strong sense of significance the experience carries. It is 
this phenomenological weight that gives one a stake in securing its rational 
credentials. Is the only option, then, to try to ‘save’ the experience by fighting 
for these credentials – mastering the intricacies of these arguments, outfit-
ting oneself with the necessary technical expertise, and tackling philosophical 
objections head on to demonstrate that this wonder is in fact error free? 
This is not an approach I’ll say much about, let alone try to carry out in 
the pages of this essay. All I will note about it is that it is not the approach on 
which the type of person who experiences this quandary as a quandary would 
be inclined to wager. This is mainly because it is precisely that – a wager. These 
philosophical debates, after all, are as old as the hills, and have exercised and 
divided some of the most brilliant minds. There are also debates in which 
successful contribution depends on skills of reasoning that are in turn partly 
dependent on contingencies of natural endowment. Even if these debates 
could be settled to universal satisfaction, the idea that one could be the chief 
agent of this result would seem hubristic if it wasn’t so foolhardy. From the 



















































117by a strong sense of significance which generates an anxiety about the rational 
vulnerability of the experience – to count on success of this kind is simply to 
trade one vulnerability for another.
But if we exclude this approach – securing this experience of deep wonder 
through a defence of the reason-giving process that founded it – how else can 
a warrant for it be found? I suggested above that it would be difficult to simply 
place this experience beyond the need for intellectual legitimation of this type, 
given the intellectual means through which it was produced. Yet I would now 
like to consider whether there isn’t after all a more principled way of making 
that case. More specifically, I would like to consider whether there might be 
a way of legitimating the experience that involves no reference to (and is not 
contingent on the outcome of a critical scrutiny of) the rational means that 
produced it, but is rather grounded in the qualities of the experience itself.
From the perspective that makes this problem appear as a problem, this is 
arguably the approach that will seem most natural and compelling. And that 
is because it pivots on, and involves honouring, the basic perception of this 
experience as a good. Hart gave voice to this fundamental perception earlier 
when he wrote about the peculiar sense of ‘happiness’ this experience carries. 
Yet what kind of ‘good’ is this happiness? On the one hand, it is a type of hap-
piness that cannot be reduced to a positive hedonic sensation or subjective 
feeling of pleasure. As Hart conveys, it owes part of its quality to a certain sense 
of promise, of something not yet attained but intimated in the experience as a 
possibility. He describes it as an “exhilarating feeling that one is at the border of 
some tremendous and beautiful discovery”, not in possession of some definite 
insight. The indefiniteness of its insight gives the experience an ambivalent 
quality, as Anders Schinkel writes; for while “it opens the door to mystery, it 
does not resolve it” by offering definite answers (Schinkel 2019, 306). In this 
regard, it has the character of an unfulfilled longing. 
Yet not all longing registers as a kind of pain (contrary to what Schopen-
hauer and other philosophers have sometimes argued). And some kinds of 
longing can feature as objects of value – first-order desires desired in a sec-
ond-order way. The desire that others not suffer, or the longing for justice, 
are perhaps the clearest examples. That we have these kinds of desires tells us 
something about who we are, shaping or confirming our identity. So, I would 
suggest, does the type of desire that enters the phenomenology of existential 
wonder.13 Part of the felt significance of the experience lies not in what it says 
about the world but what it says about ourselves as subjects of that experience. 


















































118 The sense of wonder we experience when we are struck by the fact that “noth-
ing within experience has any ‘right’ to be, any power to give itself existence” 
in Hart’s expression, so that we ask ourselves why anything exists at all, cannot 
be divorced from a sense of astonishment at our own ability to formulate such 
thoughts and pose such questions. In this wonder – in the desire to understand 
– we discover ourselves. The desire itself seems to deliver a kind of truth; we 
know less than we imagined, yet more is possible than we thought. It supports 
the hope that a new transformative understanding of ourselves and our world 
might after all be possible. In a minimalist vein, Robert Solomon has described 
spirituality as simply a ‘larger sense of life’ (Solomon 2002). On these terms, we 
would have no difficulty recognising this as a fundamentally spiritual experi-
ence. For the duration of the experience, our vantage point is enlarged by a 
desire and hope for a deeper understanding of our nature and the nature of 
the reality we inhabit. Although the experience may ultimately bring no sub-
stantive insight beyond this, part of its special ‘happiness’ lies in the felt truth 
it carries.
 This is by no means an attempt to provide an exhaustive characterisation 
of the phenomenology of the experience. Yet I have tried to at least indicate the 
kind of features that constitute this as an experience of intense meaningfulness 
and significance, and that might lead us to bracket the specific means through 
which it was produced and consider their rational assessment irrelevant to its 
warrant. But it is important to be precise about what this claim involves. This 
is not to say that the means through which the experience was produced are 
entirely irrelevant. In fact, they enter into its phenomenological warrant neces-
sarily, given that the wonder we experience at our ability to formulate certain 
kinds of questions and thoughts is a wonder at a capacity that was exercised and 
exemplified by following a certain set of arguments and train of reasoning. Yet 
for this, the strength or weakness of the specific arguments is immaterial. What 
matters is not that these reasons work, but that reason does. 
In considering how the means through which an experience is produced 
enter into an assessment of its legitimacy, it is instructive to consider a similar 
(if not entirely identical) experience of wonder where the issue of means comes 
up equally if not even more sharply. In the last few decades, there has been 
growing interest in the scientific community in the psychological effects of a 
class of substances often referred to as ‘psychedelics’, which include psilocy-
bin, mescaline and LSD. These effects vary across individuals, and they can be 
tracked over different levels. Yet an element that recurs in descriptions of the 
mental state generated by a number of these substances is a sense of wonder. As 
Michael Pollan puts it in his recent book How to Change Your Mind: The New Science 



















































119“disable (...) conventionalized, shorthand modes of perception”. In so doing, 
it “restores a childlike immediacy, and sense of wonder, to our experience of 
reality, as if we were seeing everything for the first time” (2018, 9).
In the cultural history of the last century, it is hard to think of someone 
who conveyed the ‘Adamic’ quality14 of this perception quite as powerfully as 
the English writer Aldous Huxley. In a short tract titled The Doors of Perception, 
Aldous Huxley set out to document the experience that followed his inges-
tion of half a gram of mescaline one day in 1953. His perception of the world 
underwent a startling transformation. Colours became more vivid; ordinary 
things like chairs and tables took on a miraculous aspect (“how miraculous 
their tubularity, how supernatural their polished smoothness!” (2017, 13-14)). 
Huxley found himself gazing in fascination at his flannel trousers (“Those 
folds in the trousers – what a labyrinth of endlessly significant complexity! 
And the texture of the gray flannel – how rich, how deeply, mysteriously sump-
tuous” (2017, 21)). In Huxley’s experience, we will have no difficulty recognising 
a dramatic instance of wonder. This was an experience he repeatedly connected 
to a heightened sense of meaning and significance. Books on the shelves 
glowed with ‘a profounder significance’, theirs colours “so intense, so intrinsi-
cally meaningful, that they seemed to be on the point of leaving the shelves 
to thrust themselves more insistently on my attention” (2017, 11). Throughout, 
Huxley used a strong religious vocabulary to articulate that sense of signifi-
cance. What he felt he was seeing was “what Adam had seen on the morning of 
his creation – the miracle, moment by moment, of naked existence” (2017, 9). 
He was beholding the ‘unfathomable mystery of pure being’ (2017, 25). Huxley 
described it as a ‘sacramental’ vision of reality (2017, 13).
Huxley has been far from alone in connecting this pharmacologically pro-
duced experience to a powerful sense of meaningfulness. These terms also 
feature prominently in the results reported by a landmark 2006 scientific study 
of the effects of psilocybin (Griffiths et al. 2006), which provided a key fillip 
for the renaissance of scientific research on the topic. In the core experiment, 
thirty volunteers were administered doses of psilocybin over two or three ses-
sions conducted at two-month intervals. Studying the persisting effects of the 
experience, the authors of the paper reported that “67% of the volunteers rated 
the experience with psilocybin to be either the single most meaningful experi-
ence of his or her life or among the top five most meaningful experiences of 
his or her life”, its level of significance similar “to the birth of a first child or 
14 This is Pollan’s term (2018, 25), in the context of describing one of the first experiences of LSD by 
its accidental discoverer, the Swiss scientist Albert Hofmann; its phenomenology shared interesting 

















































120 death of a parent” (Griffiths et al. 2006, 276-77). The title of the paper said it all: 
“Psilocybin Can Occasion Mystical-Type Experiences Having Substantial and 
Sustained Personal Meaning and Spiritual Significance.”
There are important differences between the type of wonder that Huxley 
describes and the one I have been considering. Above all, the sensuous quality 
and perceptual focus of Huxley’s wonder stands in sharp contrast to the intel-
lectual, concept-driven character of the wonder I discussed.15 Yet there are also 
important similarities. Both involve an apprehension of mystery, an orienta-
tion to being in its mysteriousness, and an intense sense of significance.16 Both 
thereby draw us into a space where we view things with a ‘larger sense of life’. 
Yet no less importantly, like the concept-driven wonder I have described, this 
pharmacologically induced wonder also invites a pressing question about how 
the means used to produce it affect its legitimacy. “This is how one ought to 
see,” Huxley writes at one point; this is “how things really are” (Huxley 2017, 
26). Yet how could this normative claim be validated? Powerful and transforma-
tive as it may be, what kind of warrant does this mode of perception have, taken 
as the result of ingesting a finite amount of a particular chemical compound? 
Our former question about whether cosmic wonder is valid unless founded on 
the right reasons is here reformulated as a question about whether wonder is 
valid unless grounded in the proper causes. Scepticism in the first case would 
be voiced in the question, “Is it rational?” Scepticism in the second would most 
likely be voiced in the question, “Is it natural?”
This kind of scepticism, as Pollan notes, is a hallmark of how such pharma-
cologically induced experiences are commonly received by outside observers. 
They stand in marked contrast to the way in which subjects themselves think 
about these experiences, even long after the event. Several decades before 
Huxley sat down to ingest his half gram of mescaline, William James outlined 
a number of key features that characterise mystical experiences. The most 
important, for our purposes, was what he designated as their ‘noetic quality’. 
mystical states seem to those who experience them to be (...) states of knowl-
edge. They are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the 
discursive intellect. They are illuminations, revelations, full of significance 
15  Huxley in fact sees concepts as profoundly inimical to this Adamic perception. The concept “distorts 
every given fact into the all too familiar likeness of some generic label or explanatory abstraction” 
(2017, 63) and stands in the way of a more direct experience of the world. 
16 In his account of one of his own psychedelic experiences, Pollan frames this perception of the mystery 
of being in terms far more closely related to the philosophical case I’ve been considering: he experi-
ences a sense of ‘gratitude for the very fact of being’, viewing the fact ‘that there is something rather 



















































121and importance (...) and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of 
authority for after-time. (James 1982, 380-81)
Put differently, these kinds of experiences carry a kind of intrinsic authority 
that makes them appear self-validating to those who have them. Although 
James did not have pharmacologically induced mystical experiences in mind 
when writing these lines, his remarks capture well the attitude of many of 
their subjects, for whom the authority of the experience is not undermined 
by consideration of the means that produced it. “How can you be sure this 
was a genuine spiritual event and not just a drug experience?” Pollan presses 
one of his interviewees. “It’s an irrelevant question,” she responds. “This was 
something being revealed to me” (Pollan 2018, 275). Huxley himself provides 
an especially suggestive expression of this attitude when he writes in one place: 
“What is important is less the reason for the experience than the experience 
itself” (Huxley 2017, 25).17 
The case of pharmacologically induced wonder raises special questions 
that do not attach to its philosophically induced counterpart. Before taking 
a stance on it, certainly, one would have to say far more about the biochemical 
foundations of human experience, or about the difference between ‘natural’ 
and ‘unnatural’ chemical compounds. Similarly, the ‘noetic quality’ James 
describes appears to be stronger in the case of this wonder than its philosophi-
cal counterpart. The higher receptivity to doubt in the latter case reflects its 
intellectual character, though also its weaker cognitive or informational con-
tent compared with its pharmacological counterpart. This makes it necessary 
to recover the internal warrant of the experience through some type of rational 
articulation, as attempted here. Yet in both cases, the internal qualities of the 
experience play a determining role in securing this warrant. 
Yet this kind of phenomenological validation, as the above will have made 
clear, must be understood more broadly than the term ‘internal’ suggests. 
These internal qualities are not, as I noted earlier, simply a matter of the posi-
tive valence or hedonic feel of the experience, which can in fact be ambivalent. 
In both pharmacologically and philosophically mediated wonder, the defin-
ing quality is a sense of significance tied to the ‘larger sense of life’ they evoke, 
which crystallises new ways of thinking about ourselves and about the reality 
we inhabit. Such experiences, while intrinsically valuable qua experiences, can 
also have important implications for broader well-being. In the case of phar-
macologically induced wonder, this connection is supported by the 2006 study 
17 Suggestive, though at a slight angle, as Huxley is not referring directly to mescaline as the reason or 

















































122 just mentioned, in which several participants recorded an important increase 
in life satisfaction following their psilocybin experience (Griffiths et al. 2006, 
277).18 Although research in this area is ongoing, recent studies appear to con-
firm this connection.19
Does philosophically induced wonder carry similarly powerful conse-
quences for well-being in the longer term? The answer to this question is not 
equally obvious, for reasons that point to an important difference between 
the two experiences that was already alluded to. The cognitive content of this 
type of wonder appears less definite and substantive (cf. Schinkel 2019) than 
that of many of the experiences described by consumers of psychedelic sub-
stances, making it less likely to have comparably transformative effects. That 
experiences of awe and wonder in general can make a significant contribution 
to well-being is a case being increasingly made, and is reflected in the inter-
est being taken in these emotions by positive psychologists (e.g. Peterson and 
Seligman 2004). Though the empirical evidence does not yet seem ironclad, 
and the types of experience on which empirical studies focus are very different 
from the one I have been considering, part of this appears to rest on the sense of 
‘connectedness’ these emotions induce – a feature they share with this particu-
lar form of wonder.20 More generally, there is reason to think that the sense of 
hope, epistemic humility, intellectual openness, and enlarged self-awareness 
this particular experience nourishes would make an overall positive contribu-
tion to well-being.
There are empirical questions here, certainly, that can take fruitful inves-
tigation. Yet as defenders of a more objective conception of happiness or 
eudaimonia have argued, our character and our flourishing do not simply relate 
as cause and effect. Who we are is an essential part of our flourishing, rather 
than an extraneous means to it. If we take this view, the question whether this 
philosophical wonder contributes to our well-being will partly turn on the 
question whether we want to be the kind of people we become through the 
experience.
5.
In the above, I outlined one way in which the experience of existential won-
der could be defended against the potential vulnerability of its rational 
18 “Seventy-nine percent of the volunteers rated that the psilocybin experience increased their current 
sense of personal well-being or life satisfaction ‘moderately’ (50%) or ‘very much’ (29%).” 
19 See e.g. the recent review article Jungaberle et al. 2018 and Elsey 2017. These kinds of (in principle 
objectively measurable) outcomes of the experience provide a partial remedy for the epistemological 
solipsism that its “noetic quality” entails (cf. James 1982, 422).



















































123foundations. This defence involves looking away from the reason-giving that 
produced the experience and locating its warrant in features of the experience 
itself. This form of internal validation entails considering the broader place 
this experience occupies in, and the impact it has on, the life of its subject. 
Taken in this broader sense, this defence aligns itself with what I earlier 
described as the ‘forward-looking’ justification of emotions, which attends to 
their ‘instrumental’ or ‘strategic’ rather than ‘cognitive’ rationality. A purely 
instrumental approach to the warrant of this experience would not seem satis-
fying. Even though we often accept instrumental evaluations of our emotions, 
particularly where these concern patterns of emotional response (“Your anger 
issues are destroying your relationships”, “This kind of anxiety is no way to 
live”), these kinds of analyses can also be alienating. From a first-person view-
point, we tend to think of our emotions as rational in the cognitive sense – as 
appropriate to their object, not merely as helpful for our lives or conducive to 
our happiness. This is all the truer in this case, where wonder has been gener-
ated through unusually direct cognitive means. While the proposal I outlined 
has not taken a purely instrumental form, it may still be asked: Is there some 
way in which the rationality of the experience could be defended on terms 
more relevant to this means?
If this means a defence that manages to circumvent the philosophical bat-
tlefield around natural theology arguments, and that is inoculated against 
philosophical objections, that would be hard to come by. All I can do here, as 
a modest alternative, is outline what I think of as one of the leanest ways of 
understanding the intellectual workings of these arguments. To properly fol-
low an argument, I suggested earlier, involves allowing oneself to entertain 
intellectual possibilities. These possibilities, in the case of some of the prime 
instances of the cosmological argument, include the proposition that the 
world’s existence requires explanation, which involves entertaining the pos-
sibility that no world might ever have existed. Some of the ways in which these 
arguments make these possibilities thinkable for us is by working on our imag-
ination: al-Kindī inviting us to follow time back rail by rail; Leibniz asking us 
to follow the states of the world back book copy by book copy. Yet on another 
level, we could describe their work more basically as a matter of giving clearer 
content to existing concepts – of making certain concepts thinkable, or more 
thinkable. It could be said that what makes us experience the need for an expla-
nation of the world’s existence is most simply the fact that, after many years as 
master speakers of ordinary language, we for the first time (to use a colloquial 
expression that seems especially apt) ‘wrapped our mind’ around the concept 
of ‘world’. We enclosed the world in our minds, as a limited whole. The sense of 

















































124 able to look beyond it. It was a result of the mind’s natural surpassing of a limit. 
‘Limited’, it may be demurred, is what a specific argument makes it out to be: 
and that is in question. Yet my point is that it is natural to us to enclose things 
in concepts, and then to look beyond the limits of this enclosure – as natural as 
thinking and the ordinary idea of a ‘world’, even if we may need external help 
for its content to become fully available to us.
Philosophical arguments are certainly not the only way in which such con-
cepts can become thinkable for us. The representation of the world as a limited 
whole is after all also supported by the best current scientific hypothesis about 
the origins of the universe. My account has been open to acknowledging the 
plurality of routes through which existential wonder might become available 
to us, or be nourished once it does. While we can be educated into this type of 
wonder in a variety of ways, the special role of theistic arguments in shaping 
the ‘thinking’ that makes this ‘feeling’ possible should lead us to look at the 
value of a theological education with new eyes. Like all philosophical argu-
ments, such arguments work by making things we took for granted appear 
strange or wondrous. As such, they are a celebration of our capacity to think. 
Far more than other philosophical arguments, these arguments are a source of 
wonder at this capacity. We don’t need to agree with their conclusions to make 
this wonder our own.
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6  On Wonder: Wittgenstein, 
Buber and Educational Practice
David Erlich 
Introduction
W onder, with an o, as written in the title of this paper, and wander, with an a, as in to wander around, have two different etymological origins. Wander comes from wend, which means to turn and also 
originated wind (Lexico: n.d). This allows us to think that, despite the different 
origins, we can relate wonder as something that appears to us, that invades us 
like a wind, when we turn. What we could be trying to mean by this is that to 
be grasped by that feeling of amazement and admiration that we call wonder, 
demands us to turn, to get out of an established route. There is a displacement 
that takes us out of our ordinary mastery of language. This view of wonder will 
be the one held throughout this essay as a starting point to the dialogue that 
will take place between Wittgenstein and Buber. The complete justification of 
the adequacy of thinking of wonder as a way of being almost speechless would 
require, perhaps, an entire essay about the ways in which wonder – or, at least, 
what may be called ‘contemplative wonder’ (Schinkel 2017, 544) – appears in 
the fundamental texts of our Western culture. We can, nonetheless, read it in 
sources as different as the Old Testament – in which God, seeing His Genesis 
creation can only utter the word good – and the famous passage of the Critique of 
Practical Reason – in which Kant states his admiration for and awe of the starry 
heavens above and the moral law within.
In part I of this paper, I will portray Ludwig Wittgenstein’s approach to 
language in his Tractactus Logico-Philosophicus and the implicit acceptance of 
wonder as something that we cannot put into words. Then, I’ll move on to 
the aim of reading Wittgenstein’s “Lecture on Ethics” and understanding the 
ethical meaning of the acceptance of wonder, as an individual openness to the 
unsolvable mystery of the world. In part II, it will be argued that the Wittgen-
128 steinian theme of the limits between what can be said and what can only be 
lived as wonder is shared by Martin Buber, who approaches it in a relational 
manner. In part III, I will search, in the thought of the two philosophers, for 
some hints about how to give wonder a place in the classroom.
I. Boundaries of language: Wittgenstein and the ethical 
meaning of wonder
Tractatus’ account of language
The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, a book that Wittgenstein wrote while he was a 
soldier in the First World War and that was published in 1921, was received with 
great joy by the neopositivists (Hanfling 2004, 195). We can understand why.
Wittgenstein argued that language, once logically analysed, should work 
like an image of reality: “We make to ourselves pictures of facts” (Wittgenstein 
2010, 2.1)1; “The picture is a model of reality” (ibid., 2.12); “The proposition is a 
picture of reality” (ibid., 4.01). The resemblance between this image and what 
it stands for is what defines its truth-value: “The picture agrees with reality or 
not; it is right or wrong, true or false” (ibid., 2.21).
In this ideal language, all complex propositions are to be composed of sim-
ple propositions that would affirm a state of affairs: “The simplest proposition, 
the elementary proposition, asserts the existence of an atomic fact” (ibid., 4.21); 
“It is obvious that in the analysis of propositions we must come to elemen-
tary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination.” (ibid., 
4.221). And, in these simple propositions, each name is to have a denotation – 
something we can point at to show what the word means: “The simple signs 
employed in propositions are called names[;] the name means the object. The 
object is its meaning (...)” (ibid., 3.202-3.203).
“Only the proposition has sense (...)” the philosopher writes (ibid., 3.3), sug-
gesting that the linguistic atoms called names, such as table and pen, only have 
sense if put into a sentence that portrays a possibility about how the world 
is. For example, the pen is on the table. This proposition has sense because it is 
bipolar: I can look at how the world is and verify the proposition: if it fits the 
world, it is true; if it doesn’t fit, it is false: “The proposition determines reality 
to this extent, that one only needs to say ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to it to make it agree with 
reality” (ibid., 4.023); “Propositions can be true or false only by being pictures 




















































129of the reality” (ibid., 4.06); “If the elementary proposition is true, the atomic 
fact exists; if it is false, the atomic fact does not exist” (ibid., 4.25). 
It is important to note, regardless of being true or false, that the pen is on the 
table is a proposition with sense because it can be true or false – either the pen 
is on the table or it is not: “The picture agrees with reality or not; it is right 
or wrong, true or false”; “The picture represents what it represents, indepen-
dently of its truth or falsehood (...)”; “What the picture represents is its sense”; 
“In the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality, its truth or falsity 
consists” (ibid., 2.21-2.222). Now if I say, for example, this pen doesn’t have a soul, 
this proposition would be nonsense because it is not verifiable. We don’t know 
what could count as a case to refute it or confirm it, precisely because we do not 
have a clear referent for one of the names: we know what a pen is, but not what 
a soul is. As Wittgenstein puts it, if a proposition “has no sense this can only 
be because we have given no meaning to some of its constituent parts (ibid.: 
5.4733).
In the Tractatus, philosophy is considered an activity of distinguishing lan-
guage that has sense from language that does not, opening the field for the 
advancement of natural science: “The totality of true propositions is the total 
natural science (...). Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (...) The object 
of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory 
but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The 
result of philosophy is not a number of ‘philosophical propositions’, but to 
make propositions clear. Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the 
thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred” (Wittgenstein 
ibid., 4.11-4.112).
The implicit acceptance of wonder in the Tractatus
What about wonder, and in what way, is a brief outline of Tractactus Logico- 
Philosophicus, as I presented above, relevant to approach that matter?
At first glance, Wittgenstein gives wonder no special place in the Tractatus; 
only twice does Wittgenstein use words derived from wonder: one to express 
how ‘wonderful’ logic is (Wittgenstein 2010, 5.43), and the other to say that, 
considering the pictorial theory of language, “it is not to be wondered that the 
deepest problems are really no problems” (ibid., 4.003).
But although Wittgenstein does not explicitly use the word wonder, he does 
not dismiss it. Let us look at this and understand the significance of what we 
are trying to emphasise here. 
We can, in a probably oversimplifying way, classify philosophers in two 
groups: those who dream with certainty and those who shed suspicion on that 












































130 the former: “the Tractatus, (...) he [Wittgenstein] believed (...), contained all that 
was essential for the solution of the problems of philosophy (...). With perfect 
consistency, once he had completed the book, he gave up philosophy” (Kenny 
2006, 6). Moreover, certainty, in its highest point, makes wonder undesirable. If 
we go through life with absolute certainty, we will not make room for wonder 
and the interrogations it brings. (It is not to be understood by this that open-
ness to wonder demands constant scepticism, as such an extreme opposite also 
suppresses wonder, because it levels all expectations.) Idealist Plato, absolutely 
convinced of the truth of his Ideas, wanted to expel the poets from the perfect 
polis; rationalist Descartes claimed, with pride, that his system would finally 
put an end to all disagreements; and neopositivist Carnap proposed that those 
in metaphysics should stop misusing language and, in fact, become musicians. 
So we could legitimately expect that Wittgenstein would reject wonder as 
something that takes language out of what it really ought to be – if language is 
a representation of the world, wonder would only be an obstacle to the achieve-
ment of that representation. But, to the reader’s surprise, in the final part of 
the Tractatus, Wittgenstein talks about ethics, value, death and infinity. He 
tells us that “there can be no ethical propositions”; that “if good or bad willing 
changes the world, it can only change the limits of the world, not the facts”; 
that “death is not an event of life (...) [and] is not lived through”; that “if by 
eternity is understood not endless temporal duration but timelessness, then he 
lives eternally who lives in the present” (Wittgenstein 2010, 6.42-6.4311). And, 
at the end of the Tractatus, he commits himself to silence: “whereof one cannot 
speak, thereof one must be silent” (Wittgenstein 2010, 7).
The first proposal of this paper is that the final part of the Tractatus can be 
read as an acceptance of wonder. Anders Schinkel, in a recent paper about edu-
cation and wonder, portrays wonder as “a mode of consciousness in which 
we experience what we perceive or are contemplating as strange, beyond our 
powers of comprehension, yet worthy of our attention for its own sake” (Schin-
kel 2018, 34). It is precisely the Tractatus’ acceptance of wonder that delivers a 
tension between the need to say and the difficulty of saying. This is why Witt-
genstein tells us that “there is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it 
is the mystical” (Wittgenstein 2010, 6.522). Something is inexpressible if it 
demands expression without allowing the full achievement of expression. So 
we can agree with Nuno Venturinha when he says that Tractatus is not only a 
book about linguistic access to reality but also – and equally important – a book 
about the limits of such access (Venturinha 2010, 85). Moreover, this proposal 
goes in the same direction as Kevin M. Cahill’s, although not as far in respect 
to the intentionality of the book, when he says – in a provocative work about 



















































131in the book’s attempt to reawaken a sense of wonder in its reader” (Cahill 2011, 
13). Indeed, Wittgenstein first develops a description of language in which all 
expressible things would be totally clear and non-ambiguous in their expres-
sion and a logical analysis would seem to make all mystery disappear, but then 
at the end of Tractatus, he dismisses that view and accepts wonder as a human 
way of being, acknowledging the kinds of experiences that bring us face to face 
with the inexpressible. 
Lecture on ethics and the unsayability of the world
In the beginning of his “Lecture on Ethics”, delivered at Cambridge Univer-
sity in November 1929, Wittgenstein distinguishes between relative judgements 
of value and absolute judgements of value. Both kinds of judgements use the word 
‘good’ to talk about something we appreciate. In Wittgenstein’s view, rela-
tive judgements of value don’t pose any kind of problem. He tells us that “if 
I say that this is a good chair, this means that the chair serves a certain pre-
determined purpose and the word ‘good’ here has only meaning so far as this 
purpose has been previously fixed upon” (Wittgenstein 2002, 1). Here, good 
only means suitable in order to achieve a determined goal. A good pen writes. A good 
oven heats the food. A good car takes us from one place to another. But do these 
relative judgements of value put us in contact with what Ethics is? “[T]his is not 
how Ethics uses [this expression]”, says Wittgenstein. Ethics is concerned with 
‘what is really important’, ‘the meaning of life’, ‘what makes life worth living’, 
‘the right way of living’ (ibid., 1); and in this way Wittgenstein claims that Eth-
ics delivers absolute judgements of value which are radically different from the 
relative ones written above. The difference relies on the fact that, according to 
Wittgenstein, relative judgements of value can be shown to be mere statements 
of fact, whereas absolute judgements of value are not reducible to statements 
of fact. So, if someone says: “My computer is a good computer”, that judgement 
can become a statement of fact like: “My computer has this and this component 
that allows me to perform this and this task”. But that kind of derivation from a 
judgement of value to a statement of fact, according to Wittgenstein, cannot be 
made in sentences like: “We ought to do good to the world”. But if the sense of 
a sentence is the possibility of correspondence to the world as it is, and if judge-
ments of absolute value cannot be transformed into sensical statements of fact, 
what sense do they have? Are they nonsensical? Why do they occur in language? 
Wittgenstein himself poses the question: “Then what have all of us who, like 
myself, are still tempted to use such expressions as ‘absolute good,’ ‘absolute 
value,’ etc., what have we in mind and what do we try to express?” (ibid., 3)
Wittgenstein suggests that judgements of absolute value are expressed, 












































132 use pleasure in a Cyrenaic sense, and more in Stuart Mill’s sense of superior 
pleasures, as Wittgenstein tells that “one man would perhaps choose as stock 
example the sensation when taking a walk on a fine summer’s day” (ibid., 3) For 
Wittgenstein, that experience of absolute value is described in the following 
terms: “when I have it I wonder at the existence of the world. And I am then inclined 
to use such phrases as ‘how extraordinary that anything should exist’ or ‘how 
extraordinary that the world should exist.’” (ibid., 3). 
The paradox is that, for Wittgenstein, to say: “I wonder at the existence of 
the world” is to misuse language, because a logically defined wonder would 
have to be a wonder caused by “something being the case which [we] could con-
ceive not to be the case” (ibid., 4). For example, one can (or would) be struck by 
wonder when seeing a building of a shape one has never seen before, or a cat as 
big as a house. But to wonder at the existence of the world, and to express by 
that wonder an absolute value, is nonsensical. As Wittgenstein says, we “run 
against the boundaries of language” (ibid., 6). Wittgenstein finishes his Lecture 
with this remark: “[I]t is a document of a tendency in the human mind which 
I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule 
it” (ibid., 6).
The second proposal of this paper is that the implicit acceptance of won-
der in the Tractatus becomes, in the “Lecture on Ethics”, explicit and gains an 
ethical significance. This ethical significance is openness to the mystery of the 
world, and this reading seems to agree with Cahill’s when he says that “the 
language Wittgenstein uses here [in the Lecture] to express his wonder has clear 
resonances with the language we find [in the] Tractatus” (Cahill 2011, 54), and 
also when he states that “Wittgenstein saw it as one of his philosophy’s central 
tasks to reawaken a sense of wonder for what he felt was the deeply mysterious 
place of human life in the world” (ibid., 2). 
It is a well-known fact that the word ‘ethics’ comes from the Greek for char-
acter and wonder’s ethical significance, in this reading of the Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus and Lecture, is the openness of our individual character to the unsay-
ability of the world. It is, in a way, tragic, because we want to say what cannot 
be said; but it is also, very often, beautiful and pleasant.
Final notes on part I
Two final notes are needed here. The first one is to state that, despite not 
being the goal of this paper to position itself amongst the various currents 
in Wittgensteinian commentary, with regard to the importance of the ethical 
dimension in Wittgenstein’s work there may be a proximity between the view 
I develop here and the ineffability reading of the Tractatus, which proposes 



















































133(Conant 2003, 199, note 11), an “importance given to the ineffable that can be 
viewed as an ethical position” (Biletzki and Matar 2018). The second note is to 
state a problem which arises with the reading of early Wittgenstein that was 
just exhibited (yet again, this issue will only be summarized and not dealt with, 
as that task would exceed the purpose of this paper). This problem is that, for 
the contextualist approach to Wittgenstein, the so-called second Wittgenstein 
“dropped the notion of the ‘limits of language’” with his change of focus from 
semantics to pragmatics (Rorty 1991, 64) – but that view might be oversimplify-
ing. Although “Wittgenstein did not directly address the issue of ineffability 
in the Philosophical Investigations”, “Wittgenstein’s enigmatic comments about 
silence and the mystical in TLP” are not impossible to accommodate within 
later Wittgenstein’s work (Knepper 2008, 65, 75); and, indeed, sections 217 of 
the Philosophical Investigations and 501 and 517 of On Certainty can, precisely, be 
read as still telling us something about the limits of language.2
II. Martin Buber and I-You wonder
Wittgenstein and Buber: a possible conversation
Based both on Dewey and on Oakeshott, Richard Rorty sees philosophy as an 
ongoing conversation (Rorty 2007, ix; Rorty 1979, 264). If philosophy is under-
stood this way, a specific task of a philosophical paper might be the search for 
possible connections between philosophers that never really spoke to each 
other’s work. It is with this premise in mind that we will now turn to Martin 
Buber, beginning with his work I and Thou. 
There is, indeed, a thematic convergence between Wittgenstein and 
Buber. Although Buber’s considerations about the genesis of basic linguistic 
expressions are more similar to Wittgenstein’s language games in Philosophi-
cal Investigations than to his Tractatus, both Buber and Tractatus’ Wittgenstein 
think about the limits of what can be said and, in that manner, it is very inter-
esting that both Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, published in 1921, and Buber’s I and 
Thou, published in 1923, begin with statements about the world as a whole, 
while admitting that there’s a part of the world which hides from language. 
2 PI 217: “If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then 
I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do.’” (Wittgenstein 1958, 85); OC 501: “Am I not getting 
closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described? You must look at the practice 
of language, then you will see it.” (Wittgenstein 1969, 501); OC 517: “But might it not be possible for 
something to happen that threw me entirely off the rails? Evidence that made the most certain thing 
unacceptable to me? Or at any rate made me throw over my most fundamental judgements?” (Witt-












































134 “The world is everything that is the case”, Wittgenstein begins his Tractatus 
(Wittgenstein 2010, 1), to conclude that, in the end, we have to “throw away the 
ladder”: “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” (ibid., 6.54-
7). On his part, Buber opens his I and Thou by saying that “to man the world 
is twofold, in accordance with his twofold attitude” (Buber 1937, 3), and, in 
the beginning of part two of his book, he tells us that “only silence before the 
Thou (...) leaves the Thou free” (ibid., 39). As we’ve seen above, ineffability is a 
term used to designate one of the currents in the reading of Wittgenstein; and, 
according to Santiago Kovadloff, one of Buber’s lessons is that true dialogue 
with what surrounds us maintains its ineffability (Kovadloff 1990, 83).
As has been claimed in part I of this paper, in a reading of the “Lecture on 
Ethics” as a continuation of the Tractatus, the ethical meaning of Wittgenstein’s 
acceptance of wonder is a personal openness to the mystery of the existence of 
the world. Buber will be seen to share this Wittgensteinian theme of the limits 
of language but to give it an ethical meaning that underlines the importance of 
the Other, a topic which is missing, at least explicitly, from Wittgenstein’s Lec-
ture. So, in this paper’s third proposal, it will be briefly sketched how, in Buber’s 
thought, true relation with an Other has wonder in between.
The I-It experience
For Buber – following the citation given above – “[t]he attitude of man is two-
fold, in accordance with the twofold nature of the primary words which he 
speaks” (Buber 1937, 3). These primary words are not isolated terms but com-
bined ones. One of these primary words is I–It, in which he or she can take the 
place of it. The other one is I–You.3 Our own existence is, therefore, twofold: the 
I pronounced in I-It is not the same I as pronounced in I-You.
When we engage in an I-It mode with something or someone, we don’t have 
a relation, but an experience. We are in front of an object with the intention 
of fully describing it or explaining it, in a way which is related to the use we 
have for that object. There’s an isolation of the I, who becomes an individual 
that positions an It in a previously determined system of ideas. The I-It mode 
of engaging the world is full of transitive verbs that demand a clear division 
between subject and object and aim at predictability, objectivity and control 
(ibid., 4-6).
3 In the talk that this paper is based on, I referred to the I-Thou relation by saying I-You, to make it closer 
to spoken language, as Thou is not a word often used. That choice is retained in the writing of this 
paper. Putnam’s words on this matter are clarifying: “Walter Kaufman rightly pointed out that the 
German ‘Du’ in the title Ich und Du is simply the pronoun one uses in talking to friends and family, and 
that translating it by the now archaic ‘thou’ already falsifies Buber’s thought by making it somehow 



















































135Is this I-It mode of engaging the world intrinsically bad and, therefore, totally 
undesirable? Buber suggests differently: “without It, man cannot live. But he 
who lives with It alone is not a man” (ibid., 34). So, the I-It mode of acquaintance 
with the world is not bad in itself; it is only dangerous when it inhibits us from 
reaching an I-You mode of relating with what surrounds us. Putnam stresses 
that thinking “the I-It relation is always bad” is one of the misunderstandings 
that an erroneous reading of Buber’s work may lead to (Putnam 2008, 62).
Wonder, the I-You relation and education
This is how Buber portrays an example of the passage from an I-It situation to 
an I-You situation:
I consider a tree (...). I can perceive it as movement (...). I can classify it in a 
species (...). I can (...) recognise it only as an expression of law. (...) I can dis-
sipate it (...) in a number (...). In all this the tree remains my object. (...) It can, 
however, also come about, (...) that in considering the tree I become bound 
up in relation to it. The tree is no longer it. I have been seized by the power 
of exclusiveness (Buber 1937, 7).
So, the I-You mode of engaging the world is not only able of including other 
human beings, but also natural elements. What does this relation consist of? 
When we say You, we are in a relation. Our whole being is directly with the 
You we pronounce. We are not an isolated individual, but a connected person. 
There is relation lived in the present, a non-hierarchical contemplation, a true 
encounter. In Buber’s words, “[i]f I face a human being as my Thou (...), he is not 
a thing among things (...). [H]e is Thou and fills the heavens (...) and everything 
else lives in his light” (ibid.: 8). It is important to note, as Schinkel does, that
this attitude, this relationship, cannot be maintained all the time, but 
must be re-established and renewed again and again; each time the Other 
is revealed once more as a Thou (and you are revealed as a different I in rela-
tion to that Thou) – a repeated epiphany of what was already known, the 
same way wonder can make us see the familiar afresh (Schinkel 2018, 40-41).
“All real living is meeting”, says Buber in a famous passage from his book (1937, 
11). This real living he talks about is our ability to be in relation with a You. 
There is a word that, despite not being said by Buber, distinguishes, indeed, the 
I-It experience from the I-You relation, and that word is wonder. When we say It, 
we deny wonder, we replace wonder with a full-fledged discursivity, we escape 












































136 this paper’s proposal is that wonder is a main differentiating feature between 
the I-You relation and the I-It experience. 
Although at this point it seems to me somewhat ungrounded to say that 
there’s an equivalence between wonder and I-You relations – so that’s not what is 
being proposed – I do think we can securely claim that wonder is necessarily 
absent from I-It experiences, as they are dominance based, and when there’s domi-
nance there’s no place for wonder. By contrast, wonder is necessarily present in 
the formation of I-You relations – the use of the word ‘epiphany’ in the quotation 
above, is very illustrative of that aspect. The maintenance of an I-You relation 
through time – a possibility clearly suggested by Buber’s recurrent use of the 
word relation instead of, for example, mere encounter – may diminish wonder 
but it’s safe to say that, at least at the starting point of an I-You relation, wonder 
must be present. 
Buber uses the expression ‘threshold of speech’ (Buber 1937, 6, 101) – which 
reminds us of Wittgenstein’s already quoted ‘boundaries of language’ – to 
imply what is at stake when we truly say You. We say You knowing that won-
der is bigger than language. So, the third proposal of this paper is that Martin 
Buber, whose thought has some intersections with Wittgenstein’s philosophy, 
shares Wittgenstein’s interest in the limits of language, but gives them a rela-
tional account: a true I-You relation, which is exempt from linguistic forms of 
explicability and power, is inhabited by wonder with the existence of the Other. 
Despite the fact that Buber also does not use the word wonder in either of his 
lectures on education published in the volume Between Man and Man, the way 
he states that an individual striving for creativity – “the child of man wants 
to make things” (Buber 2002, 100) – is an insufficient educational goal is in 
accordance with this paper’s proposal underlining wonder towards the Other:
We must continually point out that human inwardness is in origin a 
polyphony (...). One of the leading voices is the instinct of origination. This 
instinct is therefore bound to be significant for the work of education as 
well. (...) But (...) the decisive influence is to be ascribed not to the release of 
an instinct but to the forces which meet the released instinct, namely, the 
educative forces. (...) There are two forms, indispensable for the building of 
true human life, to which the originative instinct, left to itself, does not lead 
and cannot lead: to sharing in an undertaking and to entering into mutual-
ity. An individual achievement and an undertaking are two very different 
matters. (...) As soon as a man enters effectively into an undertaking, where 
he discovers and practises a community of work with other men, he ceases 



















































137Thou is not the originative instinct but the instinct for communion. (Buber 
2004, 102-104)
As suggested in the beginning of this paper, we experience contemplative 
wonder when something makes us speechless. So, we experience contempla-
tive wonder towards the Other when it is another human being that makes us 
speechless (in both cases, there’s an implicit shared premise that excludes from 
this concept non-pleasant or non-fruitful ways of being speechless, like shock, 
horror, humiliation – but, as I’ve also stated in the beginning of this paper, it 
is not our present goal to offer a phenomenology of wonder). When Buber, as 
we’ve just seen, tells us that ‘the originative instinct’ is not enough and that 
to educate is also to nourish ‘the instinct for communion’, he is stating some-
thing which is totally compatible with the reading presented in this paper, i.e., 
a reading of Buber as an author whose work offers a relational – and therefore 
ethical – account of wonder.
III. Wonder and educational practice
Brief summary of the three reading proposals
Before proceeding with the task that this third and last part will take us to, let’s 
briefly recap the three proposals made until this point, proposals which have in 
common a suggested possible reading of a philosophical work.
The first proposal of this paper is that the final part of Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can be read as an acceptance of wonder, an implicit 
acknowledgment of the irreducibility of contemplative wonder to linguistic 
schemes.
The second proposal is that the implicit acceptance of wonder in the 
Tractatus becomes, in the “Lecture on Ethics”, explicit and gains an ethical sig-
nificance. This ethical significance is openness to the mystery of the world, the 
openness of our individual character to the unsayability of the world when we 
wonder at how things are.
Finally, in this paper’s third proposal, starting from the premise of a simi-
larity between important areas of both Wittgenstein’s and Martin Buber’s 
thoughts, we’ve read Buber’s I and Thou and understood that an I-You relation 
is inhabited by wonder at the existence of the Other.
Educational practice: questions from Wittgenstein and Buber
Educational practice will be the subject approached now. From Wittgenstein, 












































138 the way the World is. But how can we respect and stimulate this wonder in 
the classroom environment? From Buber, we bring the relational possibility of 
being in wonder at the existence of the Other. But how can we promote I-You 
relations in school? To sum up, how can we teach languages and, at the same 
time, running ‘against the boundaries of language’, or finding ourselves at the 
‘threshold of speech’, promote wonder at the World and wonder at the Other? 
We will look for answers in the work of the philosophers we have discussed.
Teach them astronomy at night – Wittgenstein and the Austrian School  
Reform Movement
Wittgenstein’s writings about education are scattered throughout several of 
his works and are not central in any of them (Stickney 2017, 44). Nonetheless, 
as one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century, his thought has 
also influenced philosophy of education, in a way that has been much studied 
and analysed (Peters and Stickney 2017, 4). What will be the focus of the next 
paragraphs is not something bibliographic, but biographic – Wittgenstein 
was a primary school teacher for six years. This period is somewhat underesti-
mated by Wittgensteinian commentary, claims Beth Savickey (Savickey 2002, 
49), who dedicated to it a whole chapter of her book on Wittgenstein. Savickey 
notices a very interesting coincidence: “Wittgenstein’s year of teacher-training 
(1919–1920) corresponds to the first year of the Austrian School Reform Move-
ment and his last year of teaching (1926) corresponds to the last year of that 
movement” (ibid., 50).
So, as to the question of how to promote Wittgensteinian wonder at the world 
in the classroom environment, we will turn to the Austrian School Reform 
Movement that Wittgenstein adhered to as the context for finding answers. 
Savickey introduces the Movement by writing that
after the First World War, and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monar-
chy, the Austrian Republic adopted new goals and methods of educational 
instruction. Led by Otto Glöckel, Austria’s Secretary of Education, there 
developed in Austria a new school system which replaced rote learning by 
‘Arbeitsschule’ – learning by doing. (…) The Austrian School Reform Move-
ment grew out of a variety of different social, psychological, political and 
educational theories, which were adopted and implemented across the 
national school system. In other words, the aims, methods and curricula of 




















































139The main features of this Movement are: the confidence in children’s faculty 
of logical thinking; the underlining of the joy of learning and the relation 
between eagerness to learn and investigation, in which knowledge is conquered 
instead of given; the centrality of active learning and the role of the teacher as 
a guide to children’s self-activity; a transdisciplinary approach in which the 
topic was the anchor and there was no strict division between subject matters; 
and – a really important issue when thinking about wonder – the rooting of 
education in the environment, by which “teachers gathered material from the 
child’s environment” and organised activities such as “drawing, music, physi-
cal culture (games, dance and sports) and school walks” (ibid., 51-52).
According to Savickey, Wittgenstein not only worked for six years having 
this Movement’s guidelines as an institutional set – he believed in them and 
adhered to them enthusiastically (ibid., 53, 55). So, when we ask how to pro-
mote wonder with the world in the classroom, maybe part of the answer is to 
blur the lines between the inside of the classroom and the outside of the class-
room, to do things as plain and simple as Wittgenstein did, when he “taught 
them astronomy at night” (ibid., 54).
The teacher as a whole being – Martin Buber’s lectures on education
The question we bring from Martin Buber on part II – how to promote, in a 
classroom environment, I-You relations based on wonder with the existence of 
the Other – faces the same problem as the question we have just tried to tackle: 
the teacher cannot directly cause that wonder. What is at stake in both these 
questions seems to be not how to cause wonder but how to create the best conditions 
for the appearance of wonder. With that in mind, following the same method-
ology that we used with the Wittgensteinian question, contributions to this 
question’s answer will be looked for in the educational thought of Martin 
Buber, expressed in two conference addresses: the already cited “Education – 
An Address to the Third International Educational Conference”, Heidelberg, 
August 1925 (Buber 2004, 98-122); and “The Education of Character” – An 
Address to the National Conference of Palestinian Teachers, Tel-Aviv, 1939 
(Buber 2004, 123-139).
It has been seen at the end of part II that Buber views the origination 
instinct as important but insufficient:
Action leading to an individual achievement is a ‘one-sided’ event. There 
is a force within the person, which goes out, impresses itself on the mate-
rial, and the achievement arises objectively: the movement is over, it has 
run in one direction from the heart’s dream into the world, and its course 












































140 lost in the world, to be his comrade or friend or lover beyond the arts, does 
he have an awareness and a share of mutuality. An education based only 
on the training of the instinct of origination would prepare a new human 
solitariness which would be the most painful of all. (...) But (...) youthful 
spontaneity must not be suppressed but must be allowed to give what it 
can. (Buber 2004, 103-104)
The teacher, in Buber’s account, cannot ‘compel’ (Buber 2004, 104), as tradi-
tional education wants him to do, but should also not abstain from intervening, 
in a subtle manner: “This almost imperceptible, most delicate approach, 
the raising of a finger, perhaps, or a questioning glance, is the other half of 
what happens in education” (Buber 2004, 105). In this role, the teacher has a 
mediating function, in which what “is at stake”, according to Schinkel, is “the 
possibility of true human community (...) and of hope for a truly human form 
of living-together, where we are free because we take responsibility for the 
world and for ourselves” (Schinkel 2019, 6). “What we term education, con-
scious and willed, means a selection by man of the effective world: it means to give 
decisive effective power to a selection of the world which is concentrated and 
manifested in the educator”, Buber tells us (Buber 2004, 105). And the world 
that is mediated by the teacher is not only the world of things but also of ‘rela-
tionships’; “at the opposite pole from compulsion there stands not freedom 
but communion” (ibid., 107-108). Education must, therefore, be considered a 
dialogical relation: “A relation between persons that is characterized in more 
or less degree by the element of inclusion may be termed a dialogical relation” 
(ibid., 115). But it is a special kind of dialogical relation:
however intense the mutuality of giving and taking with which he is bound 
to his pupil, inclusion cannot be mutual in this case. He experiences the 
pupil’s being educated, but the pupil cannot experience the educating of 
the educator. (...) The educator who practises the experience of the other 
side and stands firm in it, experiences two things together, first that he is 
limited by otherness, and second that he receives grace by being bound to 
the other. (ibid., 119)
So, we already have a few hints at how to promote I-You relations: the first one is 
to consider individual striving for creativity as something not to be cut off, but 
also not to be considered an end in itself; the second one is that teachers con-
sider themselves not only as mediating relations between children or between 
children and the world, but also as being a part of that relation, where they can 



















































141This leading by example and not by direct teaching is suggested by Buber in 
the second of the above cited lectures, when it comes, precisely, to ‘the edu-
cation of character’. Explaining theoretically what is right and wrong has 
doubtful results (Buber 2004, 124). “Only in his whole being, in all his sponta-
neity can the educator truly affect the whole being of his pupil. For educating 
characters you (...) need a man who is wholly alive and able to communicate 
himself directly to his fellow beings” (ibid., 125). That means that the teacher 
must have “consciousness that he represents in the eyes of the growing person a 
certain selection of what is, the selection of what is ‘right’, of what should be”. By 
acting this way, a teacher gains the student’s confidence, and the student feels 
free to ask and rely on him (ibid., 126).
So, is this the way we guarantee our students will enter in I-You relations 
with one another? No – Buber starts his address by suggesting that it is easier 
to teach maths than to educate a character. What we do learn by this is that the 
only way we can hope to achieve something in this relational education is if we 
remember that the teacher is also in relation and that, when they enter a class-
room, while they may have their head full of teaching strategies, they must not 
forget the more simple and complicated one: willingness to be an I in relation 
to a You, willingness to let students become You.
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7  From Curiosity, to Wonder, 
to Creativity: A Cognitive 
Developmental Psychology 
Perspective
Marina Bazhydai and Gert Westermann
Introduction
P layfulness, open-mindedness, thinking ‘outside the box’ describe a desirable and highly regarded state that children naturally engage in and most adults desperately crave. Across all aspects of modern life, we 
are constantly bombarded by pervasive powerful messages encouraging us to 
inquire and explore, discover and innovate. This desire is mirrored in public 
policies, education practices and business models, which emphasise the need 
for curiosity, innovation and creativity over the need for knowledge reproduc-
tion, imitation, and conformity (Cachia et al. 2010; Dede 2010; King and Rogers 
2014; Trilling and Fadel 2009; OECD 2018; UNESCO International Bureau of 
Education 2014).
Among several positively valenced psychological terms often used inter-
changeably, curiosity, wonder and creativity hold a special place in the study 
of human development as core mechanisms behind knowledge acquisition 
and knowledge transformation. As such, curiosity drives information seeking, 
wonder expands and enriches the quest for knowledge to new dimensions, and 
creativity enables transformation of existing knowledge and generation of 
new, original knowledge about the world. These capacities are already present, 
albeit in rudimentary forms, and reliably observable in early childhood. How-
ever, the cognitive mechanisms underlying the processes of curiosity, wonder 
and creativity, the links between them, and their developmental trajectories 
are currently poorly understood.
Scholarly inquiries into curiosity, wonder and creativity abound in the 
fields of philosophy and education (Carlson 2008; Carson 2011; Engel 2015; 
Schinkel 2017; Starko 2013; Vasalou 2012, 2015; Verhoeven 1972). However, psy-








































































owing to vague conceptual definitions, lack of robust measures, and disregard 
of dynamics of developmental change. The goal of the present chapter is to 
review the existing psychological accounts of curiosity, wonder and creativity 
in early development and explore the conceptual links, unifying theoretical 
approaches and methodological considerations from a cognitive developmen-
tal perspective.
Cognitive developmental science aims to uncover the underlying cognitive 
mechanisms enabling psychological phenomena and explain their changes 
with development. From this perspective, methods such as brain scanning 
(EEG, fNIRS, fMRI), physiological response measuring (e.g., heart rate and 
skin conductance), facial electromyography (EMG), eye-tracking and pupil 
dilation response measuring, as well as monitoring explicit, reliably observ-
able behaviour, may be powerful tools for understanding curiosity, wonder 
and creativity. The field is ripe for applying such methods to help theoretically 
and conceptually delineate the unique features of each of these psychological 
phenomena, enable development of age-appropriate measures for their rig-
orous experimental study, and investigate the links between them and their 
co-development.
In the present chapter, we review the state of the cognitive developmen-
tal research on these topics, with a special focus on successful methodological 
approaches, as well as challenges for the experimental study of their cognitive 
underpinnings. The chapter comprises four main sections: 1) Curiosity, where 
we focus on children’s active exploration, information seeking, and question 
asking; 2) Wonder, where we emphasise affective response, reflection, and pur-
suit of further knowledge; 3) Creativity, where we discuss capacities such as 
generating ideas, original transformations, and novel combinations; and 4) 
Relationship between curiosity, wonder and creativity, where we propose that 
these links are complex and dynamic; concluding with suggestions for future 
research to understand their interrelations as they unfold developmentally. 
Curiosity 
C uriosity is broadly defined as an intrinsically motivated exploration with an information-seeking goal (Bazhydai, Twomey, and Wester-mann, 2020; Kidd and Hayden 2015). Crucially, in a curiosity-driven 
process, information is being sought for its own sake and not as a means of 
obtaining food or another kind of essentially non-epistemic reward. Curiosity 
is often described in terms of two distinct dimensions: perceptual vs epistemic 
and specific vs diversive (Berlyne 1950). Thus, a range of behaviours can be 
146 called curiosity, from momentarily picking up a random book from the library 
book shelf to reading an encyclopaedia chapter, and from locating a particular 
fact about the topic of interest to seeking an escape from boredom by browsing 
an online news website. In the past decades, cognitive scientists, employing a 
range of approaches from the fields of neuroscience, robotics and computa-
tional modelling, have started to develop better understanding of the cognitive 
origins of curiosity and its cognitive underpinnings in early childhood.
Several theoretical perspectives have been proposed to explain how curios-
ity arises. Among those are drive, incongruency, information gap and learning 
progress approaches (see Bazhydai et al., 2020, for a detailed review). Behaviour-
ist approaches saw curiosity among other basic drives motivated by anticipated 
reward, similar to food and comfort seeking. Infants’ attention in response to 
new and interesting stimuli was here explained in terms of mere orienting 
reflexes. While identifying the lower level components underlying curiosity-
driven behaviour, largely from work on animal models, these approaches 
neglected more complex and cognitively rich mechanisms. In the wake of the 
cognitive revolution in psychological science in the 1950s and 60s, curiosity 
received a fresh and more sophisticated look. A newly proposed way to explain 
the preference for novelty, surprise and complexity was to adopt an incongruency 
detection perspective. This approach postulates that upon detecting a mismatch 
between the existing state of knowledge and incoming information, a process 
of curiosity allows one to update one’s existing knowledge. That is, a person 
is driven to achieve “a feeling of coherence and of necessity, the satisfaction of 
arriving at a system, which is both complete in itself and indefinitely extensi-
ble” (Piaget 1969, 139). Relatedly, the information gap theory (Loewenstein 1994) 
proposes that curiosity arises when an individual encounters a gap in their 
knowledge and is then motivated to fill it with new and relevant information. 
Here, curiosity cannot emerge if the level of prior knowledge is too low or too 
high in relation to the novel information, while an intermediate level of infor-
mation familiarity and complexity is optimal for arousing curiosity (Kinney 
and Kagan 1976; Kidd, Piantadosi, and Aslin 2012, 2014). Finally, learning progress 
theories presume that curiosity’s goal is to maximise information acquisition 
by minimising uncertainty (Oudeyer, Gottlieb, and Lopes 2016; Twomey and 
Westermann 2018). Here, learning itself is an intrinsically motivating process, 
which in turn fuels a just as intrinsically motivated curiosity process, thus cre-
ating a positive, rewarding loop for driving knowledge acquisition. 
This variety of theoretical approaches to curiosity has been instrumen-
tal in scientists’ ability to formulate key questions to better understand how 
curiosity works. Whereas in Berlyne’s classification, information novelty and 



















































147relies on reflective awareness of one’s current knowledge in order to detect a 
gap, and the learning progress approaches place the greatest importance on the 
emerging, self-driven optimisation of information intake to enable effective 
learning. Most contemporary approaches agree that the existing knowledge 
state and the ability to obtain new information dynamically interact to give 
rise to curiosity.
Developmental psychologists often describe curiosity in conjunction with 
infants’ exploratory activities. The image of the busy infant actively exploring 
its environment, approaching, touching, banging, mouthing and throwing 
toys, putting blocks on top of each other, constantly changing its position, 
crawling around, and engaging its caregivers in a rather demanding manner 
underpins this confluence of curiosity as a cognitive mechanism and curiosity 
as an exploratory behaviour. According to Piaget (1945), such active exploration 
enables infants to construct knowledge of the existing world.1 Infants explore 
through visual scanning of their environment (as detected by eye movements 
tracking), object manipulation (grasping, throwing and mouthing them), pref-
erentially approaching something that captured their interest (e.g., crawling 
towards a new toy), as well as querying others for information with all com-
municative tools available to them (Bazhydai, Westermann, and Parise, 2020; 
Begus and Southgate, 2018). 
Infants’ motivation to know how something works is sometimes proposed 
to explain the very process of curiosity-driven learning. A widely used met-
aphor presents young children as “little scientists”, keen on discovering the 
world through optimised and adaptively rational learning mechanisms akin to 
the scientific process of knowledge discovery by trial and error. Recent research 
in cognitive developmental psychology highlights sophisticated information 
seeking strategies guiding infants’ exploratory behaviours, such as active gen-
eration and testing of hypotheses about the world, attempts to understand the 
causal mechanisms of encountered events, and heightened interest in objects 
that violated their expectations (Bonawitz, van Schijndel, Friel, and Schulz 
2012; Gopnik, Meltzoff, and Kuhl 1999). For example, infants who saw a sur-
prising event, such as an object passing through a solid wall and emerging on 
the other side intact, looked at it longer and crawled toward such an object 
more often than with an event that was just novel (Sim and Xu 2017; Stahl and 
Feigenson 2017, 2019). These rudimentary behaviours can be interpreted at dif-
ferent levels. Either infants are merely interested in something unusual and 
1 Furthermore, Piaget (1945) highlighted that it is through ‘playful interactions’ with the environment 
that the infant acquires knowledge, drawing a subtle link between learning what is known and creat-







































































148 therefore surprising, or, at a higher level, they are interested in resolving the 
uncertainty caused by the unusual event by seeking disambiguating or clarify-
ing information about it. Studies with older children provided more context 
for the latter interpretation. For example, when the evidence presented to chil-
dren was confounded (such as when two different explanations were possible 
for what makes the funny noise in an exciting new toy), children explored the 
toy in a way that would allow them to understand the precise causal mecha-
nism (Schulz and Bonawitz 2007). When information taught to them was 
insufficient (i.e., the teacher committed the ‘sin of omission’ by not relating all 
relevant information), primary school children’s exploration was strategic to 
compensate for the missing knowledge (Gweon et al. 2014).
Curiosity-driven exploration in early childhood is evident in both inde-
pendent and social processes. That is, encountering the need for information 
(either upon seeing a surprising event or when lacking information which 
they cannot obtain by themselves) may trigger infants’ turning to others for 
help. Social partners are potent sources of information for young children, and 
the ability to interrogate them by asking questions and posing information-
seeking requests develops in the first years of life (Begus and Southgate 2018; 
Ronfard et al. 2018; Southgate, Van Maanen, and Csibra 2007). Enabling such 
epistemic curiosity in social learning contexts, infants’ early nonverbal com-
municative skills such as babbling, social referencing and pointing precede 
verbal question asking. Infants use them actively and selectively, paying atten-
tion to epistemic cues that available social partners exhibit (Harris and Lane 
2014; Poulin-Dubouis and Brosseau-Liard 2016). They also strategically request 
pertinent information about the immediate environment from someone who 
can be regarded as knowledgeable about it as opposed to an ignorant person, 
and do so only when information (e.g., an unfamiliar object name or a hidden 
object location) was being asked for but not available to them (Bazhydai et al. 
2020; Begus and Southgate 2012; Begus, Gliga, and Southgate 2016; Goupil, 
Romand-Monnier, and Kouider 2016; Kovács et al. 2014; Vaish, Demir, and 
Baldwin 2011). Thus, infants engage in curiosity-driven knowledge acquisition 
before they are even able to speak.
With development, deliberate question asking gives rise to more precise, 
sophisticated, and complex processes (Choinard 2007; see Ronfard et al. 2018 
for a review). To seek knowledge from others, disambiguate unclear facts and 
confront counter-intuitive testimony, children pose ‘why’ questions, demand 
clarifying answers, solicit additional evidence, and question the reliability 
of information, actively engaging in critical thinking processes powered by 
intrinsic motivation (Frazier, Gelman, and Wellman 2009; Tizard and Hughes 



















































149curiosity – if children seek information from social partners when in need – 
sometimes overly normative situations may inhibit curiosity. For example, 
when provided with a counter-intuitive testimony by an otherwise trustwor-
thy adult, preschoolers endorsed the adult’s judgment without scepticism or 
attempts to engage in independent verification even when given opportunity 
to do so (Ronfard, Chen, and Harris 2018; Ronfard et al. 2019). And when taught 
in a directive, explicitly pedagogical manner, children limited their further 
spontaneous exploration as if treating received evidence as exhaustive and 
normative (Bonawitz et al. 2011).
While actively engaging in strategic information seeking, infants are also 
known to constantly explore seemingly without an immediate perceivable 
goal. Given this sometimes aimless search for information, which is a hallmark 
of the diversive-perceptual kind of curiosity in contrast to the specific-epis-
temic kind (Berlyne 1950), infants’ attention has been compared to a lantern, 
in comparison to adults’ more focused spotlight (Gopnik 2009). Formalisation 
of infants’ behavioural exploration has led to the development of artificial 
intelligence models in robotics and computational modelling (Gottlieb and 
Oudeyer 2018; Oudeyer 2017). The main idea behind these approaches is that 
infants’ exploration (active information sampling, in jargon terms) is not ran-
dom but rather systematic and selective, thus enabling optimal and efficient 
learning (Smith et al. 2018). “Infants are curious learners who drive their own 
cognitive development by imposing structure on their learning environment 
as they explore”, in the words of Twomey and Westermann (2018) who devel-
oped a neurocomputational model of infants’ exploration as they learn object 
categories. This model, operating on the principle of the in-the-moment, step-
wise maximisation of learning opportunities, emphasised the importance of 
dynamic interaction between the properties of the available information, the 
environment, and the learner’s current internal state. Given the freedom to 
select an object to learn from at each iterative step of the process, the model 
chose stimuli that took into account these interactions in order to optimise 
learning. In doing so, the model generated exploratory sequences of over-
all intermediate complexity, echoing studies with infants as young as seven 
months old showing that infants’ visual attention to sequences of events that 
are either too simple (too familiar) or too complex (overly unpredictable and 
novel) is diminished while attention to events of intermediate complexity is 
enhanced. This preference for intermediate complexity (called the “Goldi-
locks Effect” of curiosity-driven exploration), supports the idea that infants 
implicitly seek information that they can reliably absorb and that is neither too 
boring nor too cognitively taxing (Kidd, Piantadosi, and Aslin 2012). An active 







































































150 to “an increase in intellectual potency” understood as strategic deployment of 
cognitive resources (Bruner 1961).
The variety of approaches to the study of curiosity feature in turn in the 
variety of methods that may be successfully employed to uncover its mecha-
nisms in early childhood. Viable measures include detection of visual and 
manual exploration, neural signals, physiological responses, and explicit 
behavioural choices. For example, the peak of the pupil dilation measured 
with eye-tracking equipment can be used to examine when infants are curi-
ous about what they are seeing. This measure has been successfully used with 
adults, correlating with self-reported curiosity (Kang et al. 2009), and with 
infants when they viewed sequences of images that were first scrambled and 
then unscrambled (Ackermann, Hepach, and Mani 2020). The amount of look-
ing (allocation of attention) can be captured with fine-grained eye-tracking of 
infants’ visual exploration of complex visual scenes, which has been shown in 
adults to correlate with their individual curiosity trait (Baranes, Oudeyer, and 
Gottlieb 2015; Risko et al. 2012). Similarly, suspending attention (looking away) 
may be a measure of curiosity’s transience – determined by how rapidly curi-
osity subsides when a curiosity-inducing stimulus is removed. Physiological 
correlates of curiosity have been proposed as a decreased (decelerating) heart 
rate and increased skin conductance response (AlZoubi, D’Mello, and Calvo 
2012; Berlyne, and Lewis 1963; Spinks and Siddle 1985), though these have to 
be carefully distinguished from general positive emotional arousal (Langsdorf 
et al. 1983; Hutt 1966; Hughes and Hutt 1979; Provost and Gouin-Dicarie 1979) 
and attention (de Barbaro, Clackson, and Wass 2017; Libby, Lacey, and Lacey 
1973). Another implicit behaviour – facial displays of interest – can be meas-
ured in infants by coding their perplexed, puzzled, quizzical facial expressions 
(e.g., eyes widened and mouth slightly open, but with no smile) (Feinman et 
al. 1992; Hornik and Gunnar 1988; Reeve and Nix 1997). Finally, studying 
neural signatures is an exciting new avenue in infant curiosity research, with 
recent research associating theta band waves as curiosity’s potential biomarker 
(Begus, Gliga, and Southgate 2016; Köster, Langeloh, and Hoehl 2019). System-
atic and multi-faceted investigation into the cognitive correlates of curiosity is 
key to uncovering its mechanisms.
In sum, curiosity drives knowledge acquisition, with its mechanisms 
actively enabled from the first months of an infant’s life and behavioural mani-
festations becoming more complex and sophisticated with the development of 
the child’s cognitive capacities and communicative repertoire. Curiosity leads 
to the pursuit of knowledge, either specific to answer a pertinent question, or 
broad, to satisfy one’s drive for exploring and generating information, and can 



















































151physiological and neural measures. What curiosity alone is not able to explain 
is the cognitive-affective state underlying the need to know commonly referred 
to as wonder. The next section will cover the variety of theoretical and empirical 
approaches specifically concerned with this state.
Wonder
H aving reached the information-seeking goal of their curiosity-driven exploration, children may experience the state of wonder, under-stood as an emotionally laden, rewarding mental state of pondering 
upon their discoveries with astonishment and excitement about embarking 
on further deeper enquiry into the phenomenon. While ‘burning with curi-
osity’ made Alice follow the white rabbit in the first place, as her adventures 
unfold, she finds them ‘curiouser and curiouser’.2 In addressing how curiosity 
and wonder differ from each other, we emphasise affective response, reflection 
on obtained information, and seeking deeper and broader knowledge.
Scholars in philosophy and education disciplines have long debated about 
the nature of wonder (Schinkel 2020; Gallagher et al. 2015). Wonder has been 
defined as an astonishing, incomprehensible surprise, transcending the 
existing structures (Fingerhut and Prinz 2018), a combination of cognitive 
perplexity and intense perceptual engagement (Weger and Wagemann 2018), 
which is intricately linked to epistemic cognition. Two broad types of wonder 
have been proposed (Carlsen and Sandelands 2015; Parsons 1969; Schinkel 2017; 
Washington 2018): an active one (more akin to curiosity, ‘wondering about’) 
and the passive one, also called deep or contemplative wonder (more akin to 
awe, ‘wondering at’), which “involves not knowing of a different kind – not 
a not-yet-knowing, but a fundamental, irresolvable not-knowing” (Schinkel 
2017, 546). In this way, curiosity is a quest for knowledge that is already out 
there, while wonder is a quest for knowledge that may never be attainable. It 
is this propensity for posing essentially rhetorical, ‘big questions’ that may 
have led Socrates to famously propose that wisdom begins in wonder. Unlike 
curiosity, wonder can never be satisfied fully; it is not terminal as it would not 
disappear once relevant or missing information about the phenomenon has 
been discovered (Sinclair and Watson 2001). These conceptual distinctions date 
back to the Ancient Greek dichotomy: wonder is viewed as essentially a quest 
for truth, achieved by embracing holistic perception and remaining open to 








































































152 uncertainty, a valuable experience in itself regardless of the logical outcomes 
(Plato), while curiosity is a quest for information in order to fill epistemic 
gaps, reduce uncertainty, and deconstruct the phenomenon into parts in a 
rational, optimal way (Aristotle) (Schinkel 2017; Vasalou 2015). Centuries later, 
at the dawn of the cognitive revolution in psychological science, Bruner (1961) 
described a similar dichotomy in more contemporary terms: a “learning as a 
task of discovering” (curiosity) in comparison to “learning about” as a sought-
after disposition which facilitates a deeper quest, accompanied by a sense of 
agency and mastery orientation (wonder). 
While the contemporary field of education has been actively emphasising 
the benefits of wonder for learning (Booker and Batt 2016; Jacobs and Crowley 
2007; Edeiken 1992; Egan 2014; Opdal 2001) and the philosophical scholar-
ship investigating wonder is thriving, the cognitive developmental research 
on this mental state is in its infancy. Below we review major advances in con-
ceptualising wonder – from an epistemic emotions view and a developmental 
perspective – and discuss the differences between wonder and related concepts 
such as curiosity and awe in light of these approaches.
Curiosity and similar states such as interest, surprise, wonder, astonish-
ment, awe, doubt, uncertainty, boredom, feeling of knowing, fear of the 
unknown, to name a few, have been collectively referred to as ‘epistemic emo-
tions’ (Carruthers 2017; Scheffler 1991; Vogl et al. 2019). According to these 
theories, affective and cognitive processes work in tandem, with epistemic 
emotions enriching purely cognitive activities related to the pursuit of knowl-
edge and learning, such as information-seeking, explanation-seeking, belief 
formation and revision (Frijda, Manstead, and Bem 2000; Izard 1992). While 
other emotions, such as happiness, anger or hatred may also affect epistemic 
processes under certain conditions, what makes epistemic emotions unique 
is their specialisation in characterising (either supporting or inhibiting) epis-
temic goals. Despite substantial advances in identifying a range of affective 
mental states that influence processes related to knowledge acquisition and 
revision, the nature of the relationships between some of the core emotions 
has not yet been clearly delineated. For instance, wonder has been included in 
composite measures of awe (Saroglou, Buxant, and Tilquin 2008; Shiota, Kelt-
ner, and Mossman 2007) but often used interchangeably with curiosity (e.g., 
“I am curious/wonder about”; Bijou 1998; Valdesolo, Shtulman, and Baron 
2017) and surprise as a response to the unexpected (Frijda 1986). The causal 
links between concepts are also debated: according to one view, curiosity may 
arise from the feelings of awe or wonder and motivate exploration in order to 
resolve uncertainty (Frijda 1986; Izard 1977); on another view, wonder arises 



















































153nent information), by making one probe deeper (Opdal 2001). Despite these 
differences, both curiosity and wonder are agreed to be intrinsically rewarding 
emotional states promoting learning in the form of active explorative activities 
and constructive knowledge acquisition. 
A classical theory providing a valuable insight into the distinction between 
curiosity and wonder is the Piagetian theory of cognition (Piaget 1969), propos-
ing that at first novel information is processed in order to be incorporated into 
the existing knowledge base through a process called assimilation. If success-
ful, new information forms part of the ever-expanding knowledge repository 
in the mind. However, if the assimilation process fails, people either abandon 
the attempts to learn, or this novel information instead undergoes the process 
of accommodation – creating new knowledge structures to adopt the incom-
ing information. In other words, assimilation incorporates new information 
into pre-existing epistemic schemas, while accommodation changes the 
pre-existing schemas to absorb new information. This latter property of the 
accommodation process is what links it to wonder as a qualitative and quanti-
tative expansion of curiosity-driven information acquisition. 
A combination of both the epistemic emotions view and the accommoda-
tion process of cognition lays a foundation for empirical study of the state of 
wonder and its cognitive origins. Schinkel (2018) urges psychologists (in addi-
tion to educators and philosophers) to dedicate more attention to wonder, 
especially as distinguished from curiosity and awe. We further propose that 
study of wonder would benefit from a cognitive development perspective, 
because understanding of early manifestations of any psychological phe-
nomena may help explain complex cognitive mechanisms underlying these 
processes in adults.
Despite a well-developed theoretical base, empirical developmental 
research on wonder is lacking. One argument limiting research on wonder 
from a cognitive developmental perspective is that as a complex, reflective state 
requiring sophisticated metacognitive abilities, wonder may not be readily 
accessible to young children. Studies of metacognition generally conclude that 
children’s ability to self-monitor their own affective and cognitive processing is 
not present until the preschool years (Sodian et al. 2012; Sobel and Letourneau 
2018). Children’s use of verbs related to epistemic states, such as ‘know’, ‘guess’, 
and ‘remember’ starts at around the age of three (Johnson and Wellman 1980), 
and children’s explicit understanding of complex emotions not until the pri-
mary school years (Russell and Paris 1994). Counter to this view, rudimentary 
metacognitive processes have been shown as accessible to children even before 
they mastered language (Gliga and Southgate 2016; Goupil and Kouider 2019). 







































































154 cognitive states have been used, such as conceptualising a state of epistemic 
uncertainty as a delay in making a choice or persistence in attempts to find 
reliable information. For example, preverbal infants, using social looks and 
pointing as communicative tools, are able to strategically request information 
from other people when they are aware of their ignorance; e.g., when they don’t 
know where the toy was hidden but know that their parents can provide this 
information (Goupil et al, 2016) or when they don’t know the label to a novel 
object but know who can provide it (Bazhydai et al, 2020). If we accept that 
wonder as a unique experiential state is indeed accessible to young children 
and even preverbal infants, just as curiosity or uncertainty which have been 
actively studied in this population, similar implicit measures can be employed 
to capture its cognitive origins.
What does wonder look like? A child experiencing wonder may be the one 
whose eyes are sparkling with excitement and amazement, one that pauses to 
think about the encountered phenomenon, one that persists in discovering 
more about the object that elicited wonder, or one that is not satisfied with 
the available answers. As we cannot rely on asking children what they think or 
feel, the use of objective rather than self-report measures becomes instrumen-
tal. Wonder may manifest itself neurally, physiologically and behaviourally 
in several ways. For example, we may record and analyse the overt observable 
behaviour, such as the kinds of questions that children may ask in wonder, as 
differentiated from other similar cognitive-affective states such as curiosity or 
awe. Such fine-grained behavioural analyses would allow disentangling the 
very conceptual uniqueness of wonder. Similarly, we may attempt to uncover 
the neural underpinnings of wonder by using techniques such as EEG or NIRS, 
or physiological signatures such as heart rate or skin conductance response, 
which, when compared with findings on other related states may pinpoint the 
exact biomarkers of wonder.
To develop such measures specifically, we need to adopt a working opera-
tional definition, for example one like this: an intense, emotionally uplifting 
experience whereby the person becomes aware of an expanded field of possi-
bility for thought or action and engages in exploring this field (after Glăveanu 
2017, 2). This definition is two-fold, invoking several specific measures as 
plausible candidates. For example, the intensity of an emotional state can be 
detected through implicit measures of physiological arousal (heart rate and 
skin conductance response), facial expressions via EMG or pupil dilation 
response. These measures may allow us to distinguish wonder as an intense, 
expansive experience following astonishing events (both external and inter-
nal) from curiosity as less emotional and more iterative, rational information 



















































155attending to, approaching and exploring the unexpected events (Sim and Xu 
2017; Stahl and Feigenson 2017, 2019).
The second aspect of wonder according to the adopted operational defini-
tion – awareness of expanded possibilities and their passionate exploration 
– can be assessed both quantitatively and qualitatively. Children’s desire for 
more knowledge may manifest itself in repeated searching for information, 
lack of satisfaction with immediately available evidence, seeking corroborative 
evidence, and returning to the topic that sparked their wonder even when all 
explanations have been received. Aimed at explanatory expansion upon wit-
nessing anomalous or ambiguous facts, this ‘wondering about’ (Carlsen and 
Sandelands 2014) may prompt children to engage in the so-called ‘passages of 
intellectual search’ (Tizard and Hughes 1984) – a persistent stream of questions 
and explanations offered by children themselves as they strive to arrive at the 
truth about the phenomena of interest, above and beyond the routine ‘why’ 
questions (Chouinard, Harris, and Moratsos 2007; Frazier, Gelman, and Well-
man 2009; Legare 2012; Ronfard et al. 2018). This may also manifest itself in 
the number of comments and emotional content in such remarks, connecting 
the topic of the wonder-inducing phenomenon to personal experiences, and 
posing rhetorical questions.3 In preverbal infants, wonder can be measured as 
information seeking (e.g., through pointing or approaching objects) following 
reliable and timely attainment of key missing information (e.g., a novel label or 
demonstration of a toy’s function). That is, upon satisfying the need for infor-
mation through curiosity, wonder is likely to keep infants inquiring about the 
same object or event leaving them unsatisfied with the answers. The length of 
time dedicated to asking such questions and further exploration may serve as 
a proxy for the measure of wonder.
While given a lot of attention in philosophy and education, wonder remains 
an undeveloped psychological concept with its position in relation to similar 
terms unclear. To the best of our knowledge, no empirical work in cognitive 
development has investigated wonder as such. This may be due to young chil-
dren’s underdeveloped emotion and metacognitive skills and methodological 
challenges to detect the experience of wonder, which is among the “precious 
but elusive psychological states that are difficult to research experimentally” 
(Weger and Wagermann 2018). The study of wonder conceived as an epistemic 
emotion and a cognitive accommodation process is a promising avenue for 
3 As an educationally minded side note, the beneficial role of the adults engaged in such passages is 
that in addition to resolving misunderstandings and presenting counterinformation if needed, they 
help children clarify and extend their own ideas and explanations. By questioning their ideas, adults 







































































156 future research, in combination with a range of cutting-edge approaches to 
study complex cognition in early childhood.
To reiterate, wonder, and specifically its active, inquisitive type, just as curi-
osity, enables knowledge acquisition, but takes this process to a different level, 
a step forward towards knowledge transformation. In the range of ‘playful 
interactions’ with the environment (Piaget 1945), wonder underlies the desire 
to go further, deeper and broader than curiosity, the latter being transient and 
inherently terminal. In a quote brought up earlier in this chapter, Piaget (1969, 
139) mentions that information acquisition allows the child to arrive at a state 
of mind that is both irreducible, in that the uncertainty has been resolved, but 
also ‘indefinitely extensible’. This added-value property, though not called 
wonder by Piaget explicitly, may refer to probing the field of knowledge fur-
ther, allowing for multiple perspectives as a pathway to creative knowledge 
transformation (see Glăveanu 2017 for a proposed relationship between won-
der and creativity).
Creativity
Sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.
“I see nobody on the road,” said Alice.
“I only wish I had such eyes,” the King remarked in a fretful tone.
“To be able to see Nobody! And at the distance too! 
Why, it’s as much as I can do to see real people, by this light!”
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland
From a cognitive perspective, creativity includes a set of mental processes 
(rather than a particular personality or genetic predisposition) which mani-
fest themselves in overt behavioural choices, such as coming up with multiple 
ideas (divergent thinking), forming unusual associations (associative think-
ing), combining elements based on such remote, non-obvious associations 
(combinatory thinking), and transforming the existing structures in original 
ways (transformative thinking) (Guilford 1968; Finke, Ward, and Smith 1992; 
Mednick 1962; Rhodes 1961; Simonton 2010). Tolerance to ambiguity, flexible 
thinking, plasticity of mental structures, and openness to experience enable 
these processes. In contrast, functional fixedness, reliance on heuristics, con-
text rigidity, hyper-precise prior probabilities as inability to update beliefs 



















































157ences are detrimental to creativity. Creativity thus can be conceptualised as a 
cognitive process leading to original modification of existing information and 
generation of new knowledge. We focus here on three core cognitive facets of 
creativity: idea generation or divergent thinking, novel combination and origi-
nal transformation.
Creativity manifestations in early childhood are difficult to pinpoint. One 
difficulty is lack of developmentally appropriate measures applicable to the 
very young population. Even with adults, measures of creativity lack consist-
ency and vary greatly with the conceptual approach chosen by the researchers 
(Baptiste 2019; Said-Metwaly, Van den Noortgate, and Kyndt 2017). A second 
challenge comes from adherence to the argument that children simply do 
not exhibit creativity in its true, eminent, genius-type sense (Feldhusen 2002; 
Weisberg 1999), also called the ‘Big C’ (Kaufman and Beghetto 2009). This 
argument is dismissed by adopting a perspective of the so-called ‘little c’ crea-
tivity rooted in everyday playful imagination, undoubtedly accessible to young 
children (Amabile 2012; Bateson 1999; Craft 2001; Russ 2014). Accepting the 
premise that young children and even infants do not lack sufficient cognitive 
complexity to exhibit rudimentary creative behaviours (Glăveanu 2011; Engel 
1993; Jalongo and Hirsch 2012), here we review how creativity manifests itself 
and how it can be measured in early childhood in order to better understand 
how these cognitive capacities develop.4 The literature on children’s creative 
process (as opposed to artistic outputs or other creative products; Rhodes 1961) 
is typically represented with several related but distinct strands: object play, 
imaginative play and tool innovation. We review how the facets of idea genera-
tion, combination and transformation are present in each of these strands and 
suggest ways to study these in young children.
Just as children actively seek information in curiosity-driven exploration, 
they actively engage in creative expression and experimentation with objects. 
While exploration and play are often discussed interchangeably in child devel-
opment literature (Power 1999; Wohlwill 2018), the two are distinct. It has been 
suggested that children’s play with objects is an early manifestation of creativ-
ity as only during play (but not exploration or other rational use of objects, 
such as construction) children create novel ways of using objects (Pellegrini and 
Hou 2011; Pellegrini 2013). Pointing to their unique role in cognition, explo-
ration and play have been differentially linked to physiological arousal levels 
(Hutt 1966): exploration correlated with elevated heart rate, while play with 
4 In the words of Vygotsky: “One of the most important questions of child psychology and pedagogy is 
the question about creativity in children, its development and its significance for the general develop-







































































158 lower heart rate. During object play, children go beyond the systematic acqui-
sition of information afforded by the object (e.g., learning that it rotates or 
plays music when a button is pressed, etc.) and using the object properly (e.g., 
using a block to build a tower), to inventing novel ways to use the object (e.g., 
using unrelated, random objects to build a tower). Hence, they exhibit freedom 
from constraints of what is known and find creative opportunities where none 
existed. Both infants’ and adults’ playfulness have been shown to serve as a 
precursor to later creative outcomes (Howard-Jones, Taylor, and Sutton 2002; 
Lieberman 2014; Sutton-Smith 1967), and an evolutionary perspective high-
lighted the role of object play in cultural innovation (Riede et al. 2018).
Developing as early as eighteen months (Skolnick and Bloom 2006), a more 
cognitively complex process – pretend or imaginary play – has also been con-
ceptualised as a manifestation of creative processes (Russ and Fiorelli 2010; 
Russ and Wallace 2013; Vygotsky [1930] 1967, [1990] 2004; Weisberg 2014). Imag-
inary play, like object play, is inventing novel ways of using an object, but here, 
it involves substitutions of functions of objects and creating new meaning 
(e.g., pretend that it can fly). During imaginative play, the child demonstrates 
remarkable tolerance to uncertainty, “not bothered by inconsistencies, depar-
tures from convention, nonliteralness (...) which often results in unusual and 
appealing juxtapositions and associations” (Gardner 1993, 228). This openness 
to new experiences and actively creating such experiences is possible due to a 
heightened alertness to opportunity – ability to notice relevance of available 
information (objects, people, situations) for potentially including it into the 
pretend play space. Inspired by this child-like capacity, Torrance (1988) trained 
adults who have performed poorly on standard creativity tasks to appreciate a 
cue-rich environment and take advantage of unrelated objects and concepts for 
creative recombination and transformation.
Another way in which creativity manifests itself in early childhood is 
through spontaneous tool innovation (Beck et al. 2011; Carr, Kendal, and Flynn 
2015; Cutting et al. 2014). Innovation along with imitation are considered the 
“dual engines of cultural learning” (Legare 2015), playing complementary roles 
in knowledge acquisition and transmission (Carr, Kendal, and Flynn 2016; 
Heyes 2012; Want and Harris 2002). Unlike imitation following a social dem-
onstration, children’s tool innovation in experimental tasks has been rarely 
observed (Chappell et al. 2013). This is typically explained by their propensity 
to learn socially and to conform in their tool use after observing someone else 
(Flynn, Turner, and Giraldeau 2018; Turner, Giraldeau, Flynn 2017), especially 
someone with a history of efficacious and reliable demonstrations (Carr, Ken-
dal, and Flynn 2015). However, recent research suggests that children are more 



















































159than when it remained causally opaque (Neldner, Mushin, and Nielsen 2017) 
and when the efficacy of the adults’ demonstration was low, leaving space for 
further experimentation (Carr, Kendal, and Flynn 2015). Furthermore, research 
with adults shows that other people’s social performance cues may influence 
innovative choices (Toelch et al. 2011). In this vein, infants as young as 30 months 
of age have been shown to be able to achieve tool innovations when socially 
guided to do so, but not when left on their own (Hayne, Herbert, and Simcock 
2003; Barr and Wyss 2008). Overall, the infrequency in reporting innovations 
in experimental studies may be the result of methodological shortcomings, 
where such behaviours may be discarded as anomalous findings rather than 
properly pursued (Carr, Kendal, and Flynn 2016). Despite these challenges, two 
kinds of spontaneous innovative behaviours in childhood have been identified: 
independent invention (such as creating a novel tool from scratch) and modifi-
cation (such as adopting an existing tool for a new purpose) (Carr, Kendal, and 
Flynn 2016). 
One of the core pillars of the creativity process is idea generation, or diver-
gent thinking – an ability to come up with multiple ideas, alternative scenarios, 
thoughts and actions. In adults and older children, divergent thinking is tested 
using a variation of the classical Unusual Uses task (Torrance and Haensly 2003; 
Mouchiroud and Lubart 2001). Here, a person typically is asked to list as many 
uses for an everyday object, e.g. a paperclip, as they can (e.g., Alternative Uses 
Test: Guilford 1967; Torrance Test of Creative Thinking [TTCT]: Torrance 1974; 
Thinking Creatively in Action and Movement test [TCAM]: Torrance 1981; Wal-
lach and Kogan tests of creativity: Wallach and Kogan 1965). The number and 
breadth of unusual uses are then scored to assess the level of creativity. Diver-
gent thinking has been assessed in the verbal (report on various ideas), figural 
(drawing), kinaesthetic (movement) and manual (object use) domains. The 
latter is most useful from a cognitive developmental perspective since young 
children may not have yet developed language or drawing ability. In a recent 
demonstration of the applicability of the divergent thinking measure in pre-
verbal infants, Hoicka and colleagues (Bijvoet-van den Berg and Hoicka 2014) 
used a colourful wooden box with several exciting features and five unrelated 
objects. Here, divergent thinking was coded as the number of different action-
box area combinations infants applied during a free play episode (e.g., hitting 
the edge of the box and then guiding an object through the hole). Evidence 
also suggests that young children increase their action innovations follow-
ing social modelling of divergent thinking behaviours by adults (Hoicka et al. 
2016). While divergent thinking received the most attention in both adults’ and 







































































160 one measure is inappropriately reductionist as it misrepresents the dynamic, 
complex nature of creativity processes (Baptiste 2019; Baer 2016).
The second facet of creative cognition is the ability to come up with novel 
combinations. Here, unlike in divergent thinking where novel ideas depart 
from the known, the process is building heavily on the elements of existing 
knowledge, which are then combined in a novel way. At the core of this pro-
cess lies the ability to re-imagine the existing structures – also called creative 
problem-finding (Runco 1994). In a seminal study with adult artists, Csikszent-
mihalyi and Getzels (1971) presented participants with a range of objects to use 
in a still-life drawing. The longer the artists spent choosing the objects, manip-
ulating and rearranging them in several potential combinations, and the more 
objects they picked up, feeling their weights and textures and trying to work 
out their mechanical parts – in other words, time spent ‘finding’ a creative 
problem – the higher were their creativity scores received on the final drawings. 
Combinatory properties of creativity lie at the core of several major cognitive-
based approaches, implicating the role of associative thinking, insight, mental 
imagery, conceptual combination, expansion and synthesis (Finke, Ward, and 
Smith 1992; Helie and Sun 2010; Mednick 1962; Simonton 2010; Thagart and 
Steward 2011). For example, in a creative synthesis task (Finke 1990), adults are 
tested on their ability to construct creative objects by mentally combining the 
components they are presented with into a potentially useful entity. The pro-
cess of insight is understood here as an underlying cognitive restructuring of 
the problem that allows coming up with a sudden solution (Bowden et al. 2005; 
Gilhooly and Murphy 2005; Schooler and Melcher 1995).
The third core facet of creativity is the ability to make original transforma-
tions. Like with combinations, this process relies on some existing knowledge 
as a baseline structure, which is then modified in a novel way. For example, in 
a classical creativity task used with adults and children (TTCT; Torrance 1974), 
participants are asked to transform an incomplete figure by coming up with 
additional elements to complete the drawing. Similarly, the symbolical equiva-
lence test (Barron 1988) measures the ability to make original transformations 
of objects or concepts, such as thinking of relevant metaphors or symbols. Such 
image transformation ability has been shown to correlate with performance 
on other creativity tasks in adults and predicted originality of their inventions 
(Palmiero et al. 2015). For young children, the process of pretend play serves as 
an excellent illustration, as children use existing objects but transform their 
meanings such that they depart from routine use (Russ 1993), transforming 
their imagination into reality (Vygotsky [1990] 2004). Thus, the ability to trans-



















































161How can divergent thinking, combinatory and transformative creative pro-
cesses be measured in young children, keeping aside tasks that rely heavily 
on language or ability to draw or make other forms of art? Observational and 
behavioural experimental studies come to the forefront here, accompanied 
with fine-grained coding. Children may be observed while playing with a 
novel toy affording multiple actions and outcomes, just like the unusual box 
task (Bijvoet-van den Berg and Hoicka 2014). Measuring the number of unique 
actions performed is a clear proxy for divergent thinking, while the sequences 
of actions and specific action combinations can be coded as a proxy for combina-
torial thinking. Here, the behaviour of interest is deviation from the typical use 
when two or more of such uses are combined. Transformation can be observed 
when children put together two unrelated objects in the process of play to cre-
ate new meaning. A similar observation can be made when children engage 
with other elements which can be potentially combined or transformed, aside 
from toys or play objects. An example is providing children with a musical 
instrument like a piano or a xylophone, or a ‘music wall’ or ‘music stairs’ – an 
interactive sound sculpture of various shapes and colours – affording a range of 
musical keys. Creating novel musical sounds by combining them, transform-
ing the sound of a single ‘press’ by adding other elements such as tapping or 
singing to them can be reliably coded by independent observers. Museums 
have long recognised the value of exhibits encouraging children’s creativity 
and it is time that cognitive science learns from them (e.g., Association of Chil-
dren’s Museums 2015; Herz 2017; Luke et al. 2017). A variation of such tasks may 
capitalise on children’s propensity to engage with mundane, everyday objects 
in an original way. A sample task to measure this process would be to offer them 
plain objects, such as wooden blocks or shipping cardboard boxes, and prompt 
their free play with them, subsequently coding how long and in what way they 
engage in the process, or even coding fluency, flexibility and originality of gen-
erated actions using the standard Consensual Assessment Technique (Amabile 
1982). 
Implicit neural measures of the creative process are also possible with chil-
dren with techniques such as fNIRS and EEG. Studies with adults have long 
implicated the brain’s default mode network (Beaty et al. 2014; Immordino-
Yang, Christodoulou, and Singh 2012), dynamic interactions between the 
large-scale brain networks (Beaty, Seli and Schacter 2019), and alpha and theta 
oscillations activity (Fink and Benedek 2014; Stevens and Zabelina 2019) as cor-
relates of creative thinking. EEG has long been a staple neuroscience method 
for studying various aspects of infant cognition (Saby and Marshall 2012), and 
advances in fNIRS have brought it to the forefront of cognitive developmental 







































































162 method for studies of infants’ developing default mode network as a signature 
of creative processes, a study using the fNIRS brain scanning technique was 
successful in capturing the default mode network activity in 18-month-olds 
(Bulgarelli et al. 2019). In sum, a combination of novel behavioural tasks and 
neural correlates capturing the facets of creative thinking in young children is 
necessary to move the cognitive developmental science of creativity forward.
Creativity as a cognitive process involves forming unusual associations, 
coming up with unconventional ideas, and making use of available resources 
and context in an original way. These novel ideas are possible due to a flexible 
attentional system, shifting perspective, noticing elements that were initially 
unnoticeable, and perceiving remote affordances in everyday objects and 
situations. Three core facets of creativity – divergent, combinatory and trans-
formative thinking – are exhibited in children’s object play, pretence and tool 
innovation activities, which form the base for experimental study of creativity 
process in childhood.
What is the relationship between curiosity, wonder  
and creativity?
W e proposed that curiosity, wonder and creativity are comple-mentary processes in cognitive development: curiosity drives exploration of the environment to gain new knowledge, wonder 
pushes the boundaries of acquired knowledge, and creativity enables active 
manipulation of the environment to generate new knowledge and encourage 
new opportunities for learning. How exactly are these processes related to each 
other?
Studies with adults have shown that curiosity, both specific and diversive 
(per Berlyne’s typology, 1954), predicts creative problem solving and perfor-
mance (Hagtvedt et al. 2019; Hardy, Ness, and Mecca 2017; Harrison 2016). Here, 
idea generation as a staple of the creativity process is fuelled by either diversive 
thinking, desire for novelty such as a brainstorming session (Voss and Keller 
1983), or the cognitive process of iterative, step-by-step idea linking (Hagt-
vedt et al., 2019). Curiosity and wonder as an intrinsic need for knowledge are 
proposed to be the means for reaching creative goals (Kashdan and Fincham 
2002; Taylor 1964). On another account, an expansive state of wonder (the kind 
most similar to awe) affects creative thinking through modification of pre-
existing mental frames and openness to alternative perspectives (Chirico et al. 
2018). However, the existing research is both limited, due to an overwhelm-



















































163“Are you a curious/wondrous/creative person?” which is very prone to social 
desirability biases), and inconclusive, as it often does not take into account per-
sonality traits such as openness to experience, which is equally predictive of 
curiosity, wonder and creativity (Hunter et al. 2016; Silvia et al. 2015). Further-
more, curiosity conceptualised as a stable trait has been shown to form part 
of one’s creative self-efficacy and creative personal identity (Karwowski 2012), 
thus reducing curiosity to an aspect of creativity and generally blending the 
distinctions between these concepts (Arasteh 1968; Maw and Maw 1965; Pen-
ney and McCann 1964). Nevertheless, research with adults firmly intertwined 
curiosity, wonder and creativity, although the causal direction and the nature 
of these links remain to be better understood. Several theoretical approaches 
are plausible.
One line of thinking proposes a linear relationship, in that curiosity and 
wonder are direct precursors to creativity: the generative power of curiosity 
may lead to a state of wonder, which may in turn lead to creative pursuits. In 
more detail, exploration of the environment leads to accumulation and inte-
gration of multiple experiences and perspectives through assimilation and 
accommodation of existing information. Creativity then follows as modi-
fication and transformation of this information in order to generate new 
knowledge. The traces of this idea are present in early cognitive developmen-
tal literature. Vygotsky (Ayman-Nolley 1992; Lindqvist 2003; Vygotsky [1990] 
2004) proposed that accrual of experiences and a combinatorial process applied 
to what is known are the building blocks of creative thought.5 Similarly, the 
Piagetian account of knowledge construction through playful interactions 
with the environment (Piaget 1945; 1969) posits the accumulation and accom-
modation of multiple scenarios and perspectives as a pathway to creativity. 
Hence, the richness of experience, both quantitatively and qualitatively, ulti-
mately affects the richness of creative imagination. 
The following two theoretical models specifically link wonder and creativ-
ity in this way and are ripe for empirical investigation. Glăveanu (2017) argues 
that a wondering person is able to entertain and adopt multiple perspectives, 
to engage with the possible and the impossible in novel ways, and to inhibit 
conventional schemas. Having opened up the possibility for multiple perspec-
tives, a person can then explore those perspectives through creation. A pillar of 
creativity – divergent thinking – is rooted in engagement with the expanded 
space of the possible. Schinkel (2017) similarly suggests that wonder’s open-
5 “…the creative activity of the imagination depends directly on the richness and variety of a person’s 
previous experience because this experience provides the material from which the products of fantasy 







































































164 ness to experience, eagerness to inquire, desire to understand, and willingness 
to suspend judgement and bracket existing – potentially limiting – ways of 
thinking, seeing and categorising, paves the way for creativity. On the one 
hand, wonder pushes the boundaries of what is known to the realm of the still 
mysterious phenomena; on the other hand, “wonder defamiliarizes the famil-
iar, making it appear in a new light, as if seen for the first time” (Schinkel 2017, 
543). Regardless of how familiar or novel the object of wonder is, it is the active 
act of wondering that makes subsequent divergent thinking possible.
Non-linear relationships between curiosity, wonder and creativity are also 
possible. First, the process may flow in the opposite direction depending on the 
stage: engaging in a creative act (e.g., playing a musical instrument) or witness-
ing it (e.g., attending a symphony concert) may put one in a state of wonder, and 
further prompt to search for specific information (e.g., what is the history of 
this symphony), which may in turn lead to more wonder (e.g., learning about a 
baffling fact), fuelling another phase of creativity (e.g., writing a poem inspired 
by the unexpected fact). Second, the three states may be deeply interlinked so 
that dissociating them into curiosity, wonder and creativity at any particular 
moment may not only be impossible but would also be detrimental to prop-
erly accounting for complex dynamically evolving cognitive phenomena (see 
dynamic systems approaches for a similar argument, e.g., Smith and Thelen 
2003). Third, the three states may be cross-fertilising. Presenting a cyclical 
approach to creative cognition (Finke, Ward, and Smith 1992), the Geneplore 
model (made of verbs generate and explore), presents curiosity (pre-inventive 
exploration) and creativity (generation of pre-inventive structures) as a means 
to each other in a cognitive process. For example, in preparation for writing a 
book, a writer may gather information about the époque, traditions and people 
in their story. This would be the curiosity or exploration stage. Upon obtaining 
this knowledge, rooted in already existing and now discovered information, 
they then transform the facts in an original way, eventually generating new 
knowledge. This would be the creativity or generation stage. Here, creativity 
follows curiosity, which in turn enables further transformations and modifi-
cations so that generative and exploratory phases work in tandem, enabling 
creative transformation both through conceptual change and focused decision 
making.
In sum, both linear and non-linear relationship models between curiosity, 
wonder and creativity are open for experimental investigation. Studies with 
adult participants, primarily in personality and social psychology research, 
have obtained mixed findings (see Loewenstein 2014 for a discussion; Voss 
and Keller 1983), which may reflect the lack of measurement validity, or alter-



















































165stable traits. The links between curiosity, wonder and creativity in childhood 
have been proposed but underspecified (Cecil et al. 1985), hence necessitating 
advancement in experimental research rooted in cognitive approaches in order 
to delineate their relationship and specify their developmental precursors.
Conclusions and further directions
“What is this?” he said at last. 
“This is a child!” Haigha replied eagerly, coming in front of Alice to introduce her (…).
“We only found it today. It’s as large as life, and twice as natural!”
“I always thought they were fabulous monsters!” said the Unicorn. “Is it alive?”
“It can talk,” said Haigha solemnly.
The Unicorn looked dreamily at Alice, and said “Talk, child.”
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland
The intellectual fascination empowering every study designed by a cognitive 
developmental psychologist comes from the inability of young children to talk: 
if only these “fabulous monsters” could tell us all that we want to know about 
their curiosity, wonder and creativity! In this chapter, we focused on these three 
concepts, intrinsically linked to each other but often used and researched with-
out due attention to fine differences and causal links between them. Having 
developed clear operational definitions, the field of cognitive development 
would be able to undertake empirical investigations into these phenomena, 
which will in turn enable a better understanding transferrable to other schol-
arly fields.
We presented a range of theoretical models along with emerging evidence 
on how curiosity, wonder and creativity underlie knowledge acquisition and 
knowledge transformation in early childhood. Curiosity is an intrinsically 
motivated, deliberate form of information-seeking through independent 
exploration and active social learning. Wonder is conceptualised as an emo-
tionally uplifting, expansive quest for more knowledge through questioning 
of existing frames. The transition from knowledge acquisition to its transfor-
mation begins with wonder, which expands the possibility space for knowledge 
beyond what already exists, motivating further discovery-oriented processes to 
search more broadly and inquire more meaningfully. Both curiosity and won-
der seem to be useful prerequisites to creativity, understood as generation of 
novel ideas, original transformations and novel combinations of the existing 







































































166 sition as a goal in itself eventually extinguishes curiosity, while it does not 
detrimentally affect either wonder or creativity. Creativity allows to develop 
new knowledge regardless of what already exists or is potentially attainable. 
In a nutshell, curiosity is assimilation of information, intellectual activity in 
search of knowledge to achieve a reduction in uncertainty, whereas wonder 
pushes the door open to uncertainty, and creativity allows for modification 
and transformation of information and is only possible with a high threshold 
of tolerance to uncertainty.
It is premature to infer the causal links between these concepts. Cogni-
tive processes may change dynamically from seeking specific information and 
engaging in broad exploration, to pondering upon discoveries and posing orig-
inal questions, to generating novel ideas and transforming existing structures. 
Unanswered questions abound. Future research may ask whether curiosity and 
wonder differentially affect learning or creativity outcomes, or whether indi-
vidual differences in trait curiosity remain stable across development and are 
retained in adulthood. To test the proposed linear relationship between these 
concepts, it may be asked if curiosity and wonder necessarily precede creative 
thinking; does one need to have satisfied one’s curiosity about the topic before 
the creative process can start? While curiosity seeks out relevant, pertinent and 
reliable information to satisfy its goal, what kind of information is suitable for 
wonder and creativity? While we know that curiosity subsides once the missing 
information has been obtained, wonder may be much more open-ended. What 
about creativity? Does one stop being creative upon believing to have found the 
most creative solution? Is it the abundance of cues and information or rather 
its scarcity that is conducive to creativity, given its reliance on perceiving non-
obvious affordances in the environment? We hope to see future research engage 
with these and other fascinating questions.
Furthermore, essential both for enabling optimal experimental investi-
gations and effective educational interventions is an answer to the question 
whether curiosity, wonder or creativity can reliably be induced. Some sug-
gestions to facilitate curiosity are to encourage question asking and critical 
thinking, expose children to counter-intuitive evidence, pose follow-up ques-
tions to probe further interest, encourage sharing interest with others, and 
create informationally rich environments. Wonder can be supported through 
exposure to various fascinating phenomena, dedicating time and space to 
experience and reflect upon them, access to a variety of information sources, 
promoting tolerance of uncertainty and complexity, and being open and 
welcoming to new experiences. Creativity thrives in judgement-free, playful 
environments, conducive to artistic and emotional expressivity, and benefits 



















































167ceptual combination, associative thinking and cognitive flexibility. A more 
fundamental question, however, is whether a generic approach fits every child 
(Parsons 1969). For instance, we may have assumed that seeing the northern 
lights for the first time is a likely generic candidate for inducing wonder and 
started to use this as an experimental induction in our study. But what about 
those children for whom encountering a challenging mathematical problem is 
most wondrous, while the wonders of nature leave them unaffected? We would 
be devastatingly wrong to conclude in our experiment that these children were 
unable to experience the state in principle or were less prone to wonder. Con-
sidering such inevitable individual differences, longitudinal methods may 
be most instrumental in detecting developmental change in the behavioural, 
neural and physiological manifestations of curiosity, wonder and creativity. 
Finally, while in this article we chose to focus on the cognitive developmen-
tal approach to the study of curiosity, wonder and creativity, other fields of 
empirical inquiry, such as phenomenological research, embodied cognition or 
psychoanalysis, among others, may also substantially contribute to our under-
standing of these phenomena.
The abundance of practical guidelines for parents, educators and psycholo-
gists urges them to foster curiosity, nurture wonder and encourage creativity 
in children, often lacking supporting empirical data for the proposed inter-
ventions. Such evidence could be generated with the use of age-appropriate, 
interdisciplinary measures providing insight into underlying cognitive pro-
cesses, asking feasible research questions and conducting longitudinal studies 
marking individual trajectories in development of curiosity, wonder and crea-
tivity.
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8  Wonder: Its Nature and  
Its Role in the Learning Process
Yannis Hadzigeorgiou
Introduction
F rom time to time, the value of wonder has been defended by educators and scientists alike. In her classic The Sense of Wonder, marine biologist and environmentalist Rachel Carson – who helped launch the environ-
mental movement (see her Silent Spring) –described wonder as “an unfailing 
antidote against the boredom and disenchantments of later years, the sterile 
preoccupation with things that are artificial, the alienation from the sources 
of our strength (Carson 1965, 43). Writing from the perspective of an educa-
tor, Carson, in her book, talked about children’s ‘inborn sense of wonder’ and 
the importance of keeping it alive throughout life. Even though she did not 
attempt to explicate the concept of wonder, she did send an important mes-
sage to parents and teachers: keeping alive a child’s inborn sense of wonder 
requires the companionship of at least one adult who must share this sense 
of wonder with the child, and thus rediscover with the child the mystery, the 
joy and the excitement of the natural world (Carson 1965). On the other hand, 
Oxford evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, one of the most fervent expo-
nents of the role of wonder in science, talks about beauty and the ‘poetry of 
science’ by pointing out that the beauty of and the ability to wonder at various 
phenomena don’t disappear because scientists have explained them. For exam-
ple, Newton’s explanation of the rainbow has not explained away its beauty or 
the wonder people feel upon seeing a rainbow. In other words, the prismatic 
analysis of light into different colours has not diminished the sense of wonder 
experienced at the sight of a rainbow. In his Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, Delu-
sion, and the Appetite for Wonder, Dawkins considers wonder “one of the highest 
experiences of which the human psyche is capable” (Dawkins 1998, xii), and 























































instrumentalist conceptions of knowledge (and of education for that matter): 
“Far from science not being useful, my worry is that it is so useful as to over-
shadow and distract from its inspirational and cultural value. Usually even its 
sternest critics concede the usefulness of science, while completely missing the 
wonder.” (Dawkins 1998, 10, my italics).
In the area of philosophy wonder is, of course, a taken-for-granted notion 
(i.e., wonder is considered the source of all intellectual inquiry, which, as an 
idea, goes back to Plato and Aristotle). In education, however, wonder has not 
received enough attention. Although wonder is not by any means a panacea 
for students’ anorexia learnosa (my neologism), anecdotal evidence and some 
empirical studies (e.g. Gilbert and Byers, 2017; Hadzigeorgiou 2010; 2012; 
Hadzigeorgiou and Garganourakis 2010; Hadzigeorgiou et al. 2012) point to 
one indisputable fact: wonder can be an important teaching/learning tool, 
which can foster both emotional and cognitive engagement with subject mat-
ter, regardless of the discipline (e.g., history, science, geography, language arts). 
According to Kieran Egan’s educational theory, which conceives of education as 
a process of recapitulation during which students recapitulate, that is, repeat 
in the same order, ‘kinds of understandings’ – somatic, mythic, romantic, 
philosophic and ironic – as these have appeared in our cultural history, the 
characteristics of each kind of understanding become cognitive tools, that is, 
tools which can aid thinking and learning (Egan 1992; 1997; 2005). Wonder, in 
Egan’s educational theory, is an important cognitive tool for students in the 
age range from seven to fifteen years. (The specific characteristics of romantic 
understanding can be seen in table 3.)
But, as mentioned earlier, wonder, in general, has not received the atten-
tion it truly deserves. One could identify a number of plausible reasons for 
such lack of interest: (i) The difficulty of conceptualising and articulating 
wonder (e.g., is it a feeling, a state of mind, a mode of consciousness, an expe-
rience? Does it differ from curiosity?); (ii) The inherent passivity of wonder 
(e.g., wonder is as an anaesthetic and linked to incomprehensibility); (iii) The 
identification or association of wonder with the notion of the sublime, with 
miracles, with magic, with science fiction; (iv) The association of wonder with 
emotions (e.g., emotions are important but knowledge is more important); 
(v) A stronger focus on what learning is rather than the conditions on which 
learning depends (e.g., learning as a rational activity, emphasis on the social 
and the cognitive element); (vi) The notion that wonder has to be evoked (e.g., 
requires specific questions and takes time to uncover and reflect upon); (vii) 
Emphasis on ‘accountability’ and ‘performativity’ (e.g. PISA and measurable 
outcomes); (viii) The fact that wonder may disrupt the predictability or ‘order’ 











































ing questions in a non-linear fashion); (ix) Teachers, like the majority of adults, 
have lost their sense of wonder (e.g., how many times during a school day do 
teachers ask wonder questions or even such questions as “I wonder why, when, 
how…”?) (Hadzigeorgiou 2007; 2012; 2016). There is also the problem that chil-
dren, because they are overwhelmed by sensory information at a very early age 
through activities such as TV viewing and video games, lose their sensitivity 
(i.e. their capacity to attune with reality), which is crucial for the experience 
of wonder. Therefore, children, as they grow up, have difficulty to experience 
wonder. The view that “when wonder, beauty, sensitivity and secure attach-
ment are present, learning is meaningful” is a reminder of some important 
preconditions for the experience of wonder (L’Ecuyer 2014).
And yet, regardless of the aforementioned reasons, some people can, and 
do, experience wonder in daily life. An experience of wonder can take place in 
the street, in a museum, at home, at a theatre, in the great outdoors or any natu-
ral environment for that matter, in a lecture hall, on the beach while watching 
the sunset or the rolling waves, in a scientific laboratory during an experiment, 
or even while sitting and thinking about a situation, past or future. All these 
examples do illustrate the many guises of wonder and hence its complex and 
elusive nature. And these guises may very well make one wonder at and about 
the nature of wonder itself.
It appears that wonder can be conceived: (i) as (bewildered) curiosity, that 
is, as a drive to explore, to investigate (i.e. to wonder about); (ii) as (bewildered) 
curiosity, mingled with admiration; (iii) as admiration, that is, as a response to 
entities, phenomena, events and ideas (i.e. to wonder at, an experience with 
the form of awed wonder); (iv) as a response to something mysterious, magi-
cal, even miraculous and incomprehensible (i.e. to wonder at, a feeling of awed 
wonder); as Aristotelian thaumazein, that is, as a response to puzzles and natu-
ral phenomena (i.e. the wonders of nature) which are thaumasta (wonder-full) 
things, worthy of our attention (i.e. to wonder at and wonder about); (v) as 
Socratic aporia, that is, as puzzlement over contradictions, discrepancies, para-
doxes (i.e. to wonder about) (Hadzigeorgiou 2001; 2016; Schinkel 2017). Gabriel 
Marcel has argued that the thaumazein (wonder) of the ancient Greeks lies on 
the borderline between wonderment and admiration (Marcel 1963). 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into the Platonic or the Aristote-
lian notion of wonder, but it appears, in reading the literature, that the legacy 
of Plato and Aristotle can provide some insights into the nature of wonder. 
For Plato, “Wonder (‘thaumazein’) is the beginning of philosophy” (Theaetetus 
155d), something with which Aristotle concurred: “Men were first led to phi-
losophy, as indeed they are today, by wonder” (Metaphysics I, 982b). For Plato 
(speaking as/for Socrates in the various dialogues), ‘thaumazein’ (infinitive) 
188 is specifically and explicitly linked to ‘aporia’ (a + poros = no way to proceed, 
no path to follow), that is, an ‘intellectual impasse’, which signals the limits 
of one’s knowledge and hence one’s ignorance and the desire for ‘true knowl-
edge’. For Plato, ‘thaumata’ (noun), as made evident in the dialogues, refer to 
the wonders of nature and of the universe, and also to taken-for-granted ideas 
such as good, virtue, morality, etc. However, the notion of confusion is also 
linked to the notion of wonder. Indeed, Theaetetus admits that he wonders 
about all the things he is confused about and “in looking at them he truly feels 
dizzy” (Theaetetus 155c). And Aristotle’s sense of wonder is also given by the 
word ‘Thaumazein’, which is linked to admiration and confusion and puzzle-
ment over the ‘thaumata’, which are the wonders of nature, of the universe. 
Apparently, Aristotle inherited the Platonic ‘thaumazein’, as the source of all 
intellectual inquiry. And his sense of ‘thaumazein’ is linked to one’s ignorance: 
“A man who is perplexed and wonders believes himself to be ignorant and phi-
losophizes in order to avoid ignorance”, (Metaphysics I, 982b). Such views about 
wonder could be summarised as follows: 
• Wonder = Aporia (puzzlement);
• Wonder = Thaumazein (admiration);
• Wonder = Thaumazein + Aporia;
• Wonder = Thaumazein f (Aporia) (that is, ‘thaumazein’ as a result of 
‘aporia’).
It is of note that in ancient Greece the notion of curiosity did not have a place 
in one’s intellectual inquiry, simply because the word ‘περιέργεια’ (curiosity) 
described the activity of prying into other people’s affairs. Thus it was the 
notion of wonder that described one’s intellectual curiosity, that is, the source 
of intellectual inquiry. Of course, with the birth of modern science, curiosity 
acquired a special significance. For it was curiosity, together with wonder, that 
played a central role in the development of science (Ball 2013). Despite the fact 
that the two notions are frequently used interchangeably, there is a subtle dif-
ference between the two: “Curiosity belongs to the scientific impulse and would 
strive to dominate nature; whereas, wonder is poetic and is content to view 
things in their wholeness and full context (Taylor 1998, 169). Martin Heidegger, 
in his Time and Being, described the difference between curiosity and wonder as 
follows: “Curiosity has nothing to do with observing entities and marvelling 
at them (…) once curiosity obtains sight of anything, it already looks away to 
what is coming next.” (Heidegger [1927] 2008, 216, 398). And Edmund Burke 
in his A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful 
identified curiosity as “the first and simplest emotion which we discover in the 






















































189all emotions are suspended and “the mind is so entirely filled with its object 
that it cannot entertain any other (…)” (Burke [1757] 1990, 11, 53).
In looking at the notion of wonder per se, dictionaries define it as: “A cause 
of astonishment or admiration (Oxford Dictionary, 11th Ed.), as “A feeling of 
surprise mingled with admiration or curiosity or bewilderment (Oxford Paper-
back Dictionary, 2nd Ed.), and as “Rapt attention or astonishment at something 
awesomely mysterious or new to one’s experience (Webster’s New Collegiate 
Dictionary). These definitions, apparently, cannot capture the full meaning 
of wonder, due to the multidimensional nature of the latter. But a concep-
tual inquiry into wonder has identified three ‘faces’ of wonder: (a) Wonder as 
the emotion caused by the perception of something novel and unexpected or 
inexplicable, (b) Wonder as the state of mind in which this emotion exists, and 
(c) Wonder as astonishment mingled with perplexity or bewildered curiosity 
(Hove 1996). At the same time, however, one needs to realise the very complex 
and elusive nature of wonder. Indeed, wonder, as a state of mind, can be asso-
ciated with mystery, awe, perplexity, astonishment, surprise, amazement, 
admiration and bewilderment. Yet the experience of a sense of wonder cannot 
be reduced to the experience of any one of the aforementioned elements. Mere 
surprise or even mere astonishment is not wonder any more than is mere admi-
ration or bewilderment. Schinkel’s (2017) definition is worth mentioning here, 
as it captures the most important features of wonder: “A mode of conscious-
ness in which we experience that which we perceive or are contemplating as in 
some way strange, beyond our understanding, yet worthy of our attention for 
its own sake, and in which our attention takes the form of an open, receptive 
stance”. My own conception of wonder, as a mental state which is characterised 
by aporia (a sense of perplexity and puzzlement due to one’s ignorance) and/
or thaumazein (admiration), captures two faces of wonder and also both the 
cognitive and the affective component of it (Hadzigeorgiou 2007).
Given, however, the multidimensional, complex and elusive nature of won-
der, definitions cannot capture the ‘whole picture’, that is, the full meaning of 
it (i.e. one should always bear in mind the many ‘faces’ or ‘guises’ of wonder). 
Moreover, definitions, while they can serve as guides by giving us some sense 
of what wonder is, do not say enough (and some of them do not say anything) 
about some important characteristics that have specific pedagogical implica-
tions. For example, given the relationship between intellectual curiosity and 
wonder (i.e. curiosity as a ‘guise’ or form or wonder vs curiosity as something 
different but which has its source in wonder), the fact that one’s sense of wonder 
can remain even after one’s curiosity has been satisfied is not given by defini-
tions. And it cannot emerge from them either, unless, of course, one embarks 










































190 der as an implication of a definition. It is my purpose in this chapter to discuss 
thirteen ideas/features of wonder, which point both to its complex and elusive 
nature and to its educational/pedagogical value, along with their implications. 
Even though the ideas and features are interrelated, I choose to discuss them 
separately in order to get clear about their meaning and implications. These 
ideas and features are the outcome of empirical research in the area of primary 
and secondary science education, even though some of the material and some 
of the activities used in the research, and hence the implications for students’ 
experience of wonder, transcend disciplinary boundaries (Hadzigeorgiou 2001; 
2006; 2007; 2010; 2012; Hadzigeorgiou and Garganourakis, 2010; Hadzigeor-
giou et al. 2011; Hadzigeorgiou et al. 2012).
1. Wonder has to be evoked
U nlike curiosity, which is aroused by novel, unusual, unfamiliar and strange situations, objects and events, wonder can be experienced in situations and events and with objects and ideas that are ordinary and 
familiar. And it is precisely the experience of wonder that makes these look 
extraordinary and unfamiliar. This is the legacy of Socrates, who questioned the 
nature of familiar ideas that most people took – and still take – for granted (e.g., 
the nature of love, virtue, friendship) and, in the process, made his interlocu-
tors feel perplexed and confused (Hadzigeorgiou 2016). It is therefore evident 
that the experience of wonder (at and about familiar and ordinary situations, 
objects and ideas) does not ‘happen automatically’, it has to ‘emerge’, that is, to 
be evoked through questions, linguistic expressions, images and experiments. 
This, however, does not mean that there are no cases in which the experience 
of wonder ‘happens automatically’, that is, when wonder ‘strikes’. But in cases 
in which we refer to very familiar and everyday objects and phenomena (e.g., 
a glass of water, a tree, the rain, the trajectory of a pebble or of a football) one’s 
sense of wonder has to be evoked. But again, this does not imply that common 
and everyday phenomena, like a sunset, cannot evoke a sense wonder in both 
young children and adults.
The idea, for example, that ‘we are all stardust’ (Sagan’s famous phrase), 
and that the water that comes from our tap could contain molecules that dino-
saurs drank more than sixty million years ago, refers to our own bodies and 
the water we drink – something that most, if not all, people take for granted. 
But when encouraged to reflect on this by a teacher, most students started 
to wonder about it (as a video and audiotape analysis showed). The primary 






















































191water as we do today, which prompted them to consider various other possi-
bilities. And the secondary school students, even though they were aware of 
the human body’s chemical composition, found the fact that we are made of 
the same chemical elements that starts are made of amazing and intriguing. 
What’s even more interesting is that these students spent a great deal of time 
outside class wondering about the implications of the idea that we are all star-
dust (Hadzigeorgiou 2010).
What, therefore, should be pointed out is that, although there are cases 
in which the experience of wonder is immediate (e.g., watching a spectacular 
stellar explosion, a rainbow, a total eclipse of the sun), more often than not 
this experience is the result of an awareness which presupposes reflection 
upon what is taken for granted, in order to discover something unexpected. 
The following example illustrates the point I am making even more clearly. 
Many students know that light travels at a speed of 300,000 km/s. It’s a piece 
of information that most secondary school students remember but also take 
for granted. It’s a universal constant and everybody needs to know it. However, 
they only start to wonder about light being the fastest entity in the universe 
when, by doing a simple calculation, they realise that if you were travelling 
at the speed of light, you could fly around the earth (the equator) seven times 
in one second. No one, let alone a young student, holding a tiny globe in one 
hand is able to move their index finger around the globe’s equator more than 
two or three times in one second (Hadzigeorgiou 2016). It is this awareness that 
helps evoke a sense of wonder in the student. Of course, the state of ‘height-
ened awareness’, in general, is another characteristic feature of wonder, which 
I discuss later in this chapter. But the point I want to make here is that devel-
oping awareness always requires some kind of activity (and question asking). 
In the above example, the activity with the globe was crucial for raising the 
students’ awareness.
2. Anything can be a source of wonder 
I f wonder needs to be evoked, as discussed earlier, then everything can become a source of wonder. The above examples illustrated this. Below I quote at some length from a book written by Kieran Egan, who used as an 
example something not just ordinary and very familiar, but also something 
that we dispose of after use. He talks about a broken Styrofoam cup’s ‘heroic 










































192 We can enlarge its significance by considering it as a part of the heroic 
journey that is the human struggle to shape the world more closely to our 
desires, to find release from the constant toil, sickness, and pain that have 
been the lot of most people most of the time (…). The knowledge of chemical 
and physical processes that have gone into its design and making is prodi-
gious. And we have learned the environmental costs entailed in applying 
this knowledge to create this convenience, and we are as a society recog-
nizing that we must satisfy this particular desire in other ways that do not 
threaten our harmony with the natural world. One can flash such thoughts 
through the mind in less than half a second (…). They are associations that 
come with the romantic image of the broken cup. (Egan 1992, 76-77)
The various associations that come to mind when we see an ordinary cup can 
help develop our awareness of the chemical and physical process that have gone 
into manufacturing one cup, and also the cost we have to pay as a society for its 
use. It is the awareness of these associations that make the familiar, ordinary 
cup an object of wonder. Of course, one should be reminded that there are some 
students who wonder at and about many things and some who do not wonder 
at all. Hadzigeorgiou (2010) has identified a number of student profiles with 
regard to wonder (i.e. not all students are wonderers, even though they can be 
curious). Even in the field of professional science there are those who do not 
really wonder. But those who do can find wonder in almost anything, simply 
because anything can be a source of wonder. In The Star Thrower Loren Eiseley 
speaks of two kinds of practitioners in science. One is the “extreme reduction-
ist who is so busy stripping things apart that the tremendous mystery has been 
reduced to a trifle” and the other “who still has a controlled sense of wonder 
before the universal mystery whether it hides in a snail’s eye or within the light 
that impinges on that delicate organ (Eiseley 1979, 151).
3. Wonder involves focused and sustained attention
W hen one wonders at and/or about something (i.e. the object of wonder), one’s attention is always focused, and often also sus-tained. This is because, as Edmund Burk put it, the mind is “so 
entirely filled with its object that it cannot entertain any other” ([1757] 1990, 
53). In other words, when one experiences a sense of wonder, one is truly pre-
sent in a situation or an event. Even though such an observation will not lead 
educators and teachers to reconsider what the notion of ‘being present’ in the 






















































193really means, the pedagogical value of wonder can be seen in the evidence from 
some studies.
In a study with very young children (aged between 4 and 6 years), ‘objects 
of wonder’ (e.g., familiar and ordinary objects connected to unexpected situ-
ations or phenomena: a toy car that moves without batteries, picking up an 
ice cube using only a string and salt, pouring water from one glass to another 
using a string) were placed in front of the children and in a corner of the class-
room by the teacher. The children spent time exploring the objects and asking 
questions about them, paying attention to the details of the objects. And the 
children, at least some of them, also demonstrated this focused and sustained 
attention the next few days (Hadzigeorgiou 2001; 2010). Surprisingly, while one 
might expect the children’s sense of wonder to wane or even disappear alto-
gether after having explored the objects and hearing the explanation (which 
was geared towards factual knowledge rather than conceptual understanding), 
the evidence showed the opposite. A possible explanation is that children’s 
sense of wonder was so powerful that it made them pay attention again and 
again to the objects of wonder.
However, focused attention must be accompanied by involvement with the 
object in order for a familiar object or situation to become an object of wonder. 
For example, while at an amusement park, a child may look at a helium-filled 
balloon or a wave swinger but may not notice what is really happening, even 
though this goes contrary to his or her own experience. Indeed, a child seeing a 
balloon going up may not notice that that particular balloon is something that 
contradicts his or her own experience with balloons, which always fall down 
(unless there is strong wind to blow them away). The child, of course, if asked, 
will most likely say that it is the air that takes it up. It is for this reason that the 
child must be invited to notice differences by seeing a regular balloon going 
down and not up in the air, in the absence of wind, if he or she is to start to reor-
ganise and revise his or her ideas about the weight of objects and their motion. 
And in the case of a wave swinger, it is very unlikely that children, even adults, 
will notice that the angles the seats form to the vertical are all the same and 
independent of the weight they carry (i.e. both empty seats and loaded seats 
form the same angle to the vertical) (Hadzigeorgiou 2016).
4. Wonder fosters deep engagement










































194 possibilities for students’ engagement with the object of wonder increase. One 
should be reminded that while teaching, in any way, does not necessarily result 
in learning, increasing the possibilities for learning through a variety of ways 
is a strategy worth keeping in mind. 
It is of note that what describes, more often than not, the educational reality 
worldwide is the difficulty on the part of students to engage in the various disci-
plines. For example, despite interesting methods of teaching, despite attempts 
at making school science student centred and socially oriented, even despite 
students’ motivation to learn, engagement with science, particularly with sub-
ject matter, remains a problematic issue (Hadzigeorgiou and Stivaktakis 2008; 
see also Godek et al. 2018, for a review of the problem of ‘engagement’). While 
deep engagement may very well be considered an ideal – and to a certain degree 
it really is – engagement with science, as empirical evidence suggests, can be 
high in some cases. It may or may not be deep – ‘deep’ in the sense that it is the 
outcome of what Schinkel (2017) describes as ‘deep wonder’, but this is a matter 
of interpretation of the empirical findings. These findings refer to two studies 
with ninth graders, one conducted in a public school and the other in a private 
school.
In the first study, a public school teacher taught two similar (in terms of 
students’ academic achievement and socioeconomic background) ninth grade 
classes the mandated curriculum and attempted to evoke wonder in one of 
them (i.e. she identified potential sources of wonder from the science curric-
ulum and used these to evoke wonder at the beginning of the instructional 
process). The students of both classes kept an optional journal from early Octo-
ber to the end of April, in which they were free to write, whenever they wanted, 
any questions or comments about the lessons (e.g., what they found interest-
ing or not, what they liked, what made an impression on them, things they 
really wanted to ask, what they would have liked to learn more about, etc.). A 
quantitative analysis of their journal entries can be seen in tables 1 and 2 where 
the difference between the groups is very evident (Hadzigeorgiou 2012). Even 
though the qualitative analysis of the content of the journals gave valuable 
information about the role of wonder in the learning process, the quantitative 
data do provide support for the power of wonder in engaging students. This 
evidence is also supported by Gilbert’s (2013; Gilbert and Byers 2017) studies 






















































195Table 8.1 Quantitative data from students’ optional journals (Control group)
Table 8.2 Quantitative data from students’ optional journals (Wonder group)






Number of students 
who made entries
11 6 5
Total number  
of entries
34 20 14
Total number of 
questions asked
109 67 42
Total number  
of comments
48 30 18






Number of students 
who made entries
19 10 9
Total number  
of entries
75 35 40
Total number of 
questions asked
321 165 156
Total number  
of comments
235 120 115
The second study involved 19 private school teachers who taught two treatment 
groups (i.e. quasi-experimental design) consisting of ninth-grade students the 
mandated curriculum (current electricity – DC & AC) and attempted to encour-
age the development of ‘Romantic Understanding’ in one of them (by using a 
story based on actual historical events in the life of Nikola Tesla). As in the first 
study, the students of both treatment groups kept an optional journal (until 
the end of the school year), in which they too were free to write any kinds of 
comments and questions about what they had learned in class whenever they 
liked (i.e. what they found interesting or not interesting about AC electricity, 
what they liked, what made an impression on them, things they really wanted 
to ask, what they would have liked to learn more about, etc.). The students also 
took a test (consisting of 10 items) at the end of the school year (Hadzigeorgiou, 
Klassen, and Froese-Klassen 2012). 
While a comparison of the two treatment groups in terms of involvement 
provided evidence for the higher number of students from the ‘Romantic’ 










































196 like in the first study), a qualitative analysis of the students’ journals also 
provided another important piece of information. The most prevalent char-
acteristic of romantic understanding was the experience of wonder, as tables 3 
and 4 show (Hadzigeorgiou et al. 2012).
Romantic characteristics Number of students Frequency of appearance
Humanisation of meaning 43 (26M, 17F) 106 (55M, 51F)
Heroic elements 94 (53M, 41F) 221 (157M, 164F)
Wonder 94 (54M, 40F) 258 (131M, 127F)
Extremes of reality 50 (32M, 18F) 72 (52M, 20F)
Contesting of ideas 26 (17M, 9F) 55 (36M, 19F)
Romantic characteristics Number of students Frequency of appearance
Humanisation of meaning 28 (19M, 9F) 77 (44M, 33F)
Heroic elements 66 (31M, 35F) 105 (70M, 35F)
Wonder 68 (37M, 31F) 113 (62M, 51F)
Extremes of reality 34 (24M, 20F) 54 (29M, 25F)
Contesting of ideas 10 (6M, 4F) 19 (13M, 6F)
Table 8.3 Romantic characteristics identified in students’ journals and their  
frequency of appearance in students’ journal entries
Table 8.4 Romantic characteristics explicitly associated with science content 
knowledge and their frequency of appearance in students’ journal entries
It is true that the results of the aforementioned two studies refer to what hap-
pened in a single classroom, and in a variety of schools, respectively. No doubt 
the novelty of the interventions used in both studies helped in motivating the 
students to learn. However, at the same time, the quantitative analysis, when 
considered in the light of the qualitative analysis of students’ journal entries, 
does provide evidence for the role of wonder in fostering engagement with 
content knowledge. Even though one may very well be sceptical about the 
evidence and its potential to inform educational policy (due to the limitations 
inherent in such kind of studies), the fact that wonder increases the possibili-






















































1975. Wonder creates anticipation
A nticipation, the expectation that something will happen in the near future, is central to Dewey’s notion of ‘aesthetic experience’. This kind of experience is different from an ordinary experience, in the sense 
that it involves unity, flow and fulfilment. Such an experience is transforma-
tive (Dewey 1934; Pugh, Bergstrom, and Spencer 2017). In a study with both 
second- and eighth-grade students of various primary and secondary schools, 
the teacher created anticipation in students by simply announcing what activity 
they would participate in the coming week: the second graders would lift a stack 
of books using just their breath, and the eighth graders would make a density 
tower by stacking different layers of liquid on top of one another. An over-
whelming majority of students, regardless of school, age or educational level, 
felt anticipation at the prospect of the activities. And the activities that created 
anticipation were all activities that evoked a sense of wonder in the students 
(Hadzigeorgiou 2010). It should be noted that when the teacher announced next 
month’s experiment – make-your-own plastic with only milk and vinegar – stu-
dents of both age groups were so excited that even after a month’s wait, most of 
them remembered exactly what their teacher had promised and couldn’t wait 
to get started. Even the students who couldn’t contain their curiosity and had 
gone online to find out how to turn milk and vinegar into plastic were eager to 
participate in the classroom activities (Hadzigeorgiou 2010).
6. Wonder captures the imagination and fosters  
possibility thinking
W onder taps the imagination. This is a fact. Whether one wonders at or about an unknown, novel or unfamiliar object or event, or about something familiar, the act of wondering stirs the imagina-
tion and causes us to see the object or event in a new light. This is because the 
mind inevitably becomes involved in divergent thinking (since the object of 
wonder cannot be understood in terms of past knowledge and experiences). A 
tree, as an object of wonder, can fire the imagination and can be seen as a silent 
guard, as can a tree leaf which can be seen as a valley with a network of streams 
that keep it fertile and alive (Hadzigeorgiou 2010). Of course, the opposite is 
also true: wonder feeds the imagination (i.e. wonder fosters imaginative think-
ing). And this is why ‘imaginative education’, as an education of and for the 
imagination, places primacy upon the role of wonder in the learning process 










































198 Seeing the world through the lens of wonder can make schools more exciting 
and creative places (Egan et al. 2014). And in this sense, imagination can foster 
what is specifically called ‘possibility thinking’ (i.e. a kind of divergent, creative 
thinking). The empirical evidence below is a case in point (Hadzigeorgiou 2012):
If matter is 99% empty space, and if light is invisible, scientists may be able to create 
an invisible human being who can pass through walls, buildings, etc. (ninth-grade 
student)
The idea of wireless transmission of electrical energy made me think of the possibility 
of transmitting energy to distant places on earth and perhaps, in the future, to a colony 
in space before it is developed and becomes self-sufficient in terms of power production. 
(ninth-grade student)
7. Wonder has an aesthetic dimension
T he relationship between aesthetics and wonder is well known. Whether one perceives beauty in nature (e.g., a sunset, a rainbow, a stellar explo-sion, a water crystal) or beauty in human creations (e.g., the Parthenon, 
a medieval castle, a statue), one’s sense of wonder is always present in the 
form of admiration. In other words, the aesthetic perception of the whole is 
expressed as ‘admiratio’, that is, wonder (Taylor 1998, 169). One could, if fact, 
form a hypothesis: might the ‘fact’ that beauty is everywhere around us (as 
Thomas Aquinas said) be the reason that everything can be a source or object 
of wonder?
With regard to the beauty in nature, the aesthetic dimension of wonder can 
be linked to what Richards (2001) calls our ‘deeper ecological self’, who reacts 
at the sight of natural forms (e.g., mountains, clouds, trees, forests, waterfalls), 
leading to ‘a deeper holistic awareness’. Natural beauty, as Richards argued, has 
an adaptive value since it may advance a greater connection with the natural 
world. Although this could be contested, there is a pressing and legitimate 
question: why do we respond so quickly and intensely to certain images of the 
natural world? Why do natural forms around us capture our attention, evoke 
appreciation, evoke wonder and inspire even awe? Fractal forms, in particular, 
found in these natural forms, can be associated with transcendent experiences 
of beauty, even with the sublime (see Santayana 1955). It makes sense, there-
fore, to talk about “a transcendent reaction of our deeply aware ecological self” 
(Richards 2001, 63). Richard’s notion of ‘deeper holistic awareness’ concurs 






















































199work of relationships between the various components of reality. As he argued: 
“Beauty concerns the inter-relations of the various components of reality, the 
inter-relations of the various components of Appearance, and also the relations 
of Appearance to Reality. (Whitehead 1933, 341).
Such a notion of beauty makes sense if one considers that for Whitehead 
beauty lies in experiencing contrasts. His notion of beauty stems from his view 
of harmony as the interconnection of differences: “Contrast elicits depth, and 
only shallow experience is possible when there is a lack of patterned contrast” 
(Whitehead 1933, 268). The notion of ‘patterned contrast’, in and of itself, could 
very well be the source of wonder, without any reference to the notion of beauty 
per se (even though such notions as ‘pattern’ and ‘wholes’ do have an aesthetic 
dimension, and, as such, evoke a sense of wonder). Indeed, because wonder has 
to be evoked, one needs to take the various parts of one’s experience (which 
can be considered the ‘background’ of one’s experience) and then put them in 
relationship, in order to interconnect the various parts and thus perceive a ‘pat-
terned contrast’ (which can be considered the ‘foreground’ of one’s experience 
and possibly one’s object of wonder). However, for Whitehead it is the contrast 
among the various parts, the various components of reality, which constitutes 
beauty. He is quite explicit about the role of ‘contrast’ in bringing the various 
components of reality into focus and hence in forming ‘wholes’: “The whole 
heightens the feelings for the parts, and the parts heighten the feelings for the 
whole, and for each other” (Whitehead 1933, 296).
The relationship, however, between aesthetics and wonder can be also seen 
in the context of education. It is possible that students become involved in 
an exploration, in order to understand a situation for the purpose of creating 
an artifact. The students’ creation can be a connection between wonder and 
aesthetics. For example, young children in the first grades of primary school 
realized that, while a ball from modelling clay sinks in the water, appropriately 
shaped – that is, like a boat – it can float. And this boat can even hold a few other 
smaller balls without sinking. The students’ initial wonder (i.e. wonder at the 
fact that it is not only the weight of an object that determines whether the 
object will sink or float, but also its shape) was complemented with aesthetic 
judgments. Indeed, for them the boat they made from modelling clay was 
‘cool’, ‘fantastic’ and ‘awesome’. Such judgements, while they do not explic-
itly refer to the notion of beauty, are aesthetic in the wider sense of the term, 
which incorporates a sense of wonder (Hadzigeorgiou 2016). However, more 
importantly, the aesthetic dimension of wonder, in general, has the potential 
to humanise curriculum and instruction, especially in the case of technology 
and the physical sciences, and engineering for that matter (Hadzigeorgiou 










































200 both curriculum and teaching with emotions, even intense emotions (i.e. pas-
sion). And it becomes quite ‘visible’ in art and science connections, in teaching 
science through poetry, in designing something by considering both the prin-
ciples of science and aesthetic considerations, or even in designing or creating 
anything (e.g., an experiment, a bridge) that may be considered ‘wonder-full’ 
by those who designed it and/or perceive it.
8. Wonder remains – it ‘lingers’ – even after one’s curiosity 
has been satisfied
W hether intellectual curiosity is seen as a guise of wonder or as something that is different from wonder, its value is indisputable. The role of intellectual curiosity in the learning process, as a drive 
to explore and to search for answers to questions and solutions to problems, is 
of paramount importance. However, at some point, when exploration comes 
to an end because answers to the questions have been found, curiosity comes 
to an end, too. Certainly, there may very well be new questions and hence new 
explorations etc., and therefore we should rather talk about an on-going explo-
ration, as is the case with scientific research. But in the context of education, 
(and in daily life too), where students become involved in an exploratory activ-
ity (e.g., in order to understand a specific historical event, a puzzling physical 
or chemical phenomenon, in order to create something that sounds strange or 
even impossible), the timeframe of the instructional activity more or less coin-
cides with the end of students’ exploration and investigation, and hence with 
the satisfaction of their intellectual curiosity. Does the same thing happen with 
students’ sense of wonder?
There is empirical evidence that students who were wondering at the possi-
bility of stacking a number of liquids in a jar, and became intellectually curious 
about how to create such a multi-layered liquid, understood during their inves-
tigations that it is the concept of density that makes that possibility a reality. 
Once they understood this and were successful at creating a jar with various 
liquids with different densities, their initial curiosity was satisfied. However, 
their sense of wonder at the idea or possibility of having many liquids on top 
of one another remained. The comments in their journals provided evidence 
of this. By the same token, even though students’ intellectual curiosity was 
satisfied with regard to how it is possible for divers to perform a twisting som-
ersault (i.e. at first glance it appears that there is a violation of the principle of 
conservation of angular momentum), for basketball players to literally ‘hang 






















































201with regard to the mystery of ‘fairy circles’ (i.e. perfectly circular patches of 
barren ground) in some African regions, their sense of wonder remained even 
after these phenomena were explained and it was clear that no violation of any 
physical laws had occurred. And this sense of wonder also helped take science 
out of the school classroom, as an analysis of students’ journal entries revealed 
(Hadzigeorgiou 2010).
9. Wonder helps one make sense of a situation, an event, 
through a silent dialogue with oneself 
W hen I read Callum Roberts’ Ocean of Life (2013), I experienced a sense of wonder (as astonishment mingled with bewildered curi-osity) when I learned that a fishing boat in the Pacific Ocean, in 
the process of legally catching 211 mahi-mahi, caught and tossed back dead 
into the water: 488 turtles, 455 stingrays, 460 sharks, 68 sailfish, 32 tuna, 11 
wahoo, 8 swordfish and 4 giant sunfish. Even though I did not know the names 
of some of those fish, my first reaction was a sense of wonder at and about such 
an activity. My sense of wonder could be reduced to the ‘Why’ question, but 
I also began to ‘ask myself’ specific questions about what I had just read and 
tried to find answers to these questions. In other words, I was involved in a 
silent dialogue with my own self.
In the context of a research project with secondary school students, a 
teacher used an excerpt from Callum Roberts’ book that described the fisher-
men’s activity and the numbers of fish they caught and tossed back into the 
ocean. Here are the questions an eighth-grade female student asked herself and 
tried to answer before sharing her thoughts with her classmates:
• Why do people exhibit such irrational behaviour toward wildlife?
• Is there something deeper in the human soul that could justify such 
behaviour?
• Does making a living justify the killing of so many fish?
• Is it reasonable to catch so many fish that you do not want (collateral 
damage) in order to feed 211 people with mahi-mahi?
• How could we fish more sustainably? 
Of course, a silent dialogue with one’s self is always an attempt to understand a 
situation, a problem, an issue or an idea. And, as such, the relationship between 
wonder and thinking should be recognised and acknowledged. The feeling of 
surprise, or even astonishment, one may experience upon reading about Cal-










































202 wonder), can become a motive for critical thinking, which is a prerequisite for 
some kind of socio-political action that may prevent such irresponsible fishing 
activities worldwide in the future.
10. Wonder can be experienced both at the beginning of 
inquiry and at the end of it
I ndeed, a sense of wonder can be experienced (as Socratic aporia, that is, puz-zlement and perplexity and awareness that one’s knowledge is incomplete or mistaken) when one wonders about a problem or a situation in order to 
understand, and this can take place in the beginning of a teaching event. How-
ever, according to Richard Feynman (1969; 1989), wonder can be experienced 
even after one explores and inquires, that is, after one acquires knowledge 
about an entity or a phenomenon. It is in this sense that the wonder and the 
beauty of ideas comes as a reward of learning. Using as an example the liquid 
stacking experiment described earlier, the students were initially baffled and 
puzzled by the possibility of stacking liquids on top of one another and then 
became intellectually curious about how to do it. Once they understood that 
the experiment required liquids of various densities, and that the challenge 
was about a simple concept, namely, density, they were still able to wonder at 
their creation. The beauty of science was something that students sensed at 
the end of their investigation. And this beauty could be associated with both 
aesthetic perception (different layers of liquids with different colours) and the 
beauty of a scientific idea, namely the concept of density (even though here 
one needs to distinguish, in a Deweyan sense, between the concept of density 
and the idea of density, as a possibility, that is, how to use the idea of density 
to interact with the world). Whether or not some students experienced the 
first or the second kind of beauty, or both of them, is a matter that needs to be 
researched, but the point is that beauty and wonder, in the form of admiration, 
(i.e. admiration toward an artistic creation or science idea) can be experienced 






















































20311. Knowledge about the object of wonder can enlarge the 
initial sense of wonder (or knowledge can add more wonder 
to one’s sense of wonder)
N obel Prize winner Richard Feynman has argued that knowledge of science can add to the beauty of a natural entity, like a flower. In associating the beauty in nature with the wonder evoked from the sci-
entific ideas that explain its phenomena (i.e. natural and chemical processes) 
as well as from what is going on ‘underneath the surface’ of those phenomena, 
Feynman made a case for the role of knowledge in enlarging one’s initial sense 
of wonder. His argument, in the case of a flower, is that a scientist can ‘see more’ 
than an artist, simply because: “There are all kinds of interesting questions 
that come from a knowledge of science, which only adds to the excitement and 
mystery and awe of a flower. It only adds.” (Feynman 1989, 11). Of course, there 
are students who may not find beauty at all in the processes taking place at a 
molecular level. But there are also some who may.
However, many ordinary people who see the Colosseum in Rome for the 
first time will most likely feel a sense of wonder at the sight of its massive and 
sturdy structure. And they may also wonder at the fact that it has survived 
earthquakes, fires and looting in the course of history. This sense of wonder 
has nothing to do with the Colosseum’s artistic beauty, though it may also 
be understood by people like engineers and architects who are hard-wired to 
appreciate architectural and compositional features, such as the proportions 
and symmetry of the arches, arcades and columns. But when an ordinary per-
son looks closely at the details of the columns, and becomes aware that all three 
ancient Greek architectural orders (i.e., Doric, Ionic, Corinthian) have been 
included, his or her sense of wonder deepens. This is something I personally 
felt when I visited the Colosseum for the second time. And, of course, my sense 
of wonder at and about it was much deeper compared to the first time I vis-
ited it. Both the example of the liquid stacking experiment and the empirical 
evidence with students of various ages seem to support the claim that knowl-
edge (of details) adds to one’s initial sense of wonder (e.g. Hadzigeorgiou 2010; 
Hadzigeorgiou and Garganourakis 2010).
12. Wonder involves a ‘felt awareness’ 










































204 stage of precision and the stage of generalisation. This can be interpreted in 
a number of ways as regards its implications for the learning process. How-
ever, what is clear from what Whitehead said is that students, before they study 
something with precision and before they are ready to make generalisations, 
have to develop a romantic relationship with their object of study. At the stage 
of romance there is a feeling of “excitement consequent on the transition 
from the bare facts to the first realization of the import of their unexplored 
relationship”, and also a realisation of “unexplored connexions with possibili-
ties half-disclosed by glimpses and half-concealed by the wealth of material” 
(Whitehead 1985, 17-18).
Whitehead’s notion of the stage of romance can be illustrated by Carl Sagan 
himself. Sagan, as a young child living in New York, experienced a sense of 
wonder which was associated first with the awareness that stars were that 
aspect of his environment that was different from all the rest – something that 
also made him wonder about their nature – and second with the awareness that 
they (stars) were suns, just like ours, and very far away. His comments on that 
kind of awareness are quite instructive and worth quoting:
It was in there. It was stunning. The answer was that the Sun was a star, 
except very far away. The stars were suns; if you were close to them, they 
would look just like our sun. I tried to imagine how far away from the Sun 
you’d have to be for it to be as dim as a star. Of course I didn’t know the 
inverse square law of light propagation; I hadn’t a ghost of a chance of 
figuring it out. But it was clear to me that you’d have to be very far away. 
Farther away, probably, than New Jersey. The dazzling idea of a universe 
vast beyond imagining swept over me. It has stayed with me ever since (…) I 
sensed awe. And later on (it took me several years to find this), I realized that 
we were on a planet – a little, non-self-luminous world going around our 
star. And so all those other stars might have planets going around them. If 
planets, then life, intelligence, other Brooklyns – who knew? The diversity 
of those possible worlds struck me. They didn’t have to be exactly like ours, 
I was sure of it. (Sagan 1995, 25)
However, empirical evidence has shown that students themselves can sense 
and express their awareness of what they are learning (Hadzigeorgiou 2012):
That all the subatomic particles contained in the bodies of all people on earth, if we 
could remove all empty space from their bodies, could pack easily into a ping-pong ball 






















































205Although I knew that gravity was the weakest of all forces and I could see that in the 
numbers on that table about the relative strength of all forces in nature, it was after 
that simple and very easy-to-do experiment that I understood it better.
I knew that molecules are very-very small. But it was after calculating the number of 
molecules contained in a glass of water that I really understood how tiny they really 
are (…). Now I can say that I understand all about Avogadro’s number. 
The empirical evidence, as regards the experience of wonder, shows that not 
only Socratic ‘aporia’ (i.e. awareness of one’s lack of knowledge, or of mistaken 
ideas) but also various kinds of awareness can be experienced by students: 
awareness that some phenomena exist at all, awareness that there is a con-
nection between seemingly unconnected phenomena and ideas, awareness 
of mystery, awareness of beauty. However, what deserves to be pointed out 
is that wonder makes one aware of the significance of things. If wonder can 
make the ordinary and familiar look extraordinary, it can make the insignifi-
cant look significant (just like the heroic journey of something insignificant, 
like a broken Styrofoam cup, can make it look significant). And here one needs 
to recognise the power of wonder in the context of educational theory, which 
poses two fundamental questions: What is meaningful? What is significant? 
(Hadzigeorgiou 2005b).
13. Wonder fosters a change of outlook
T he view that significant learning is always linked to a change of outlook has been defended by both philosophers and educators (e.g., Hirst 1998; Peters 1973; Jardine et al. 2003; Schank 2004). But what is ‘significant 
learning’? Many would agree that it is learning that persists beyond the time 
at which the acquisition of knowledge and skills is certified (i.e. by taking a 
test), and learning that is valued and is used in out-of-school contexts. In short, 
learning that is transformative (e.g., Hadzigeorgiou 2016; Pugh 2004; Pugh, 
Bergstrom, and Spencer, 2017). This kind of learning is not merely a hoped-for 
goal, but, as empirical evidence suggests, an actual possibility. However, the 
empirical evidence, specifically with regard to the role of wonder in making 
students see things differently, is quite interesting (Hadzigeorgiou 2010; 2012; 










































206 The fact that there can be straight line motion at extremely high speeds in the absence 
of a net force makes you see motion as mysterious a phenomenon as electricity and 
magnetism.
Ever since I learned about matter being 99% empty space I see solids and liquids as 
empty space with some protons and electrons in it. If I think about it, every time I drink 
water, I think I drink nothing, except for a few protons and electrons.
Matter, what a strange concept!! Everything around me looks different if I really think 
about it. For we all touch, see, eat and drink vacuum.
Trees can do useful things for us without cutting them (…) this is important because 
after some time there will be no trees. So we must see trees as we see people, not like 
pieces of wood that we cut in order to use.
Now that I learned how important trees are for protecting people from many things I 
will try to protect trees as much as I can. I cannot think that a tree is like any kind of 
object. It is a special object. It is like a human being that understands things, as if it has 
a brain, so they can understand, they know, that people need help, and when there is a 
need for help it will help us.
If trees can save people like me from floods and can also protect people from very 
strong winds, then trees are like silent guards (and they do not cost anything).
The evidence cited above shows that wonder, once it is evoked – and regard-
less of the guise it takes on (e.g., aporia, bewilderment, surprise, astonishment, 
perplexity, admiration) – results in a change of perception. The awareness that 
accompanies wonder makes one see more and thus see differently. When a 
young girl experienced a sense of wonder about trees (see quotation above), 
after she learned some surprising and unexpected facts about them, she 
thought that trees are like human beings with a brain. Such a change in her 
perception of trees was the result of her experience of wonder, which had its 
source in her awareness that trees can indeed protect us and save us from many 






















































20714. Wonder has important implications for  
instructional practices
T he implications of the notion of wonder, although not characteris-tics of wonder, are part and parcel of it in the sense that they blend with, and simultaneously emerge from, what has been discussed thus 
far. Thus, I choose to discuss them briefly along with all the characteristics of 
wonder. Even though the most important implication of the notion of wonder 
for instruction is to turn to phenomenological and aesthetic perspectives (i.e. 
the very notion of wonder necessitates alternative approaches to the teaching/
learning process), there are some specific implications worth considering:
• Starting with the ‘richness’ of an object or phenomenon (e.g., a tree leaf, a 
waterfall, a rainbow, a flash of lightning) through attentive observation (i.e. 
involving all senses) and ‘letting them speak to us’ (i.e. moving away from 
cognitivism);
• Providing opportunities for ‘aesthetic experiences’ (i.e. experiences charac-
terised by flow, unity, fulfilment) as well as for the inclusion and infusion of 
the arts in all curricular subjects;
• Making students sense ‘aporias’ (i.e., knowledge gaps);
• Considering A.N. Whitehead’s notion of a ‘stage of romance’;
• Considering Kieran Egan’s notion of ‘romantic understanding’;
• Considering the importance not only of understanding ideas but also of 
being inspired by them;
• Reclaiming the value of questions and questioning in the classroom.
Final Comments
T he power of wonder, at least for those who have experienced it, is indis-putable. It is a motive for exploration, an awareness of the significance of things, an intellectual satisfaction, a reward for what one has learned 
and knows. Two decades ago I had argued that, in the context of science educa-
tion, the experiences of mystery and wonder, perhaps more than any other kind 
of experience (e.g. conceptual change) can provide sources of intellectual curios-
ity and engagement for most students (Hadzigeorgiou 1999), which is, of course, 
a prerequisite for learning any school subject. One could very well say that this 
is just wishful thinking. And it is true that the evidence from the few empirical 
studies that have been cited here are not enough to inform educational policy. 
But, at the same time, who could argue against the power of wonder to engage 










































208 if not all, students wonder and become curious and engaged in order to under-
stand how it is possible for them to relive their birthday in the same year (i.e. to 
celebrate it twice)? How can this really be possible in the first place? And who 
could argue against the fact that their initial sense of wonder does not diminish 
at all, even when they discover that they can celebrate their birthday twice by 
just crossing the International Date Line somewhere in the Pacific?
Making schools places of wonder may seem a far-fetched idea, but it is time 
we gave it some serious thought. The educational benefits of wonder, accord-
ing to what was discussed here, are many, even though wonder cannot – and 
should not – be seen as a panacea. But the role of wonder – especially if it has 
its source in the deep mysteries of life and the universe, in making us aware of 
the limits of our own understanding (Schinkel 2017) is something that needs to 
be more seriously considered in the context of contemporary education. For it 
can help cultivate a mindset of intellectual humility, which provides the basis 
for a willingness to listen to all the voices involved in a dialogue and to consider 
the possibility that one’s own beliefs (e.g. religious, moral, political) might be 
mistaken. Thus, the role of wonder in promoting the notion of ‘democratic dia-
logue’ needs to be recognised. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the role 
of wonder as a source of meaning in life (Schinkel 2019) also needs to be consid-
ered. It would be a terrible mistake on the part of educationalists to consider the 
design and the implementation of activities for engaging the students’ minds 
in the absence of meaning. What Nobel Laureate in physics Richard Feynman 
wrote in an attempt to make sense of his situation and his place as a human 
being in this universe should be a reminder of the value of wonder in education 
and in life in general (see Feynman 2015 for the whole poem):
I stand at the seashore alone and start to think.
There are rushing waves, mountains of molecules,
Each stupidly minding its own business.
Trillions apart, yet forming white surf in unison. 
Ages on ages before any eyes could see
Year after year, thunderously pounding the shore as now.
For whom for what? 
On a dead planet with no life to entertain.  
Out of the cradle onto dry land, here it is standing, 
Atoms with consciousness, matter with curiosity, 
Stands at the sea, wonders at wondering,
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9  Pathways to Wonder-Infused 
Practice: Investigating the 
Transition from Pre-Service  
to In-Service Teacher
Andrew Gilbert
It seems to me that some of us value information over wonder,  
and noise over silence. And I feel that we need a lot more wonder and  
a lot more silence in our lives. (Rogers 1994)
Introduction
F red Rogers, who spread kindness and understanding through his remarkable vision regarding the wisdom and goodness of children, reminds us that the child’s world is inundated with information 
through the stunning pace of modern life. In the years since he spoke these 
words, it seems that life is simply accelerating with little sign of slowing 
down. Schools invariably get caught in this trap of modern times with stand-
ards documents, neoliberal visions of schooling, success measured only by test 
scores, and other means of commodification of learning (Au and Ferrare 2015, 
6). The pace and demands of modern life, “[do] not allow us to fully exist and 
the power of slowing down provides opportunities for our human connection 
to the natural world and to one another” (Cant 2014, 169). The question fac-
ing educators is: how do we shelter our pedagogical practices from allowing 
these demands of the modern world to negatively impact the children in our 
classrooms?
It is important to remember that educators can find ways to practise agency 
within their classroom practices. The key is not more of the mind-numbing 
pedagogy that has dulled children’s desire to learn, but reconnecting them 
to the things that drive their learning (Gilbert and Gray 2019, 112). The goal 

















































































humans to better understand the natural and cultural world and our place 
within it. There exists a power that lies within the individual for creating their 
own meanings and connections to the world because there exists a ‘genetically 
motivated process of learning’ (Cobb 1977, 18) that impacts people in a far more 
meaningful fashion than memorising someone else’s interpretation of that 
world.
This chapter hypothesises that the utilisation of wonder and wonder-based 
pedagogical approaches is one means to connect learners to content by engag-
ing their emotions and desires to learn. The power of these connections to the 
emotive is that it links actions to an aesthetic experience where “education is 
not where everything is fully predictable or, on the other extreme, left for stu-
dents to decide and discover on their own, but where transactions progressively 
occur that bring growth to students’ efforts (…)” (Wickman 2006, 149). These 
aesthetic connections to content can trigger an intrinsic desire to engage with 
school content. This process is transactional, as it moves beyond simply trying 
to pour facts into children or conversely an approach that expects children to 
build completely on their own, but rather one where the teacher designs expe-
riences connected to beauty and emotion. Ultimately, this chapter will address 
the question raised by Di Paolantonio (2018, 1), who asked, “Can wonder – as 
that sense which throws us and spurs us towards sensing and thinking without 
closure – help us to overcome the thoughtlessness that dulls our attention to 
what we do to each other through education?” (See also Di Paolantonio 2019, 
213-214.)
This chapter explicates the journey taken by two beginning teachers from 
their graduate teacher education programme across student teaching experi-
ence and into their first year in the classroom. The goal of this instrumental 
case study is to articulate how engaging with wonder and wonder-infused 
pedagogy might impact those developing teachers’ notions of what is possible 
in their classroom practice and how those conceptions were shaped, if at all, by 
their experiences with wonder. The following chapter will lay out several key 
theoretical positionings and related research regarding wonder in school con-
texts, including value to education and classrooms, wonder across key content 
areas, and the practical and philosophical connections to teacher education. 
This is followed by a contextualisation for the study using multiple data arti-
facts from two beginning teachers that span across their graduate teacher 
preparation programme into their first year of practice. Based on this founda-
tion for wonder in classroom contexts, this study set out to better understand 
what happens as teachers make the leap from a programme steeped in wonder-
infused approaches (Gilbert and Byers 2020) into their professional practice. 
Often this boundary is under-studied in terms of what future teachers both 
214 retain and enact as they enter professional classrooms. The main research 
questions included: 1) How do these teachers describe their experiences with 
wonder, and what elements of wonder-infused pedagogy were reflected in 
their teaching? 2) What were the barriers and supports beginning teachers 
envisioned as they considered enacting these classroom approaches?
r evi ew of literatur e
The value of wonder 
… by awakening the mind’s attention from the lethargy of custom, and 
directing it to the loveliness and the wonders of the world before us; an 
inexhaustible treasure, but for which, in consequence of the film of famili-
arity and selfish solicitude we have eyes, yet see not, ears that hear not, and 
hearts that neither feel nor understand. (Coleridge 1817, 208)
Over 100 years after Coleridge wrote these words, we can still apply them 
directly to the scene in the average public-school classroom where experiences 
often fall into the ‘lethargy of custom’ and are not typically directed toward the 
‘loveliness and wonders of the world’. Egan (2014, 191) argues that educators 
should help students engage with their surroundings – even in the ordinary 
everyday phenomena that are rarely contemplated. There exists a need to 
develop frameworks that facilitate pre-service teachers to engage with their 
own wonders and consider how to develop pedagogy steeped in wonder for 
their future classrooms. Wonder is often viewed as solely the domain of the 
child, but engaging with wonders and wondrous thinking with older students 
and adults is of supreme importance (Takaya 2014, 99) because they have been 
dulled by the ‘lethargy of custom’. We must rekindle those wondrous moments 
in the adults if we ever hope for them to bring wondrous moments into class-
room contexts.
I am reminded of the words of environmentalist Rachel Carson, who 
depicted the urgency and importance of wonder in the lives of children and 
most importantly the adults’ role within helping children make sense of their 
wonderings:
If a child is to keep alive their inborn sense of wonder… he needs the com-
panionship of at least one adult who can share it, rediscovering with him 






















































215Interestingly, Carson contends that wonder and wondering are not simple 
individual or internal conditions; rather they are to be shared, a communal 
engagement. Wonder is a powerful ‘re-connecter in our lives’ (Haralambous 
and Nielsen 2014, 234), which seeks to open experiences and reflections that 
facilitate discoveries, not through some fanciful or supernatural way, but 
through a disciplined pathway of inquiry inspired by our human way of inter-
acting with the world. Munns (2007, 304) argued for the restorative power that 
wonder can bring to underserved school populations by building classroom 
communities and student engagement through the rewiring of classroom 
discursive structures. Despite these possibilities that wonder brings to educa-
tion, wonder itself is ‘virtually non-existent in curricular documents across the 
world’ (Cant 2014, 163). This brings us to how wonder might be operationalised 
in classroom contexts, and considering particular possibilities across the cur-
riculum. As such, the following sections highlight aspects of wonder related to 
science, social studies and teacher education in an effort to ground the experi-
ences and actions of the participants as they transitioned from pre-service to 
in-service teacher.
Wonder in the classroom
Science: a special connection to wonder and wondering 
Scientists, throughout time, have referred to the affective links between sci-
ence and wonder as a means of inspiration toward discovery and also directly 
linked to the process and essence of science itself. The concept of wonder and 
the unknown is an integral element of scientific thinking and being – a power-
ful driving force leading them deeper into this exploration of the unknown 
(Cox 2011, 5). Cox describes the joy involved in the learning of science where 
the mystery drives the thinking, knowing and learning as they move toward 
the unanswered and vexing questions. Often teachers (and future teachers) 
have slowly had this joy of learning and teaching eroded by mind-numbing 
numbers of standardised assessments and packaged curricula that further 
deprofessionalise their approach. These practices can also be policed in ways 
that drive teachers to fear of engaging in practices that might seem outside 
of the expected, packaged, and/or scripted curricular approaches. It should be 
noted that these types of curricular approaches and the prevalence of memo-
risation of disconnected facts tends to dominate many public-school science 
classrooms across the world. Teachers’ pedagogical work can often be impacted 
by their hopes and fears, but fear is a constant driver for teacher decision-mak-
















































































216 working to bring critical and engaging approaches into classrooms where insti-
tutions are working to exert control on teachers through neoliberal structures 
that wish to turn schools and children into commodities (Gilbert 2013, 6). This 
can have serious implications for the types of pedagogy that teachers engage 
in and consequently limit pedagogical risk-taking. This type of pedagogy 
tends to push teachers away from complex, critical-thinking, inquiry-based 
approaches, which limits opportunities for children and teachers. This ulti-
mately drives students and teachers further away from how advances are made 
in areas such as science or social studies and further away from what drives us 
as humans. 
Kerns (2015, 99) reminds us for the power of viewing our everyday exist-
ence through a lens of wonder: “As subjects of wonder, we could allow that 
there is always more to be surprised by, admire, feel, know, doubt, puzzle”. This 
research worked to engage future teachers as ‘subjects of wonder’ and to study 
if that wondrous engagement might drive them to enact processes related to 
wonder in the classroom. There have been recent improvements in building 
interest with future educators by connecting them to the affective aspects of 
learning in science. These approaches include: the role of emotion in science 
learning (Jaber and Hammer 2016, 190); wonder as a means to inspire student 
content learning and teacher self-reflection (Sezen-Barrie, Miller-Rushing 
and Hufnagel, 2019, 3); wonder as central to science pedagogy (Takaya 2014, 
100); the role of curiosity in the process of science (Lindholm 2018, 987; Luce 
and Hsi 2015, 93); wonder as a means to evoke emotive connections to content 
(Hadzigeorgiou 2016, 132) and aesthetic experiences as a driver for learning 
(Milne 2018, 49). It is important to clarify here that wonder is not confined 
solely to science contexts as it also provides some promising possibilities in 
other areas of the curriculum.
Pedagogical possibilities for social studies
One of the areas where wonder and emotional engagement with content is 
beginning to make impacts is associated with social studies education. These 
emotive connections include a range of approaches including notions of play, 
empathy, perspective taking and wondering itself. It is important to note that 
social studies in elementary contexts is facing similar challenges that are also 
faced in the sciences. Most notably, social studies often lose out on instructional 
time as compared to literacy and math instruction.
As time and space for social studies content in elementary classrooms 
continues to be pushed to the side and reduced to arbitrary tidbits of infor-






















































217sharing strategies with preservice teachers that will strengthen social stud-
ies content knowledge, so they may gain the confidence needed to integrate 
social studies in meaningful ways each day in their classrooms. (Alarcon, 
Holmes, and Bybee 2015, 186)
The authors further argued that the role of social studies in the elementary 
grades should be designed to get children thinking like historians where chil-
dren work to build and share narratives as a means to challenge myths and 
investigate historical topics (ibid., 186). Others have suggested that we can 
bring life into the social studies curriculum through play that allows children 
to connect with and take on new identities (Chappell 2010, 1), which can facili-
tate students seeing the complexity of the world and the people acting in it. 
This has direct parallels with the goals for science to get children to engage 
in the processes of science itself. Similar to elementary science, social studies 
contexts also suffer from pedagogical approaches that work to have children 
memorise disconnected facts. This works to take the life out of history and 
politics that could be full of connections to emotion, including joy and sorrow. 
Helmsing contemplated the possibilities regarding a ‘reanimated social stud-
ies’ that creates “curricular engagement with perceiving the world rather than 
merely viewing it, memorizing it, in a passive state of spectatorship” (2016, 137). 
Helmsing continues: “Social studies education, and much of what takes place 
in the name of schooling and formal education, diminishes the purchase of 
wonder through modes of disenchantment, ignoring and discouraging” direct 
connections to the world around us (2016, 142). He consequently advocated for 
educators to endeavour to “rediscover a sense of wonder in everyday life” (ibid., 
142) as a means to rewire how children and teachers are able to make sense of 
history, politics and the social studies that are embodied in the present day.
Wonder in teacher education: Potential and possibilities
There has been a growing awareness and effort to understand how engagement 
with wonder can impact burgeoning teacher practices. In one of the few stud-
ies directed at pre-service teachers and wonder, Gilbert and Byers (2017, 911) 
argued that wonder-infused pedagogy impacted future elementary teachers’ vision 
of both science content and science teaching by directly connecting science 
content to aesthetics and emotion. They argued that ultimately engagement 
with wonder positively altered future teachers’ conceptions of science, which 
created more openness to science content and desire to teach it in their future 
practice (ibid., 924). This is a direct impetus for this current project, namely 
to look closely at how beginning teachers develop interest in wonder-infused 
















































































218 wonder-related inquiry? And lastly, do those approaches translate into class-
room teaching practice when they enter the professional classroom setting?
The framing of wonder-infused pedagogy was heavily influenced by philos-
ophers wrestling with conceptions of wonder. Wonder is not simply confined 
to a single well-defined entity, but rather should be considered as a ‘family of 
experiences’ (Schinkel 2017, 541). Schinkel also argued for two types of wonder 
that are important in educational contexts: active and deep wonder. Active won-
der involves a “drive to explore and a desire to know (…) something that causes 
amazement or puzzlement” (Schinkel 2017, 543). Deep wonder, in contrast, is 
a contemplative act where, “we sense the utter mysteriousness of whatever we 
are contemplating; it is an experience that leaves us lost for words (…) open-
ing up to the mystery one senses” (ibid., 544). Schinkel’s distinction provides 
a vision for how I approached the utilisation of wonder in this work. Active 
wonder was an entry point for inquiry with pre-service teachers and offered a 
means of entry into science content thinking. Deep wonder, however, was more 
closely aligned with the descriptions of inspiration and connection to the natu-
ral world espoused by many successful scientists. However, deep wonder has 
not been considered particularly important in most school contexts because 
of the difficulty to quantify wondrous notions that are involved in moments 
of appreciation or feelings of inspiration, beauty or awe (Schinkel 2017, 540).
This is similar to Vasalou’s contention that wonder was “valuable as its 
capacity to stimulate inquiry and lead us to an understanding of things we 
had previously not held in our grasp” (2015, 6), while simultaneously warning 
against framing wonder solely in its value toward devising explanations for 
phenomena. In the case of this research project, one of the goals was merely 
to get participants to engage with their thoughts as a means to bring their 
wonders out in the open regardless of whether those wonders led directly to 
answers. For instance, scientists remain interested in the questions they cannot 
answer, not solely in the questions they have solved. It is this spirit that I have 
tried to incorporate in my practice and instil in my future teachers, wonder is 
not about finding answers or truth, but rather comes from the realisation of 
not knowing. “It is frequently forgotten that wonder arises not from ignorance 
but from consciousness of ignorance” (Quinn 2002, 19). Wonder in this study 
worked to help future teachers see not only what they did not understand, but 
to facilitate them in finding interest to think about those vexations. The goal 
was to “elevate the position of wonder, of the imagination, not as an experi-
ence, sentiment, or feeling that needs to cease or be replaced with knowledge, 























































Enacting an instrumental case study 
T his study closely followed two pre-service teachers from their course-work, internships in schools, student teaching and into their first year in the public-school primary classroom. This longitudinal qualitative 
study is best described as an instrumental case study (Stake 2000, 5). Instrumen-
tal case study differs from the traditional notion of case study research because 
the questions of the researcher are paramount as opposed to the case itself. Con-
sequently, this research method was chosen because of the condition where, 
“we have a research question, a puzzlement, a need for general understand-
ing, and feel that we may get insight into the question by studying a particular 
case” (Stake 1995, 3). The project was designed to best understand how wonder 
pedagogy is developed and enacted by new teachers, and necessitated framing 
the questions and approach up front as opposed to seeing what would emerge 
from random cases where the design was, “defined by an analytic focus on an 
individual event, activity, episode, or other specific phenomena, not necessarily 
by the methods used for investigation” (Schram 2006, 106). The main value of 
utilising this approach was to study the complex situations that impacted the 
participants’ thinking toward engagement with wonder and illuminate what 
could be learned from these two individual cases (Flyvbjerg 2006, 221). Case 
study research allows for the methodological freedom (Stake 1995, 445) to uti-
lise ethnographic data collection and analysis that were most appropriate for 
the questions that were investigated within this project.
Context and participants
These case studies took place across eighteen months, which included the 
students’ final year in the programme and six months after graduation. The 
programme itself is a post-graduate masters’ programme housed in a large 
mid-Atlantic university in the United States. The programme also boasts 
a strong school university partnership structure that affords future teach-
ers with multiple opportunities to teach in public schools during their time 
in the programme. This includes coursework embedded in schools from the 
first semester onwards, teaching practicum placements and a student teach-
ing internship experience (that ranges from one semester to a year depending 
on programme cohort). This provides all pre-service teachers with multiple 

















































































220 The two pre-service teachers were purposefully chosen because they had dem-
onstrated an interest in wonder frameworks during their graduate programme 
and more specifically designed capstone action research projects that endeav-
oured to bring wonder into their student teaching experience. In addition, 
they were familiar with research into wonder frameworks as part of building 
the conceptual frameworks for their action research approach. The researcher 
assumption here was that if any future teachers were going to attempt bringing 
wonder into their future professional classrooms, it would be ones that were 
compelled enough to utilise it in their coursework and study it during student 
teaching. This would provide an excellent lens to view potential issues and/or 
successes concerning future teachers’ designed approaches steeped in wonder.
This study investigated the two cases of Otis and Anne (pseudonyms) and 
documents their journeys as they take the leap from programme to practice 
in terms of developing wonder approaches. Otis is a white, male student in his 
early twenties that has an infectious energy and is well-liked across the pro-
gramme for his open and kind demeanour. Children in classrooms also react 
well to even tempered kindness. Anne is a white female student also in her early 
twenties. She carries a similar energy of enthusiasm and positivity that endear 
her to students in her class and her colleagues in the programme. They com-
pleted the programme, received their initial licensure for primary classrooms 
and are now employed in a local school district.
Data gathering
In order to best understand Anne and Otis’ teacher experiences, key data artifacts 
were collected that gave insights into their thinking and actions surrounding 
wonder and wonder-infused pedagogical approaches. The programme struc-
ture itself allowed for developing insight into pre-service teachers’ work in 
the classroom over the course of the programme before they moved to student 
teaching and graduation. These included reflecting on video analysis of their 
classroom teaching, individual interviews (during student teaching and first 
year in the classroom), wonder journals, action-research wonder projects and 
email communications. The reasoning for focusing on these particular tasks 
was because they were best suited to demonstrate insights directly into how 
these teachers were conceptualising inquiry-based approaches and how those 
were influenced or hindered through the use of wonder.
Data analysis
Once the interviews were completed, they were listened to in totality before 
being transcribed by the researcher. This was an effort for the investigator to 






















































221qualitative analysis tool Dedoose© to organise and analyse all aspects of the 
data set. In an effort to build credibility, data sets were subjected to a thor-
ough coding process where preliminary emergent themes were identified and, 
using iterative complete readings of data, were combined to build more robust 
themes (Miles and Huberman 1994) and those were member checked with 
participants to add credibility (Merriam and Tisdell 2016, 240). This process 
continued as the researcher worked through a constant comparative approach 
where, “as an incident is noted, it should be compared against other incidents 
for similarities and differences” (Corbin and Strauss 1998, 9). These efforts were 
predicated on Holliday’s ‘principle of emergence’ (2007, 93), where the entire 
data set is viewed thematically and changed and evolved as part of the emer-
gent process. As an example for this process, consider the following example 
from the data analysis process from Otis describing his current social studies 
practice.
It’s made a difference so far in their interest of things. Like this ancient 
Egypt unit took place right after ancient China. They seemed to care about 
this a lot more than they did about China. I had either two or three kids 
check out books about ancient Egypt from the library when we went last 
week, which I didn’t see them do for China. They were just interested in 
finding out more.
This excerpt was originally placed in a global category titled ‘Wonder in prac-
tice’; however, this category remained too broad and needed greater specificity 
and was therefore broken into three separate themes that better matched the 
elements arising from the analysis. These new areas were titled: 1) Reasons for 
incorporating wonder; 2) Implementation and reflection on practice; and 3) 
Reflection on student impacts. These new categories were member checked 
with participants either in person or through email communication through-
out the project analysis. This particular excerpt was ultimately placed within 
the last category of ‘Reflection on student impacts’. Consequently, the original 
theme of ‘Wonder in practice’ was subsumed into these more refined catego-
ries. All themes were open for interpretation and each represented a consensus 
of opinion, between the participants and myself, which was based upon evi-
















































































222 fi ndi ngs and discussion
T hese findings represent how two beginning teachers navigated the ter-rain of engaging with their wonder experiences during their teacher preparation programme and how those experiences impacted the 
nature of their developing classroom practices, particularly to better under-
stand the successes and challenges of enacting wonder in their teaching. 
The findings are organised around the main research questions: 1) How do 
these teachers describe their experiences with wonder, and what elements of 
wonder-infused pedagogy were reflected in their teaching? 2) What were the 
barriers and supports beginning teachers envisioned as they considered enact-
ing these classroom approaches?
RQ 1: How do these teachers describe their experiences with 
wonder, and what elements of wonder-infused pedagogy 
were reflected in their teaching?
Experiences with wonder 
The pre-service teachers enrolled in the programme had many opportuni-
ties to engage with wonder and wonder-infused pedagogy throughout their 
time in the programme. This is mainly from their work in science methods 
that is steeped in these approaches (see Gilbert and Byers 2020 for a detailed 
description of programme pedagogy). In the following excerpt from an initial 
interview with Anne, she describes how the process and engagement with won-
dering did not come easily but resonated quickly with her.
I think I was confused at first about how I was supposed to do this and 
implement it with science. Then as you shared more examples and stuff 
about it, I was like, oh, this is actually really cool. Getting away from using 
our phones and technology constantly, and just being outdoors and sitting 
there, and just hearing what you hear, seeing what you see, smelling what 
you smell. All of that, and just using your senses, I thought would be just 
very calming.
She describes the slowing down in order to understand the world around her 
and how that ultimately was calming during what can be an extremely chal-
lenging graduate programme. In a follow-up interview during her first-year 
teaching Anne articulates that these ideas and wonder experiences are still part 






















































223I do wonder a lot of things. Sometimes I feel stupid for thinking some of 
the stuff that I think, but then it’s really not. It’s not stupid to think those 
things, so why is the sky really blue? Things that as kids we were told, 
“That’s a stupid question. Why would you ask that? It just is.” It’s, no, 
what’s the actual science behind why the sky’s blue?
What is essential here is that she articulates that her thoughts do have value. 
Far too often children’s ideas are not taken seriously. And in the case of adults, 
particularly primary teachers, they can devalue their own thoughts in areas 
that they do not feel confident (Gilbert 2013, 18). This valuing of thoughts and 
wonder experiences is an essential notion if we wish for teachers to make emo-
tional connections to content.
Otis’ experience with science echoes the typical approach that has worked 
to sap students’ interest and curiosities regarding science content as students 
endure behaviourist approaches that are focused on memorisation. This is 
described in his initial interview during his student teaching semester.
I remembered science being taught to me in elementary school as very by 
the book. Every once in a while you get some hands-on experiment and 
whatever, but it wasn’t really anything that caused me to think too critically 
or deeply… So, over the summer when I kind of got to thinking that I love 
doing my wonder journals, I would think about whatever questions I had, 
and I had a lot of fun just making them kind of creative and colourful, and 
really just thinking about all these questions that I have and I just realised 
they didn’t have answers to, and kind of practising those inquiry skills.
Otis described that he ‘loved doing wonder journals’ during his summer sci-
ence methods course and this emotive connection to content paved the way 
for considering the pedagogical possibilities he envisioned in his practice. The 
positive emotions and connections to their engagement allowed for both Anne 
and Otis to venture into scientific thinking in a low-stakes environment and 
remind them they had interests related to science content. This helped them 
begin conceptualising how they might implement wonder-infused approaches 
in their teaching contexts.
Reasons for incorporating wonder 
The experiences with wonder and conceptualising wonder in practice were not 
solely the exclusive terrain of the science methods course; rather there existed 
multiple opportunities for future teachers to think about wonder in the class-
















































































224 teachers read and enact ideas from the text titled: A place for wonder: Reading and 
writing nonfiction in the primary grades (Heard and McDonough 2008). This text 
highlights multiple approaches that wonder can be utilised within the teach-
ing of non-fiction. Anne highlights the impact of the text on her thinking for 
incorporating wonder in her student teaching placement.
I read about the wonder wall in Dr. Ripley’s class. It was really cool how this 
teacher was explaining how she implemented wonder into the class. She 
did various things, but one of the things was a wonder wall. I was like, that 
is really cool.
She was impacted by this approach enough to try it in her capstone Action 
Research (AR) course. In the written report of her project she stated her rea-
soning for tackling wonder: “I became really motivated to try to implement 
this in my own classroom, but rather than waiting for my future classroom, 
I found that now was the perfect time to test this concept out in a classroom 
setting.” So rather than wait until she exited the programme, Anne set out to 
work toward bringing wonder into her practicum placement and her student 
teaching assignment.
Otis also carried out a wonder-related project in his AR course and he 
describes how this drove his desire to incorporate wonder into his classroom 
practice during an interview in his first year as a professional teacher.
I knew that from my action research project I wanted to help them get more 
interested in science and social studies. Social studies especially, because I 
noticed that they just didn’t really seem to care. I did an interest survey with 
them about how they felt about those subjects, and it was like rate it on a 
scale of one to five, and the vast majority of the responses for social studies 
were three or below, meaning they were either meh or just not interested 
at all.
The interesting aspect here is that his own joyful experiences with wonder 
served as the catalyst for him to envision wonder-infused approaches as a viable 
means to build interest in content for the children in his classroom. This hark-
ens back to how many professional scientists (Cox, Carson, etc.) articulated the 
joy of wondering about the issues that vex us.
Implementation and reflection on practice
When pre-service teachers are placed in schools for practicum experiences and/






















































225not making waves or following the lead of the classroom teacher as opposed 
to taking pedagogical risks. Interestingly, though, Otis began incorporating 
wonder soon after it was introduced to him during his practicum placement in 
a fourth-grade classroom. Both he and Anne incorporated wonder approaches 
during their student teaching as part of their capstone research experience. 
Anne constructed her approach mainly as a means to engage her children in 
research projects to find definitive answers. She described using a ‘wonder wall’ 
and ‘wonder of the week’ to stimulate question gathering from her students. 
She provided some detail for her approach during a follow up interview.
They could get a sticky note and put it on the wonder wall. There was some 
really cool stuff that they came up with and questions. Some of them were 
silly, or some of them were unanswerable… The first week, me and my men-
tor teacher went through them and we picked out five or six wonders for 
the groups to choose from… I already had assigned groups so that way there 
was a balance of students in those groups.
The goal for her through this wonder project was to engage students in lit-
eracy standards related to carrying out research including library and Internet 
searches. She does this by tightly bounding the possibilities for students to 
limit the complexity that students might face with many of the wonders posted 
by their classmates. After she and her mentor teacher chose the questions, the 
groups then decided what question they wished to pursue for researching and 
presentation of findings. Interestingly, Anne makes mention of some of the 
student disenchantment when it came to giving the formal presentation in her 
written action research report: “I was surprised with how much they enjoyed 
the wonder wall project. While doing it, some of them did not seem to enjoy 
making the presentations.” This reaction is not surprising given that it is often 
the feral nature of thought that wonder engenders that students enjoy (Gilbert 
and Gray 2019, 110) and once the structure of schooling and the notion that 
value is only attributed to finding the answer are associated with curricular 
standards then student interest can wane (Milne 2018, 49). This might provide 
some insight for Anne’s subdued description for the student reactions regard-
ing the presentations.
Otis also utilised wonder approaches for his AR course project. Prior to that, 
he also developed and taught an inquiry unit, steeped in wonder, as part of 
his integrated mathematics and science methods course that was embedded 
in a local primary school. He, along with his teaching partner, devised a three-
















































































226 wonders in terms of static electricity with grade four students. In his opening 
lesson, Otis described the initial activities:
The students got to see and wonder about how a piece of wool made Rice 
Krispies cereal jump around in the air. They got to try to make a can of soda 
move by only using a balloon and a piece of wool, without touching the can. 
Then, they were tasked with making an invention that uses static electricity 
properties. What ensued was three days of learning, observing, wondering 
and sparking curiosity.
In the images below you can see that the engagement level is high as children 
observe the phenomena of static electricity and make observations for the pro-
portion of Rice Krispies that were picked up by the charged balloon.
Fig. 9.1 Otis working to evoke wonder in children through engagement with 
static electricity
This approach works to evoke wonder using a surprising event that is also 
directly connected to the content of both science and mathematics (Hadzigeor-
giou 2012, 987). 
After the conclusion of the initial testing the students’ observations were 
compiled using a See, Think, Wonder chart that provided the teachers with 
some real-time formative assessment of student thinking. These insights 
helped to frame how the teachers proceeded to the next portion of the lesson. 
Otis and his teaching partner were most interested in getting their children to 























































As part of a written reflection, crafted from video analysis of this unit, Otis 
remarked:
The more students thought outside of the box, the more encouraged we 
became: They were thinking. This was all a part of our process. Students get-
ting to jump to different conclusions and then explain their reasoning 
allowed us to redirect their energy towards our objective…
The enthusiasm is clear in his remarks, as he observes the excitement during 
the video. The wondering becomes the currency to help him scaffold student 
understanding toward static electricity. Wonder is not a silver bullet, but Otis 
saw it as a motivator for children and a pedagogical device to continually redi-
rect children’s thinking toward the curricular goals. This practicum experience 
was the platform for which Otis set out to construct wonder as a tool in his 
student teaching placement.
Reflections on student impacts
The data included in this section comes from action research projects during the 
participants’ student teaching experience. Anne’s project focused on research 
using a wonder wall, where children placed their written wonder/questions 
on a classroom wall that ultimately became the basis for class research topics. 
Otis’ project tackled the utilisation of wonder journaling strategies where chil-
dren did free writing in their journals regarding their wonderings on ancient 
Fig. 9.2 Student responses on See, Think, Wonder chart  
















































































228 Egypt based on photo prompts provided to children. Anne’s project was based 
in literacy standards regarding research and Otis’ project was focused directly 
on social studies.
Anne described the impact of her approach and despite her efforts to keep 
children focused on answerable questions they persisted to push boundaries 
and consider questions and wonders without clear-cut answers.
I think it is coming from different things that they did wonder about and 
didn’t get answered. A lot of them did come up with though during history 
when we were doing the Revolutionary War, I think is what we were talking 
about, some of the questions they came up with on the wonder wall were 
what if our country didn’t have this? What if we were still under British 
rule? Stuff like that.
This harkens back to Vasalou’s (2015, 6) question that asks: is wonder solely 
a means to explain or is it something for us to enjoy? It seems that children 
were less concerned with finding the answers to their wonders, rather it was 
the wondering itself that was the joy for them. This also provides support for 
Schinkel’s (2017) claim that the notion of ‘deep wonder’ has profound possi-
bilities for educational contexts. Another interesting aspect of this approach is 
how seamlessly the students in her class saw opportunities to wonder regard-
ing social studies content. Otis also articulated how children naturally seemed 
to be impacted by actively pursuing wonders in relation to content regarding 
history and geography.
It’s made a difference so far in their interest of things. Like this ancient 
Egypt unit took place right after ancient China. They seemed to care about 
this a lot more than they did about China. I had either two or three kids 
check out books about ancient Egypt from the library when we went last 
week, which I didn’t see them do for China. They were just interested in 
finding out more.
Otis articulated at the outset his goal for this project was to increase student 
interest in social studies, since his initial class survey found students demon-
strated the lowest level of interest in studying social studies content. Once he 
introduced the wonder journals to the unit regarding ancient Egypt, he felt 
a qualitative difference; they seemed to build their interest toward learning 
more. In addition, the affinity that children displayed toward wondering 
within the social studies content provides support for Helmsing’s contention 






















































229cation “through endeavoring to rediscover a sense of wonder in everyday life” 
(2016, 142).
RQ 2: What were some of the barriers and supports 
beginning teachers envisioned as they enacted these 
classroom approaches?
Struggles
The introduction of wonder-infused pedagogy into public school contexts cer-
tainly comes with challenges, particularly for beginning teachers. Typically, 
those struggles were related to assessment as both Otis and Anne negotiated 
how to ‘count’ the work that the children undertook when engaged with their 
wonders. Otis described this difficulty in an interview during his first year of 
professional teaching, “Yeah, it just really got them thinking. Like some of 
the journal entries I would make (...) I still need to kind of design like a point 
system on how I’m going to assess these.” What is interesting is that he incor-
porated wonder journaling in his first-year teaching without a clear assessment 
plan for how he would count the work carried out in the journals. What is more 
important though is how he described engaging with student wonders and 
knowing ‘when to push their thinking’ and ask ‘clarifying questions’. So rather 
than attaching a score to the journals he used it as an opportunity to create a 
written and running dialogue with students. This may ultimately prove to be 
a more effective tool than simply placing a letter grade on the journal entries. 
Otis also depicted that as a first-year teacher there is a continual worry about 
bringing too much attention to your classroom practices.
I’m just doing the dance that the teacher here is supposed to do, but I want 
to add a little bit my own thing to it, but especially as a first-year teacher I’ll 
try to comply with whatever it is I’m told to do.
This is not uncommon as many beginning teachers feel a strong pressure to 
meet an unspoken rule that your practice should fall in line with the teachers 
around you and most certainly should always follow any directives from school 
administration.
These pressures to fit in are a constant worry for beginning teachers and 
often work to erode their joy and most certainly curtail most willingness to 
take pedagogical risks or design approaches that fall outside of typical expec-
tations, i.e. utilising wonder. In addition, there are so many responsibilities 
















































































230 a classroom approach that works for their vision of the classroom. This became 
apparent during an interview in Anne’s first semester as a professional teacher, 
when I asked “how are things going?” Anne replied:
It’s going. I am just taking it day by day. I love my class… It’s just very over-
whelming. I think it also takes you back from the stress of we have to meet 
this, this, this standard. Let’s meet all them right now. We need to go quickly 
through all of this… I am not what I expected myself to be…I have had to 
give so much structure. At least starting out, I think freedom will come once 
we start knowing the routines.
Anne’s sentiment is common as teachers navigate the pressures of standards-
based education and the relentless workload as first-year teachers work to 
develop their classroom approaches for lots of areas outside of academics. 
These pressures work to keep teachers from slowing down and engaging chil-
dren in meaningful content in order to just keep pace with the expectations 
laid up on them in the classroom (Cant 2014, 169). It is important to consider, 
however, that Anne also addresses a hopeful message that in time the freedom 
will come, as she continues to navigate the terrain of teaching.
Courage
Despite the pressures that Anne continues to experience in her classroom, 
Anne articulated still wanting to bring less stressful approaches into her class, 
which requires finding the courage to take the leap. During her final interview, 
she described her most recent attempts to bring wonder across her curriculum 
through having children compiling wonder lists.
I didn’t limit what I wanted them to wonder about. I liked that they were 
able to wonder about science as well as social studies, and wonder about 
math, and wonder about literacy, and the books that they’re reading in 
class. I really like how open ended I kept it.
Despite the pressures she articulated, Anne is still finding ways to engage chil-
dren across the curriculum, which ultimately is an act of courage for a first-year 
teacher. This could be due to the continual presence of university support even 
during her first year as well as several graduates from our programme also 
working in her school context, which provides some level of support by col-























































231In the case of Otis, he was also supported by his social studies faculty member 
Dr. Holdo, who was supportive of his approach for incorporating wonder jour-
nals into his practice despite the dearth of research supporting this approach 
in that content area.
 
But then I started thinking: how could I increase their interest in social 
studies, and Dr. Holdo actually gave me the idea to do a Wonder Journal 
for social studies. She was like, “Maybe it hasn’t been done, but you could 
still try it.” So then I started thinking about all the different things that 
they could ask questions about, and that led me to like, we were doing our 
ancient Egypt unit at the time that I took over for independent teaching… 
So as our morning work, what we started doing was they would come in, 
there’s a picture on the board, they wonder about it. They ask different 
questions, and we did kind of a model of that one day, and then we did that 
for two weeks.
Dr. Holdo (social studies educator) both demonstrated and supported a coura-
geous approach when Otis recounted her words of encouragement: “Maybe it 
hasn’t been done, but you could still try it.” It is exactly these types of interac-
tions that facilitate future teachers to take on acts of pedagogical courage. We 
cannot expect beginning teachers to take risks without first scaffolding them 
for those challenges, such as, in this case, to take on pedagogical innovation in 
their own practice. The support of this social studies educator provided Otis 
the courage to take on this approach and led directly into ‘creative explora-
tion’ of his classroom approach (Milne and Cremins 2016, 87). Otis continued 
to describe the community from which he draws this courage from:
The people I work with, my different people in my cohort, people I’ve had 
classes with, my professors, are all pretty ambitious in terms of things that 
they try, and I think I’ve kind of adopted that sort of ... What’s the word for 
that? I don’t know. There’s just a certain attitude where trying new things 
is okay, and there’s like openness to new things, and to just try it out and see 
if it works. And if it doesn’t, how can you change it?
The importance of this support cannot be understated, as he has developed 
his pedagogical willingness to take risks as part of a community as opposed 
to a lone beginning teacher on his own in the classroom. Research has shown 
that wonder-infused approaches can positively impact classroom community 
















































































232 mechanism for building communities of teachers as it creates ‘an openness to 
try new things’.
Conclusion
T he key to working with wonder in the classroom is that it is an invi-tation. An invitation to remind children and their teachers that there is so much to enjoy in the pursuit of learning. Learning itself is not a 
pursuit of pre-ordained standards that were decided by a committee of experts, 
but rather starts from thinking about the questions that drive us. This is the 
essence of what it means to learn. Can we reconsider the usual process that 
teachers enact where they begin with standards and try to find some spaces that 
may resonate with students? Imagine instead that we begin with wonder and 
as teachers we try and facilitate how those wonders might link with important 
content areas within the curriculum? If we evoke emotion, we may find that it 
triggers students’ desire to know.
Di Paolantonio (2018, 1) asks the provocative question “Can wonder – as 
that sense which throws us and spurs us towards sensing and thinking with-
out closure – help us to overcome the thoughtlessness that dulls our attention 
to what we do to each other through education?” My sense is yes, that it does 
move us beyond the simplistic notion that thinking exists merely to finish a 
bounded task, a discrete package of knowledge and then move onto the next 
task to memorise. Wonder lends itself directly to creative exploration, one not 
bounded by the structure of schooling. Anne and Otis remind us of the pow-
erful homogenising structures that are at play for new teachers and if we are 
serious about bringing wonder into the public-school context there are par-
ticular considerations that must be addressed. In many ways, education has 
become about routines and structures and less about critical thinking and the 
messiness of learning. This seems to stem from fear on many fronts including 
following the expectations of colleagues and administration, managing heavy 
workloads, worries about content deficiencies, pressures of standards-based 
expectations and testing, and time.
We see in both cases of Anne and Otis that the education communities they 
are surrounded by offer important avenues of support. In many ways, wonder 
itself can offer respite from feelings of isolation and pressures of time as won-
der drives community building and provides an opportunity for slowing down 
and thinking about the issues that vex us. Wonder in this sense helps teachers 
“build a sense of community (social capital) in a world where many people feel 






















































233wonder in teacher education, one that builds community and lessens fear. “Dis-
tinct from wonder is fear; when the imagination is overcome by fear/ terror, 
wonder disappears.” (Kearns 2015, 100). Reducing fear must be a top priority 
for those wishing to engage both in-service and pre-service teachers in the use 
of wonder-infused pedagogy. In this sense, we can offer exemplars for future 
teachers to engage with wonder, since those prior experiences with wondering 
have proven to be a catalyst for beginning teachers to take on these wondrous 
approaches in their classrooms. 
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10  Using Oral Traditions in 
Provoking Pupils to Wonder  
and Grow in Moral and 
Intellectual Values
Valentine Banfegha Ngalim and Fomutar Stanislaus
Introduction
T he debates about the status of African philosophy have become redun-dant. Today, popular discussions on African philosophy concentrate on colonial deconstruction, problem-solving and the need to affirm 
the African identity and personality in the world. Julius Nyerere’s concept of 
Ujamaa emphasised the need to develop educational values in Africa on the 
basis of people’s needs and experiences (Nyerere 1973; Ngalim 2018b; Ngalim 
2018c). Kwame Nkrumah’s Consciencism (1970) promoted problem-solving phi-
losophy within the African context. For him, the practice of philosophy in 
Africa only has meaning when it leads to resolving the daily practical problems 
of the people in the continent.
The thoughts of both thinkers above advocate a post-independent phi-
losophy of education founded on the wisdom, teachings and traditions of the 
continent’s experiences. This approach set out to portray the limitation of 
building today’s African educational values only on colonial heritage (Nyerere 
1973; Ngalim 2018b Ngalim 2018c). In an attempt to place the child at the centre 
of African traditional pedagogy, Nyerere argues that the organisation of the 
school curricula in Africa has to take into consideration the mother tongue, 
the needs, interests and experiences of the Africans (Nyerere 1973). It is within 
this framework of thought that this paper sets out to situate African traditional 
pedagogy capable of enhancing wonder and curiosity in children within the 
African milieu, precisely in Cameroon.
Owing to the foregoing perspectives, this paper will investigate how African 
traditional forms of philosophising can be reappropriated to enhance creative 
and critical thinking skills of pupils (Morrison 2008). In other words, can prov-
erbs, riddles, traditional narratives like myths, folktales and folklores enhance 
238 moral, social and cognitive skills in pupils? The main thrust of the paper is the 
claim that if we want to produce a society of creative and critical adults to solve 
daily problems, then we have to render children reflective individuals. Con-
sidering the fact that the objective of education is to teach young children to 
think by provoking their sense of wonder, one wonders why one has to promote 
educational values and systems producing so many unthinking individuals. 
Wonder is the starting point of philosophy. Children have great dispositions to 
wonder, but unfortunately some present systems de-wonder them thus destroy-
ing their creative and critical thinking skills. To propose African traditional 
forms of philosophising sets the pace for a crusade of reinstituting wonder, 
curiosity and critical thinking skills in schools through oral traditional tech-
niques (Fisher 1998).
With the advancement of technological and sophisticated means of com-
munication and media, the demand for critical thinking skills in school is 
becoming more prominent. Unfortunately, this demand has been largely 
ignored. Said differently, most school values are insensitive to the moral and 
intellectual demands of the changing world. It is therefore imperative for Afri-
can philosophers of education to diagnose and prescribe appropriate means 
through which schools in Africa could be linked to their cultures (Grant and 
Asimeng- Boahene 2006; Tyron and Terry 2011). This fact has been attested 
by research in the context of Indian culture and education. The separation of 
school experiences from home experiences in pedagogic content and method 
constitutes one of the difficulties Indian students encounter in schools. Most 
“educators have traditionally attempted to insert culture into education 
instead of inserting education into culture” (Ladson-Billings 1995, 323-329). 
This has prompted the problem of discontinuity between what students expe-
rience at home and what they experience in school. These differences could be 
discerned between teachers and pupils in the speech, language of interactions, 
methods of teaching and the contents taught. Most studies in this domain have 
retained the hypothesis that if the home experiences of pupils are incorporated 
into their classroom experiences, pupils are more likely to experience academic 
success (Dewey [1916] 1966; Ladson-Billings 1995).
Definition of key concepts
T he principal ideas in this paper include using oral traditions to provoke pupils’ wonder, and to promote moral and intellectual values. Oral traditions in African pedagogy include the use of proverbs, riddles, 






























































































































transmitted from one generation to the next by way of mouth. They constitute 
informal pedagogic techniques employed to promote moral and intellectual 
values in the different communities (Takov 2016; Ngalim 2016a; Ngalim 2019). 
Wonder has been indicated as a primary disposition of a child (Stephens 2007). 
It has to be provoked in order to enhance the growth of creative and critical 
thinking skills in children. What are the various techniques by which oral tra-
ditions may be used to provoke wonder and critical thinking in pupils? With 
this traditional pedagogy, pupils experience four main approaches, namely 
‘hooks’, ‘bias towards action’, ‘start small’ and ‘failing forward’ (Maxwell 2007, 
in Karin et al. 2017). These teaching techniques are explained in the subsequent 
paragraphs.
Hooking lessons with anecdotes, proverbs, riddles and narratives like 
folklores, myths, folktales and music, especially at the initial stage, captures 
the interests of pupils to follow and participate in learning. What are hooks 
in a lesson? What are the strategies of hooking pupils’ attention or curiosity 
in a lesson? The use of proverbs, riddles and narratives like myths, folklores 
and folktales which could either be sung or danced serve as hooks to lessons. 
Essential questions are said to be stimulating and thought provoking, and to 
spark more questions. They are questions that give opportunities to explore 
and deepen understanding. These are possible questions that the teacher leads 
pupils to ask in the dialectic and interaction with proverbs, riddles and narra-
tives (Maxwell 2007, in Karin et al. 2017).
Bias towards action refers to the pedagogic approach of letting pupils think 
independently and letting them provide answers to puzzles even if they make 
mistakes. Failing forward requires that pupils should take the risk to answer 
questions in the classroom dialectic process. Failures should not be seen as 
disappointments but as opportunities for pupils to learn more intelligently. 
Challenge yourself on selected proverbs, riddles or narratives and get started 
without having all the questions answered. Empower the pupils to plan, and 
with wonder and curiosity unconstrained by adults’ problems they will think 
and develop more critical and creative skills.
To start small, when we are committed to take a minor chance, we are less 
afraid of failure. This strategy advises us to use ‘Quick win’ cards (each hav-
ing one small strategy related to deeper learning principles that could easily 
be implemented). With these cards we are expected to ask more questions to 
pupils in class than lecture, and ask pupils to formulate their own questions 
about the proverbs, riddles and narratives provided. It is also interesting to 
conduct a live poll in which you ask pupils for feedback on narratives treated. 
Starting small supports bias to action because once the first step is incremental, 
240 we are motivated to go forward until we realise our aspirations (Maxwell 2007 
in Karin et al. 2017).
Moral and intellectual virtues refer to commendable values which reflect 
the rightness of choices and actions and those that enhance our growth in 
knowledge and science. The baggage of moral lessons obtained from proverbs, 
riddles, folklores, folktales and myths could be traced in the goodness they pro-
mote and the evil they condemn. These traditional pedagogies are not limited 
to the teaching of morality, but they also provide a great deal of knowledge 
relevant to the practice of arts, science and technology.
African traditional forms of critical pedagogy
T his paper discusses pedagogical techniques that provoke critical thinking skills in pupils’ processes and procedures of learning in Afri-can traditional pedagogy. To attain this objective, we have referred 
to the place of philosophical sagacity in enhancing the imaginative powers 
of pupils to think and flourish in educational values. This approach intends 
to use proverbs, riddles, and narratives like myths, folklores and folktales to 
provoke critical and creative thinking skills in early childhood education. The 
use of proverbs, riddles and tales enhances provocative, persuasive, rhetorical 
and intriguing learning experiences through expressions and statements that 
lead the listener from a natural experience (i.e. an experience with the natu-
ral world) to a human one (i.e. an experience with the human world) (Takov 
2016, 152). These observations about life employ the suspension of judg-
ment involved in ceremonial utterances (Takov 2016, 152) and “they serve as 
important pedagogic devices because they provide experiential case material 
on which pedagogic reflection is possible” (Takov 2016, 154; cf. Boateng 1983; 
Asante 1991). As learners break into the proverbs, riddles and stories they are 
able to reflect on the meanings and implications embedded in the experiences. 
These teaching devices are colourful and full of imagery thus enabling listen-
ers to visualise their messages and create a life-lasting impact on their minds 
(Adeyemi and Salawudeen 2014). For instance, proverbs are very short but 
enhance quick applications to situations or contexts. First, we shall discuss the 
use of proverbs in provoking growth in moral and intellectual values. Second, 























































241Proverbs as pedagogic hooks to wonder and grow in virtue
Proverbs are ‘popular epigrams or maxims’ highly employed in African tra-
ditional thought patterns. These maxims are conceived as means for the 
embellishments of speech and symbols of communication (Ukoma, Egwu, and 
Ogechukwu 2016). For the Igbo, a ‘proverb is the palm oil with which words are 
eaten’ (ibid., 326). Here, palm oil serves as an ingredient/catalyst that increases 
the quality of food to be consumed. If proverbs are perceived as such, it means 
they serve the role of provoking critical thinking. This mode of communication 
possesses different levels of meaning. These include: the contextual, literal, 
sensory and symbolic meanings. These thought-provoking statements and 
observations about life portray the entire worldview of a people. They are per-
ceived as catalysts of knowledge, wisdom, philosophy, ethics and morals. They 
call for a deeper reflection and further thinking and consideration of issues. 
For the Yoruba, “A proverb is the horse which carries a subject under discussion 
along; if a subject under discussion goes astray, we use a proverb to tract it.” 
(Akporobaro and Emovon 1994, 1). Within this background of thought, anyone 
who understands their indigenous language possesses the wisdom of proverbs 
(Hallen 2008). Mbuy (2012) observes that the language of proverbs has a rich 
vocabulary of words, phrases, combination of words, symbols, pictures, illu-
sions, association and comparison.
Like Mbuy (2012) and Makinde (1985), most African thinkers maintain that 
proverbs capture every part of society. For them, they enhance an understand-
ing of science, metaphysics, logic, religion and other human endeavours. Some 
scholars may argue that “proverbs mean different things to different people”, 
but it has to be retained that these are “symbols of communication packed 
in short sentences or even anecdotes and stories, sometimes carved on wood, 
stone or other materials, or even sung and danced” (Adeyemi and Salawudeen 
2014, 186, who refer to Mbiti 1995 here). Talking about proverbs in the Cam-
eroon context for instance, Mbuy (2012, 120) states that:
Whoever uses a proverb wants to teach something very profound to the lis-
tener. The proverb carries across the message in such a way that the hearer 
is forced to reflect on what he is being told. So one who listens to a proverb 
does not remain content with basic outward meaning.
Highlighting the above, proverbs tend to challenge listeners to wonder beyond 
spoken words. They always have an obscure and versatile nature. Their blurred 
and vague meaning at face value, provokes critical analyses and brainstorming 
to make a step by step progress to their hidden meanings and essences (Asi-








































































242 They continue to fuel the curiosity of young learners. For example, an educa-
tor may choose to use this proverb as a didactic tool to spur a young learner 
and to caution him or her of the excesses of selfishness: “Wir li e kitam, wu reeme 
wir, wu sho nyam, wu kfer wun mo’on” (“When a man falls into a trap, he raises an 
alarm for help, but when an animal falls into it, he eats it alone”).1 The first 
thing that strikes the consciousness of a young listener to the above proverb is 
the rich imagery in it, that not only renders the whole expression aesthetically 
appealing, but also conspicuously intriguing. A lot of meaning is hidden in 
the word ‘trap’ as used in this proverb. As the word lingers around the learner’s 
imagination, he or she is obliged to question and decode the meaning of the 
word. What does a trap stand for? What is the relationship between a trap and 
an animal? What explains the double standards of humans as per the difference 
between falling into a ‘trap’ and raising an alarm for help, as opposed to getting 
a ‘big catch’ in a ‘trap’ and eating alone?
The basic thing that comes to the mind of the learner when the word ‘trap’ 
is mentioned is surely ‘pain’ to the victim, and triumph to the trap-setter. This 
simply balances the equation. The learner by this proverb is being led to dis-
cern the holistic nature of a trap. If the learner succeeds to perceive selfishness/
greed as a trap that does not only have benefits, but also repercussions, then 
the message must have gone through. Note should be taken here, that only one 
word from the entire proverb has so far been identified and analysed. In fact, 
because proverbs are oblique and veiled, the depth of interpretation depends 
on the depth of one’s imagination and insight. Here again, we confront the 
merit of proverbs as didactic tools. A direct question requires a straightforward 
and rigid answer, more often reproduced than thought out. This limits the 
extent to which a child may wonder imaginatively, and therefore stands on the 
way of a child’s creativity. However, because of the beclouded nature of African 
proverbs, they provoke learners to think beyond bounds. They expose learners 
to wonder and think critically to enhance their creativity and capacity to make 
open-minded interpretations. Precise questions require precise answers and 
define in advance not only what a learner has to learn, but also the extent to 
which the learner must learn it. With proverbs this is not the case.
Another proverb that sends the same message of warning or caution as the 
above, but through a different imagery and a different symbolism is as fol-
lows: “La wir yo a la vilu, e kfen a ban yuv” (“Those who like honey should not 
hate bees”). This proverb betrays a high degree of pretence for those who do 
not cater for nature as it provides for their needs. The interpretation goes 























































243beyond simple words of wisdom and addresses ecological issues in the light 
of a sustainable consumption of nature. If an elder has advised the young per-
sistently to no avail, he or she may say the following in resignation: “Nyam lon 
yoyii yu Kisharang” (“An ill-fated animal never senses danger”). This testifies 
that the strength of moral caution goes along with the wisdom embedded in 
proverbs. The structure of the sentence (syntax) has an influence on semantics 
thus influencing the decoding of information by the audience addressed or the 
recipients. “A wani loo du ndev bve’h kitem a loa sheri?” (“If children destroy the 
buckets on their way to fetch water, should we be celebrating?”) This proverb 
simply calls for discipline by castigating the mediocre mentality of feasting on 
one’s failure. “Vikuu vi yur moo ngwasang dzen ngwa.” (“The coco-yams are itchy 
because we have enough corn in the barn.”) This particular proverb also empha-
sises discipline in children. It draws inspiration from their eating habits and 
choices. The moral lesson here arises from the fact that a child who has several 
choices of foodstuff could go ahead and choose what to eat. On the contrary, he 
or she who has not got such luxury is condemned to eat what is available. “A 
kum Chum kum Kimakar.” (“You are playing the smaller drum and the bigger one 
at the same time.”) This is a ceremonial utterance to deter people from greed. 
The message underlines greed and serves as a polite and subtle means to cau-
tion the audience concerned against the evil habit in question.
As already indicated above, these proverbs may serve as warnings and 
caution against greed and other ills in areas of human activities. They sim-
ply disclose how to relate or treat other people thus enhancing the growth of 
moral values. One great feature of proverbs is that they can be used variously 
in different circumstances. Proverbs do not have a fixed or ‘dead’ meaning. 
They live. Proverbs are dynamic and a learner’s capacity to manipulate and 
display them in different situations can be an efficient means to evaluate that 
learner’s achievement. The sense in which a proverb is applied may criticise, 
praise, advise (like in the cases above), teach and caution. These are seen to be 
rich sources of African wisdom and philosophy.
Furthermore, proverbs by their capacity to cause learners to wonder do 
not only help in their moral growth. They also expose them to wonder about 
divine qualities, theological virtues and how man has to embrace them. Van 
Manen (1990) contends that proverbs throw more light on the concrete reality 
of lived experiences. In this context, they serve as pedagogic devices producing 
essential case material on which pedagogic action is possible. As children or 
learners analyse proverbs, they are able to reflect on the meanings and implica-
tions embedded in the experiences. Consider this proverb; “Ngoo kisham yo yi ko 
kitchi.” (“The termite of the frog does not climb on the tree.”) This emphasises 








































































244 philosophical value here lies in the thesis of rational theology, which traces the 
origin of all creatures to God. He is the creator of the Universe and at the same 
time the governor of the Universe. Some other proverbs express the cause-
effect relation also discussed in metaphysics (Leonard 1966). There are proverbs 
which hold that nothing happens without a cause or reason “quidquid movetur ab 
alio movetur”. (“The toad does not run in the daytime in vain, either something 
is pursuing it or it is pursuing something.” Hebga 1998).
Moreover, to understand the wisdom communicated by proverbs and 
how they can be used to express or address life problems or crises, one has to 
consider that these proverbs carry profound meanings more than the simple 
human can comprehend or easily interpret. Take the example of indigenous 
proverbs which are seen to possess socialising and enduring values of inter-
dependence, sharing, living together in the spirit of Ubuntu and peaceful 
coexistence. For example, the proverb “Veshweni wa tom ateng” (“Those with 
two legs should lend help to the crippled”) indicates the duty to give assistance 
to those in need (Enslin and Horsthemke 2004; Okoth and Anyango 2014). A 
custodian of ancestral wisdom may utter the aforementioned proverbs to the 
young to uphold the theological virtues of kindness in them. Here kindness is 
portrayed from two perspectives: divine and human.
Besides, proverbs also serve as veritable tools of education in values, cul-
ture and social attitudes especially in the traditional or indigenous educational 
practices. The heritage of proverbs is indicative of values taught to children to 
enhance the virtues of living together peacefully. There is a famous proverb in 
Nso: “Wir dze wir bii wirii.” (This approximately says that one is a person because 
of others.) In Swahili, the very idea is transmitted as “Mtu ni watu”, meaning 
one can only define oneself in the context of others (Enslin and Horsthemke 
2004; Venter 2004; Yosso 2005). In the same context other proverbs hold that “A 
person cannot pull and set a ship alone” and “One hand does not tie a package”. 
These reveal the importance of individual contributions towards the success 
of collective goals. However, to emphasise the values of hard work one finds 
proverbs like “A person who wants what is under the bed must bend”. This is 
indicative of the invaluable role of one’s efforts in the success of any endeavour. 
In spite of the fact that one receives assistance from others in times of need, one 
is expected to make an effort to be successful.
For proverbs that stress the importance of education and its primary objec-
tive one finds examples like: “An educated person without good deeds is like 
a beehive without honey” and “Knowledge is light that spreads in the dark”. 
These reiterate what one can refer to as real-time learning (Maxwell 2007; 
Funteh 2015). All the knowledge acquired in the course of learning has to have 






















































245stress the procedures of early childhood education, there are Nso proverbs 
like “Bven kitchi a ki dzee kibor”, which translates literally into something like 
“bend the tree when it is still young”. The Swahilians express the same idea 
in the proverb “Undongo Ukande Ungali Maji” (Ngalim 2016, 37), meaning a tree 
must be straightened while still young. This is testified in the popular English 
phrases “Clay must be modelled while still wet” and “Strike the iron when it is 
still hot”. These thought-provoking statements provide perspectives for early 
childhood education (Akinsola, in Nsamenang and Tchombe 2011). The empha-
sis here lies in the rigorous moral foundation in early childhood. The virtues 
have to be instilled in children early in life.
Considering the pragmatic value of education, a proverb like “Elimu ni mai-
sha si vitabu” (Abubakar, in Nsamenang and Tchombe 2011), literally meaning 
“Education is life and not books”, highlights the outcome of learning, which 
has to impact on the socio-economic and political integration of learners into 
their communities. As advocacy for exemplary values in life, one finds a Nso 
proverb like “Wan ngev i yen foo kiyii ki”, literally meaning “The chick got it 
from the hen”, and proverbs like “Children straddled on the back observe their 
mothers’ backs”, and “The leaf that the she-goat has eaten will be eaten by her 
kids” (Abubakar, in Nsamenang and Tchombe 2014). The inherent moral lesson 
is that the older generation has the responsibility to socialise the younger ones 
in the life of the community. Moral values are not for export as these proverbs 
provide the hallmark for parenting practices. Elders are role models, where 
children observe them and take after their examples. Parents are expected to 
teach what they believe and practise what they teach.
In addition, some proverbs provide critical thinking values like the law of 
identity. “Ezinkpolo nada ezinkpolo” means “From good seed falls good seed”. 
Mbih J. Tosam (2016, 18) corroborates this view with the example: “A partridge 
only begets a partridge.” This expresses the principle of identity and empha-
sizes the biblical wisdom that from their fruits we shall know them.
Apart from the above pedagogic value of proverbs, it is interesting to note 
that they provide perspectives for peace and good citizenship (Enslin and 
Horsthemke 2004). Take the example of the proverb “Albassa ba ta balli n rua”, 
meaning “The nature of onion and water are different though one grows by 
the help of the other” (Akinmade 2012, 12). This proverb bridges the gap of 
differences by highlighting the important of interdependence in harmonious 
living. Tolerance and understanding of other people are of capital importance 
in a multicultural context like that of Cameroon (Ngalim 2018a). There are 
approximately 380 ethnic groups in Cameroon, further complicated by a bi-
cultural colonial heritage of Britain and France. Apart from the individual 








































































246 the symbiotic and interdependent relation among ethno-linguistic divides and 
political differences. This is a commendable perspective for unity in diversity as 
advocated by the present politics of national integration. There is no superior 
culture within the context; tolerance of other cultures is of capital importance 
to harmonious living (Ngalim 2014a; Ngalim 2014b; Ngalim 2014c). This is a 
perspective that could be exploited to deconstruct tribalism and the Anglopho-
bia-francophobia malaise in Cameroon (Ngalim 2016b; Ngalim 2018a).
To advocate for moderation and caution against foolhardiness, consider the 
proverb which states that “When a strong man is constantly praised, he fights 
empty-handed and is carried away in a worn-out basket” (Akinmade 2012, 12) 
and the Nso proverb which says “Mburi ngev yi kfen kife”, meaning after lavish-
ing praises on someone they miss the track. This refers to a person who is full 
of himself and does not listen to advice. They think they know it all after the 
flattering praises lavished on them. Owing to the vices of pride and self-confi-
dence, they take decisions that bring horror and disaster to themselves and to 
the people of their community. Central themes discernible in some proverbs 
include a life of moderation, hard work, respect for the truth, solidarity, will-
ingness to work and suffer for oneself and the community, respect for hierarchy 
and authority, a sense of honesty, modesty, tolerance, sense of goodness and 
kindness, love of one’s neighbours, respect for life and concern for the other.
Other proverbs simply spur learners to wonder, and it seems that is their 
intended purpose. In some circles in Africa, proverbs have become so inter-
woven with living speech that they can be heard at any time and occasion. In 
Nso for example, proverbs serve as a means of achieving clarity and concise-
ness in discourse. They are vehicles used in driving home a point. In this case, 
children can be aptly introduced to proverbs in their vernacular deliberations 
on issues of interests that portray concepts and values in a culture. For exam-
ple, “Bong ke ngaa yuv” (“Privileged are the dead”) or “Vishwim viyo ko way ngvev” 
(“Cockroaches do not sell in the same market with fowls”). The latter proverb 
informs us that not all mixtures operate harmoniously. There are some that 
lead to conflicts and disasters and therefore must be separated. The persistent 
conflicts discernible in the legal and educational system as a result of the two 
colonial cultures in Cameroon testify to this wisdom (Ngalim 2014b). What 
could be learned here is that while there are some values that can be harmo-
nised, there are some that must be kept asunder to preserve the specificities 
of each culture. Therefore, a multicultural perspective of unity in difference 
has to be the appropriate approach to the philosophy of harmonisation in 
Cameroon (Ngalim 2014a; Ngalim 2014b; Ngalim 2014c). It remains evident 
that proverbs expose learners to critical thinking and challenge them to make 






















































247hidden messages. Proverbs are usually signboards leading to deeper realities. 
Beyond what is said orally, a lot remains inherent and unspoken. It is this inner 
treasure of proverbs that keeps learners in awe, wonder and relentless quest. 
They constitute a warehouse of knowledge that can only be tapped with critical 
analysis and hard work.
Riddles as provocative utterances of moral and intellectual values
Riddles are basic forms of symbols which challenge the listener to explore, 
reflect and think in order to discover further meaning. It is a didactic game that 
sharpens one’s powers of observation and comparison. They constitute a formi-
dable intellectual exercise because they enhance the development of a child’s 
reasoning powers and skills for decision-making. They introduce children into 
the material and non-material cultures, namely: agricultural tools, household 
utensils, arts, crafts, effigies and symbols, their mother tongue, belief systems, 
music, drama, geography, history, cuisine, social ordering and the socio-polit-
ical structure of a people. These exercises are used to pose problems for the 
audience to find solutions, though not always in question form.
Concerning riddles, one may say that they are of the same family as prov-
erbs. Riddles have a provocative aura in such a way that, unless one finds an 
answer to them, one never finds rest. They keep straying around one’s mind 
like a notorious fly. One’s mind can travel the whole world round just to find an 
answer to a riddle. Riddles, like proverbs, keep the mind working and aiming 
high. Let us consider the following riddle, still from the Nso cultural back-
ground: “Li mo yi mosho” (“Take me and eat me with it”). Once this riddle is put 
out to a child of Nso cultural background, wondering and guessing begins. 
Since this riddle suggests the possibility of a food item that can be taken and 
eaten with this same item, the child begins judging from a myriad of options; 
is it possible to eat beans with beans? “Impossible!”, the child will say after care-
ful examination. The learner will proceed to ask again; is it possible that corn 
can be eaten with corn? In which forms can this be possible? “No, impossible!”, 
the learner will say again after critical analysis of various corn products. The 
search will not end here. The learner continues considering various food items 
and will proceed to ask: “Can cocoyams be eaten with cocoyams?” “Mbar!” he or 
she will exclaim. “Viku’uu!” he or she will yell. “Yes! Mbar [leaves of cocoyams] 
can be eaten with cocoyams!” “Bravo!” he or she will say to him or herself. In 
the process of conjectures and refutations, the child discovers the answer to the 
puzzle. The joy a learner experiences when, through a fine spun and delicate 
search, he or she arrives at the right answer cannot be concealed. Riddles have 
this quality of provoking an eagerness to obtain the answer which often buries 








































































248 riddles are pedagogic hacks that should not be neglected in child formation 
and development. Other examples abound: “Taa-ta lav ki-ghev dze!” (“A Grand-
father who sits in the house and his beards are seen outside. What is it?”) “Tim 
fen tim nyam bar!” (“I stand and shoot an animal at a very long distance! What is 
that?”) These are approximated translations of some riddles from the Nso tribe 
in Cameroon. These testify to how one could exploit them to subject pupils to 
fact-finding exercises and incessant self-questioning and wonder.
Searching for values and meaning in African traditional narratives
Most African oral narratives for an audience of children appear as forms of 
entertainment, but in reality they carry a baggage of moral lessons and pro-
voke critical thinking skills. These narratives include myths, folklores and 
folktales. They have objectives such as instruction, character education and 
preparing children to assume responsibility in society (Nkata 2001). Myths 
could be explained as stories tailored to make explicit in human terms what is 
beyond human understanding. They treat events that took place a long time 
ago, which include the adventures of the gods, giants, villains and etiological 
themes (Takov, in Tosam and Takov 2016).
African folklore is a term used to designate numerous varieties of tradi-
tional narratives. Telling stories is a universal experience common to both 
primitive and complex societies. These folklores are similar from culture to 
culture. The discernible messages in these narratives reflect the values of the 
society in which the children are socialised. Among the most cherished of these 
values are honesty, hard work, perseverance, courage, respect for elders, obedi-
ence and being considerate of others. Some narratives are meant to serve as 
deterrents to vices like greed, gluttony and laziness.
Folktales are employed to sharpen the creative sense of visualisation and 
imagination of children. They stir the mind of the young to think indepen-
dently on a given topic and arrive at judicious conclusions on perplexing 
or confrontational matters (Takov 2016). These pedagogical approaches are 
opposed to learning by rote or memorisation, therefore being sympathetic to 
teaching as dialogue. Numerous exchanges and interactions between the edu-
cator and pupils lead the pupils to self-discovery of truth. Oral tradition is at 
the centre of African traditional pedagogy. These approaches are most often 
overlooked due to the insistence on writing, memorisation and recitation exer-
cises in early childhood education. Folktales have (at least) seven objectives:
1.  The enhancement of the fear of God and the deities, and to respect tradition, to 
respect the elders.
2.  To instil fear in the minds of the young not to take laws into their hands. 






















































2494.  To teach elementary principles of natural and supernatural laws. 
5.  To sharpen the creative sense of vision and imagination in young ones.
6.  To direct the minds of the young to think independently on a given topic.
7.  To arrive at judicious conclusions on perplexing or confrontational matters.
The relevance of folktales in the development of moral and intellectual vir-
tues lies in that they present a moral order representing a set of normative 
requirements. These requirements are often directed to the consciousness of 
individuals through the use of oral traditions such as satire. When folktales are 
told to children an elder asks them: “What does the story teach us to do and not 
to do?”, and the children will give their answers following their understanding 
of the story. These were stories used to keep the evenings alive in the different 
communities after a day’s hard work. They were psychological tools for elders 
to sharpen the imagination of children and instil in them enormous fear for 
wrongdoing. In Nso folktales, one finds something to laugh, think and to set 
one’s imaginary flight in a jungle where animals rule like human beings. Some 
examples include “Choumptu the Orgist”, “The adventures of Baa and Wanyeeto” 
and “The adventures of Kpuntir” (Lantum 1980).
Challenges to the use of African traditional pedagogies  
in schools
A s seen in this paper, African traditional pedagogies involve the oral traditions that have been identified as important sources of knowledge acquisition. These traditions serve as media of cultural 
continuity in poems, proverbs, riddles, narratives and wise sayings in local 
communities (Shiza 2005; Shiza 2006). These practices were used in indigenous 
education to teach moral values and appropriate behaviour. They were the pri-
mary ways in which a great deal of African philosophy, knowledge and wisdom 
has been taught (Shiza 2006). With these oral traditions, there are no written 
records of the ancient past and all that has been preserved of their knowledge, 
myths, philosophies, liturgies, songs and sayings has been handed down by 
word of mouth from generation to generation. The absence of written records 
has been the point of focus for most critics of this system. They emphasised 
the difficulty of preserving these thoughts from one generation to another, the 
values thus being susceptible to extinction. This is probably an expression of 
Western imperialism, where only written records have been identified as hav-
ing great scientific value (Hegel 1945; Hegel 1954). Socrates’ philosophy was 








































































250 mented it afterwards. Therefore, the values of a culture cannot be deprived of 
its scientific value for the simple reason that they have not been documented. 
Cases where a people’s ideas and contributions to human thought have been 
dismissed or doubted for the reason that they were unwritten must be given a 
second thought (Makumba 2007).
Another challenge raised by the critics of this system is that African values 
communicated orally like myths, proverbs, wise sayings, narratives, riddles 
and legends lack a universal or universalisable interpretation. The argument 
goes that proverbs, riddles and folktales may mean different things in different 
cultures and traditions in Africa. For that reason, they are not worthy of being 
classified as a source of science (Hegel 1945; 1954; see Funteh 2015). This point 
is probably acceptable to the extent that one can agree that these oral traditions 
differ according to cultures and local traditions. However, the hermeneutics of 
these forms of oral communication lies in one’s ability to exploit them and use 
them in the context of one’s classroom realities. The interpretations may differ, 
but they carry the same immutable truths of justice, peace, rightness of charac-
ter, religion, fear of God, science and technology, morality, and love for nature 
and humankind. What has to be retained is that there is a cultural contribu-
tion of every people to the universal themes in philosophy and science. Every 
culture brings from its house a baggage of values bequeathed to the universal 
spirit to keep it relevant to the reality of life (Makumba 2007).
In line with our response to the above challenges, we contend that there is a 
need to recover the values embedded in these traditional pedagogies to enhance 
the creative ingenuity and critical (moral) thinking skills of pupils in schools 
today. We are not in any way attempting to say that all these values are rel-
evant to the needs and experiences of pupils in all contexts. Critical pedagogy 
requires that educators exploit these values as they present themselves as rel-
evant to the values they intend to project in the curricula to ensure the growth 
of pupils in moral and intellectual virtues. The crisis of education today is dis-
cernible in the untested values in social media to which children are exposed. 
Let us limit ourselves to the experiences of social media and television series 
that have taken over the oral narratives that characterised the evening sessions 
of children and the elders of the community. This is a crisis of education and 
at the same time a crisis of socialisation. Chinua Achebe has advised African 
writers for children to draw from the infinite treasury of African oral traditions 
(Chakava 1998). This is to serve as an antidote to the story books provided to 























































T his paper set out to demonstrate the invaluable role of African tradi-tional pedagogy in provoking the growth of moral and intellectual virtues in pupils. In traditional African pedagogy, schooling and edu-
cation, or learning skills, societal values and norms have hardly been separated 
from other spheres of life. Eurocentrists have therefore had ‘doubts about the 
authenticity of traditional African education’ (Funteh 2015, 139). The debate 
has been that prior to the colonial period, Africa lacked ‘the prerequisites to 
genuine educational acquisition’ (idem). We dare to corroborate the view 
that this is ‘a blinded cultural paradigmatic estimation by Europeans’ (idem). 
From the foregoing explanations and examples, it goes without saying that 
African traditional thought and pedagogy promotes critical thinking and crea-
tive ingenuity in both moral and intellectual matters. The organisation of the 
school curricula today needs to integrate these pedagogies into the content 
and processes of education right from early childhood education on. Bodun-
rin (1991) contends that there is no reason to exclude proverbs, myths of gods 
and angels and the social practices from philosophical inquiry. An example of 
the creative recovery of these narrative forms in schools today is the introduc-
tion of Sankofan education, which is a bulwark to uncritical and often ignorant 
negative images about Africa (Tedla 1995; 1996). Bringing the informal (oral 
philosophy) into the formal (schools) permit schools to re-wonder the pupils that 
they de-wonder with pedagogic contents and practices that separate them for 
their daily home experiences.
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A nders Schinkel (2017; 2018) defends the role of deep wonder as an antidote to the instrumentalising effects of a neoliberal approach to education. Educationally, children should be encouraged to enter 
into wonder-full1 states, yet how to educate for wonder? In this chapter, I will 
further build on Schinkel’s ideas and defend the arts as an important vehicle 
for prompting the experience of wonder. The arts are likely to give rise to a 
sense of wonder due to the way in which they present concepts, images and 
ideas in new and creative ways. Such artistic depiction encourages those engag-
ing with artworks to adopt a certain way of seeing; a mode of perception that is 
open and receptive and thus likely to result in feelings of wonder. I claim that 
creating space for the arts on the school curriculum will provide opportunities 
for wonder in educational settings. 
Wonder often seems elusive. It seems as though some people (especially 
young children) often experience moments of wonder whereas others do not… 
and wonder is the type of experience that is unlikely to become manifest the 
more it is chased. As such, experiences of wonder may surprise us, arising 
anywhere at any time. As teachers, how may we teach students to experience 
wonder? We may create the conditions conducive to wonder, yet we cannot 
guarantee the perceiver will experience wonder. The experience of wonder 
involves subjective and contextual factors; factors which may be difficult to 
































ensure in a classroom, although the appropriate attitude receptive to experi-
encing wonder may be encouraged and role modelled.2
I claim that the arts are likely to give rise to a sense of wonder because art-
works invite those engaging with them to view things (including objects, ideas, 
concepts and images) in ways that would not usually occur to us as we go about 
our daily lives in a pragmatic fashion. This may be the case because we are usu-
ally time poor and/or goal oriented as we go about our daily tasks. Artists often 
convey, transcribe, render and transform ideas they express in creative ways 
that present the familiar (and unfamiliar) to viewers in new forms. In this way, 
artworks invite and encourage viewers to adopt a certain mode of perception 
– a way of seeing that is open and receptive, which is likely to result in the 
experience of wonder.3 
Art teachers are in the position to be able to educate students as to how 
to adopt this particular mode of perception in relation to artworks. This may 
occur in relation to students’ own work and art making, as well as to that of 
others, including artworks that form the canon. Art teachers may do this by 
role-modelling this open and receptive mode of perception and describing and 
explaining what they perceive in artworks, as well as by teaching students to 
look for and appreciate the features by which artworks are judged.4 
In this paper, I will commence with defining wonder as ‘deep wonder’ (fol-
lowing Schinkel 2017, 2018). I will argue that wonder is associated with a certain 
mode of perception that is open and receptive to what is there to be perceived. I 
shall then make a similar argument about art; namely, that artworks invite con-
templation5, which involves adopting a particular, open and receptive mode of 
perception. This mode of perception is conducive to the experience of wonder 
and, as such, the arts have a role to play in stimulating experiences of wonder.
There may certainly be other ways to encourage the experience of wonder, 
along with facilitating an open and receptive mode of attention, and I am sure 
2 Note that I am not ruling out the possibility of teachers learning how to be more receptive to experi-
encing wonder from the attitude adopted by their students!
3 Such a mode of perception may also result in feelings or experiences of awe, the sublime, anger, dis-
gust, fear, compassion, humility etcetera. It does not adversely affect my argument to claim that other 
feelings and experiences may arise as a result of engaging with artworks or adopting the mode of per-
ception to which I refer. For the sake of the claim I seek to defend, I merely need to establish that some 
artworks invite this mode of perception which is conducive to the perceiver experiencing wonder. 
4 These will likely include formal features such as form, expression, unity, composition, line, colour, 
shape, tone, texture, pattern. Appreciation may involve valuing and valuing may involve aesthetic 
and/or ethical value. For the sake of this paper, I shall set aside this debate as I lack the space to do it 
justice here. For more on aesthetics and ethics, see Jerrold Levinson, (Ed). (2001). 
5 Whether or not such contemplation is ‘aesthetic contemplation’ or simply contemplation applied to 
art objects is another debate I shall set aside for the purposes of this paper. However, for more on this, 
see the debate between George Dickie (1964), Jerome Stolnitz (1960), and Gary Kemp (1999).
258 that environmental education and religious education are other good candi-
dates for a similar argument to be made. However, my argument need not be 
damaged by the fact that one may equally advocate for environmental educa-
tion and/or religious education as conducive to students experiencing wonder. 
In fact, the appropriate response may well be ‘the more the merrier’ when it 
comes to wonder-full educational moments. In this chapter, I will focus on how 
the arts may prompt experiences of wonder and, correspondingly, I will defend 
arts education as a good way to introduce young people to a manner of engag-
ing with artworks that supports such wonder-full experiences. 
Defining wonder
A s a starting point, defining what is meant by ‘wonder’ is no small task. Genevieve Lloyd (2018) helpfully traces the history of the word in the ideas of philosophers throughout the Western tradition and notes 
some important features of the term, distinguishing it from and yet still not-
ing its connection to the sublime. It is clear that the word ‘wonder’ has not 
always been used in the same way throughout history or by various philoso-
phers (Lloyd 2018, 4). In the 18th century, the notion of the sublime emerges and 
transforms the way ‘wonder’ was considered; with one version being more akin 
to curiosity and the other similar to awe and dread (ibid., 5). Without dismiss-
ing the aesthetic notion of the sublime, which took on some of the original 
features of wonder, Lloyd defends reclaiming the Socratic understanding of 
wonder where wonder is connected with intellectual inquiry and reality, as 
well as with fictions and artworks (ibid., 120-121).
Although our contemporary common use of the word seems synonymous 
with question asking, Schinkel (2017) notes the differences between wonder 
and curiosity, stating that curiosity seems to seek answers and thus may be lim-
ited in its scope as to what may be discoverable. Curiosity also applies to the 
novel, to the new, to the not-yet discovered or understood; whereas wonder 
need not only apply to novelty. Wonder may also apply (perhaps continually) 
to the familiar which is, nonetheless, still wonderful. Lloyd concurs, noting,
The mental unrest induced by the not-yet-known is not always the mere 
passing pangs of unsatisfied curiosity. Not all wonder is allayed by expla-
nation. Wonder that things are as they are can persist – even when inquiry 
into what they are, and how they came to be that way, has come to its natural 






















































259I follow Schinkel (2017) in making a useful distinction between two different 
kinds of wonder: active wonder or wondering which is prompted by curiosity and 
encourages exploration and understanding, and deep or contemplative wonder, 
which is not inherently inquisitive and may be silenced when faced with the 
mysterious or the sublime.
In this paper, I will focus on what Schinkel has termed ‘deep wonder’, which 
he defines as follows: 
Deep wonder might be described as a mode of consciousness in which we 
experience that which we perceive or are contemplating as mysterious or 
other, fundamentally beyond our powers of comprehension, yet deeply 
worthy of our attention for its own sake; in which the limits of our under-
standing and what we could ever fully grasp are foregrounded; and which 
engages us on all levels – emotionally, intellectually, aesthetically, and 
strongly existentially. It is a mode of consciousness, a way of being aware of 
the world, we are often ‘thrown’ into, but that we may also cultivate as a dis-
position. It is an experience with a particular temporality: time slows down, 
comes to a momentary standstill, we pause to contemplate what arrested 
our attention, we stop to wonder – or we have made a habit of doing so. 
(Schinkel 2017, 552).
Deep wonder is a ‘rich’ or ‘thick’ experience rather than a ‘thin’ experience (for 
a distinction between the two see Sharpe 2000, 329-330), meaning that it resists 
a reductionist empirical account of the phenomenology of the experience. This 
‘mode of consciousness’ involves paying attention to something or valuing it 
‘for its own sake’, and the form of attention paid is ‘open’ and ‘receptive’ (Schin-
kel 2019). One significant aspect of Schinkel’s definition of deep wonder is that 
this state may be stimulated when one is appreciating something (an object, 
thing, animal or person6) for its own sake; that is to say, intrinsically rather 
than instrumentally.
Deep wonder involves a ‘slowing down’ rather than a speeding up; the 
phenomenology of the experience is such that the feeling state comes upon us 
and we ‘stop to wonder’ (Schinkel 2017, 552) even though we may remain in an 
active (rather than passive) state. The seeming contradictions encapsulated by 
wonder are illustrated by Lloyd as follows:
6 For the sake of ease I shall refer to these as ‘objects’ henceforth. Note I am not committed to saying all 































260 Flaubert shows that wonder and stupidity belong together; that they coex-
ist and interact. There are some striking commonalities here with older 
philosophical ideas of wonder: the imagery of motion and rest; the inter-
mingling of intellect and emotion. His theoretical reflections explore the 
possibility of a state which hovers between not-knowing and knowing – a 
condition not unlike that in old accounts of wonder (Lloyd 2018, 8). 
On this account of deep wonder, there is a particular mode of perception that 
is a way of seeing or engaging with what is present before us that is being 
depicted. On this account, we attend to the object for its own sake, seeking to 
know but also aware that we do not know (or cannot know) the object in its 
entirety. The phenomenological state of wonder involves the activation of our 
emotions as well as our intellect. 
The mode of perception that is required for wonder to result involves being 
open and receptive to what is there to be perceived. Such a mode of percep-
tion may be difficult to adopt, given much of the time we see and use things 
instrumentally in a pragmatic fashion as we go about our daily lives. Yet, the 
mode of perception that enables us to be receptive to the experience of wonder 
is different, conceptually as well as phenomenologically, from this pragmatic 
attitude. This may in part account for why the experience of wonder is elusive, 
transient and defies command. I do not experience wonder simply because I 
will it. If I chase the experience for the sake of the feeling evoked, I may be less 
successful in evoking deep wonder. However, if I attend to the object in an open 
and receptive manner, valuing the experience for its own sake, taking my time 
instead of rushing, wonder is more likely to arise because it is supported by this 
particular mode of perception I have adopted. 
Art and wonder 
T hus far I have supported the claims made by Schinkel (2017, 2018) that ‘deep wonder’ is associated with adopting an open and receptive mode of perception. I wish to make a similar argument about art; namely, 
that artworks invite and encourage contemplation, which involves the receiver 
of the artwork adopting a particular open and receptive mode of perception in 
relation to the artwork or object. Given the mode of perception encouraged by 
artworks, those engaging in this way with artworks are also well disposed to 
experiencing a sense of wonder in response to the work in question, or in rela-
tion to the ideas and feelings evoked by the artwork. It must be noted that I am 






















































261this experience), yet neither am I ruling this out. For now, I shall set aside the 
question as to which artworks are able to do so. Provided my argument applies 
to some artworks it suffices for my purposes here, and will enable me to con-
clude that the arts have a role to play in stimulating experiences of wonder due 
to the fact that aesthetic contemplation involves adopting an open, receptive 
mode of perception when engaging with an art object.
Firstly, it is unsurprising that many of the examples provided by theo-
rists illustrating the experience of wonder are drawn from art and literature. 
Despite the connections to notions of the sublime, art (especially religious art) 
and nature are the examples that spring to mind when we consider the last 
time we felt a sense of deep wonder. Words such as awe and beauty often accom-
pany such descriptions, and it is for this reason that I wish to point out that not 
all art is awesome, beautiful or sublime. Yet, even so, there are artworks that 
will inspire a sense of deep wonder. 
Artworks invite those engaging with them to be willing to really look to 
see what is there to be seen. I use the word ‘see’ here in a wide sense, as many 
artworks rely on various forms of perception, not solely that of sight. Each and 
every one of us has experienced a work of art that has completely captivated 
and engaged us, such that time seems to stand still and we are fully absorbed 
in what we are perceiving. Consider, for example, a particularly engaging 
film, novel, opera, dance or music performance, a painting or a sculpture that, 
after captivating one’s attention, stays with us in a sense. This particular mode 
of perception apprehends and carefully attends to what is there to be seen or 
perceived. It may not be unique to artworks, yet some artworks invite and 
encourage this mode of perception to be adopted due to the way in which they 
seek to draw in and affect the receiver of the artwork.
The creativity of the artist’s depiction stimulates the imagination of the 
receiver of the artwork. The imagination is required as the perceiver is offered 
a perspective (or perspectives) on that which is made manifest through the 
art form. This occurs in various ways depending on which art form is being 
used. Even in a still life painting, painted as realistically as possible, the way 
the fruit and flowers appear rendered in the paint invites the viewer to look 
again at fruit or flowers they may have seen and smelt and eaten a hundred 
times in their daily lives. Even if the perceiver of the painting does not apply 
such focused attention to any actual fruit or flowers they encounter, they are 
certainly invited to specifically attend to the depicted fruit and flowers in the 
painting. As such, they are invited into the world of the painting, however 
broad or narrow such a world may be. If the audience is a contemporary one 































262 in transporting the viewer back to the time in which the painting was painted, 
which may seem at once old-fashioned as well as timeless.
It is through the use of our imagination and a particular attentive mode of 
perception that artworks invite us to adopt various perspectives on objects, sce-
narios and concepts. This particularly imaginative mode of perception is often 
associated with art, even if it may not be exclusive to aesthetic contemplation. 
Maxine Greene defends the inclusion of the arts and aesthetic education on the 
curriculum precisely because it, among other things, encourages this particu-
lar way of seeing. Greene often refers to ‘noticing what is there to be noticed’ 
and ties this vision to an attentive, imaginative engagement with that which is 
presented to us (Greene, 2001: 32).
For Greene, this argument forms a vital defence of aesthetic education and 
the inclusion of the arts in the curriculum. The honing of students’ perception 
is reliant on the use of the imagination, and the arts offer such imaginative, 
aesthetic experiences and meaning-making to students:
‘Aesthetic Education,’ then, is an intentional undertaking designed to nur-
ture appreciative, reflective, cultural, participatory engagements with the 
arts by enabling learners to notice what is there to be noticed, and to lend 
various works of art their lives in such a way that they can achieve them 
as variously meaningful. When this happens, new connections are made 
in experience: new patterns are formed, new vistas are opened. Persons see 
differently. (Greene 2001, 6)
The connection between the imagination and an attentive form of perception 
is also made by Hepburn, who, in turn, connects this idea – what Nussbaum 
(1990) would call ‘sympathetic imagination’ – to wonder. “Wonder is ‘broken 
knowledge’”, Hepburn (1980, 6) notes, quoting Francis Bacon, because it fills 
the gaps of what we do not know. It is the imagination that allows us to encoun-
ter the ‘as-if’; possibilities that may be real or fictional. Artworks present us 
with perspectives and sensations that may stimulate the experience of deep 
wonder.
The connection between aesthetic experience and wonder for Hepburn is 
akin to the tie we have already identified between art and perception. Hepburn 
(1980, 16) argues that in wonder as well as in aesthetic activity, the main aim is 
‘expansion of cognition’ and ‘intensity of perception’. He quotes Hagen who 
argued that wonder is ‘the exercise of intentionality for its own sake’; ‘intensi-
fied awareness’ (Hepburn, 1980, 16; quoting Hagen 1972). It is a specific kind 






















































263truly looks and sees, sympathetically7, with an open respect for that which it is 
receiving. 
When we attend to an artwork using our sympathetic imagination, we may 
experience deep wonder. The object of such deep wonder may be the art object 
itself, or the artist, or the way one’s subjective vision has been altered as a result 
of encountering the work in question. The perceiver may experience wonder at 
the beauty or technique of the work, or at the expression (of the concept or feel-
ing) embodied in the artwork and/or the artist or artists who are able to render 
it thusly. Nussbaum has suggested that in wonder we are “maximally aware of 
the value of the object, and only minimally aware, if at all, of its relationships 
to our own plans. That is why it is likely to issue in contemplation rather than 
in any sort of action towards the object” (2001, 54–55), which sounds akin to 
Schinkel’s deep wonder, rather than active wonder.
In this way, artworks invite and encourage perception that is open, recep-
tive, and thus, arguably sympathetic. This kind of perception makes use of the 
imagination, the cognition as well as one’s feelings. By attending to artworks 
using an imaginative, receptive mode of attention, one is open to what is there 
to be seen and is likely to experience what is there to be experienced. Such 
experiences depend contextually on the artwork and the way in which it is dis-
played or presented as well as on the individual and the subjective features of 
their own experiences and perceptive faculties. While these multiple factors 
cannot be predetermined or quantified, it is the case that artworks prompt 
experiences of deep wonder in those who receive them. Not all artworks and 
not all perceivers will manage this, but where it occurs, wonder is experienced 
as an impactful component of aesthetic engagement. 
Hepburn (1980, 16) notes that wonder has an aesthetic aspect, saying: “In 
acknowledging its appreciative and contemplative aspects, we have already 
identified an aesthetic aspect of wonder.” He writes: “The boldest suggestion 
would be that the fields of aesthetic experience and of wonder are coextensive”, 
yet rejects this strong claim, stating that “the fields of aesthetic experience 
and wonder do indeed overlap; but I would resist any stronger claim. Not all 
wonder belongs to aesthetic experience.” Further, he goes on to say that not all 
aesthetic experience is ‘wondering’ (note the use of the verb here seems to shift 
the meaning from deep wonder to active wonder) (Hepburn 1980, 17). So there 
may be wonder without an aesthetic experience, and there may be an aesthetic 
experience without wonder.
































264 I agree with Hepburn, particularly because, despite the claim that wonder and 
aesthetic experience are not coextensive, he goes on to say that “where wonder 
is not itself the central aesthetic effect, it may be an element in the total experi-
ence of a work of art, a higher-order element” (Hepburn 1980, 17): 
It is wonder at the achievement of what (independently of wonder) is of high 
aesthetic value, perhaps at the complex formal integration of a symphonic 
movement, or at its vivifying initially unpromising materials. Thus wonder 
cannot be identified with aesthetic experience as such.
While Hepburn doesn’t limit wonder to aesthetic experience, or vice versa, 
this is not to deny that aesthetic experience goes hand in hand with wonder. 
As is evident in his quote above, it seems precisely that wonder may emerge 
or result from aesthetic experience, even if it is not coextensive with aesthetic 
experience. In this way, at least, the aesthetic experience may include a feel-
ing of wonder and, importantly for our purposes here in this chapter, aesthetic 
engagement may produce a feeling of wonder in the perceiver of artworks. 
Indirectly teaching for wonder
I f we wish to create moments and experiences of wonder in the classroom, or if we wish to cultivate a steady attitude of wonder in students, why should we ensure that we teach the arts? It is the arts that invite us to adopt an open, 
receptive mode of perception to the ideas, scenarios and characters therein 
depicted. Artworks offer receivers of the work a safe fictional space in which to 
imaginatively encounter these ideas, scenes and characters and thus provide us 
with a space to practise this open, receptive form of perception. It is this open, 
receptive mode of perception that allows the receiver of the artwork to also be 
receptive to an aesthetic experience and experiences of wonder. It is the arts 
that provide us with ready access into the hearts and minds of others, whether 
fictional or real, allowing us to perceive what is there to be noticed, honing our 
perception in a way that is then open to the experience of wonder.
Such experiences of wonder may be directed at the art object itself, the ideas 
and characters creatively expressed therein, or to corresponding ideas, scenar-
ios or people in real life. Art teachers can assist students to see in a particular 
way – attending to form and specific details and ‘reading’ the artworks in ways 






















































265meaning and experience the affect that is there to be experienced.8 This ‘aes-
thetic literacy’ is a skill set that art teachers can teach their students, enabling 
them to make meaning from artworks that connects to and draws upon formal, 
aesthetic, historical and technical knowledge and understanding of artworks, 
art forms and various media. Art teachers must therefore have specialist knowl-
edge and training themselves in order to be able to support their students to 
learn about, for instance, art history, aesthetic theory, as well as the technical 
skills involved in art making. When students create their own artworks, art 
teachers can guide them to hone their perception in relation to their own work 
as well as learn and practise the skills and techniques required in order to mani-
fest the form they have in mind. This is to say that teachers can role-model, and 
assist students in learning to adopt, the open, receptive mode of perception 
towards artworks that is conducive to perceiving the artwork aesthetically as 
well as to experiencing a feeling of wonder in relation to the art object. While 
such a mode of perception and the experience of wonder may well come natu-
rally and even frequently to some, this is not to say that there is not also an 
important role for teachers in supporting such aesthetic literacy. Aesthetic lit-
eracy involves practising an open and receptive mode of perception, it includes 
engaging imaginatively with artworks and objects. Such aesthetic literacy as I 
describe here is, I suggest, conducive to wonder-full experiences. 
Wonder-full educational experiences are, for example, classes or lessons 
that are more than simply ‘fun’, or ‘interesting’, or ‘enjoyable’, even if they may 
be some or all of these things as well. When wonder is a pedagogical tool, Yannis 
Hadzigeorgiou (2014, 50) claims it results in the following kinds of awareness:
• Awareness that one’s knowledge is incomplete or mistaken.
• Awareness that there is more to be learned.
• Awareness that some phenomena exist at all.
• Awareness of unexpected connections between phenomena and ideas.
• Awareness of the beauty of natural phenomena. 
It is these moments of awareness that give the experience the ‘wow factor’ 
(ibid., 50) that indicates that the experience is one of wonder rather than sim-
ply something else (being fun, interesting or engaging). It is these modes of 
awareness (or perception) that indicate whether the student experiencing the 
8 This is not to deny that receivers of artworks will also respond subjectively to artworks and some-
times feel what is not intended by the artist or necessarily depicted in the formal features of the work. 
I shall set aside the debate about ‘ideal’ readings of artworks and the ‘intentional fallacy’ (Wimsatt 































266 wonder-full educative moment is not simply feeling curious; they are also feel-
ing surprised by a sense of wonder.
The benefit of practising such a mode of perception (or awareness) in rela-
tion to artworks is twofold. Firstly, the arts are fictional and such imaginative 
engagement may be less threatening than when one is receiving information 
and meeting real life others in the real (i.e. non-imaginary or non-fictional) 
world. Secondly, such artworks deliberately invite us to adopt various points 
of view or they present perspectives that we wouldn’t usually encounter in 
our daily lives or when thinking about things and perceiving the world in our 
habitual manner. 
Here we see why art goes hand in hand with wonder and how the art teacher 
can position everyday objects in such a way as to be perceived differently by stu-
dents. It is art that renders objects in new and distinct ways, inviting perceivers 
to look again, to pay attention to things that we perhaps see every day or perhaps 
are surprising and novel, unique or even shocking. Egan and Gajdamaschko 
(2003, 89) note that the teacher can present almost any object as ‘an object 
of wonder’. They see the teacher as able to position or present the object for 
consideration in such a way that it brings out ‘the strange and wonderful in 
what seems routine or taken for granted’ (Egan 1997, 219; quoted in Zazkis and 
Zazkis 2014, 68). The art teacher is very well positioned to do this through the 
artistic mediums that engage various senses; of touch, sight, sound and move-
ment. In this way, engaging with art often involves broadening our perception 
in so far as we make use of various senses and focus them on particular art 
objects in order to attend to them, to receive the aesthetic experience they may 
have to offer us, and, possibly, hopefully, be open to the experience of wonder 
that may also result from this encounter. 
Egan (2014, 157) wants to extend such wonder-full educational experiences 
so that every subject is enhanced by them. He wants to see wonder-full educa-
tional moments across the entire curriculum. He writes:
It would seem that a curriculum chosen to bring out the sense of wonder 
will likely incline us to select content that exemplifies the extremes of 
human achievement and natural phenomena. But it can also direct us to 
bring out the wonder of the everyday world around students. Much of the 
world is so taken for granted that it is hardly noticed. 
Yet, he argues, by making the familiar strange, students may experience the 
wonder of, for example, nails and screws. Now, it may be that Egan is being 
optimistic here; however, through art, I can see a clear way that artist’s use and 






















































267such everyday objects differently and open them to the feeling of wonder and 
surprise that results from this encounter. In this way art teachers may play a 
positive role in creating wonder-full educational moments of the kind Egan 
and others describe, and to which Schinkel claims education should aspire.
Movements such as ‘everyday aesthetics’ (Saito 2019) that have emerged 
from Dewey’s (1934) pragmatic conception of the arts sees aesthetic experience 
as an extension of ordinary experience. On such views, the connection between 
natural (human) perception and experience and aesthetic appreciation or expe-
riences is highlighted. Such theories provide support for the inclusion of the 
arts in the curriculum as something everyone can enjoy and engage in, even if 
not everyone is likely to consider themselves as an artist. Laura-Lee Kearns 
(2015, 99) also sees the connection between attentive perception, wonder and 
the arts. She writes: “[B]y (re)awakening our attention to wonder, I hope to 
begin to elucidate the benefits of fostering a deliberate effort to wonder in our 
everyday experiences” and further connects the education of the artistic imagi-
nation with moral purpose:
Any pedagogy that chooses to recognize the whole person would have to 
include the arts as integral to the curriculum. One’s active participation in 
the arts, whether it be making, viewing, analyzing, discussing, or wonder-
ing, brings us closer to living harmoniously with ourselves and others. 
(Kearns 2015, 115) 
Drawing upon Rousseau’s conception of childhood, Nussbaum also provides a 
naturalistic connection between children, the natural world and their sense of 
wonder. She gives the example of a child learning the song ‘twinkle, twinkle, 
little star, how I wonder what you are’ and claims: “In learning such a song, 
the child develops further her already present sense of wonder – a sense of 
mystery that mingles curiosity with awe.” (Nussbaum 2001, 427). Even when 
fictional, the receiver of the artwork must draw upon their own experiences 
in order to make meaning, and, in so doing, artworks connect to reality, and to 
the everyday (Greene, 2001, 81-82). Thus, the perception honed by attending to 
art may be applied to that which is generally there to be perceived. This receptiv-
ity creates space for the experience of wonder. In this way, the arts are able to 
offer educational experiences well suited to the experience of deep wonder that 
prompts a sympathetic way of perceiving others and the world.9
9 Elsewhere, I have argued teachers should use artworks, particularly narrative artworks, to stimulate 
and provoke philosophical dialogues with students, that engage them in critical and compassionate 































268 If this connection between the arts and an open, receptive mode of attention 
is accurate, and if such a mode of attention also primes us to be more receptive 
to the experience of wonder, then the arts are a good vehicle through which to 
prompt wonder-full experiences. If we wish for children and young people to 
cultivate this mode of perception that supports wonder-full experiences, then 
the arts are conducive to this purpose and may be used in this way in an educa-
tional manner. If the arts are included in the school curriculum and students 
spend time on art making, creative play, aesthetic education (which includes 
aesthetic theory as well as art history), and art interpretation, then more oppor-
tunities arise for them to experience wonder and to be receptive to wonder. 
This, in turn, may invite and encourage an open, receptive mode of perception 
that includes the practice of one’s sympathetic imagination.
Conclusion
E ducation that fosters wonder-full experiences and encourages students to be open to experiences of wonder in their lives is valuable. Even if we cannot directly teach students how to wonder, we may create the condi-
tions conducive to wonder, and we may encourage students to adopt an open, 
receptive mode of perception that is amenable to experiencing such wonder-
full moments. In this chapter, I have defended the arts as an important vehicle 
for prompting the experience of deep wonder due to the ways in which they 
present concepts, images and ideas in new and creative ways. Such artistic 
depiction encourages those engaging with artworks to adopt a certain way of 
seeing; a mode of perception that is open and receptive and thus likely to result 
in feelings of wonder. Art teachers may support students in learning how to 
see what is there to be seen in artworks and they may role-model the open, 
receptive mode of perception required to see in this manner; a manner which is 
conducive to experiencing wonder in relation to the artworks encountered. As 
such, by creating space for the arts on the school curriculum, we also provide 
opportunities for wonder in educational settings. 
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12  Cultivating a Mindset of 
Wonder: A Narrative Analysis on  
the Mechanisms of Seeing the  
Extraordinary within the Ordinary83
Jacky van de Goor, Anneke M. Sools and Gerben J. Westerhof
Introduction
I n this article we dive into the mindset of wonder as a means to experience meaning in life. Meaning in life is a basic human need and crucial to well-being (e.g., Frankl 1969; Mascaro and Rosen 2005; Reker, Peacock, and Wong 
1987; Ryff and Singer 1998), yet is increasingly under pressure. It is suggested 
that, in a world of acceleration, reason and rationality, one may easily become 
alienated or indifferent and lose a sense of existential wonder and meaning in 
ordinary life (Heschel 1976; Jenkins 2000; Rosa 2013). While education tradi-
tionally focuses on cognitive wonder (Hakkarainen and Ferholt 2013; Miyazaki 
2013), it is through existential wonder that education may contribute to a sense 
of meaning and moral development (L’Ecuyer 2014; Musaio 2012; Schinkel 
2018). Existential wonder is an emotion that may befall us, but is also a mindset: 
an intention to see the special and meaningful in the ordinary and everyday 
(Bennett 2001; Vasalou 2015). Though theorists have emphasised the impor-
tance of this mindset in education, empirical studies on the mindset of wonder 
and the way it may be cultivated remain scarce. In this article, we investigate 
the way this mindset works, by analysing the construction of meaning in mem-
ories of familiar routines.
Our investigation into the mindset of wonder focuses on familiar routines 
for two reasons. First of all, familiar routines are relevant because of their para-
doxical relation to meaning and wonder. On the one hand, familiar routines 
have the potential to enhance meaning in life, giving ordinary life a sense of 
1 This article is an edited version of: Van de Goor, Jacky, Anneke M. Sools, and Gerben J. Westerhof. 2018. 
“Unraveling the Wonder of the Ordinary: A Narrative Analysis of Meaning Construction in Memories 
of Familiar Routines.” Journal of Constructivist Psychology 32, no. 3: 292-308.
272 purpose and coherence; as such being “a mechanism by which we can fulfil 
one of our deepest, most fundamental motivations –to feel as if our lives mat-
ter” (Machell, Kashdan, Short, and Nezlek 2015, 295). On the other hand, the 
recurring nature of familiar routines may just as well cause us to take them for 
granted, thereby contributing to feelings of indifference and a loss of mean-
ing and wonder. It is precisely this paradox that this article primarily explores: 
by studying the mechanisms of meaning construction –the way familiar rou-
tines become meaningful instead of meaningless –we aim to gain insight in 
the mindset of wonder.
Second, we note that familiar routines are not only of value to study the mind-
set of wonder but are also inherently part of our educational systems. Insights 
on meaning construction in familiar routines may therefore also directly be of 
value to re-enchant educational routines that have lost their vitality.
This paper builds on to a previous study on meaning construction in memories 
of familiar routines (Van de Goor, Sools, and Westerhof 2018) – a study focused 
on meaning in life and meaningful routines in general, not specifically in the 
context of educational institutions. The method and results presented here are 
from this previous study; in the discussion the insights from this generic study 
are translated to the domain of education and schooling, and to the cultiva-
tion of a mindset of wonder within this domain. In this introduction, we first 
describe the familiar routines that are the focus of this study. After this, we 
elaborate on both sides of the meaning paradox of familiar routines: on their 
potential to elicit meaning as well as to become meaningless. Finally, we intro-
duce the narrative approach we adopted to investigate this paradox, focusing 
on the way meaning is constructed in the memories of familiar routines.
Familiar routines: a description
While the meaning potential of daily activities has been recognised in various 
studies, (e.g., Machell et al. 2015; Steger, Kashdan, and Oishi 2008; White and 
Dolan 2009), here we specifically focus on familiar routines. Familiar routines 
are moments that are familiar because they are known and ordinary, i.e. “to be 
expected in the normal order of events” (Merriam Webster n.d.), and routine 
because of their repetitive nature, recurring more or less frequently over time. 
Drawing on narrative psychology, familiar routines can be classified as generic 
moments, which are distinguished from specific moments that are single-event 
and unique in their occurrence (Singer and Blagov 2000). Generic moments 
“are composed of equivalent events that repeatedly occur over time intervals 
that are not themselves part of the memory. The events blend or fuse together, 






















































273(ibid., 12). With regard to the scope of our study, we finally focus specifically on 
familiar routines in a regular, “life as usual” setting, that is not directly nega-
tive, threatening or precarious. In summary then, the familiar routines that are 
the object of this study are known and ordinary, to be expected in the normal 
order of events; they have a repetitive nature, occurring over time intervals that 
are not themselves part of the memory; and they take place in a setting that is 
not directly precarious.
The meaning paradox of familiar routines
In this paragraph, we address both sides of the meaning paradox of familiar 
routines: how they may be experienced to be meaningful and how they may 
lose meaning. First, we integrate literature from the fields of psychology, reli-
gion and spirituality in two distinct viewpoints on familiar routines as a source 
of meaning. After this, we switch to the other side of the paradox, giving a short 
overview of the way familiar routines may just as well become mechanical and 
meaningless.
After Frankl’s call for the recognition of meaning as our basic striving 
(Frankl 1969), many studies on meaning have followed, leading to a variety of 
models and definitions. Two aspects of meaning life seem particularly relevant 
in relation to familiar routines, i.e. the experience of purpose and coherence (King, 
Hicks, Krull, and Del Gaiso 2006; Martela and Steger 2016; Reker and Wong 
1988; Ryff and Singer 1998; Steger 2012). Where purpose refers to values and 
long-term aspirations in life that motivate action, coherence refers to the com-
prehensibility of life, to an implicit order that transcends chaos. 
Reflecting on the meaning of routines in relation to purpose, it is relevant 
to distinguish the ritual and instrumental function of routines. Where instru-
mental routines are utilitarian by nature, ritual routines are aimed at a higher 
purpose, e.g. the expression or experience of individual or group identity, cul-
ture, religion, spirituality or values (Heinze 2000; Hobsbawm and Ranger 2012; 
Spagnola and Fiese 2007). In their study on family routines, Spagnola and Fiese 
(2007) clarify this difference by the effect of their disruption: while disrupted 
instrumental family routines may cause a hassle, disrupted rituals threaten 
family cohesion. They note how the instrumental and symbolical, ritual func-
tion may be found together in one routine. Ganzevoort and Roeland (2014) 
exemplify this by showing how the routine of gardening, apart from its instru-
mental function, may become a devotional activity, setting the stage “to receive 
life as a gift” (ibid., 92). In education, routines as rituals are found in the form of 
celebrations, ceremonies and rites of passage, recognised as ‘reinforcing behav-
iours’ that are of value to communicate and strengthen school identity and the 



























































































274 clearly relates to the educational practice of repetition, which is taken to be the 
secret to mastery and perfection of skills (Montessori [1909] 1986).
Next, we shift our attention from routine as a purposeful practice to routine as 
an experience of coherence. Meaning may simply be experienced when life and 
the world makes sense (Heintzelman and King 2014a; 2014b). Coherence refers 
to this sense of order, of an underlying pattern beyond the factual and visible. 
It is a sense of rightness (King 2012), an experience of confidence when what 
happens is predictable and explicable (Antonovsky 1987). Coherence may be 
considered cognitively as well as spiritually: as the self-transcendent aware-
ness of the way we are part of patterns and cycles at a higher, holistic level (e.g. 
Frankl 1966; Maslow 1971; Reed 2008; Van de Goor et al. 2020).
The routines we create often follow natural cycles of life, relating to 
rhythms of the day, season, year or human life phases. As they pattern our life 
by means of expected repetitions, they provide ways to comprehend and con-
nect to life and existence (Romanoff 1998). Creating coherence is also found to 
be an important function of routines in the educational context: routines are 
mentioned to give children a sense of security and order, ‘as the children can 
anticipate what comes next’ (l’Ecuyer 2014, 4). Within therapy, coherence is also 
an orienting principle, aimed at providing structure and order in the context of 
chaos, trauma or loss (e.g. Gillies and Neimeyer 2006; Neimeyer, Herrero, and 
Botella 2006). Familiar routines may help to accept and appreciate the cycles 
of life, stimulate agency, give hope and facilitate healing (Ganzevoort and Roe-
land 2014; Imber-Black 1991; la Cour et al. 2009; Mattingly 1998). They connect 
us to traditions as well as to the transcendent meaning of our existence, to 
“something beyond the self” (Address 2005, 224).
In sum, a routine may be a rich source of meaning, an experience of purpose 
or coherence. On the other hand, a familiar routine may just as well become 
mechanical and mindless, and it may be a challenge to see the wonder in the 
familiar (Schinkel 2018).
Because of its ordinariness, its repetitive nature, a familiar routine may 
become a habit, i.e. an automatic response to a specific contextual cue (e.g. 
Verplanken and Orbell 2003; Wood, Quinn, and Kashy 2002). Though habits 
are intentional and purposeful in their origins, they lose this intentionality in 
their execution, and are performed with less awareness or consciousness, and 
less thought and emotions (Bargh 1994; Verplanken and Orbell 2003; Wood et 
al. 2002). This is more likely to happen to routines that recur frequently, for 
example on a daily basis; though we may just as well become indifferent to less 
frequently recurring routines, such as an annual family dinner. Heschel warns 






















































275pointing out how routine may become spiritual poison, as “life is routine, and 
routine is resistance to wonder” (Heschel 1976, 49).
In education, this deadening effect of routines has also been recognised; 
l’Ecuyer (2014) even mentions how routines can be problematic to children’s 
development. When there is no wonder involved in the routine, she states, 
when children perceive the routine as a mere repetition of acts without mean-
ing, it becomes alienating, and learning becomes a mechanical process. In her 
article, she quotes Thomas Moore (1997), who said that “education is not the 
piling on of learning, information, data, facts, skills, or abilities— that’s train-
ing or instruction – but is rather making visible what is hidden as a seed.”
So what prevents us from becoming indifferent to familiar routines, but 
instead causes us to value them as meaningful moments? Within the body of 
literature, several studies mention meaning construction to be a mindset, a 
deliberate focus and awareness, a passion of inquiry directed to the familiar, 
the taken-for-granted, in such a way that the extraordinary becomes visible 
within the ordinary (Bennett 2001; Vasalou 2015). This meaning-constructing 
mindset is also referred to as the mindset of wonder (Van de Goor et al. 2020; 
Vasalou 2015) or awe-based consciousness (Schneider 2004). Machell et al. (2015) 
suggest that this mindset may be stronger in the context of depression or nega-
tive events in life, as people in these circumstances might be more sensitive to 
daily events that boost meaning. The study of la Cour et al. (2009) supports this 
idea, showing how the awareness of the end of life may lead to the construc-
tion of new meanings in familiar, instrumental routines like cooking. On the 
other hand, Emmons (2000) refers to this mindset as an intelligence, a charac-
ter trait, an ability “to invest everyday activities, events, and relationships with 
a sense of the sacred” (ibid., 30). While these studies show how the meaning 
construction mindset may be related to specific contexts or personal qualities, 
we assume it to be natural to all human beings, as part of ordinary life. But how 
then does this mindset work –how does the enchantment set in? Therefore, 
we shift our attention to how meaning is constructed in memories of familiar 
routines. In the next paragraph, we introduce the narrative approach we have 
taken to answer this question.
A narrative approach to meaning construction in ordinary life
To study the meaning construction in familiar routines, we take a narrative 
approach, focusing on memories of familiar routines that are shared with oth-
ers. It has been proposed that narrative is the mode par excellence by which 
humans construct meaning (e.g., Bamberg 2012; Brockmeier and Carbaugh 
2001; Bruner 1991). Narrative psychology accepts that we live in a storied world 



























































































276 ries we exchange (Gergen 1994; Murray and Sools 2014). However, within the 
larger field of narrative inquiry, there are different approaches and conceptu-
alisations of narrative. Over the last decades, the usefulness of narratological 
and structuralist approaches to narrative for understanding storytelling in 
everyday life has been critically reviewed. For the purpose of understanding 
the way meaning is constructed in memories of familiar routines, we find the 
dimensional approach to living narrative, such as the so-called big and small 
story approach, particularly relevant (Bamberg 2006; Georgakopoulou 2006; 
Ochs and Capps 2001; Sools 2012). This dimensional approach can be taken to 
depict text sorts, to sites of locating narrative, and may be applied as an analyti-
cal lens for investigating stories. As a text sort, small stories are literally short 
in contrast to whole life stories. As sites of engagement, small stories draw 
attention to under-represented narrative activities such as tellings of ongoing 
events, future or hypothetical events, seemingly uninteresting small incidents 
and taken-for-granted truths (Bamberg and Georgakopoulou 2008). This small 
story approach is aimed at understanding those other stories “that are still in 
the fringes of narrative research” (Georgakopoulou 2007, 36), changing the 
focus from narrative as product to narration as a process (Sools 2013). Impor-
tantly, a small story approach stretches the definition of narrative, and diverges 
from the dominant focus on sequence and emplotment as key features of nar-
rative. The dimensions of this approach, on which stories may vary from big to 
small (Ochs and Capps 2001; Sools 2012) are:
• tellership: personal experience of one narrator versus shared experience by 
multiple narrators.
• tellability: the degree to which a story or incident is worth telling as judged 
by the narrator. 
• linearity/temporality: the time focus and manner of ordering in the story, 
varying from a past oriented, closed, causal path to other ways of order-
ing, including thematic and spatial orderings, and a focus on hypothetical, 
future or ongoing events.
• embeddedness: the extent to which the narrative stands on its own or is 
part of local discourse contexts.
• moral stance: the way the moral meaning of events is pieced together, vary-
ing from constant to uncertain, fluid and dynamic.
Regarding these dimensions, memories of familiar routines typically have 
both big and small characteristics. They may be small in the sense of being 
brief accounts of short incidents, rather than lengthy elaborations. They are 
typically big stories in the sense that they are retrospective accounts of past 






















































277of a linear account of how events evolve over time from beginning to middle to 
end (big story) or may be ordered differently (small). 
When it comes to the meaning paradox of familiar routines the dimension 
of tellability is of particular interest. Events become tellable when they are sig-
nificant, surprising or unusual, and worth reporting – which is typical for big 
stories. A story with low tellability will have events that are expected or taken 
for granted, they are ‘no big deal’ (Ochs and Capps 2001). In the above-men-
tioned literature on familiar routines, we find support for both high as well as 
low tellability. Familiar routines may be highly tellable because they are experi-
ences of coherence or have been created to be valuable intentional actions. At 
the low end of tellability, they are ordinary, not unique or surprising; as famil-
iar routines may be instrumental, become habitual and thereby not worthy 
of telling. Thus, the dimension of tellability seems particularly apt to address 
the meaning construction paradox of familiar routines and to gain insight in 
the mindset of wonder. In this study, we therefore use tellability as a lens to 
discover how memories of familiar routines are constructed to be meaningful. 
Method
A s mentioned, this paper makes use of data that has been collected and analysed in a previous, generic study on meaning construction in memories of familiar routines (Van de Goor, Sools and Westerhof 
2018) in a wider context than merely educational institutions. A qualitative, 
exploratory method was used to elicit memories of meaningful familiar 
routines, and a narrative analysis was performed to investigate how these 
memories become tellable.
Data collection
The memories of meaningful familiar routines in this study have been col-
lected by means of the Wonderful Life question: What if there is an afterlife? There, 
all your memories will be erased, except for one. Which memory do you choose to take with 
you to eternity? This question, derived from Hirokazu Koreeda’s movie After Life, 
has proven to be a powerful way to elicit meaningful moments that stick out in 
the evaluation of a whole life, without directing to specific types of experiences 
(Van de Goor et al. 2020). It elicits a great variety of memories of meaningful 
moments, both intentional and unintentional, special and ordinary, and in 
positive as well as negative settings. Memories describe major life events like 
marriage, death, depression, severe illness and childbirth, as well as encoun-



























































































278 meetings with family or friends. Familiar routines have been distinguished as 
a specific category of meaningful moments elicited by this question (Van de 
Goor et al. 2020). These memories, that fit the description of familiar routines 
as given in the introduction, differ from other categories as they do not form 
a contrast with the known and familiar (as is the case with memories of unex-
pected, unusual and unique moments), nor do they stick out in a negative, 
precarious setting.
The Wonderful Life question was put to people in workshops aimed at per-
sonal development. The workshops were held with a diversity of people from 
different worlds, varying from professionals in leadership training, students, 
homeless people, to women living in a women’s shelter and festival-goers. In 
the workshops, participants were asked the Wonderful Life question, after 
which they were given some time alone to choose a memory. The memories 
were then shared in the group and recorded with a data recorder. People were 
asked to recount their memory like a film clip, giving as much detail as pos-
sible, but without explaining their choice or describing the wider context in 
which the ‘film clip’ took place. The other participants were asked to listen to 
the story without intervening; only the workshop facilitator asked occasional 
questions for the purpose of clarification or to ‘zoom in’ on an essential part 
within a longer ‘film clip’. Thus, a ‘poetical space’ was created for participants 
to go back in their memory and derive meaning from it. In this way, we col-
lected a total of 116 memories of meaningful moments in sixteen different 
workshops; all of which have been transcribed and for which consent has been 
obtained. From the total dataset we selected thirteen memories in the category 
familiar routines, adhering to the criteria of familiar routines as described in 
the introduction. 
Narrative analysis
To analyse how the collected memories of meaningful routines become tella-
ble, we use the heuristic devices of evaluations and breach. Evaluations focus 
on what is mentioned in the narrative about the way the event is subjectively 
experienced by the narrator, relating to personal beliefs, desires, values and 
emotions (Bruner 1991; Fludernik 2003; Labov 1972). Both the nature (i.e. the 
tone and character) of the evaluations and their manner of appearance in a narra-
tive provide clues as to how an event is experienced (e.g.,. significant, unusual 
or surprising). Evaluations may be specifically and clearly stated, or they may be 
implied. The distinction between embedded and external evaluations (Labov 
1972) is also of interest to our study. Where embedded evaluations are descrip-






















































279external or extra-narrative evaluations are reflections by a narrator positioned 
outside the event who is commenting on the narrated situation. 
Breach as a device focuses on the structural components of the narrative. 
It refers to a disturbance or fracture with the expected, the canonical or the 
taken-for-granted, that makes it worth telling (Bruner 1986; Bruner 1991; 
Murray and Sools 2014). The breach arises out of the imbalance between two 
structural components or storyline elements that make up the narrative: the 
setting/scene (where?), agent/character (who?), acts/events (what happens?), 
means (with what help or hindrance?), and purpose/goal (what for?). It is this 
imbalance that motivates the story and makes understandable how the sto-
ryline elements are connected into a meaningful whole (Burke 1969; Murray 
and Sools 2014).
As far as evaluations are concerned, we analysed the nature of the evalu-
ations that appear in the memories and how they appear in the course of the 
moment. To this end, we first coded all explicit and implicit emotions, feelings, 
values, desires and beliefs within the narrated moment before clustering them 
into groups of similarly natured evaluations. Also, we coded the way the evalu-
ations manifest themselves in the course of the moment, discerning embedded 
evaluations from external evaluations. To discover the breach within the mem-
ories of familiar routines, we performed a storyline analysis as developed by 
Murray and Sools (2014), focusing on the above-mentioned storyline elements: 
setting/scene, agent/character, acts/events, means, and purpose/goal. First, 
each storyline element was identified and characterised, and missing elements 
were detected. Next, we determined whether a breach could be found between 
two story elements, and if so, we summarised the breach in one sentence.
In both the analysis on evaluations and breach, we critically regarded 
the influence of the researcher in her role as workshop facilitator, i.e. the 
dimension of tellership of the small story approach. Tellership describes the 
involvement of conversational partners in the process of narration. Where the 
big story approach focuses only on the main narrator, an in-depth yet decon-
textualised analysis of personal experiences, the small story approach shifts 
attention to co-construction by multiple narrators. In the analysis of our data, 
it is important to recognise that the researcher may have influenced the course 
of the narrative by intervening in its flow or by asking the narrator to zoom 
in on specific events. Therefore, our analysis focuses on the small side of this 
dimension, and interventions by the researcher have been analysed separately.
The analysis was performed by the first author of this article and then 





























































































T o give an impression of our data, we first present a general overview of the characteristics of the thirteen memories of meaningful familiar routines in our study. Next, we present our findings concerning the 
evaluations and breach, which culminated in two types of memories of familiar 
routines.
General overview
The familiar routines in our study are from nine female and four male adults, 
varying in age from mid-twenties to fifty. They all describe moments of family 
life involving close family members: parents and grandparents, partners and 
children. The narrator is never alone. Ten memories are set in or around the 
family home or the home of a family member, describing routines like family 
visits, Sunday morning hugs and frolics, coming home, and caring for children. 
Three memories are in a setting that is leisure related, describing a holiday or 
summer routine: a walk in the woods, boating and sailing. Six memories are 
childhood memories; the other seven describe routines in the narrator’s adult 
life. The descriptions tend to be short, varying from a few sentences to several 
paragraphs. All of the memories consist of positive feelings and values like 
safety, calmness, feeling connected, freedom, love, warmth, energy, flow, alone-
ness, completeness and goodness.
Finally, we look at the attributes related to purpose and coherence: ritual 
vs instrumental in relation to purpose, and patternedness in relation to coher-
ence. While all memories have been found to have ritual characteristics (e.g. 
celebrating), ten memories also feature an instrumental function (e.g. pre-
paring food). The patternedness of the memories relates to both cultural and 
natural cycles. Their recurrence varies from frequent, (the routines being part 
of daily life) to infrequent: (recurring on a yearly basis, e.g. relating to seasons 
such as summer or the Christmas holidays).
Two types of memories of familiar routines
On the basis of the analysis of evaluations and breach, two types of familiar 
routines could be distinguished in the memories: routines of transition and 
routines of harmony. Where routines of transition describe a buildup of events 
or a transformation over time from one state of being to another, routines of 
harmony describe a stable situation with solely positive evaluations. In table 
1 an overview of the frequency and characteristics of these two main memory 
types is presented, followed by an in-depth description of how these types dif-






















































281way these are co-constructed between narrator and researcher. These variations 
within and between the two types are illustrated by means of six memories. In 
order to facilitate referral, each memory has been given a number and a name.
Table 12.1  Two types of memories of familiar routines 
Memory no. Characteristics
Routines of  
transition 
5 • Transition in time, sequential buildup of events
• Evaluations
– express a polarity: two complementary or  
opposing evaluations
– emerge in the form of a transformation from one 
pole to another, sometimes higher valued pole  
(e.g. aloneness → togetherness)
• Breach
– between instrumental act and higher purpose
– temporal breach that sequentially unfolds; the 
instrumental act enables the transformation from 
one pole into another
Routines of  
harmony 
8 • Stable situation without a buildup in events
• Evaluations
– solely positive embedded evaluations, emerging 
simultaneously, in two forms:
– as a balanced polarity between two  
complementary or opposing evaluations or  
poles (e.g. safety ↔ freedom)
– only one single positive evaluation
– contrast may emerge between embedded  
evaluations and external evaluations
• Breach
– may be implied between instrumental act and 
higher purpose
– non-temporal breach: the instrumental act  
enables (opposing) evaluations to emerge  
simultaneously
Routines of transition
Memories of this type describe the transformation from one state of being 
to another, often a more favourable state. These memories contain multiple 
actions or events in a clear sequence, resulting in a change or transformation. 
Looking at the nature of the evaluations and their manifestation in the course 
of the moment, we see how they appear as a polarity, i.e. two evaluations or 
poles that are complementary or opposite to each other. Examples of polarities 
that we have found are seriousness and playfulness, togetherness and auton-
omy, and reality and possibility. In memories of routines of transition, these 
poles appear sequentially, one evaluation transforming into another. In the 





























































































1. Coming home (male respondent, middle aged)
The image or the film clip I see… It is a gentle day, a weekday. I am riding my bike 
home from the station… after work. My girlfriend has a cottage-like, little white 
house. I arrive home, put the bike in the shed, open the door, and… I’m just received 
with so much warmth… And yes, that is what I want to take with me. A, yes, just a 
harmonious and respectful relationship.
Facilitator: So you enter the house, can you describe that?
Yes, that’s hugging, and just, a lot, talking through the things of the day. And then 
together, being together. And that…. Yes it just feels so full of love…
Facilitator: And what if we have to shorten the film?
The part where I come home. The memory I want to take with me is that lovingness.
Facilitator: How do we see that in your film?The moment I enter the house.
Identifying a breach always involves some degree of interpretation, but the 
relative brevity and sparsity of the memories made breach identification in this 
study particularly challenging. Sometimes storyline elements were missing or 
only described very briefly. However, despite these difficulties, we were able to 
identify a breach in all memories describing routines of transition, and more 
importantly the breach was consistently found between the acts and purpose.
In memory 1 (Coming home) for example, we have defined the breach as 
“finding love (purpose) by entering the house (act)”. This breach was detected 
in the following way, taking into account the co-construction of the narrated 
memory by researcher and narrator. In this memory, “receiving the warmth” of 
“a harmonious and respectful relationship” is initially constructed as desired 
result or purpose, but it is not entirely clear what it contrasts with. Is it the 
situated possibility of receiving warmth, the lack of access to this specific rela-
tionship, or the unavailability of other potentially warm relationships? In the 
first part of the excerpt, the narrator sets up a series of seemingly mundane acts 
(riding his bike home, arriving home, putting the bike in the shed, opening 
the door), which at the same time suggest anticipation. Here, the seemingly 
ordinariness and instrumentality of the acts are in contrast with the meaning 
and value found in the result of this action: in the warm welcome, the love and 
harmony (purpose). The researcher then zooms in by asking the narrator to 






















































283not explicitly mentioned. The intervention is successful in that it elicits a more 
detailed account of the desired result, which gives further clues about what is 
so meaningful about that moment: “Yes, that’s hugging, and just, a lot, talking 
through the things of the day. And then together, being together. And that…. 
Yes it just feels so full of love…”. We learn in more detail about what constitutes 
“warmth” for him, e.g. “hugging”, “talking through the things of the day”, 
togetherness and a feeling “full of love”. Next, the researcher requests to ‘zoom 
in’ by asking the narrator to shorten the film. The narrator then chooses “the 
part where I come home”, thereby specifying the essential part of the memory: 
“that lovingness”. In response, the facilitator asks, “how do we see that in your 
film?”. In the narrator’s reiteration of “the moment I enter the house” as the 
final act, we find extra support for the defined breach between act and purpose; 
the act transforming the situation to the desired state. 
Although a completely different memory in terms of content, the breach 
in memory 2 (Raising the sail) is technically similar: a breach between act and 
purpose. We identified a breach between the utilitarian act of hoisting the sail, 
and the higher purpose experienced as a result of this: experiencing freedom 
and autonomy. In this memory, there is no co-construction between narrator 
and researcher that helps to define the breach, but we see how the narrator 
herself “zooms in” and highlights the essence of the moment by saying “rais-
ing the sail, yes, that moment”. Similar to memory 1, Coming home, memory 
2 features a simple act that serves as a transformative moment, leading to the 
higher purpose.
2. Raising the sail ( female respondent, middle aged)
My moment, well, imagine, I… I have a boat. And I am on this boat, it’s a sailboat, 
about 11 metres long. My family is on board, two daughters, my husband. And… we 
are going on holiday, and then we... usually, when the weather is good, we set onto 
the ocean, so it’s clear blue weather, and there’s a nice breeze. We navigate into the 
sluice here in IJmuiden, and after that the sluice opens, the sail is raised. You can 
hear the seagulls and feel the sun. And the… the moment the motor is turned off, that 
is the moment I would like to take with me. You know, just the sail, and me at the 
rudder, and the rest, well, yes they’re on board, but that’s of secondary importance. 



























































































284 Finally, as the examples above illustrate, we have found the breach in memo-
ries of routines of transition to emerge in a temporal way: the higher purpose 
emerges as a result of the instrumental act, after the instrumental act has fin-
ished. It is a breach that sequentially unfolds, the instrumental act enabling the 
transformation from one evaluation or pole into another.
Routines of harmony
Memories of this type describe a moment of harmony or wholeness: a stable sit-
uation that contains solely positive evaluations. Typical for these memories is 
that there is either only a single act/event, or multiple events that do not build 
up to a certain point. In the memory 3 below, In the meadows, this is the act of 
playing in the fields. With regard to the nature of the evaluations in routines 
of harmony, we found that the evaluations within one memory often express 
a polarity, as in routines of transition. In memory 3, we see a polarity between 
connectedness (safety, calmness, connection to each other and the land) and 
autonomy (playfulness, freedom from the rest of the world):
3. In the meadows ( female respondent, mid-twenties)
I choose the moment that I step out of the car with my two sisters and my father, at 
one of our meadows, cornfields, at the end of a beautiful summer day. It’s twilight 
and still comfortably warm, the atmosphere is calm and safe. Going with my father 
to see how the grasslands and corn were doing at the end of the day became a weekly 
habit during the summer months. We would spend time playing calmly in nature, 
wearing a dress and boots, surrounded by the sounds of grazing cows, a summer 
breeze, humming insects, the car radio in the background. The feeling of connection to 
each other, to the soil that my parents worked, and freedom from the rest of the world. 
I think I was around eight years old.
With regard to the manifestation of the evaluations in the course of the moment, 
we found the evaluations or poles to emerge simultaneously in the memories of 
this type. As there is no temporal buildup of events in the memory, there is 
also no temporal buildup in the evaluations. In memory 3 (In the meadows), 
we see how autonomy is experienced at the same time as the connectedness to 
each other and the land. However, it was not possible to find a polarity in every 
memory, as the descriptions were generally very short. In these cases, the evalu-
ations seem to come together in one positive evaluation, e.g. happiness, as we 























































4. Frolicking ( female respondent, mid-forties)
I have a very short memory. I am in bed with my family, with my husband and 
children. And they are frolicking delightfully. And… the, the love and happiness is 
overwhelming. And I am just enjoying that very much. Yes. That’s the memory I 
want to take with me.
The results described above relate to the embedded evaluations within the mem-
ories: the evaluations in which the narrator takes position within the event. 
These were all found to be merely positive evaluations. However, in several 
memories that also contain external evaluations, a contrast emerges between 
the embedded and external evaluations, i.e. evaluations in which the narrator 
is positioned outside of the event, reflecting on the moment. While the embed-
ded evaluations are all positive, the external evaluations have a different tone. 
This becomes clear in memory 5 (Together on the boat), in which the external 
evaluations are underscored. While the embedded evaluations are all positive, 
an experience of togetherness, they form a contrast with the external evalua-
tions that emphasise how this togetherness is not to be taken for granted, and 
is absent in the here and now, in which the narrator is alone.
5. Together on the boat ( female respondent, middle aged)
I just had a very happy childhood. And I was lucky to have that, because many chil-
dren do not have happy childhood memories.
Facilitator: Can we cut to one scene in that childhood movie?
Well yes, that I am an only child, and I have... yes, a father and a mother. I lost them 
both at a very young age… And the part before that I want to keep with me very 
much. I don’t know how clear I have to be about that, but yes, I just think that is very 
precious, that I just, experienced that so preciously.





























































































Well, that’s difficult, everything was beautiful. Oh yes, that the three of us, my 
father, he was a carpenter, and he had made a boat, a rowing boat. And well, us three 
being on the water. […] That’s it actually, those were very beautiful moments, that 
boat with the three of us in it. And well, I would really like to keep that memory. The 
three of us being together.
Facilitator: And what happened there?
 Yes, having fun, my father went fishing, I went swimming, I helped my father take 
the fish off the hooks and… throw them back into the water. And, and my mother she, 
yes, she was also with us, pleasantly, and she also went swimming with me,…  
and yes…
In this memory, the contrast between the embedded and external evaluations 
is clearly a result of the co-construction between narrator and researcher. We see 
how the researcher asked the narrator to ‘zoom in’ on a specific moment in her 
childhood: “Can we cut to one scene in that childhood movie?” and later: “Can 
you choose a specific event within that period?”. From the answers to these 
questions, we learn what was so meaningful in the childhood of the narrator, 
i.e. being together with her parents: “us three being on the water”, “those were 
very beautiful moments, that boat with the three of us in it”, “The three of us 
being together.” The probing question “And what happened there?” prompts 
the respondent to elaborate on the setting and acts that contribute to this 
togetherness: father, mother and daughter each doing their own thing, and 
also engaging in each other’s activities: “my father went fishing, I went swim-
ming, I helped my father take the fish off the hooks and… throw them back into 
the water. And, and my mother she, yes, she was also with us, pleasantly, and 
she also went swimming with me.” While this “zooming in” by the researcher 
has elicited these embedded evaluations, the narrator herself “zoomed out”, 
positioning herself outside the event and reflecting on her childhood, which 
led to the underscored external evaluations that emphasise the absence and 
unusualness of togetherness in the here and now. It is through this combina-
tion of zooming in and zooming out that a contrast emerges.
Finding a breach in memories of routines of harmony was even more chal-
lenging than in routines of transition; these moments generally being even 
more compact. However, in several memories of this type a breach between the 
same storyline elements as in routines of transition may be implied: between 
a simple, instrumental act and a higher purpose. In the following memory, 6 






















































287breach ‘connecting the hearts (purpose) through reading a story (act)’. While 
the purpose is quite clearly mentioned by the narrator (“that moment of con-
nection, with... with my heart and their hearts”) and highlighted through the 
sentence “realising yes, this is what it is all about”, the act is only briefly named 
(“I am reading to them”) thereby possibly pointing to its smallness:
6. Storytime ( female respondent, middle aged)
I’m sitting in my youngest son’s room, he is 18 months old, and... my other son is also 
sitting on his bed, he is three years old... It’s after dinner, they both have taken a bath, 
they’re in their pyjamas, and I am reading to them. And… that moment of connec-
tion, with... with my heart and their hearts, and realising yes, this is what it is all 
about. That’s what I want to take with me.
Other than in memories of routines of transition, we have found the breach in 
memories of routines of harmony to be solely structural and not temporal. In 
memories of routines of harmony, the instrumental act and higher purpose 
that constitute the breach emerge simultaneously – when the act stops, the 
higher purpose stops as well. In memory 6, Storytime, the heart of the mother 
and the children’s hearts are connected in the process of reading. 
Conclusions and discussion
H ow do we see the extraordinary within the ordinary? In this study we investigated the mechanisms of meaning construction in memories of familiar routines as a means to gain insight into the mindset of 
wonder. A distinction was found between routines of transition and routines 
of harmony. In memories of routines of transition, meaning construction is 
evidently related to the process of change: to the temporal transformation of 
evaluations within the memory, and to the contrast between the small, instru-
mental act and the higher purpose of the routine. In these routines, this breach 
sequentially unfolds; the co-construction between researcher and narrator 
helping to zoom in on this breach. Routines of harmony are stable, solely posi-
tive moments without a buildup in events. Our findings show how memories 
of these routines may be constructed to be meaningful through the simultane-
ous emergence of contrasting, complementary evaluations within the routine. 



























































































288 the memories, memories of routines of harmony may also be constructed to 
be meaningful through the co-constructed combination of zooming in and 
zooming out, i.e. valuing the specific memory against a wider, contrasting con-
text. Though less clear than in memories of routines of transition, in memories 
of routines of harmony a similar contrast may be implied between the small, 
utilitarian act and the higher purpose of the routine. 
From these general insights on the mechanisms of meaning construction in 
memories of familiar routines, we now zoom out to the purpose of this study 
and ponder on how these mechanisms may be employed to cultivate a mindset 
of wonder in education. First of all, routines of transition show us the value 
of being aware of transformations, of changeovers between one state of being 
and another. Routines of transition in this way may be seen as miniature rites 
of passage within ordinary and everyday life. Looking at educational institu-
tions, there are multiple examples of grand rites of passage, such as graduation 
or end-of-schoolyear ceremonies, and they are acknowledged for their value in 
reinforcing a culture for learning (Hobby 2004). But what about the cultiva-
tion of transitional routines to mark the smaller changes within the weekly or 
daily school cycle? What about rituals to mark the transition between courses, 
between activity and rest, between different forms of learning? A mindset of 
wonder may be cultivated by highlighting the different states of being and the 
different values that are inherent to the daily routines of the educational sys-
tem.
Next, we look at routines of harmony. The narrative approach has shed 
light on the paradoxical, simultaneous appearance of opposing values and 
truths within familiar routines, thereby deepening insight in the way harmony 
or wholeness may be experienced. Though the fact that the analysis was per-
formed on generally short memories raises questions about the validity of this 
finding, the awareness of this resolution of opposites – referred to in Maslow’s 
later works as dichotomy-transcendence (Maslow 1971) – is a promising field 
for further study in relation the field of wonder and meaning. Where tradi-
tional education is typically focused on either-or thinking with single, right 
answers to questions, i.e. the ‘known information question’ (Hicks 1995), the 
cultivation of a synergetic and-and mode of thinking, stimulating the search 
for alternative possibilities and opening up to a multi-layered reality, is an 
opportunity to be explored. This idea aligns with Miyazaki’s (2013) plea for 
teachers to ‘give up being the adult who knows better’ (ibid., 120) and cultivate 
the ‘unknown question’, which makes the familiar seem strange and stimulates 
exploration.
Alongside these insights, our study has pointed to the value of zooming in and 






















































289and between its instrumental and ritual function. Creating contrasts helps us 
see routines in a different, more meaningful light, with simple, instrumental 
acts of ordinary life as ‘gateways to meaning’. Reflecting on this insight from 
the perspective of education, zooming out may be an important skill for teach-
ers in creating a meaningful learning environment. For education, too, has the 
risk of disenchantment, and a focus on the instrumental aspect of learning 
may lead to a neglect of the higher purpose that it serves. It may offer a solu-
tion to the alienating effect of educational routines that l’Ecuyer (2014) warns 
against, as they may be perceived as mere repetitions of acts that seem to have 
no meaning. For what would happen if we strengthen the connection to the 
higher values that teaching serves? If teachers cultivate reading as a gateway 
to freedom, writing as a gateway to self-expression, and knowledge of history 
as a gateway to compassion? While in story 1 (Coming home) the door literally 
opens to warmth and love, education opens doors to development and growth. 
However, students will not see this wonder when teachers zoom in on the door, 
but only when they zoom out to the world behind it, to the world that this door 
leads to. 
Awareness of everyday rites of passage, cultivating paradox, zooming out 
to the higher purpose of instrumental acts – our study shows how the mindset 
of wonder comprises at least these three elements. In this discussion we have 
given some examples of the way these insights may be put to use in educational 
institutions. But of course, education may also be referred to in a broader sense: 
as lifelong learning, personal development and ‘Bildung’. How the results of 
this study may be translated to education in both of these senses constitutes a 
valuable field for further exploration.
Reflecting on our method, we align with the small story approach, agreeing 
that there is a great challenge to create a space for telling seemingly ordinary 
experiences (e.g., Sools 2012). As an intervention, the Wonderful Life question 
has proven to fulfil this need, highlighting not only the unique or extreme as 
meaningful, but also the small and ordinary. Additionally, its dual temporal 
focus is of interest, as it entails both an orientation to the past (a memory) as well 
as to the future (the afterlife). The Wonderful Life question as an intervention 
thereby relates to “the generation of a discourse of desire, that is, a discourse 
that creates images of a future that nurtures hope, excites and entices” (Gergen, 
2006, 173). As such, the Wonderful Life question in itself is of value as an educa-
tional practice. While storytelling has been widely recognised as an important 
educational tool (e.g., Abrahamson 1998; Hobby 2004; Mello 2001), this study 
points to the specific value of storytelling in stimulating a mindset of wonder 



























































































290 stories of meaningful moments by means of the Wonderful Life question – or 
a similar question.
Utilising this question as a means to gather data allowed us to collect 
familiar routines that are extremely meaningful: the Wonderful Life question 
sends us ‘on holiday’ (Freeman 2006) and activates a process of reflection. How-
ever, the lack of extra contextual and evaluative information in the data have 
restricted the scope of reflection on the construction of meaning. Addition-
ally, we are uncertain whether our dataset contains sufficient memories for a 
saturated analysis, which leaves open the possibility that there are other ways 
of meaning construction in familiar routines than in the two types we have 
found. 
Although our study on meaning construction in familiar routines raises 
new questions and is open ended, it provides deeper insight into the mech-
anisms of the mindset of wonder – insights that may be used to cultivate a 
mindset of wonder in education, and to re-enchant classroom routines that 
have lost their vitality.  For, while routine may be spiritual poison that kills 
wonder, the opposite is true just as well: routine can be a spiritual potion that 
brings alive wonder and unveils the meaning of everyday life.
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13  Stimulating Children’s Sense 
of Wonder via ‘Communities  
of Dialogue’: Case Studies from  
a Local Library84
Mihaela Frunză, Liana Precup, Sandu Frunză 
Introduction and context
S everal studies show that processes of learning in both children and adults are enhanced when a form of inquiry-based learning is being used, which in general includes an element of ‘wonder’ (Pedaste et al 
2015; Alfieri et al 2011). In a meta-analysis of 32 studies that describe inquiry-
based learning, Pedaste and his collaborators note that wonder can be located in 
the ‘investigation’ phase of inquiry-based learning, among other processes the 
authors identify.2 (Pedaste et al 2015, 52). In an attempt to operationalise ‘won-
der’, Gilbert (2013) and Santi (2007) have described the following components: 
the ability to ask questions; to actively search for answers; to evade control and 
predictability; to find not ‘the correct’ answer, but answers for which one may 
find reasons; originality; creativity. In our empirical part of the article, we will 
use this list in order to illustrate children’ appropriation of wonder. 
The openness of children towards discovering the world through question-
ing can be explained in several ways. One of them is that the age of childhood is 
often considered as the age of big questions and great discoveries, both of them 
being associated with the perpetual stage of wonder and fascination, which 
the child experiences on a daily basis in her life journey. The wonder and fas-
cination that manifests in the child in the face of daily problems is part of the 
1 Acknowledgments. MF and LP are especially grateful to the participants at the international conference 
Wonder, Education, and Human Flourishing (Amsterdam, April 5-6, 2019) for their helpful comments and 
suggestions. MF wishes to acknowledge the support of Babes-Bolyai University in participating in 
the conference and writing this article, through the form of an internal Grant for Supporting Com-
petitivity, AGC no. 30419/28.01.2019. All authors are grateful to the anonymous reviewers who helped 
clarify their intentions and refine their final text. 
2 The other processes mentioned by the authors are: “‘resources’, ‘accessing data of their choice to 
address the question’, ‘sign system exploration’, ‘create’, ‘generate’” (Pedaste et al 2015, 52).
297human way of being in the world. The attempt to decipher the immediate facts 
of life through clarifying the world’s mysteries is an intrinsic part of the human 
condition. This attitude can suggestively be described by what Mircea Eliade 
calls the orientatio (orientation) phenomenon. Eliade assumed that there are 
two phenomena connected to the vertical situatedness of human beings. On 
the one hand, humans organise their entire existence around themselves, by 
placing themselves in the centre of a symbolism that provides consistency to 
the whole universe. On the other hand, during this process humans acquire the 
feeling that they are beings in a universe they perceive as infinite, and which 
they interpret with fascination and an attitude that we can consider as similar 
to wonder, as it is a fundamental attitude towards existence (Eliade 1978, 3). 
Eliade associated these feelings with the experience of the sacred, but we want 
to associate them with the wonder that humans have as an existential attitude, 
as an experience of thinking, as an initiation tool into the dynamics of life. 
Therefore, we situate this intrinsically human way of relating to the world in 
the very sphere of philosophical wonder.
Yet another fundamental landmark of the history of philosophy is that 
of Jeanne Hersch, who stated that “Wonder is an essential component of the 
human condition” (Hersch 1994, 6). We always try to get out of the box in terms 
of the convenience of thinking and place ourselves into a sphere where we 
ruminate about the most simple problems that torment, provoke and fascinate 
us, as beings situated in a world that conceals the mysteries to the same extent 
as it makes them known. This is an experience associated with knowledge, 
creativity and an authentic way of being in a world. We can therefore explain 
the fact that, through the lens of the history of ideas, we appreciate wonder as 
a fundamental human experience. This privileged status of wonder, as part of 
the creative attitude of humans, can be understood through Hersch’ claim that 
“[e]ach of us possesses, strictly speaking, one’s own philosophical experience: 
each time we are supposed to take an important decision we ask, often without 
realizing, philosophical questions. Five-year-olds ask philosophical questions; 
the same is valid for fifteen or sixteen-year-olds” (Hersch 1994, 6).
Stolberg (2008) describes three basic sources of wonder – physical, personal 
and metaphysical. The last one can be “prompted by any type of interaction, 
but the wonder evoked goes beyond a reflection on the original stimulus” 
(Stolberg 2008, 1960). Metaphysical wonder is mostly explored in the litera-
ture of ‘philosophy for children’ (P4C), a branch of applied philosophy that 
attempts to cultivate various competences in students at pre-university level. 
These competences range from logical and conceptual abilities pertinent to the 
development of critical thinking to building self-esteem, various degrees of 













































































298 within a community (Lipman 2003; Worley 2011; 2012; Wartenberg 2013; 2014; 
Buckley 2011). Our hypothesis is that, if we are to cultivate these competences, we should 
place a great deal of emphasis on stimulating students’ wonder.
Philosophical debates with children may follow multiple aspects:
1.  The first one aims to cultivate a particular type of thinking “that is generated 
by a specific form of rational conceptualization developed on epistemologi-
cal operationalization of wonder and doubt as research engine” (Santi 2007, 
110). It associates wonder with critical thinking and its orientation towards 
participants’ attitudes that are open towards dialogue.
2.  Another aspect of philosophy for children is what Peter Worley calls its 
‘transformative power’: the ability of philosophy (in general) and phi-
losophy for children (in particular) to change the normal things and 
concepts surrounding us and see them from a different (and to some extent 
enhanced) perspective, without modifying them in a physical way. We 
believe P4C is also capable of transforming the participants to dialogue: 
both children and facilitators are enriched after the P4C sessions and their 
values and attitudes become more open, tolerant and critical. This special 
type of interaction has been revealed by Worley, when he states: “I like to 
think that philosophy has an alchemical power and, just as the alchemists 
of old believed that one could change base metals into gold, the philosopher 
has the power to change the banal into something sparkling with interest, 
revealing a wonder about things towards which wonder may have been lost, 
even for the teacher too.” (Worley 2011, 50).
3.  A third aspect that is fostered through the interactions in the sessions of the 
philosophy club is participants’ (particularly children’s) autonomy. Chil-
dren are usually considered as not-entirely-autonomous participants to 
dialogue; nevertheless, they are undergoing a growth process that includes 
their autonomous faculties. By being themselves immersed in the dialogue 
with their peers and facilitators, children are able to reproduce and reflect 
on this dialogue in themselves (by developing their inner dialogue), which 
contributes to the development of their moral autonomy (Sprod 2001).
To better describe our own approach in P4C and to give a more accurate name 
for what we do in Cluj with the children participating in our workshops, we 
have coined the term ‘community of dialogue’ (CoD). However, there are sev-
eral approaches that are traditionally used in P4C. The main concepts that are 
used to describe the approach of working with children include: ‘Commu-
nity of Inquiry’ (CoI – Lipman 2003, Sharp and Reed 1992) and ‘Philosophical 
Enquiry’ (PhiE – Worley 2012). Each has their own merits, which have been well 






















































299The CoI places together the facilitator and the children in an attempt to foster 
children’s ability to formulate questions that are increasingly deep, considerate 
and philosophical, and to encourage them to find answers that are justified, 
reasoned and collaborative. PhiE gives the facilitator the prerogative of asking 
philosophical questions and guide children in finding connecting and coher-
ent answers. However, both approaches have, in our view, some limitations: 
CoI may often end up in repetitiveness, and children’s questions and answers 
may not always be as philosophical as intended by the facilitator (Shapiro 2012; 
Lewis 2011). While PhiE does a better job in enabling and directing a philosophi-
cal conversation (Frunză 2019), its content remains and its success is (mainly) 
evaluated according to the standards of analytical philosophy, leaving outside 
some values and standards that are closer to continental philosophy.
The Community of Dialogue (CoD) does justice to the type of conversation we 
engage in with children during our meetings, and establishes the standard we 
attempt to look towards, even if in practice it is only rarely fulfilled – not only 
in philosophical conversations with children, but among philosophers them-
selves: that of (Socratic) dialogue. By referring to and integrating the ideas of 
several authors that we particularly cherish (namely Martin Buber and Emma-
nuel Levinas), we also attempt to open our dialogues with children towards 
the values of continental philosophy that we aim to infuse in our contribution: 
those of tolerance, of openness, of seeing the world through the eyes of the 
Other(s)3.
The Community of Dialogue (CoD) values both the mutual recognition that 
participants in a dialogue owe to each other and the face-to-face relation that 
makes this recognition simultaneously functional and transforming. On the 
one hand we claim, as does Buber (1970), that placing children inside the dia-
logic relation brings about a valorisation of the reflections that are found inside 
the questions each participant asks for themselves and for the others. The dia-
logical relation also brings with it recognition of the quality of the meanings 
in the answers searched for in common, as possible solutions to the problems 
discussed.
This integration of each participant in the unity between question and 
answer determines that each member of the philosophical community resig-
nifies both the content and the meanings of the texts discussed through 
dialogue. We mean that the face-to-face dialogue, through the lens of a mutual 
3 These values that we attribute to the tradition of continental philosophy are constantly emphasised 
during the P4C sessions through the attitude and behaviour of the facilitators: they must remain 
supportive of children, constantly encourage them to pay attention to what the others say, establish 














































































300 recognition of each other’s intrinsic value, contributes to the development of 
a reflective community capable of reaching sophisticated argumentation and 
useful conceptualisation for the philosophical endeavour. The presence of the 
other as a Face, in the way Levinas understood it (Levinas, 1969), opens the dia-
logue towards embracing an alterity that can be expanded from the authentic 
relation of a dialogue between an ‘I’ and a ‘You’ towards a community of dia-
logue. Dialogue places us in a face-to-face relation not only among ourselves, 
but also towards the problems we wonder about, and the problems we attempt 
to clarify and find answers to. We therefore reach a manner of entering the 
game of dialogue and of philosophical reflection.
Methods and data collection
W e used as method what Stake describes as an ‘instrumental case study’ (2000). This is a qualitative approach that is oriented by the type of data we were able to collect. Our data includes, on the one 
hand, 19 reports of several monthly P4C sessions in which the researchers par-
ticipated during 2018 and 2019, 16 of them taking part in one of the branches of 
the local library, three of them in a classroom. After each meeting, the facilita-
tor recorded the most important details of the session using a template. 
Each report recorded the number of children who attended each session, 
the materials used, the plan of the session, and any interesting answers given 
by the children that the facilitator remembered. Reports also included photos 
of the whiteboard (especially of concept maps, inquiry plans, results of voting, 
children’s arguments) and a section for the children’s feedback (if solicited and/
or offered at the end).4 
On the other hand, we add the qualitative analysis of a sample of sessions (4) 
conducted by the researchers during February 2019 and March 2019. This sam-
ple of sessions was audiotaped and transcribed, and subsequently analysed in 
order to study the wonder-related elements. All 23 (19 + 4) sessions were carried 
out at one of the five branches of the local library of our city, or at a high school 
from Cluj; they were attended by children (5 to 13 years old) who were either 
regular participants in the Philosophy Clubs for Children organised by the 
researchers at the library, or first-time participants of a demo workshop in P4C.
4 As a general unwritten rule, we always try to include a feedback slot at the end of a session; either 
via open discussions or through post-its; sometimes, due to external reasons (the room needed to be 
vacated and the children had to leave) there was no time to register their feedback, which is why it is 






















































301The stimuli used in all 23 sessions (19 for which we analysed the reports and 
four that were audiotaped) were either literary stories that were recommended 
by P4C practitioners such as Thomas Wartenberg, or stories specially written by 
P4C practitioners who designed them to facilitate philosophical dialogue (for 
instance by Peter Worley, Jason Buckley or Tom Bigglestone), plus a non-verbal 
stimulus. All texts were translated to Romanian. As we asked the children to 
read them aloud and to take turns in reading them, we used Bigglestone’s sug-
gestion to use alternating bands of colour to facilitate taking turns reading the 
sections and ensure flow (Bigglestone, 2018).
The stimuli used in the audiotaped sessions were three stories invented 
by authors who also design P4C sessions: “What color are the feathers on my 
head?” (Jason Buckley 2011) “The Ceebie stories: Friends” and “The Ceebie sto-
ries: The Tony Test” (Peter Worley 2011). 
The first story is one connected to knowledge. “What color are the feathers 
on my head?” is a story of a young penguin that has recently grown up and is 
unsure whether the feathers on the top of his head are black (like those of his 
peers) or grey (like when he was little). Not being able to reach a conclusion, he 
searches for different ways to find a valid answer: through observation, asking 
others’ opinions, induction, deduction.
The second story is on friendship. “The Ceebie stories: Friends” analyses 
the relationship to objects and things and compares it with the relationship 
with human beings. “Friends” is a story of a boy, Jack, who doesn’t have many 
friends. Jack considers books his friends, but this doesn’t convince his father, 
who owns a robot company. Jack’s father comes up with the idea to build a robot 
that can be Jack’s friend, maybe along with the books. Jack likes the surprise his 
father made for him, as Ceebie can download anything from the Internet and 
he is also able to have any kind of discussion with Jack. So, they spend a lot of 
quality time. In the meantime, Jack has made a human friend at school, Tony, 
who makes him laugh all the time. Jack decides to show Ceebie to Tony, but 
Tony is jealous and says that Ceebie can’t be a true friend because he is “made 
of plastic and metal and nuts and bolts”.
The third story is on what defines personhood: “The Ceebie stories: The 
Tony Test” (a story inspired by the famous mathematician and computer scien-
tist Alan Turing). Tony suggests to Jack that they perform a test to see if Ceebie 
is a true friend. Ceebie will be connected to a computer at Tony’s house. Tony 
will also connect a person to the same computer, but Jack won’t know who it is. 
Jack then has to have a conversation with both of them to guess who he thinks 
it is, a robot or a human being. Tony says that if Jack can’t tell the difference, 
the test proves that Ceebie can think; and if Ceebie can think, he must be a real 













































































302 These three stories are examples of philosophical children’s stories about 
important topics: how we can be sure of what we know, or what could be the 
relation between humans and robots? The stories encourage the children to 
wonder and have therefore been selected.
Results and discussions
Analysis of the 19 sessions
The 19 meetings took place between March 2018 and May 2019. They were facil-
itated by either the two authors (S1-S7, S9, S14, S16, S18-S19), other colleagues 
(S8) or students (S10-S13, S15, S17) enrolled in the Philosophy for Children uni-
versity course, taught by one of the researchers. The main elements are found 
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304 The number of children who participated in the 19 sessions varied between 5 
and 30; their age ranged between 5 and 13 years (most of them being between 8 
and 12 years). The stimuli used were either literary stories (S1-S3, S5, S7-S8, S11-
S12, S16) or specially written philosophical stories (S4, S9-S10, S13-S15, S17-S19). 
One session included non-verbal stimuli, namely two pieces of music (Fantasy 
on a Fugue by J.S. Bach and the famous John Cage’s 4’33”). Apart from the dia-
logues around the stories, some sessions included other activities (games, ice 
breakers, props, watching a short movie, etc.).
For the qualitative analysis of both the reports and the audiotaped tran-
scripts we used several strategies of operationalisation of wonder, such as: the 
ability to ask questions, the ability to actively search for answers to the ques-
tions, the ability to evade control and predictability, the skills to find not ‘the 
correct’ answer, but answers for which the proponent may find reasons, and 
other features such as originality and creativity (Gilbert 2013, Santi 2007).
In the last column of the table, we recorded the frequency with which such 
elements of operationalised wonder were likely to be found during the dia-
logue with children. When less than half of the participants were able to show 
these elements of wonder, we termed this ‘few’ in the table, with their number 
in parenthesis; where more than half of the children displayed these elements, 
we entered ‘many’, also indicating their number; and finally, where above 80% 
of children displayed these elements, this was included in the table as well.
From the analysis of Table 1 – in particular cross-tabulating the last col-
umn and columns nos. 3 (type of session), 4 (number and age of children) and 
6 (type of stimulus) we can note the following: when the children were used to 
P4C sessions and not first-time participants to demo sessions, their predispo-
sition to display wonder-related elements increased. Also, during the regular 
meetings of the philosophical club, the age range of children varied more than 
in the case of school students who attended the demo sessions together with 
their classmates. This could also have a beneficial influence on the quality of 
philosophical dialogue, since a greater variety of ages implied a greater variety 
of experiences and consequently a greater diversity among the opinions they 
provided during the sessions. We have to emphasise that these characteristics 
are related, so it is not possible to distinguish the influence of each of these 
individually.
One last note is related to the type of stimulus used (literary vs specially 
written by P4C practitioners). While sessions that circled around specially 
written philosophical stories do seem to engage more children and stimulate 
their wonder (see in particular S13 and S14), some literary texts also seem to do a 
great job (see esp. S3, S5, and S17, where almost all the children participated and 






















































305a systematic study has yet to be conducted to validate this claim, our current 
experience seems to indicate that a greater variety of stimuli (using both liter-
ary stories and specially written philosophical ones) contributes to a greater 
extent to the development of wonder-related abilities in children.5
Audiotaped sessions
Qualitative analysis of sessions, focusing on wonder-related elements
In this part, we provide and analyse some textual examples of verbatim quotes 
from the children that we took from all the sessions, and in particular from the 
audiotaped ones. The data was explored qualitatively; two researchers inde-
pendently assessed the transcripts and identified the wonder-related elements, 
5 We have used the same type of inference as that of Wartenberg (2013). He claimed that, the same 
way that adult students react differently and are stimulated differently by various philosophical sub-
disciplines – such as ontology, aesthetics, ethics, metaphysics, etc. – children are also likely to react 
differently to these topics: some are going to be more responsive to metaphysical dilemmas, and some 
to ethical ones. Wartenberg’s advice was to include as many philosophical subdisciplines as possible 
in a P4C module. Although we have not properly tested this hypothesis in a controlled experiment, 
we have noted that different children react to different topics that are embedded in various philo-
sophical subdisciplines, and in the long run, more children participated in a P4C module if more 
philosophical subdisciplines were included. The same seemed to be valid for philosophical vs literary 
stimuli: different children reacted to the topics and a greater part of children were involved during 









































































































































































306 which were grouped according to the categories below. The quotes show the 
way in which children demonstrate all the elements that we pinpointed inside 
the general category of ‘wonder’, namely: the ability to ask questions, to actively 
search for answers for the sessions; to evade control and predictability; to find 
not ‘the correct’ answer, but answers for which one may find reasons and argu-
ments; originality; creativity (Gilbert 2013, Santi 2007).
The ability to ask questions 
Some P4C methods are especially designed to increase children’s abilities to 
generate questions – for example, Lipman’s (2013) followers include special 
intervals during the sessions when they ask children to ask questions, and in 
particular philosophical questions. Those questions are sorted using, most 
often, the question quadrant (Cam 2003) and the question with the most votes 
is discussed during the investigation. During several sessions the facilitators 
used this method (S2, S7, S11), and it is no coincidence that these were the ses-
sions where the most children asked interesting questions.
Table 13.3 Examples of the ability to ask questions
Session Ability to ask  
questions - examples
Comments
S2 “What does  
Something look like?”
One character of the story “Tree of wishes”, when 
asked about his wish, does not want a specific 
thing, but “Something”. He receives something that 
has no shape or form. The child asked about the 
properties of Something unspecified. 
S2 “How has the leaf 
understood how many 
sweets are required to 
make someone sick?”
Another character from the same “Tree of wishes” 
wants to eat as many sweets as to become sick of 
it – a wish that is finally granted. The child inquired 
about the specificity of the wish – how come the 
magic object knew the exact quantity of sweets 
that would make someone sick?
S7 “How come the  
characters of the story 
do not hear us all the 
time?”
In the story “We are in a book!” the characters 
interact with the readers, as if they know how the 
readers will act. The child logically extended the 
inquiry to the possibility that the characters would 
hear readers all the time.
S11 “How many years does 
childhood take?”
When discussing “The Little Prince”, the children 
wondered about what distinguishes a child from 
a grown-up person; and one of them asked this 
general question about childhood.
S16 “I don’t understand: 
how can a dragon 
travel around the 
world in 10 seconds?”
During the session on “The Princess and the  
Dragon”, one of the children considered the story 
is weird because of this fact. Although it is not 























































307The ability to evade control and predictability 
One longer example from A2 in which children display this ability is when they 
easily brought into discussion the friendship with different other inanimate 
objects, like books, or animate but non-human creatures, like pets. As Worley 
(2011) also emphasises, the idea that one can befriend a robot is not a very intui-
tive one; however, from the examples below we can see the children are ready 
to explore many aspects of this idea and establish unusual connections:
Facilitator: Why do you think the robot can be a real friend to the child or to any 
person?
Child 1: Because… robots and people, even if they are different, they still can play 
together.
Child 2: I was thinking… The boy can learn a lot from the robot and the robot can 
learn from the boy, so they can be good friends. (…)
Child 3: Me? I have a LEGO robot… actually I want to build one and I think it’s very 
cool to play with little robots, especially because some of them can do things or take 
things and you can use them for different stuff. (…)
Child 4: Me? … I guess it’s cool to have a little robot. Whatever is it made of, LEGO or 
anything else, because you can use it for many different things. (A2)
During session A4, some children think it doesn’t make sense for a robot to 
play games:
Child 2: I think it’s a human being, because a robot can’t have personal interests or 
preferences. It’s a robot, it doesn’t have free time. It shuts downs when Jack is not 
there, and it turns on and speaks to him when he’s back. Therefore, it makes no sense 
to be a robot, and if you compare the answer with the previous one, the other one 













































































308 Also during A4, finding themselves in the situation of not finding other 
arguments, children surprised the facilitator by searching arguments in the 
following part of the story:6
Child 2: No child would answer ‘I’ll be your friend’, instead he or she would say  
‘Yes’, or ‘OK’.
Child 3: For Ceebie it’s normal, because he’s programmed.
Child 1: Or it could mean ‘I’ll continue to be your friend’.
Facilitator: Anyone wants to plead for a human answer?
Child 2: Only for the next test.
Facilitator: You’ve already read the next test?
Child 2: Yes. (A4)
Also, children dismissed the idea the answer can be given by a robot, because of 
the words used: “I adore them!” Interestingly, these were not the exact words 
used in the test, this was a quote made from memory by a child, who possibly 
distorted things to help prove his or her argument. The discussion about play-
ing against a computer was very interesting:
Facilitator: Have you ever played games?
Children: Every day!
Facilitator: Sometimes you play against a friend, sometimes against the computer, 
right? … That proves a computer can play, right?
Child 1: Yes!
Child 2: No, it’s programmed, it’s not because it chooses to play, and it’s not a robot, 
it’s part of the game.
6 Worley (2011) specifically recommends for this story to be read in sequences, and we have followed 
his suggestion, by asking children to stop reading at intervals and focus on what they have just read. 
However, some children disobeyed this request and continued reading to see how the story ends. In 























































Child 3: Yes, because a robot playing a game would probably mean a robot, with a 
console in his hanwds, looking at the screen and playing. 
Child 4: A robot would think very strategically and would never let the players win.
Facilitator: Do you think so? You’ve never won from the computer?
Child 4: Oh yes! (A4)
When discussing the story “The Princess and the Dragon”, one of the children 
was unhappy with the end of the story because the prince should have said 
“Thank you” for being saved instead of arguing about how the princess is 
dressed (S16).
The ability to actively search for answers in the sessions
During session A4, a very interesting topic brought up by the children was 
common sense:
Child 3: I think robots, even if they aren’t human inside, they can still be friends.
Facilitator: You think they can be friends. Why do you think that?
Child 3: Because… A robot, even if it has no heart, it has a common sense. (…)
It’s not clear from the children’s answers if they meant to call a robot ‘he’, ‘she’ 
or ‘it’ as in Romanian one can use only the verb, and it’s the same verb for all 
three forms. So we chose to use ‘it’ in the translation because it’s a bit more 
neutral, but we are aware it could be wrong and they may have meant ‘she’ or 
‘he’. We continued trying to define common sense for a robot.
Facilitator: What do you think is common sense for a robot?
Child 1: I know!
Facilitator: Tell us if you know!















































































Child 3: Common sense means to be respectful to others …
Child 4: For robots, common sense or respect for others means to respect a set of rules 
that you have in your database.
Facilitator: So common sense means to respect a set of rules that everybody respects 
you to respect? (A4)
We could spend a whole new session on defining common sense for humans 
and robots, and on clarifying the differences between them. For some children, 
common sense means to display behaviour as dictated by human norms and 
values, for others it means a set of programming language commands. The 
meanings for ‘common sense’ in Romanian and English do not overlap, so some 
of the meaning of the answers given by the children may be lost in translation.
The group of children who believe that a robot cannot be a true friend pre-
sented these kinds of arguments:
Child 2: Robots are friends only because they are programmed to be, they don’t choose 
to be friends (…) Therefore you are never sure they can be friends, therefore they are 
not quite true friends, because it’s programmed. (A2)
In session A2, the children made it easy: the first criterion for calling someone 
a friend is to play or be able to play with them (e.g., to play outside or go swim-
ming, ). (Obviously, the latter activity is not suitable for robots.) When put to 
the vote, most children opted for the ability to play.
When things were unclear, children tried to get to an answer:
Facilitator: So, analysing the criteria, can we say that a book is a true friend?
Some children: No! 
One child: Yes, some books help us develop!























































311In session A4, the discussion after the first test centred on the words used. In 
response to the question of who gave the answers, a robot or a real person, the 
children said:
Child 2: Ceebie, because the answer is too automated, like from a dictionary …
Child 1: I also believe it’s Ceebie, because of the robotic answers and because he knows 
Jack and he probably realised it’s Jack (in the other room). …
Child 4: I believe it’s a robot, because it says we know each other, but Jack doesn’t 
know who’s there. No human would say ‘Because I’m familiar and helpful and 
because we have a bond of mutual affection.’ And how could Jack know who is there 
and why it likes him. (A4)
In the workshop that started with the story “The Princess and the Dragon”, 
children attempted to define what constitutes a princess and constitutes a 
prince. They found things in common, like playing the piano or riding a horse. 
(S16)
In response to the question “What kinds of presents should we buy for chil-
dren? Is it important to respect the rules about presents for girls and presents 
for boys?”, the children concluded we should buy a present that she or he likes, 
since every child is different. (S16)
The ability to find not “the correct” answer, but answers for which one may  
find reasons
In session A2, we discussed children’s friendship with books. According to the 
children, books could go outside or be taken outside but, contrary to the robot, 
they can’t play “They can’t play ping-pong or football…”. Children were trying 
to find more details for a definition of a true friend:
Facilitator: What else comes to mind when you think about friendship?  
What, other than what Tony said, defines a friend?
Child 7: It means you know a person, and that person plays with you and you  
don’t get bored…














































































Child 10: They cheer you up…
Child 2: They help you.
Child 5: They behave nicely…
Child 1: They love you. They help you forget when you miss someone …
Child 14: They are civilised.”
Facilitator: What else? …
Child 3: We should like them!
Child 4: They should be about the same age.
Child 9: They should help you when you need help. (A2)
Together with the children, we made a list of criteria that a true friend would 
have. The facilitator wrote the criteria on the whiteboard and continued to 
discuss different forms of friendship using these criteria. The first type of 
friendship that was discussed was friendship with pets: pets play with chil-
dren, children never get bored with them, pets love children, pets are civilised 
(if you train them), children like pets, children and pets are not necessarily the 
same age (but this did not matter to the children).
We also discussed Ceebie, the robot, and how the defined friendship criteria 
applied to being friends with Ceebie. Ceebie plays with children, children are 
not bored with it, it helps the children a lot, cheers them up, loves children, is 
good with children, is civilised, and could be the same age “if it is programmed 
to say I am 10 years old” (A2). The moderator noticed that the children’s non-
verbal behaviour (e.g., gestures and facial expressions) seemed to indicate that 
they value friendship with Ceebie more than friendship with books or pets. to 
value 
In session A4, the children gave reasons like: “It doesn’t make sense to be a 
robot because a robot wouldn’t compare playing with speaking, because they 
can’t really play” (A4).
During the discussion about Tony’s tests, we analysed the knowledge of 
the robot. The first opinion that was expressed was that a robot knows every-
thing, but then another child said a robot only knows as much as the person 
who programmed it. If connected to the Internet, the robot has access to more 
knowledge. The children then brought the discussion back to the topic of 






















































313ings, which caused some contradictory views. Then we compared robots with 
humans: can humans programme their feelings? Children discussed the idea 
of liking someone. To some extent, we ‘programme’ ourselves to fall in love 
by taking note and focusing on a person’s qualities. Also, we can ‘programme’ 
ourselves to learn for an exam because we know that a good grade will make us 
happy, so we learn, even if we don’t feel like it. Sometimes, external help is good 
in cases where we try to teach our mind to like someone. We might ask a friend 
about all the qualities of the person we are trying to like. (A4)
We talked about having affection for people and the possibility of robots 
experiencing affection. Again, the children responses varied from from a clear 
“Yes”, to “Ehm, not very personal” or “Not really, because the robots don’t have 
feelings”. Other answers included: “Not the same feelings like humans do” and 
“If he’s programmed, he can imagine how it would be to have feelings for a per-
son”. The next part of the discussion was about robots wishing to be human. 
Children had examples from Wall-E and from real life (Sophia, the famous 
robot activated in 2016). We continued with the question “What does it mean 
to have feelings?”
Child 3: To feel something for someone.
Facilitator: What exactly, can you provide more details?
Child 3: Love, jealousy, hate…
Child 6: I don’t know, when you like something it’s happiness.
Child 1: When someone hits you it’s sadness, pain, when you don’t like something  
it’s disgust…
Child 2: When someone is made for you. (A4)
Creativity/originality
Analysing different types of friendship using the criteria established with the 
children in the workshop based on the story “Friends: Can a robot be a true 
friend?”, the children said the following things about friendships with books: 
books don’t play with children, some children are bored with books, some 
aren’t, books don’t love children and can’t be good to them, books are civilised 
because writing is civilised. (A2)
We discussed Tony’s opinion that creations made of plastic, metal, nuts and 













































































314 ments to the fore, from “Nevertheless, it’s metal, and metal hardly brakes” to 
“Metal could become rusted and the bolts would loosen up, and it wouldn’t 
be…”. Some solutions they came up with included:
Child 12: Well, you could go to a mechanic and have it repaired before it totally 
brakes.
Child 1: Metal becomes rusted, people could become ill. It’s the same thing.
Child 5: And children could become ill, then they stay at home and can’t go outside in 
the park with you.
Child 13: Well, in this case you could take the robot!
Children: Hahaha.
Child 13: Or you could stay at home. (A2)
In session A4, children identified the answer “I will see if I can help” and dis-
cussed it at length. They considered it a human answer, because robots know 
whether or not they can help. Other children thought it had to be a robot, 
because children don’t help other children with their homework. During the 
discussion, they learned there are children who help other children with their 
homework, because of the responses provided by some of the children. Others 
believed the answer might have been given by a teacher, as it’s too grammati-
cally correct for a child. (A4)
Then the discussion reverted to feelings, where one of the children switched 
from a figurative meaning of the expression “to be made for someone” to a lit-
eral meaning:
Facilitator: OK, so we saw what feelings are. Can a robot have feelings?
Child 1: Well, Ceebie was made for Jack.























































O ur analysis of the P4C sessions in Cluj has shown us that wonder – operationalised as described by Gilbert (2013) and Santi (2007) as the ability to ask questions; to actively search for answers; to evade con-
trol and predictability; to find not ‘the correct’ answer, but answers for which 
one may find reasons and arguments; originality; creativity – does facilitate 
children’s development in critical thinking, has transformative power and can 
cultivate autonomy in the encounter of alterity, including the radical alterity 
provided by robots and/or technology. The analysis of the data gathered during 
our research indicates that children benefit from continuous participation in 
P4C sessions and improve their abilities to ask questions, question assumptions 
and think collectively. They challenge themselves in finding creative answers 
to questions, escape control and predictability, and continuously improve their 
disposition to think critically and arrive at reasonable and justified answers. 
Our analysis shows that these competences progress during children’s contin-
ued participation in P4C sessions.
These competences are also important from the perspective of cultivating a 
reflective attitude that we can associate with philosophical wonder. Thus, the 
basic elements of orienting themselves towards the world (Eliade 1978) and of 
cultivating wonder as an essential part of our humanity (Hersch 1994) become 
visible through our analysis. Wonder brings about the need to integrate in a 
‘question/answer’ paradigm, and therefore into a dialogic relation (Buber 
1970). Wonder supposes a form of communication that opens us to others, on 
various levels of existence. One of the most important roles of wonder is that 
it triggers the mechanisms required for integrating into a community of dia-
logue.
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O ne of the vexed questions in the philosophy of wonder and indeed education is how to ensure that the next generation harbours a sense of wonder. Wonder is important, we think, because it encour-
ages inquiry and keeps us as Albert Einstein would argue from ‘being as good 
as dead’ or ‘snuffed-out candles’ (Einstein 1949, 5). But how is an educator to 
install, bring to life, or otherwise encourage a sense of wonder in his or her stu-
dents? Biologist Rachel Carson suggests that exploring nature and specifically 
undertaking walks along the rocky coast of Maine would keep alive a person’s 
inborn sense of wonder (Carson 1984). Philosopher Jesse Prinz thinks that 
exposure to art will encourage wonderment because artworks, as he puts it, 
are “inventions for feeding the appetite that wonder excites in us” (Prinz 2013). 
Weird fiction (a subgenre of speculative fiction) – and in particular the work 
of one of its greatest exponents, the early-20th-century American author How-
ard Phillips Lovecraft – is likewise a catalyst for wonder. The reason behind 
this is that Lovecraft’s ‘wonder-stories’ are densely packed with wonder per 
design; and in support of this claim I shall in what is to come 1) provide a brief 
introduction to Lovecraft and weird fiction; 2) present a working definition 
of wonder; and 3) clarify what is meant by something being ‘densely packed 
with wonder’ via bringing to the fore evidence of Lovecraft’s literary wonder-
mongery. The paper ends with some reflections on the notion of ‘dark wonder’, 
why this peculiar label might be suitable for the kind of wonder we find in 






























Lovecraft and weird fiction
H oward Phillips Lovecraft was born in 1890, in Providence, Rhode Island, on the American East Coast. He was born into a wealthy fam-ily but ended his relatively short life in genteel poverty at the age of 
46. Despite his brief life Lovecraft produced a staggering amount of literature 
in the form of poetry, fiction, essays and letters of which the latter amounts to 
a number between 80,000 and 100,000 (Joshi 2003, 30). Thus, in terms of letter 
output alone, Lovecraft beats the prolific philosopher Bertrand Russell who 
produced approximately 40,000 letters in his lifetime (Monk 1996, xvii), which 
in and of itself is almost an unfathomable feat.
Figure 14.1  Howard Phillips Lovecraft in 1934. 
Photograph by Lucius B. Truesdell
Lovecraft died in 1937 believing himself an underachiever if not a total failure, 
and literary critic Edmund Wilson, who in his 1945 article in The New Yorker 
“Tales of the Marvellous and the Ridiculous” labelled him a hack, somewhat 
confirmed this assessment (Wilson 1980). However, like philosopher Friedrich 
Nietzsche and fellow writer and connoisseur of the extraordinary and fantastic 
Edgar Allan Poe, Lovecraft has achieved unquestionable posthumous fame and 
today he is celebrated as an inspiration for everything from alcoholic beverages 
to blogs, books, clothing lines, films, graphic novels, music, plays, podcasts, 
320 role-playing, and tabletop and videogames. Numerous Lovecraft biographies 
have emerged since his early demise, counting among them Sprague L. de 
Camp’s prominent H.P. Lovecraft: A Biography, Michel Houellebecq’s influential 
H.P. Lovecraft: Contre le Monde, Contre la Vie and S.T. Joshi’s two-volume tour de 
force I Am Providence: The Life and Times of H.P. Lovecraft. Likewise serious schol-
arly research into Lovecraft and his work has surfaced and is continuing to 
grow in the 21st century. Worth mentioning in this regard is the work of phi-
losopher Graham Harman who views Lovecraft as a writer of gaps between 
objects and their qualities, linking him to Speculative Realism and the Object-
Oriented Ontology model (Harman 2008, 333-364; Harman 2012, 4). Literary 
scholar Eugene Thacker’s work on ‘life’ and how it poses a problem for phi-
losophy, together with his work covering the ‘horror of philosophy’, is likewise 
connected to the writings and outlook of Lovecraft (Thacker 2010; 2011). Fur-
thermore, periodicals such as Lovecraft Annual edited by S.T. Joshi also propel 
Lovecraft scholarship forward.
That Lovecraft is a force to be reckoned with in our modern times is also evi-
dent from the fact that his work has been translated into multiple languages, 
including Danish, French, German and Japanese. In addition, one might also 
point out that Lovecraft enjoys the eponymous adjective ‘Lovecraftian’ and 
that Necronomicon – an annual conference, taking place in Providence, Rhode 
Island – together with the S.T. Joshi Endowed Research Fellowship, connected 
to the John Hay Library at Brown University, where the world’s largest collec-
tion of H.P. Lovecraft materials are kept, are both dedicated to him.
Now, Lovecraft published his fiction more or less exclusively in American 
pulp magazines of the 1920s and 30s, including Astounding Stories, Weird Tales 
and Wonder Stories, and his writing is roughly speaking designed to evoke either 
terror, horror or wonder in the reader (Pedersen 2017, 23). Terror, horror and 
wonder are extraordinary states of mind that we don’t experience all the time, 
but instead are rare and distinct. Naturally, this makes them interesting and 
important for the ‘weird’ tale which, according to Lovecraft’s essay “Supernatu-
ral Horror in Literature”, must hold:
a certain atmosphere of breathless and unexplainable dread of outer, 
unknown forces (…); and there must be a hint, expressed with a seriousness 
and portentousness becoming its subject, of that most terrible conception 
of the human brain – a malign and particular suspension or defeat of those 
fixed laws of Nature which are our only safeguard against the assaults of 






















































321Although undoubtedly best known for his tales of terror and horror, Lovecraft 
kept a close relationship with wonder throughout his life, despite the fact that 
he lived in an age where wonder, due to the advancement of science, had suf-
fered hyperbole, ridicule and been reduced to a sentiment for the naïve and 
foolish (Pedersen 2017, 25).
Lovecraft was of a particular sort. He was, as the Germans would say, ‘wun-
dersüchtig’, meaning roughly that he had an affinity for the supernatural or 
that which lies just beyond our senses. Lovecraft writes:
Pleasure to me is wonder – the unexplored, the unexpected, the thing that 
is hidden and the changeless thing that lurks behind superficial mutability. 
To trace the remote in the immediate; the eternal in the ephemeral; the past 
in the present; the infinite in the finite; these things are to me the springs of 
delight and beauty. (Lovecraft 2006, 53)
The citation bears witness to Lovecraft’s Romanticism and poetical acumen 
and it is clear that he views wonder as something positive.1This is underlined 
in a letter Lovecraft sent to his friend August Derleth, in which he passionately 
wrote:
The one great crusade worthy of an enlightened man is that directed against 
whatever impoverishes imagination, wonder, sensation, dramatic life, and 
the appreciation of beauty. Nothing else matters. (Lovecraft 1965, 208)
Lovecraft’s inclination towards Romanticism is evident from reading these 
lines. However, there is one element that disturbs the flow of things, namely 
the term ‘enlightened man’. On the face of it, the choice of the term and the 
dramatic outburst on what is important in life, i.e. the fight against anything 
that impoverishes imagination, wonder and so forth, are an odd coupling. It 
leaves us to ponder what exactly Lovecraft meant by ‘enlightened’. What could 
he possibly have had in mind if not the scientific views of the Enlightenment 
period, which as it were stand in opposition to the Romantic thoughts he advo-
cated? This is a difficult question and cannot be answered in full here but I 
am inclined to think that he, like the Romantic poet Percy Shelly, embraced 
scientific thought as well as the language of the heart in a self-styled rebellion 
against the wonderless zeitgeist of his age.
1 For more information on Lovecraft’s Romanticism see my article: “Howard Phillips Lovecraft: 




























322 What is wonder?
T error, it might be ventured, is a state of mind we experience when bodily injury likely to cause death is close at hand, and horror is the state of mind we experience if our life-world is suddenly threatened 
or destroyed. Wonder is more complicated and thus it is a state of mind that 
has received many definitions throughout the ages. Plato famously stated in 
the Theaetetus that wonder is the feeling of the philosopher, and French phi-
losopher René Descartes believed wonder to be the first of all the passions 
(Descartes 1986, 53). My own somewhat prosaic definition goes like this: ‘Won-
der is a sudden experience that intensifies the cognitive focus and awareness 
of ignorance about a given object’ (Pedersen 2017, 25; Pedersen 2019, 1). Adding 
to the definition one might argue that wonder is typically an unsettling yet 
delightful experience – and something perhaps we ought to seek out.
Lovecraft the wonder-monger
L ovecraft certainly sought out wonder, and particularly wonder trans-mitted through literature, because during his childhood he spent much time reading books of marvels such as The Arabian Nights, Haw-
thorne’s Wonder Book and Tanglewood Tales, The Arabian Nights, and the travel 
literature of Marco Polo and Sir John Mandeville (Pedersen 2017, 26-27). These 
sources together with the works of literary thaumaturge Lord Dunsany later 
inspired Lovecraft to write his own wonder stories – stories littered or densely 
packed with wonder-evoking tropes that play to the imagination, producing 
small sunlit windows in the mind of the reader through which a larger world 
becomes present.
To provide further insight into how a weird story can be densely packed 
with wonder, let us now explore four types of wonder-evoking tropes that 
Lovecraft frequently made use of in his fiction.
Trope 1: Deliberately vague and suggestive writing
Lovecraft had an affinity for overusing adjectives and if there ever was a master 
of vagueness and suggestion, Lovecraft is truly a worthy candidate for the title. 























































323It had been an eldritch thing (…). So little is known of what went on 
beneath the surface – so little, yet such a ghastly festering as it bubbles up 
putrescently in occasional ghoulish glimpses. (...) And inside that rusted 
straitjacket lurked gibbering hideousness, perversion, and diabolism. 
Here, truly, was the apotheosis of the unnameable. (Lovecraft 1925)
Even if one understands every word of the above sentences, reading them tends 
to make the reader feel rather thick headed because, despite his use of guid-
ing adjectives such as ‘eldritch’, ‘ghastly’ and ‘ghoulish’, it is hard to pinpoint 
exactly what Lovecraft meant to communicate. He goes to great lengths to 
explain just how dire things are but without really revealing what is amiss. 
This is a clever stylistic move in a weird tale, because it induces wonder in the 
reader, who becomes aware of his or her ignorance concerning the matter at 
hand. It is also commensurate with Lovecraft’s notion of how a weird story 
should be crafted. He writes:
Atmosphere, not action, is the great desideratum of weird fiction. Indeed, 
all that a wonder story can ever be is a vivid picture of a certain type of human 
mood. The moment it tries to be anything else it becomes cheap, puerile, and 
unconvincing. (Lovecraft 2004, 177)





























324 Weird fiction relies on vague and suggestive writing for it to work its wonder 
and leans heavily on the Baconian idea of wonder as broken knowledge. As a 
rule, it does not deal in explanations because explanations are the great neu-
traliser, the very antidote to wonder. Weird fiction, in other words, breaches 
gaps. The only way an explanation can be used effectively in a wonder story 
is if it is but a small piece of a larger puzzle of unknown shape or form. Dark 
corners or unknown regions simply must be present for it to work.
Trope 2: Between worlds
Lovecraft’s wonder stories are often escapist in nature. They have a hint of the 
fanciful and draw the reader into a wondrous atmosphere of mysterious, far-
away places not unlike the ones we find in medieval travel literature.
The stories usually revolve around a sensitive poet-like protagonist who is 
tired of life’s trivialities. The person is ghostlike, alienated, with one foot in our 
world and the other in what Lovecraft labels ‘the Dreamlands’, which is a part 
of reality accessible only to a sensitive few in Lovecraft’s fictional universe. One 
of these sensitive few is Lovecraft’s alter ego Randolf Carter, a character who 
features in several wonder stories, including “The Silver Key”, where we find 
the following peculiar passage:
When Randolph Carter was thirty he lost the key to the gate of dreams. 
Prior to that time he had made up for the prosiness of life by nightly excur-
sions to strange and ancient cities beyond space, and lovely, unbelievable 
garden lands across ethereal seas; but as middle age hardened upon him he 
felt these liberties slipping away little by little, until at last he was cut off 
altogether. (Lovecraft 1929)
The citation reveals a protagonist twice burdened. Prima facie Carter is tor-
mented by his prosaic life, which makes him a Lovecraftian pendant to the 
ennui-hunted Byronesque Romantic or the pleasure-seeking Kierkegaardian 
aesthete. Painful as this may be, he is on top of that distressed about his lost 
ability to enter the Dreamlands – an extraordinary world he has confirmed 
the existence of a posteriori. Consequently, he stands between worlds not only 
because such worlds actually exist in Lovecraft’s universe, but because he pre-
fers the world of the Dreamlands, which is now painfully out of reach. Thus 
the Dreamlands effectively becomes a paradise lost – a place of wonder that is 
either like Arcadia impossible to explore because it is evermore unreachable, 
or the utopias of Plato or St. Augustine’s that, although realisable in theory, 






















































325The ‘between worlds’ trope is also used in Lovecraft’s prose poem Celephais 
where he writes:
There are not many persons who know what wonders are opened to them 
in the stories and visions of their youth; for when as children we listen and 
dream, we think but half-formed thoughts, and when as men we try to 
remember, we are dulled and prosaic with the poison of life. But some of us 
awake in the night with strange phantasms of enchanted hills and gardens, 
of fountains that sing in the sun, of golden cliffs overhanging murmuring 
seas, of plains that stretch down to sleeping cities of bronze and stone (…) 
and then we know that we have looked back through the ivory gates into 
that world of wonder which was ours before we were wise and unhappy. 
(Lovecraft 1920)
In this passage we hear more about the Dreamlands but we also learn that, 
according to Lovecraft, we tend to lose the ability to wonder when we grow 
up. For some, adulthood equals becoming wise and unhappy, but wise and 
unhappy are not immediately natural bedfellows. What Lovecraft could have 
in mind here is the more or less stoic outlook many develop in later years. Love-
craft harboured a fierce aversion towards stoicism, mainly because stoicism 
goes against wonderment and portrays the world as disenchanted (Pedersen 
2018, 169; Pedersen 2019, 23-24; Quinn 2002, 100-103). The tranquillity of mind 
that stoicism offers as a path to happiness is rooted in pantheistic metaphysics, 
claiming that the universe is material and equals one living being that can be 
addressed as either God or nature. Such a worldview leaves no room for other 
worlds; and escape, as it were, is impossible – and this Lovecraft could not toler-
ate. It was simply too bitter a pill to swallow for a ‘wundersüchtiger’ gentleman 
like himself.2
Trope 3: The lonely protagonist
Lovecraft’s wonder stories tend to centre on a lonely figure that is waiting or 
longing for something beyond what normal human life can provide. We find 
such a character in the opening of Lovecraft’s short story “The White Ship”:
I am Basil Elton, keeper of the North Point light that my father and grand-
father kept before me. Far from the shore stands the grey lighthouse, above 
sunken slimy rocks that are seen when the tide is low, but unseen when the 
2 For more information on Lovecraft’s aversion towards stoicism see my essay ‘Howard Phillips Love-




























326 tide is high. Past that beacon for a century have swept the majestic barques 
of the seven seas. In the days of my grandfather there were many; in the 
days of my father not so many; and now there are so few that I sometimes 
feel strangely alone, as though I were the last man on our planet. (Lovecraft 
1919)
The strange, lonely setting, together with the somewhat contemplative mood 
of the protagonist, adds to the wondrous atmosphere, because such a character 
in such a place is both frightening and fascinating. Frightening because most 
of us have a hard time being alone, particularly for prolonged periods. Fasci-
nating because we naturally ask ourselves: how does he endure it? What is his 
secret?
Trope 4: Mixing reality and fiction
In his fictional work Lovecraft deliberately mixes reality and fiction to plant 
a sense of wonder in the reader. Many of his stories are set in real cities such 
as Boston, Providence and New York, but equally many are set in fictional 
New England towns such as Arkham, Innsmouth, Dunwhich and Kingsport. 
Together they form what may be called ‘Lovecraft Country’, a place where real-
ity and fiction blend together – a place ripe for wonder and wonders.
Lovecraft’s constant blending of real and fictional does not only apply to 
settings. Many of the scholarly professor-type heroes in his stories at some 
point stumble upon a library extraordinaire, and what makes these libraries 
special is that some of the books – although old and obscure – are recognis-
able to the informed reader, such as James Frazer’s The Golden Bough, Geber’s 
Liber Investigationis, Margaret Murray’s Witch Cult in Western Europe and Roger 
Bacon’s Thesaurus Chemicus. However, Lovecraft has a habit of casually adding 
fictional books such as Abdul Alhazred’s Necronomicon; Ludwig Prinn’s De Ver-
mis Mysteriis or the Pnakotic Manuscripts to the arcane collections. The result is 
wondrous as the informed reader suddenly feels less informed, bordering on 
ignorant, because what lore do these books contain, who were their authors 
and how does one get hold of the books?3
3 It has to be said that with the Internet at our disposal finding out that these ancient tomes are fic-
tional is relatively easy nowadays. However, when I began reading Lovecraft as a teenager the Internet 
did not exist and my access to the English-speaking world, including English literature, was rather 
limited. This resulted in (much to my embarrassment today) years of wondering about the status of 























































S o much for wonder-evoking tropes. I will conclude the paper by addressing the idea of ‘dark wonder’ in relation to Lovecraft, and offer some reasons why I think weird fiction can be edifying.
Dark wonder is something that comes up every now and then in the literature 
on wonder. If we look to the work of psychiatrist Paul Fleichman, we see that 
he relates the term to the character Ishmael, the fictional narrator in Herman 
Melville’s Moby Dick. Here, wonder is the salvation for the unshored modern 
mind because it encompasses violence, cruelty, destruction and annihilation 
(Fleischman 2013, 362-363).
Dark wonder also features in Casper Henderson’s A New Map of Wonders 
where it is associated with the mental darkness or aporia we experience upon 
considering the nature of black holes. A black hole emerges when a star much 
larger than our own sun turns supernova and its core collapses inwards and 
becomes a singularity – “a region in space where matter is infinitely dense 
and space-time infinitely curved” (Henderson 2017, 64). The monstrous gravi-
tational pull of a black hole allows nothing to escape, not even light, and 
because of the sheer power of the thing one would think that ‘awe’ would be 
the appropriate response. After all, ‘awe’ is strongly connected with terror, fear 
and majestic powers beyond our control (Pedersen 2019, 39). However, ‘dark 
wonder’ is also quite fitting in relation to black holes because there is much 
uncertainty surrounding them – an uncertainty that cuts deep into the realm 
of physics, exposing the division on the nature of black holes between support-
ers of the theory of general relativity and advocates of quantum theory.
Now I should think it fitting to use the term ‘dark wonder’ in relation to 
Lovecraft too, and the reason for that is twofold.4 Firstly, Lovecraft’s stories 
usually end in madness or death. In a traditional hero’s journey, the protago-
nist may go through many trials but at the end of it all he or she will emerge 
triumphant and all is well. Lovecraft does not offer that and the typical Love-
craftian protagonist usually finds himself on an endless ghost train ride or in 
a ‘Hotel California’-type situation, where you can check out any time you like, 
but you can never leave.
4 It is possible that Lovecraft himself would have approved of the term because in his 1927 novella 
The Dreamquest of Unknown Kadath, published posthumously by Arkham House in 1943, he mentions 





























328 Secondly, Lovecraft’s cosmic indifference permeates most of his stories. Earlier 
I presented an excerpt from one of Lovecraft’s letters to August Derleth, but I 
left out what follows more or less immediately afterwards:
And not even this really matters in the great void. But it is amusing to play 
a little in the sun before the blind universe dispassionately pulverises us 
again into that primordial nothingness from whence it moulded us for its 
second’s sport. (Lovecraft 1965, 208)
The last sentences bear witness to Lovecraft’s view of the world as completely 
indifferent to how our lives play out, but coupled with the first two sentences 
in the earlier quotation a certain defiant Romanticism emerges, celebrating the 
use of imagination and the significance of the person of feeling and action. 
Thus ‘dark wonder’ understood in view of Lovecraft’s weird fiction, and espe-
cially his wonder stories, should not scare us away despite its undercurrent of 
gloom. It should be studied as it kindles our metaphysical imagination in the 
wake of a confrontation with a hitherto unknown reality involving mad gods, 
inter-dimensional beings, human fortitude and perhaps most unsettling of 
all, human frailty. One might attempt a rebuke by interjecting that ‘dark won-
der’ is but an unnecessary compound word, possibly invented to make horror 
sound nicer and wonder less naïve, or perhaps just to make wonder encompass 
more of the territory usually affiliated with horror. This may be, but Moby Dick, 
black holes and Lovecraft’s weird fiction hint to us that there is an extraordi-
nary state of mind that is neither horror nor strictly speaking wonder but close 
to both. ‘Awe’ seems a worthy candidate for precisely such a state. But although 
fear is clearly present in Lovecraft’s fiction, awe’s other companion, ‘terror’, is 
seldom there and thus something is not quite right. Admittedly, ‘dark wonder’ 
is a somewhat weird label. However, it may be easier to digest if one imagines 
a circle with a fine split in it. At one end is horror, you go around the circle to 
wonder and on the other end of the circle, close to horror yet not horror, is dark 
wonder.5 
Myths and stories are composed of wonders, as Aristotle tells us (Metaphys-
ics Book 1, 982b; Aristotle 1998, 8-9), and when we actively study them we are 
in effect exposing ourselves to wonders and indeed the experience of wonder. 
Reading Lovecraft’s weird fiction has the same effect, because it is the kind of 
literature that makes us traffic in cosmology, engage with fundamental ques-
5 The image of the circle with a thin split is borrowed from psychiatrist and early LSD researcher Sid-
ney Cohen who, in the 1987 BBC documentary entitled The Beyond Within – the Rise and Fall of LSD, 






















































329tions about the nature of reality and what is really important for us human 
beings. The wonders found in Lovecraft works can be edifying partly because 
they exercise our imagination in an unusual way, making us imaginatively fit 
and rich in perspective. Naturally, such enrichment does not entail that we take 
on board his position of cosmic indifference or believe in the existence of, for 
example, the Dreamlands. Merely considering such ideas brings about the edi-
fying and perspective-enriching effect. 
I co-teach an elective course ‘Existential Themes Through the Prism of Pal-
liation’, and during this course my students work with a Lovecraft prose poem 
entitled Ex Oblivione, which means ‘from oblivion’. The poem revolves around 
a nameless narrator who, coming near the end of his life, loves the irradiate 
refuge of sleep because via sleep he can escape the prosiness of life and enter 
the Dreamlands, where he wanders through old gardens and enchanted woods 
finding a little of the beauty he had sought in life.
Some of my students report that they are quite touched by the tenderness 
of Lovecraft and the images his poem conjures up, while others express they 
feel better prepared for work in palliative care after having read and discussed 
Ex Oblivione. Although working with poetry such as this is unusual for my stu-
dents it is my belief that it trains their sensibility and ability to put themselves 
in another person’s shoes. It requires intense work of the imagination and a 
willingness to engage with wonders. Lovecraft’s work definitely helps in that 
respect as his weird fiction is a catalyst for wonder, precisely because it is loaded 
with wonder – whether dark or not – and wondrous by design.
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